Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
W.P.(C) 2706/2025, CM APPL. Nos. 12870/2025, 12871/2025 and
20402/2025 AMBUJ HOTEL AND REAL ESTATE PVT. LTD. THROUGH ITS
DIRECTOR .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Kirti Uppal, Senior Advocate
Mr. Jagesh Singh, Advocates
Through: Mr.Vineet Dhanda, CGSC
Mr. Ajay Sharma, Mr. Harsh Khabar, Mr. Anshuman Chowdhury, Mr. Saurav Agrawal, Advocates for R-2
(M:9873861611)
JUDGMENT
1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, seeking directions to enforce the Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, issued by respondent no. 2, i.e., Indian Railway Catering and Tourism Corporation Ltd. (“IRCTC”), thereby, directing the respondent no. 2 to hand over the train no. 20707-08, SC- VSKP Vande Bharat Exp (“subject train”) to the petitioner for on-board catering services. The petitioner has also challenged the demand letters and reminders thereof dated 10th January, 2025, 15th January, 2025, 18th January, 2025 and 17th February, 2025 issued by respondent no. 2 for an increased license fee, on account of augmentation in the number of coaches from 8 to 16, thereby, demanding levy of pro-rata license fee as per Clause 3.[3] of Master License Agreement.
2. Facts, as canvassed in the petition, are as follows: 2.[1] The petitioner participated in a bid for on-board catering services floated by IRCTC, for on-board catering services for a period of five years, further extendable up to two years.
2.2. The petitioner was issued a Letter of Award dated 7th August, 2024, whereby, the petitioner was awarded the contract for on-board services for the subject train. As per the Letter of Award, the annual license fee for the subject train was fixed at Rs. 1,80,00,000/- (excluding GST). 2.[3] The petitioner accepted the award vide Letter of Acceptance dated 22nd August, 2024. Upon the petitioner depositing the aforesaid amount of annual license fee and complying with other terms and conditions, it was issued the Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, for commencement of operations for the on-board catering services in the subject train. 2.[4] On 10th January, 2025, IRCTC, South Central Zone, Secunderabad, informed the petitioner that South Central Railways had permanently augmented the number of coaches for the subject train from 8 to 16. Therefore, the petitioner was liable to pay additional license fee to the tune of Rs. 2,12,40,000/- (including GST), in terms of Clause 3.[3] of the Master License Agreement. 2.[5] Subsequently, respondent no. 2-IRCTC issued reminder letters dated 15th January, 2025, 18th January, 2025 and 17th February, 2025 to the petitioner, to remit the amount of additional license fee, immediately. 2.[6] The petitioner sent replies dated 16th January, 2025 and 21st January, 2025 to the demand letters disputing the payment of demand of the aforesaid additional amount of license fee. 2.[7] Since the respondent no.2-IRCTC has failed to handover the train and the petitioner disputes the demand as arbitrary, the present writ petition has been filed.
3. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted as follows: 3.[1] As per the bid document, the subject train consisted of 21 coaches and only after evaluation of the bid by the petitioner, it has been awarded the contract, pursuant to which, the petitioner paid the requisite license fee and security deposit. 3.[2] The petitioner received Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, wherein, the license fee as per the Letter of Award dated 09th August, 2024, was admittedly received. The demand of increased license fee is erroneous, as the bid document itself, mentioned the details of coaches in the subject train to be 21. The respondent no. 2 has put up a wrong case that the same was a typographical error, and that instead of 21 coaches, the actual number of coaches was 8, at the time of floating of the tender. 3.[3] Vide Corrigendum no.3 of the Master License Agreement dated 16th February, 2024, Clause 3.[3] of Master License Agreement has been modified, and the line stating increase/decrease of license fee on the basis of change in „coach composition‟ of the train, has been deleted and the same does not exist. 3.[4] Demand of license fee by respondent no. 2 on the basis of change in coach composition and with a pro-rata increase is totally unfair, arbitrary and illegal and not at all in accordance with Clause 3.[3] of the Master License Agreement, bidding document, and Corrigendum no. 3 dated 16th February, 2024. 3.[5] Despite issuance of Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, the petitioner has not been handed over the subject train, which is a direct violation of the terms agreed upon in the Letter of Award and Letter of Commencement. Respondent no. 2, despite issuance of Letter of Commencement on 19th December, 2024, has failed to adhere to the timelines and procedures set forth in the contract, and the bidding documents. The petitioner has fully complied with the terms of the agreement, including, the payment of the entire annual license fee, as stipulated in the Letter of Award. 3.[6] The petitioner is incurring significant financial losses, due to the respondent no.2‟s failure to hand over the train on time. The petitioner is entitled to commence operations immediately as per the Letter of Commencement and the terms of the contract. 3.[7] The Master License Agreement and pre-bid clarification issued on 16th February, 2024, do not provide for such an increase in the license fee based on coach composition. The petitioner is entitled to the fixed annual license fee as per the terms of the agreement, and no revision should be made unless there is a clear basis, which is absent in this case. 3.[8] The respondent no.2 has failed to provide the data for the basis of calculation of the increased license fee, thus, the lack of transparency is an arbitrary action by respondent no.2. Further, the said action is against the Railway Policy. 3.[9] The respondent no. 2 is estopped from making the demand for an increased license fee under the principle of promissory estoppel.
