Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 30.05.2025
DALIP SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shellen Kumar Bajaj, Adv.
Through:
CM Appl.35396/2025[Exemption from filing certified copies]
JUDGMENT
1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
2. The Application stands disposed of.
3. The present Review Petition has been filed by the Review Petitioner under Section 114 read with order XLVII and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as “CPC”] seeking review of the order dated 19.02.2025 [hereinafter referred to as “Order in Review”] passed by this Court.
4. Learned Counsel for the Review Petitioner submits that the ground for challenge in this Petition is that there is an error apparent on the record. He submits that a reading of paragraph 6 and 7 of the Order in Review reflects that the Petitioner is the tenant “when in fact the Petitioner is in the premises in his independent capacity”.
5. A perusal of the record shows that the learned Trial Court had examined the matter and passed a detailed order allowing the Eviction Petition as filed by the Respondent No.1/landlord. Thereafter, after detailed arguments, this Court had upheld the order of the learned Trial Court with a finding that the challenge in the Revision Petition by the Petitioner was to the title of Respondent No. 1/landlord and that the title of a party is always decided in civil proceedings and not in proceedings initiated under the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 [hereinafter referred to as “DRC Act”]. 5.[1] The Petitioner had, in the Revision Petition, restricted the challenge to the impugned order to the issue that the Petitioner is not a tenant but has acquired ownership rights in the subject premises. This contention of the Petitioner was refuted by the Respondent and it was contended that the Respondent has acquired ownership rights by virtue of a registered sale deed. 5.[2] Relying on the judgement of the Supreme Court in the case of Kanaklata Das & Ors. v. Naba Kumar Das & Ors.1, Tribhuvanshankar vs Amrutlal[2], and the judgement of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari[3], this Court held that an Eviction Petition or even a Revision Petition does not decide a title dispute between the parties since in an Eviction Petition, the title is not germane in the strict sense. The relevant extract of the Order in Review is reproduced below:
8. The contention of the Petitioner to the extent of ownership right of the Petitioner is refuted by the learned Counsel for Respondent No.1/landlord. It is reiterated that the Respondent No.1/landlord has acquired ownership rights by virtue of a registered sale deed. It is further contended that the Respondent No.1/landlord is not aware of the Civil Suit.
9. The record reflects that the Eviction Petition was filed by the Respondent No.1/landlord in the year 2013. The matter was adjudicated for six years and decided by the Impugned Order on 30.01.2019. Concededly, the Civil Suit was filed after the Impugned Order was passed. 9.[1] An examination of the order dated 10.02.2025 passed by the learned Trial Court in the Civil Suit, a copy of which has been handed across to the Court today, shows that after the suit was filed, it was adjourned sine die by the Court by an order dated 14.09.2022. Subsequently, after the passing of the order dated 31.01.2025 by this Court, this suit has been revived by the Petitioner. It is apposite to extract the order dated 10.02.2025 in the Civil Suit which reflects this: “Heard. Perused. It is submitted that the present suit was adjourned sine-die vide order dated 14.09.2022. It is also submitted that the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi is still seized with the RC REV No.362/2019 and CM APPL. 27114/2019 filed by the plaintiff against the eviction order passed by the Ld. ARC Court which is listed for 11.02.2025 before the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi. It is also submitted that the Hon'ble High of Delhi had orally observed during the proceedings therein that the plaintiff should pursue the present suit on its merits. Heard. It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for plaintiff that fresh address of defendant no. I was furnished on 21.04.2022 and till date, defendant no.1 has not been served. On taking steps i.e. whatsapp mobile phone number or e-mail I.D. of defendant no. I accompanied with an affidavit and PF/RC, issue summons for settlement of issues to the defendant no.1 (on the fresh address filed on 21.04.2022) for NDOH. On filing of PF, issue notice to defendant no.2, returnable for 22.04.2025. Application is disposed off. Suit is hereby restored to its original number…" [Emphasis supplied]
10. It is no longer res integra that an Eviction Petition or even a Revision Petition does not decide a title dispute between parties. In any Eviction Petition, the title is not germane in the strict sense. In the case of Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das [(2018) 2 SCC 352], the Supreme Court has held that in an Eviction Petition, landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties for the decision of the suit and the question of title to the tenanted premises is not germane for the decision of the Eviction Petition. “11.1. First, in an eviction suit filed by the plaintiff (landlord) against the defendant (tenant) under the State Rent Act, the landlord and tenant are the only necessary parties. In other words, in a tenancy suit, only two persons are necessary parties for the decision of the suit, namely, the landlord and the tenant. xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
11.3. Third, the question of title to the suit premises is not germane for the decision of the eviction suit. The reason being, if the landlord fails to prove his title to the suit premises but proves the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises and further proves existence of any ground on which the eviction is sought under the Tenancy Act, the eviction suit succeeds. Conversely, if the landlord proves his title to the suit premises but fails to prove the existence of relationship of the landlord and tenant in relation to the suit premises, the eviction suit fails. (See Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal, (1995) 6 SCC 580].)
