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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC
Through: Mr. M.K. Bhardwaj, Ms. Priyanka M. Bhardwaj and Mr. Maria Mugesh Kannan, Advs.
GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR .....Petitioners
Through: Mrs. Avnish Ahlawat, SC
Through: Mr. Pardeep Dahiya and Ms. Mahima Benipuri, Advs.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT
1. Both these writ petitions arise out of judgments passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal[1], on 8 December 2023 in OA 1538/2022[2] and on 10 October 2023 in OA 472/2019[3]. The issue in controversy in both these cases being similar, they were heard together. This judgment disposes of both the writ petitions. WP (C) 10587/2024 [GNCTD and Anr. v Jyoti] Facts
2. The respondent Jyoti belongs to the Nai community, which, according to the recitals in the OA[4] filed by her before the Tribunal, is recognised as an OBC[5] by Resolutions dated 24 May 1995, 19 June 2003 and 17 February 2014 issued by the GNCTD[6]. It figures at
┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ Sl.No. Old Entry New Entry │ ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 54. Nil Jat │ │ The abovesaid inclusion shall come into effect from the date of │ │ issue of this notification. │ │ By order and in the name of the Lt. │ │ Governor of the National Capital │ │ Territory of Delhi │ │ H.A. ARFI, Secy.” │ │ Notification dated 5 February 2004 │ │ “DEPARTMENT FOR THE WELFARE OF │ │ SC/ST/OBC/MINORITIES │ │ NOTIFICATION │ │ Delhi, the 5th February 2004 │ │ No. F 8(6)/2000-01/DSCST/SCP/OBC/11677 – Whereas │ │ the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi, vide │ │ Department of Welfare of Scheduled Caste / Scheduled Tribes │ │ Notification No.F.28(93)/91-92/SCST/P&S/109, dated 20th April │ │ 1993, had constituted a commission known as ‘Commission for │ │ other Backward Classes’ to examine requests for inclusion of any │ │ class of citizens as a backward class in the list and hear complaints │ │ of over-inclusion or under-inclusion of any backward class in such │ │ lists; │ │ And whereas on the recommendations of the abovesaid │ │ Commission, 53 Castes/communities were notified for inclusion in │ │ the list of Other Backward Classes for Delhi vide Notification │ │ No.F. 28(93)/91-92/SCST/P&S/4384 dated the 20th January 1995 │ │ and whereas the “Jat” Caste / community was further included in │ │ the list of Other Backward Classes for Delhi vide │ │ NotificationNo.F.8/11/99-2000/DSCST/SCP/OBC/2855, dated the │ │ 31st May, 2000 on the basis of the recommendation made by the │ │ said Commission for Other Backward Classes in its Second │ │ Report; │ │ And whereas the abovesaid Commission has submitted its │ │ Third and Fourth reports recommending certain castes / │ │ communities for inclusion in the OBC list for Delhi and whereas │ │ the recommendations of the Commission were accepted by the │ │ Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi in toto; │ │ Now, therefore, with the approval of the Government of │ └──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
71. Re. the alleged “migrant” status of the respondent 71.[1] It has further been sought to be contended, in para 2 (viii) of the writ petition, that the OBC Certificate dated 6 February 2014 had been issued to the respondent as a migrant. The OBC Certificate says no such thing, and we are unwilling to read, into the Certificate, something which finds no place therein. In any event, if the DSSSB, or the GNCTD, was of the view that the respondent was not eligible for OBC reservation because her OBC certificate had been issued to her as a migrant, no such mention being found in the OBC Certificate itself, the least that the petitioners were required to do was to put the respondent on notice in that regard and seek a clarification from her. 71.[2] Unlike the case of Jyoti, the respondent in WP (C) 10587/2024, the rejection of the respondent’s request for being treated as an OBC applicant is not because of any defect in the OBC certificate produced by her, vis-à-vis any stipulation to be found in the Advertisement itself. The petitioners are seeking to justify the rejection on considerations outside the Advertisement; in fact, by reading, into the OBC certificate, stipulations not to be found therein. This could not have been done without seeking an explanation from the respondent in that regard. 71.[3] We deem it expedient to reproduce, in this context, para 2 (xix) of the writ petition, which reads: “(xix) That the Ld Tribunal failed to appreciate that the candidature of the Respondent under the category “OBC” was cancelled on the ground that OBC certificate produced by her was issued on the basis of OBC certificate issued in favour of his (sic her) father in the State of UP (being a resident of the said State), i.e., the OBC certificate issued to him is from outside Delhi, which is valid in State of U.P. only and not in Delhi.” In submitting thus, the petitioners seem to have overlooked the fact that it was not her father, but the respondent herself, who was seeking employment. The OBC certificate issued to the respondent was not issued by the Revenue authorities in UP but by the Revenue authorities in Delhi, and entirely fulfilled the stipulations contained in Clause 6 of Advertisement 01/13. 71.[4] Veena 71.4.[1] Ms Ahlawat cites, in this context, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Veena. 71.4.[2] Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has, times without number, emphasized that Article 141 of the Constitution of India does not require judgments of the Supreme Court to be likened to theorems of Euclid, and that they are to be understood and applied in the light of the facts which were before the Court29, we find that the decision in Veena is being cited, again and again, unmindful of the fact that the OBC certificate produced by the respondent in that case was issued by the Revenue authorities outside Delhi. This is clear from the opening sentence in para 3 of the judgment, which reads: “The respondent candidates claimed to belong to OBCs on the basis of certificate issued in a State other than the Government of the National Capital Territory of Delhi.” (Emphasis supplied) Deepak Bajaj, in fact, goes on to reproduce, with approval, the following classic exordium of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v Leathem30: “Now before discussing the case of Allen v Flood31 and what was decided therein, there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but are governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Refer Vinay Prakash Singh v Sameer Gehlaut, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1595, UOI v Bharat Forge Ltd, (2022) 17 SCC 188, Deepak Bajaj v State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16 SCC 14 1901 AC 495 (1898) AC 1 Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical Code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.” 71.4.[3] In fact, one of the primary contentions of Veena, the respondent before the Supreme Court, was that “there was no obligation on the respondents to produce such certificate from the prescribed authorities in Delhi”. It was in this context that the Supreme Court returned the following findings, in paras 7 and 8 of the judgment:
this regard deserves to be reversed.