4. On the other hand, submissions on behalf of respondent no. 2, are as follows: 4.[1] The present writ petition is not maintainable, as the same has been filed seeking relief of enforcement of a commercial contract entered with the respondent no. 2, having no statutory or constitutional flavour. The issues regarding interpretation of commercial contracts or disputes relating to questions of facts, are not to be raised by way of writ petition. 4.[2] Even questions of alleged breach of contract would not be ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4.[3] The writ petition is further not maintainable, as there is already an alternate and efficacious remedy available in the form of arbitration clause in the subject contract. 4.[4] The present writ petition is also not maintainable, since no cause of action arises in Delhi. The prayers in the writ, seeking enforcement of the Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, as well as setting aside of notices in question, have all been issued by the Secunderabad Zonal Office of respondent no. 2 to the registered office of the petitioner in Varanasi, Uttar Pradesh. 4.[5] The true purport, meaning and interpretation of the various documents, including, the bid document, the Master License Agreement, the Letter of Award and Letter of Commencement, itself is mixed question of fact and law, that requires detailed examination. 4.[6] The South Central Railways issued a letter present in the public domain informing that a new Vande Bharat Express Train number 20707- 2070[8] (the subject train) was being introduced between Secunderabad- Vishkhapatnam from 13th March, 2024. Further, IRCTC had issued ad-hoc tenders for a period of three to six months, and awarded the contract to various licensees, wherein, in all the tenders, it was stated that the subject train comprised of eight coaches, however, due to an inadvertent typographical error in the subject tender, incorrect number of coaches was mentioned for the subject train. 4.[7] The respondent no. 2 had given a „Disclaimer‟ in the bid document towards not giving any representation regarding the accuracy of the information and requiring bidders to verify from appropriate sources.
5. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record.
6. By way of the present writ petition, the petitioner has raised the dispute that it is not liable to pay the enhanced license fee on pro-rata basis, as demanded by respondent no. 2, on the ground of increase in the number of coaches in the subject train from 8 to 16. The two premises on which the present petition is based, are, firstly the bid document stated number of coaches in the subject train to be 21 and the petitioner had accordingly bid for the same. Secondly, Clause 3.[3] of the Master License Agreement and bid clarification Corrigendum no. 3 issued on 16th February, 2024, do not provide for such an increase in the license fee based on coach composition. As per the case put forth by the petitioner, it is entitled to fixed annual license fee as per the terms of the agreement and no revision can be allowed.
7. On the other hand, as per the respondent no. 2, the information about the subject train, including, type and number of coaches, i.e., only 8 coaches, as operated by the South Central Railway, was common knowledge. In the previous ad-hoc tenders for the subject train, it had clearly been stated that the subject train comprised of 8 coaches. The number of coaches in the subject train as were mentioned in the tender, was due to an inadvertent typographical error in the tender. Further, the tender document provided for the „Disclaimer’ whereby, IRCTC did not make any representation and warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or competence of the information in the bid document, and all bidders were to conduct their own investigations and analysis to check the accuracy, reliability and competence of the bid document. The relevant part of the bid document, as relied upon by the respondent no. 2, is reproduced as under: “xxx xxx xxx DISCLAIMER a. Indian Railway Catering & Tourism Corporation Ltd., herein after mentioned as “IRCTC” does not make any representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the information in this Bid Document. Therefore, each Bidder should conduct their own investigations and analysis and check the accuracy, reliability and completeness of the information in this Bid Document and obtain independent advice from appropriate sources. The Bidder shall bear all its costs associated with the preparation and submission of its Bid including expenses associated with any clarifications which may be required by IRCTC or any other costs incurred in connection with or relating to its Bid. All such costs and expenses will remain with the Bidder and IRCTC shall not be liable in any manner. xxx xxx xxx” (Emphasis Supplied)
8. This Court takes note of the submission of respondent no. 2 as regards the knowledge of the petitioner qua the actual number of coaches on the subject train, as given in its reply dated 21st April, 2025 to the CM Appl. 20402/2025, as follows:
27. In any event, the Petitioner is one of the largest onboard caterers in India supplying thousands of meals on hundreds of trains every day and it is not plausible for the Petitioner to state that it was unaware about the actual number of coaches on the Subject Train. Further, it is also not plausible that the Petitioner would have not raised any objection if the number of coaches would have reduced from the purported 21 to 8 that too without any formal notification by the Railways, as the Petitioner is now seeking to contend.