11.4. Fourth, the plaintiff being a dominus litis cannot be compelled to make any third person a party to the suit, be that a plaintiff or the defendant, against his wish unless such person is able to prove that he is a necessary party to the suit and without his presence, the suit cannot proceed and nor can be decided effectively. In other words, no person can compel the plaintiff to allow such person to become the co-plaintiff or defendant in the suit. It is more so when such person is unable to show as to how he is a necessary or proper party to the suit and how without his presence, the suit can neither proceed and nor it can be decided or how his presence is necessary for the effective decision of the suit. (See Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee [Ruma Chakraborty v. Sudha Rani Banerjee, (2005) 8 SCC 140].)
11.6. Sixth, if there are co-owners or co-landlords of the suit premises then any co-owner or co-landlord can file a suit for eviction against the tenant. In other words, it is not necessary that all the owners/landlords should join in filing the eviction suit against the tenant. (See Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan [Kasthuri Radhakrishnan v. M. Chinniyan, (2016) 3 SCC 296: (2016) 2 SCC (Civ) 331].
13. In our considered opinion, Respondent 1, who claims to be the co-sharer or/and co-owner with the plaintiff-appellants herein of the suit property is neither a necessary and nor a proper party in the eviction suit of the appellants against Respondents 2 to 5. In other words, such eviction suit can be decreed or dismissed on merits even without the impleadment of Respondent 1.” [Emphasis Supplied] 10.[1] The Supreme Court in the case of Tribhuvanshankar vs Amrutlal [(2014) 2 SCC 788] has held that in case where a landlord initiates eviction proceedings against the tenant based on landlord-tenant relationship the scope of the proceedings are very limited and the question of title cannot be adjudicated. It was further observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord’s title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant’s contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant’s denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case. The relevant extract is set out below: “28. At this juncture, we may fruitfully refer to the principles stated in Ranbir Singh v. Asharfi Lal [(1995) 6 SCC 580]. In the said case the Court was dealing with the case instituted by the landlord under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 for eviction of the tenant who had disputed the title and the High Court had set aside the judgment and decree of the courts below and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff seeking eviction. While adverting to the issue of title the Court in Ranbir Singh [(1995) 6 SCC 580] ruled that in a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship between the litigating parties.
29. In the said case the learned Judges referred to the authority in LIC v. India Automobiles & Co. [(1990) 4 SCC 286] wherein the Court had observed that: (Ranbir Singh case [(1995) 6 SCC 580], SCC pp. 585-86, para 9) “9. … in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed therein that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bona fide the Court may have to go into tenant's contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bona fide in the circumstances of the case.” 10.[2] A Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari [2004 SCC OnLine Del 18], has held that the title of the party is always decided through civil proceedings and the claim of the ownership over the tenanted premises can be vindicated by way of filing civil suit and not in eviction proceedings. “3. …The authority of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Manoj Kumar v. Bihari Lal (Dead) by LRs, 91 (2001) Delhi Law Times 25(SC) is not at all applicable in the given facts and circumstances of the case as any person who denies to be a tenant and claim to be the owner of the premises cannot claim to be granted leave to defend eviction petition as eviction proceedings initiated under the Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be converted into a title suit. The title of the party is always decided through civil proceedings. As such claim of the petitioner that he is the owner of the premises and not the tenant could have been vindicated by way of filing civil suit and not in the eviction proceedings.”
