Archana Chugh v. G S Moondhra

1. Present application has been filed challenging the order dated 21st October, 2010 by which the petitioner no. 1’s services have been terminated on the ground that the respondent-school had discontinued 2016:DHC:7523 the subject of Biology in classes 11th and 12th and the petitioner had become ‘surplus’.

2. Mr. A.P.S. Ahluwalia, learned senior counsel for the petitioner states that the valuable service of 25 years of the petitioner as a permanent teachers has been terminated out of vendetta. According to him, it is a clear case of awarding punishment to the petitioner no. 1 for having approached this Court by way of present contempt petition against the respondent nos. 1 and 2.

3. Issue notice.

4. Mr.Randhir Jain, Advocate accepts notice on behalf of respondent no.1. He states that the termination of service of the petitioner is an independent cause of action and cannot be agitated in the present contempt proceedings. He also states that no interim order in the nature of injunction can be granted in a contempt proceeding.

5. Mr.Jain prays for and is permitted to file a reply-affidavit within a period of four weeks. Rejoinder-affidavit, if any, be filed before the next date of hearing.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, this Court is prima facie of the view that the termination of service of the petitioner no. 1 is vitiated by malice as it is difficult to believe that in a school at Delhi students do not wish to study the subject of Biology in classes 11th and 12th.

7. The Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority Vs. Skipper Construction Co. (P) Ltd. and Another, (1996) 4 SCC 622 has held as under:-

19. To the same effect are the decisions of the Madras and Calcutta High Courts in Century Flour Mills Ltd. v. S. Suppiah [AIR 1975 Mad 270: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] and Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun [AIR 1986 Cal 220: (1986) 90 CWN 342]. In Century Flour Mills Ltd. [AIR 1975 Mad 270: (1975) 2 MLJ 54] it was held by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court that where an act is done in violation of an order of stay or injunction, it is the duty of the court, as a policy, to set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of the wrongdoing. The inherent power of the court, it was held, is not only available in such a case, but it is bound to exercise it to undo the wrong in the interest of justice. That was a case where a meeting was held contrary to an order of injunction. The Court refused to recognise that the holding of the meeting is a legal one. It put back the parties in the same position as they stood immediately prior to the service of the interim order.

20. In Sujit Pal [AIR 1986 Cal 220: (1986) 90 CWN 342] a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has taken the same view. There, the defendant forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff in violation of the order of injunction and took possession of the property. The Court directed the restoration of possession to the plaintiff with the aid of police. The Court observed that no technicality can prevent the court from doing justice in exercise of its inherent powers. It held that the object of Rule 2-A of Order 39 will be fulfilled only where such mandatory direction is given for restoration of possession to the aggrieved party. This was necessary, it observed, to prevent the abuse of process of law.

21. There is no doubt that this salutary rule has to be applied and given effect to by this Court, if necessary, by overruling any procedural or other technical objections. Article 129 is a constitutional power and when exercised in tandem with Article 142, all such objections should give way. The court must ensure full justice between the parties before it.”

8. Consequently, till the next date of hearing, the termination order dated 21st October, 2016 is stayed.

9. List on 16th January, 2017. Order dasti. MANMOHAN, J NOVEMBER 18, 2016 KA