Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 16.05.2025
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC
Through: Mr. Samarth Luthra, Adv.
HON’BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (Oral)
JUDGMENT
1. In view of the appearance of Mr. Samarth Luthra, Advocate, on behalf of the respondent, the caveat stands discharged. CAV 192/2025
2. Allowed, subject to just exceptions. CM APPL. 29793/2025 (Exemption)
3. This petition has been filed by the petitioners, challenging the Order dated 01.08.2024 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as, ‘Tribunal’) in O.A. No. 2816/2022, titled Sunil Panwar vs. Govt. of W.P.(C) 6575/2025 & CM APPL. 29792/2025 NCT of Delhi and Ors., whereby the said O.A. filed by the respondent herein was allowed with the following direction:
4. To give a brief background of the facts on which the present petition arises, the respondent herein, while being posted as an LDC with the Chief Election Office, HQ in the year 2013, was charged with the offence of leakage of the question paper of the Staff Selection Commission (SCC) Combined Graduate Level Examination held on an All India Basis on 21.04.2013. FIR No. 73/2013 was registered under Section 120-B/420/408/468/471/511/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘IPC’) and Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as, ‘IT Act’) by the Crime Branch, Delhi. The respondent was arrested on 22.06.2013 and was placed under deemed suspension with effect from the said date. He was later released on bail on 05.08.2013.
5. By an Order dated 06.04.2019, passed by the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate (CMM), North West, Rohini Courts, Delhi, charges were framed against the respondent in the said criminal case. The respondent challenged the said order by way of a Revision Petition, being Cr. Rev No. 160/2019. The learned Additional Sessions Court, North West, Rohini Courts, Delhi, vide Order dated 26.08.2019, set aside the Order dated 06.04.2019 passed by the learned CMM, North West, Rohini Courts, Delhi, and discharged the respondent in the criminal case.
6. Thereafter, the petitioners issued a Memorandum dated 13.01.2020, initiating departmental proceedings against the respondent under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965.
7. In the departmental inquiry as well, the inquiry officer, vide report dated 25.11.2021, found that the charges against the respondent were not proved.
8. The Disciplinary Authority, vide an Order dated 07.01.2022, accepted the report of the inquiry officer, however, directed that the pay and allowances of the respondent for the period of suspension, that is, 22.06.2013 to 01.01.2022, shall be restricted to the subsistence allowance already drawn by him. We quote from the Order dated 07.01.2022 as under:- “NOW, THEREFORE, keeping in view the fact & circumstances of the case & relevant record of disciplinary proceedings, the undersigned, being the competent Disciplinary Authority, hereby order as under:-
1. Shri Sunil Panwar, Grade-IV (DASS)/ Junior Assistant is hereby exonerated of the charges framed against him vide said Charge Memorandum dated 13.01.2020, without prejudice to further action as may be warranted against him based on the outcome of the appeal, If any, made by the Crime Branch, New Delhi, against order dated 26.08.2019 of Hon'ble ASJ, Shri Harish Kumar, Rohini Court, Delhi, in any Court.
2. Further, the pay & allowances is restricted to the subsistence allowance already drawn by the official for the period of suspension, i.e. 22.06.2013 to 01.01.2022 as the suspension is wholly justified keeping in view the fact that the official was detained in police custody and thereafter prosecuted in Court of Law.
3. The said period of suspension i.e. 22.06.2013 to 01.01,2022 may be treated as spent on duty.” (emphasis supplied
9. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed the above O.A. before the learned Tribunal. )
10. The learned Tribunal, vide the Impugned Order, after taking note of the aforementioned facts, has held that the respondent cannot be deprived of his pay and allowance for the relevant period of suspension, as he had been exonerated of the charges framed against him and discharged by a Court of law. The findings of the Inquiry Officer were also accepted by the Disciplinary Authority.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioners, placing reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation v. M. Prabhakar Rao, (2011) 8 SCC 155, submits that mere exoneration from a criminal charge would not automatically entitle an employee to have the period of suspension treated as regularised or to receive full pay and allowance for the period of suspension; it is for the Disciplinary Authority to determine, based on the facts of each case, the extent of pay and allowances a Government employee shall be entitled to under such circumstances. He also places reliance on the Judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India & Ors. v. Jaipal Singh, (2004) 1 SCC 121, in support of his submissions.