6. This Court gave a finding that Respondent No.1/landlord had successfully proved all three ingredients of a Petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act before the learned Trial Court and that the original tenant i.e., Respondent No. 2 has not challenged the Eviction Order. It was on the basis of these findings that this Court disposed of the Revision Petition.
7. The Court had also directed that since the Petitioner had taken steps to challenge the title of Respondent No.1/landlord before the Civil Court, the remedy of the Petitioner does not lie before this Court and thus liberty was granted to the Petitioner to take steps in accordance with law with respect to his challenge in the Civil Suit. The relevant extract of the Order in Review is reproduced below:
8. Concededly, even in the Review Petition, the principle challenge of the Petitioner is that the Petitioner is not a tenant and has acquired rights in the subject premises. It is not disputed by the learned Counsel for the Review Petitioner that a civil suit has already been filed by him challenging the title of Respondent No.1/landlord. This also finds mention in paragraph 7.[1] of the Order in Review, which is extracted in Paragraph 5.[2] above. 8.[1] As stated above, the only challenge by the Review Petitioner is to the findings in paragraph 6 and 7 of the Order in Review which although are reproduced in paragraph 5.[2] above are being reproduced below here once again: "6. It is settled law that an Eviction Order binds the tenant and all those claiming through such tenant. Clearly, the Petitioner is such a person.
7. However, the challenge to the Impugned Order by the Petitioner has been restricted before this Court to another issue. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that he is not a tenant but has acquired ownership rights in the subject premises i.e., two shops on ground floor forming part of property no. 4226, Ward No. XV, Tel Mandi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi- 110055 as shown in red colour in the site plan [hereinafter referred to as “subject premises”]. 7.[1] Learned Counsel for the Petitioner submits that he has already filed a Civil Suit being CS SCJ 3573/2019 captioned Dalip Singh v. Durga Prasad Sharma & Anr. which is pending adjudication before Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi [hereinafter referred to as ‘Civil Suit’]." 8.[2] It is the contention of the Review Petitioner that paragraph 6 and 7 contain a finding that the Petitioner is a tenant and thus, the Petitioner is unable to take appropriate steps in the Civil Suit. 8.[3] The findings in paragraph nos. 6 and 7 of the Order in Review have to be read with the directions as are contained in paragraph nos. 13 and 14 of the Order in Review which state that the Petitioner is at liberty to take steps in accordance with law with respect to his challenge in the Civil Suit. It further states that the rights and contentions of both parties are left open in this regard. Thus, this Court has in the Order in Review directed that the parties are free to raise all their contentions and objections in the Civil Suit. The findings in the Order in Review are in relation to the Eviction Petition/Revision Petition filed and not in relation to the Civil Suit filed by the Petitioner.
9. As discussed in the Order in Review, the scope of proceedings in an Eviction Petition or a Revision Petition is very limited, and the question of title cannot be adjudicated in these proceedings. Since a civil suit has already been filed by the Petitioner, the Petitioner has already exercised his legal remedy. This Court has also granted liberty to the Review Petitioner to take steps in accordance with law with respect to his challenge in the Civil Suit in the Order in Review. No other ground for review has been raised by the Review Petitioner before this Court.
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati & Ors.4, has held that the application for review is entertained only under the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC including on account of a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with an original hearing unless there is a glaring omission or similar grave error which leads to a miscarriage of justice, the power cannot be exercised. The relevant extract of the Kamlesh Verma case is reproduced below:
argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501], held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12) “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases…”
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144: (1922) 16 LW 37: AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526: (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337: JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
11. No error has been shown to the Court which would require this Court to exercise jurisdiction under its powers for review, given the settled law as discussed above.
12. In view of what is stated above, no ground for review is made out. It is clear that since the Review Petitioner has failed to obtain any order from Civil Court, he has filed the present Review Petition with a view to delay the execution proceedings. The record reflects that the Eviction Petition was filed in the year 2013 before the learned Trial Court and the Eviction Order was passed in the year 2019 and the Revision Petition was decided by this Court in the year 2025. Thus, the Respondent No.1/landlord has been contesting for the last 12 years to obtain possession of his property.
13. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds no reason to review the order dated 19.02.2025. The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed. The pending Application also stands closed.