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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINALAPPEAL NOS. OF 2025
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.8101-8102 of 2019)
RAGHUNATH SHARMA & ORS. …APPELLANTS
@ Diary No.34946 of 2019)
AND
(Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos.10274-10275 of 2019)
JUDGMENT
Leave Granted.
2. These appeals by special leave, call into question the correctness and legality of the judgment and orders dated 8th October 2018 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM No.11903 of 2018 in CRM No.M-23727 of 2015 and dated 29th April 2019 in CRM No.13134 of 2019 in CRM No.M-23727 of 2015, whereby FIR No.432 of 2014 dated 15th July 2014 which had earlier been quashed and set aside vide order 21st March 2016, was restored to file and concerned authorities were directed to restart the investigation. In other words, the order of quashment was recalled. Further, a review against this order of recall was also dismissed vide order dated 29th April 2019.
3. These appeals present a question of justified use or lack of the powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, using which the High Court restored First Information Report previously quashed.
4. The genesis of the dispute is an agreement to sell entered into between the parties dated 21st May 2013, an agreement dated 25th May 2013, and the Memorandum of Understanding dated Hereinafter ‘Cr.P.C.’ 15th August 2013 as also agreement to sell dated 3rd January 2014. Various disputes arose in regard to these agreements and finally, with the intervention of elders and others, a fresh agreement to sell dated 15th April 2015 was entered into in supersession of all other agreements. Accordingly, the sale consideration was decided at Rs.2,25,00,000/-. Various methods were decided upon to transfer part of the said amount totalling to Rs.35 lakhs. The remaining Rs.1,90,00,000/- was to be paid at the time of registry along with interest @ 1% per month. Also, pursuant to the fresh agreement to sell a compromise deed dated 14th July 2015 was inked with a view to bring all litigations between the parties to an end. Consequently, the order dated 21st March 2016 which quashed the proceedings came to be passed. The order is extracted in toto as under: “This petition has been preferred under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing of FIR No.432 dated July 15, 2014, under Sections 406, 420 of IPC, registered at Police Station Sector 10, Gurgoan, District Gurgaon (Annexure P-1) along with all consequential proceedings arising out of the same on the basis of compromise dated July 14, 2015 (Annexure P-2).
2. In compliance of order dated September 07, 2015, statement of the parties have been recorded by the trial Court. Report of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Gurgaon, has been received, in which it has been categorically observed that parties have arrived at compromise without any pressure or coercion from any quarter. Even otherwise, matter involved is personal in nature, which has been amicably put at rest.
4. Consequently, instant petition stands allowed, and FIR No.432, dated July 15, 2014, under Sections 406, 420 of IPC, registered at Poli Station Sector 10, Gurgaon, District Gurgaon and all other subsequent proceedings arising therefrom are quashed qua the petitioners.”
5. It, however, appears that the spirit of the compromise deed was lost upon the parties as soon after the order dated 21st March 2016, the complainant, namely, Krishan Kumar Gandhi filed an application dated 10th September 2016 praying for revival of the FIRs. Vide order dated 24th September 2016 said prayer was rejected. On 27th March 2018, another prayer of a similar nature seeking the revival of the FIRs was made before the High Court. By way of the impugned judgment and order dated 8th October 2018, the revival of the FIRs was ordered.
6. Aggrieved, the appellants are before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record and written submissions filed.
7. The scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. has engaged this Court on numerous occasions [Ref: State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy[2]; Sunder Babu v. State of Tamil Nadu[3]; Vineet Kumar v. State of U.P.4; Ahmad Ali Quraishi & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.5.] The observations made in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa[6] by a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges encapsulate the purpose of this power most aptly in the following terms: “6. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.”
8. Chapter XXVII of the Cr.P.C. deals with ‘judgment’. It defines what a judgment is; in what language it should be delivered; its contents; effect (arrest, payment of compensation, release, etc.). Section 362 provides that a Court shall not, once it has signed the judgment or final order disposing of a case, alter or review the same, except to correct an error clerical or arithmetic.
9. The scope of this power has been discussed in several judgments of this Court. 9.[1] Sanjeev Kapoor v. Chandana Kapoor[7] discusses the scope of this power in the following terms:
9.3.[2] In Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal10, it was categorically held that:
9.3.[3] The position in Sooraj Devi (supra) stands referred to/followed in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee11; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar12; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab13; and Telangana Housing Board v. Azamunnisa Begum14.
9.3.[4] The law, therefore, is no longer res integra. The exception to this position has been reorganized in Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar (supra) in the following terms:
The ‘exceptions’ of a) the violation of audi alteram partem; and b) abuse of process of law which would affect the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter and, in such cases the exercise of the inherent powers under the code has been approved by a Bench of three Judges in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Krishna Kumar Pandey15. These aren’t the circumstances of the present case.
10. It can be seen from the above pronouncements that the role of the Court, after a judgment has been delivered, is circumscribed by the law itself. In the present facts, the only provision of law, that permits an alteration in the judgment, in its own terms, was not resorted to. What was done was a review of the judgment quashing the proceedings. That, in the considered view of this Court, was not permissible. 10.[1] State of M.P. v. Man Singh16, with reference to a decision rendered by a three-Judge Bench in State of Kerala v. M.M. Manikantan Nair17, makes this position clear as follows:
Devi v. Pyare Lal, (1981) 1 SCC 500: 1981 SCC (Cri) 188: AIR 1981 SC 736].” (Emphasis supplied)
11. Again, in Narayan Prasad v. State of Bihar18 this Court reiterated that once a judgment has been passed, the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. do not permit its alteration or review. Such power is meant solely to secure the ends of justice and it cannot be taken to mean doing something that is expressly prohibited by statute.
12. In view of the above discussion of law, the conclusion is that the impugned judgment was passed by the High Court without any authority or basis. Once the criminal cases had been quashed, under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground of compromise entered into between the parties, one of the parties violating terms thereof is a ground entirely foreign to law, to once again invoke such powers and recall the order of quashing. Violations of a term of a compromise have their own avenues of law from which they can be enforced.
13. The appeals, therefore, succeed and are, accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment and orders, as described in para 2, and the consequences flowing from such revival, shall stand set aside and quashed.
14. At the end, we may record our surprise that the High Court adopted the course it did without reference to the well-established position of law, as demonstrated above. We summarize the findings/issue directions, as follows:
1. The bar under Section 362 Cr.P.C. is almost absolute;
2. The only exceptions to the bar, which would then permit the invocation of inherent powers, would be if it is necessary to meet the ends of justice; or to remedy the abuse of the process of law. Other than the above two circumstances, such inherent powers do not permit the doing of what stands prohibited by the text of the statute;
3. To clarify, it may be stated that when a Court finds itself in such extraordinary circumstances, the reasons for exercising such power should be recorded, justifying the invocation thereof.
15. We direct the Registry to circulate a copy of this judgment to all High Courts, for necessary dissemination to all concerned. It is our hope that lending clarity, coupled with the necessary information being supplied would curb such unjustified use of power.
16. In view of the discussion made in Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.)Nos.8101-8102 of 2019, matters connected therewith, i.e., Criminal Appeals @ Special Leave Petitions @ Diary No.34946/2019 and Criminal Appeals @ SLP(Crl.)Nos.10274- 10275/2019, shall also stand similarly disposed of. Pending applications, if any, shall be closed .................................... J. (PANKAJ MITHAL) ................................... J. (SANJAY KAROL) New Delhi; 16th May, 2025.