12. He submits that in the present case, there were grave charges against the respondent. The respondent was also arrested in connection with the same, and merely because he was later discharged in the Criminal Case would not entitle him to full pay and allowances as a matter of right. He submits that the Disciplinary Authority, in the present case, has considered the entire facts and circumstances of the case, and has rightly decided that for the period of suspension, the respondent would only be entitled to subsistence allowance. He submits that, therefore, the learned Tribunal has erred in interfering with the above decision of the Disciplinary Authority on the wrong premise that merely because of an acquittal of the Government employee/ respondent in the criminal case, he is entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. He further submits that the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate that the initiation of the criminal proceedings was not at the behest of the petitioners, and hence, the respondent was not entitled to pay and allowances for the period of his suspension.
13. The above submissions are vehemently opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. He submits that the respondent was not only discharged from the criminal case but also exonerated in the Departmental Inquiry. The report of the Inquiry Officer has been accepted by the Disciplinary Authority. He submits that, therefore, the respondent could not have been denied the full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. The learned counsel for the respondent also places reliance on the Judgment of the Gauhati High Court in Nripen Sharma v. State of Assam & Ors. (2018) 3 Gauhati Law Reports 513.
14. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.
15. As is evident from the facts stated hereinabove, the respondent was in fact discharged from the criminal case. It is not a case where he was prosecuted and later acquitted on the basis of a benefit of doubt being granted to him; it was in fact found that there was no evidence found against him even to proceed in the criminal case.
16. Even in the Departmental Inquiry that was initiated post his acquittal, the respondent was again exonerated by the Inquiry Officer, with the charges having been found to be not proved. The Inquiry Officer report was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority by its Impugned Order dated 07.01.2022.
17. The Disciplinary Authority, however, even in the light of the above facts, found the suspension to be “justified keeping in view the fact that official was detained in police custody and thereafter prosecuted in the court of law”. The finding is, therefore, based on the fact that the respondent had been prosecuted in the court of law, without also taking into account that the respondent was, in fact, discharged in that criminal prosecution. This was a significant and relevant fact that ought to have been considered. Moreover, even after the discharge of the respondent, the petitioners initiated a Disciplinary Inquiry against the respondent and kept him under suspension during the period of such inquiry, where again the charges against the respondent were found to be “not proved”.
18. In M. Prabhakar Rao (supra), the Supreme Court held that where a government employee is acquitted in criminal proceedings on account of the “non-availability of evidence”, the concerned authorities must be vested with the power to decide whether the employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening period, and if does, the extent to which the same is to be granted.
19. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, it is not merely that the respondent was discharged from the criminal charges, but he was also exonerated in the departmental inquiry initiated subsequent to such discharge. Therefore, the above judgment would not come to the aid of the petitioners.
20. In Jaipal Singh (supra), the Hon’ble Court again held that where the prosecution, which resulted in an acquittal, was not initiated at the behest of the employer or Government Department, and the Government employee was acquitted on appeal, the Department cannot be faulted for keeping him out of service, as the law obliges the Government to remove from service an employee who has been convicted. In the present case, as noted hereinabove, the respondent was not only discharged from the criminal prosecution but was also found not guilty in the departmental inquiry. Therefore, the said judgment also does not support the case of the petitioners.
21. In Nripen Sharma (supra), a learned Single Judge of the Gauhati High Court, in similar circumstances, found that the continuation of the suspension was itself unjustified, by observing as under:-
22. For the reason stated hereinabove, we find no infirmity in the order passed by the learned Tribunal. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J RENU BHATNAGAR, J MAY 16, 2025/ab/Kz/DG Click here to check corrigendum, if any