Full Text
W.P.(CRL)3035/2015& Crl. M.A.I8644/2015
J J V MARKETING&HOTELSPVTLTD & ORS
Through Mr.V.P.Rana,Adv. Petitioners
Through Mr.Piyush Singhal,Adv.for Mr.Ashish Aggarwal,ASC.
Insp. Anil KumarPS EOW Mr.Dharamveer Singh,Adv.for R2.
DILBAG SINGH Petitioner
Through Mr.V.P.Rana,Adv.
Through Mr.R.S.Kundu,ASC with Mr.Vishesh Wadhwa,Mr.Ankit Gulia
& Mr.Anil Kumar,Advs. Insp. Anil KumarPS EOW
RAM KISHAN SHOKEN
Through Petitioner Ms.Anupriaya Singh,Adv.
Through Mr.R.S.Kundu,ASC with 2015:DHC:11128 Mr.Vishesh Wadhwa,Mr.Ankit Gulia
& Mr.Anil Kumar,Advs. Insp. Anil Kumar PS EOW
22.12.2015 Crl.M.A No.18644/2015.18823/2015& 18827/2015
Exemption granted subjectto allJustexceptions.
Applications stand disposed of.
W.P.fCrl.)3035/2015.3076/2015 &3077/2015 This Court shall dispose of WP (Crl) 3035/2015, WP (Crl)
3076/2015&WP(Crl)3077/2015 by this common order as these cases arise from the same FIR.
The petitioners in the aforementioned writ petitions seek quashing of
FIR No. 187/2013 instituted at PS EOW, Mandir Marg under sections
420/467/468/471/I20B ofthe IPG,on the basis ofa settlement having been arrived at with respondent no. 2/ complainant. The petitioners in WP(Crl.)
3076/2015 and WP (Crl.) 3077/2015 were directors ofthe petitioner no. 1 company (in WP (Crl.) 3035/2015). However the petitioner in WP (Crl.)
3077/2015 i.e Ram Kumar Shokeen was named in the subject FIR whereas the petitioner in WP(Crl.)3077/2015 i.e. Dilbag Singh has not been named in the subjectFIR.
The dispute pertains to the sale transaction of an agricultural landed measuring 9 bighas 12 biswas bearing Rectangle No. 23, Killa No. 23 (4-
16), and 24 (4-16) at village Samalka, NH-8, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi(hereinafter referred to as 'the property'). The said sale transaction in favour of petitioner no.l, was stated to be effected by way ofa purported sale deed executed by petitioner no.5, acting under a General Power of
Attorney allegedly executed in his favour by the father ofthe complainant.
The said transaction was disputed by respondent no.2/complainant, inter alia, alleging that the father of the respondent no.2, who himself was a
General Power Attorney holder on behalfofthe respondent no.2, had never executed any such General Power Attorney in favour of petitioner no.5. It was therefore alleged that the title ofthe petitioner no.l in the said property was obtained on the basis of forged documents with an intent to cheat respondent no.2/complainant. It was pursuant to the foregoing allegations that the subject FIR came to be registered under sections
420/467/468/471/I20B of the IPG against the Petitioners. The respondent no.2 also initiated civil proceedings before this Hon'ble Court, bearing CS
(OS)No. 1862/2013,in order to protect his interests.
Be that as it may, it is submitted by the counsel on behalf of the parties that with the intervention of well wishers, they have agreed to amicably resolve the disputes and differences between them, including the pending civil and criminal litigations. It is further submitted that pursuant thereto, the parties have even entered into Settlement Agreement in the
Month of December, 2015. It is submitted that in terms thereof, it was agreed that an amount of Rs. 2 Crore would be paid to respondent no.2 towards full and final settlement of all his claims against the petitioners. It was also agreed by the respondent no.2, that upon signing the said t5^' agreement, he shall relinquish and assign all his rights, titles, claims, interest etc.,ifany,held in whatever manner,in the said property m favour of petitioner no.l. It was further agreed that within 7 working days, the parties shall file a joint application for compromise of suit in the suit proceedings bearing CS(OS)No. 1862/2013 pending before this Hon'ble
High Court.Itwasalso agreedthatin view ofthe aforementioned settlement the parties shall approach this Court for seeking permission to quash the subjectFIR.
The parties are presentin court.
The investigation in the matter is still continuing.
It is submitted that the said amount ofRs.2 Crore has already been paid to respondent no.2 by way ofcheque. The said factum ofpayment is notdisputed by respondentno.2.Therespondentno.2has accepted the same without any caveattowards full and final settlement ofall his claims agains the petitioners.Itis alsosubmittedthatan applicationunderOrder23Rule3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for compromise, has already been filed in the CS (OS) No. 1862/2013 and the suit stands disposed of as withdrawn.
Considering the fact that the grievance of the respondent No.2 has been completely redressed, this Court is inclined to quash the FIR but subjectto certain conditions.
In Gian Singh vs.State ofPunjab& Another,(2012)10SCC303,the
Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable under
Section 320 ofthe Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation ofany criminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justice demands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end and peace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only be ordered for securing the ends ofjustice
The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab & Another(Supra):
"38 No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being ofthesociety and it is notsafe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without thepermission of the court. In respect ofserious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences ofmental depravity underIPC or offences ofmoral turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can have no legalsanction at all. However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civilflavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victivn have settled all disputes between thein aynicahly, irrespective ofthefact thatsuch offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within theframework of its inherentpower, quash the criminalproceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on theface ofsuch settlement, there is hardly any likelihood ofthe offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends ofjustice shall be defeated.
The above list is illustrative and notexhaustive. Each case will depend on its ownfacts and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed."[Refer to B.S. Joshi, (2003)4 SCC 675; Nikhil
Merchant,(2008)9 SCC 677 and ManojSharma,(2008) 16
SCC 1.]
In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State ofPunjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC
466,the pertinentobservations ofthe Apex Courtare as under:-
ORDER
29. In view ofthe aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down thefollowingprinciples by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 ofthe Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminalproceedings: 29.[1] Power conferred under Section 482 ofthe Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercisedsparingly and with caution.
29.2. When theparties have reached the settlementand on that basis petitionfor quashing the criminalproceedings isfiled, the guidingfactor in such cases would be to secure:(i)ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse ofthe process ofany court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either ofthe aforesaidtwo objectives.
29.3. Such apower is notto be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while workingin thatcapacity are notto be quashed merely on the basis ofcompromise between the victim andthe offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out ofcommercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility ofconviction is remote and bleak and continuation ofcriminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category ofheinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPC in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision.It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307IPC is therefor the sake ofit or theprosecution has collectedsufficientevidence, which ifproved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature ofinjury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guidingfactor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In theformer case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissiblefor the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by thefact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve theirfuture relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 ofthe Code or not, timings ofsettlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission ofoffence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because ofthe reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not beenfiled. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed butthe evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion ofthe evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the casefinally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPG and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question ofsparing a convictfoundguilty ofsuch a crime." Thus, the inherent powers of the High Court, having a wide plenitude could be used for quashing the FIR for securing the ends of justice and to preventthe abuse ofthe process ofthe court. The subject FIR(FIR No. 187/2013,PS EOW,Mandir Marg)and the emanating proceedings thereof are, for the reasons aforestated, quashed. In view ofthe aforementioned finding these petitions are disposed of in terms ofthe aforesaid.
ASHUTOSH KUMAR,J DECEMBER 22,2015 ns