8. However, one aspect has to be borne in mind and that is the respondent candidates had made applications as if they belong to OBCs on the basis of the certificates issued by the State from which they migrated to the National Capital Territory of Delhi, but if the certificates issued in their original States of which they are permanent or ordinary residents were not good, the applications should have been treated as if they had been made in the general category and cases of the respondent candidates ought to have been considered in the general category. Therefore, to the extent, the applicants have attained necessary merit in the general list, they deserve to be appointed.” 71.4.[4] The Supreme Court was not, therefore, seized with the issue of the validity of an OBC certificate issued by the Revenue authorities in Delhi. No finding in respect of such an exigency can be read, by implication, into the judgment. The decisions of the Supreme Court already cited supra also enunciate the settled proposition that a judgment, even of the Supreme Court, is an authority only for what is stated therein, and not for what may logically seem to follow from it. 71.4.[5] We fail to understand, therefore, how the judgment is being cited as a precedent in cases in which the OBC certificate is issued by the Revenue authorities in Delhi, especially where the advertisement, pursuant to which the candidate has applied, itself distinguishes between certificates issued by Revenue authorities in Delhi and those issued by Revenue authorities outside Delhi. 71.4.[6] Veena, therefore, in our view, would not apply to a case in which the OBC certificate is issued by the Revenue authorities in Delhi – or, for that matter, in the state in which employment is being sought. 71.[5] GNCTD v Ravindra Singh32 71.5.[1] Ms. Ahlawat has also relied on an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in GNCTD v Ravindra Singh, specifically on the following passages therefrom: "3. Applications were invited for the post of Sub-Officer in Delhi Fire Service - Group 'C' post. The age prescribed for the post of Sub-Officer was not exceeding 27 years (relaxable in upper age limit for SC/ST - 5 years). The candidates belonging to OBC were entitled to three years age relaxation. The respondent herein applied for the said post, however, he was not given the age relaxation of three years. Therefore, the respondent approached the Tribunal. It was the case of the respondent/original applicant that though he was found to be more meritorious than the last candidate selected from the OBC category, he has not been appointed. The learned Tribunal dismissed the application. However, by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has allowed the writ petition by observing that in the advertisement, there was no mention of age relaxation with respect to OBC candidates. The High Court observed that the respondent, who belong to OBC ought to have been given the benefit of three years age relaxation. A review application was filed pointing out that as the respondent belong to outside OBC candidate and, therefore, as per the advertisement, he was not entitled to three years age relaxation. The High Court has rejected the review application observing that such a plea was not taken up earlier.
4. Having gone through the impugned Judgment and orders passed by the High Court and even having gone through the advertisement issued in the year 2009 which fell for consideration before the High Court, it was specifically mentioned that a candidate belonging to OBC is entitled to three years age relaxation. In the note, it is also specifically provided that "OBC candidates seeking benefit of reservation should submit OBC Certificate issued by the Competent Authority of Government of NCT of Delhi. All other OBC candidates with certificate issued from outside Delhi will be considered for the unreserved category only, if eligible otherwise". Therefore, OBC candidates belonging to outside the Government of NCT of Delhi were considered in the unreserved category. Judgment dated 12 September 2022 in SLP (C) 12474-12475/2019
5. In that view of the matter, the respondent being OBC outside the Government of NCT of Delhi and as the condition mentioned in the advertisement was not under challenge, the respondent was not entitled to the benefit of three years age relaxation and his case was to be considered in the unreserved category. Thereafter, when he was found to be over-age, it cannot be said he was wrongly denied the appointment. When it was pointed out by way of review application, the High Court has refused to consider the review application. The High Court ought to have considered the aforesaid aspect which goes to the root of the matter.
6. In view of the above and for the reasons stated hereinabove, both the appeals succeed. The impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court in the Writ Petition as well as in the Review Application are hereby quashed and set aside. " 71.5.[2] Ravindra Singh, too, therefore, appears, like Veena, to have been a case in which the OBC certificate produced by the candidate was issued by the Revenue authorities outside Delhi. Ergo, it would not apply to the present case.
72. To return, now, to the OBC certificate dated 6 February 2014 produced by the respondent, it is clear that it conforms to the stipulations contained in Clause 6 of Advertisement 01/13. The certificate has to be read as it is. It does not purport to have been issued to the respondent merely because she is a migrant. It clearly states that “Nisha, S/o/W/o/D/o Ashok Kumar, Resident of F-153, Vijay Vihar Ph-II Sec-4, Rohini, Delhi belongs to the community JAT which is recognized as Other Backward Class (OBC) as under”, and proceeds to refer to 4 Resolutions and two Notifications which so recognize the community JAT as an OBC. The mere fact that it has been issued on the basis of the OBC certificate issued to the respondent’s father in UP does not deviate from the earlier recitals in the Certificate.
73. There is no reason, therefore, for the respondent not to be entitled to the benefit of OBC reservation on the basis of the said certificate. Conclusion
74. We, therefore, find no reason to disagree with the Tribunal.
75. The impugned judgment dated 10 October 2023, passed by the Tribunal, is, therefore, affirmed in its entirety.
76. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed, with no orders as to costs.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.