9. Perusal of the aforesaid submissions of the parties clearly show that the present dispute essentially involves interpretation of terms of the contract between the parties, and questions regarding factual matrix as regards the number of coaches in the subject train at the time of issuance of the tender. The petitioner has raised grounds alleging delay in failure to honor the contractual obligations and the demand of respondent no. 2 for additional license fees, as being contrary to the agreed terms.
10. While the petitioner has contended that it bid in the tender for the subject train on the basis of information that the same had 21 coaches, the respondent no. 2 has clearly disputed the same, as being only a typographical error. Further, the respondent no. 2 is relying upon letter dated 10th March, 2024, received from the South Central Railways, wherein, it is clearly recorded that the subject train was being introduced from 13th March, 2024 with 8 coaches. The letter dated 10th March, 2024, issued by South Central Railway, is reproduced as under:
11. Further, the respondent no. 2 has relied upon Clause 3.[3] of the Master License Agreement to submit that as per the same, the license fee can be increased/decreased on a pro-rata basis due to increase/decrease in the scope of work. The submission of the respondent no. 2 in this regard as given in its reply to the present petition, is reproduced as under:
29. In terms of Clause 3.[3] of the MLA, the license fee "shall be increased/decreased on a pro rata basis" due to "any increase/ decrease in the scope of work/ business such as increase/ decrease in frequency, no. off reduction in route leading to increase/ leading to increase/ decrease in services, extension/ increase of additional services etc.,”. As would be apparent, due to the Railways' permanent augmentation of 16 coaches from the existing 08 coaches in Train No. 20707-08 SC-VSKP VANDE BHARAT Exp, there would be pro-rate increase in the license fee on account of the increase in the scope of work/business of the caterer. Notably, change of composition of train had been notified prior to takeover of the train by the Petitioner under the cluster contract. In such case, submission of "advanced" license fee (pro-rata) is prerogative of the Petitioner and the demand notice was issued in accordance with the tender terms.
12. Thus, the questions raised in the present writ petition essentially pertain to enforcement of contractual rights. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue writs for enforcement of fundamental rights. Courts do not ordinarily entertain petitions involving enforcement of purely contractual rights, especially, where it is necessary to enquire into facts involving recording of oral evidence. Thus, the true purport, meaning and interpretation of the various documents referred, such as pre-bidding clarification dated 16th February, 2024, Corrigendum no. 3 dated 16th February, 2024, bid document dated 7th June, 2024, Master License Agreement between the parties, Letter of Award dated 7th August, 2024 and Letter of Commencement dated 19th December, 2024, itself is mixed question of fact and law, requiring detailed examination. Whether, the Master License Agreement and pre-bid clarification issued on 16th February, 2024, do not provide for an increase in the license fee based on coach composition, or whether the petitioner is entitled to the fixed annual license fee as per the terms of the agreement, are all questions related to interpretation of the contractual terms. Thus, these questions related to interpretation of the terms of the contract, cannot be decided in writ proceedings.
13. Holding that a dispute relating to interpretation and implementation of the terms and conditions of a contract, cannot be the subject matter of a writ petition, and that a writ court was not the proper forum for contractual disputes, Supreme Court in the case of Pimpri Chinchwad Municipal Corporation and Others Versus Gayatri Construction Company and Another, 2008 SCC Online SC 1203, has held as follows:
12. In National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises [(2003) 7 SCC 410] it was inter alia held as follows: (SCC p. 415, para 6) “6. The respondent then filed a writ petition in the High Court for refund of the amount. On the pleadings before it, the High Court raised two questions viz.: (a) whether the forfeiture of security deposit is without authority of law and without any binding contract between the parties and also contrary to Section 5 of the Contract Act; and (b) whether the writ petition is maintainable in a claim arising out of a breach of contract. Question (b) should have been first answered as it would go to the root of the matter. The High Court instead considered Question (a) and then chose not to answer Question (b). In our view, the answer to Question (b) is clear. It is settled law that disputes relating to contracts cannot be agitated under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has been so held in Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293], State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] and Bareilly Development Authority v. Ajai Pal Singh [(1989) 2 SCC 116]. This is settled law. The dispute in this case was regarding the terms of offer. They were thus contractual disputes in respect of which a writ court was not the proper forum. Mr Dave, however, relied upon Verigamto Naveen v. Govt. of A.P. [(2001) 8 SCC 344] and Harminder Singh Arora v. Union of India [(1986) 3 SCC 247]. These, however, are cases where the writ court was enforcing a statutory right or duty. These cases do not lay down that a writ court can interfere in a matter of contract only. Thus on the ground of maintainability the petition should have been dismissed.”
13. In Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil [(2000) 6 SCC 293] this Court dealt with the question of maintainability of petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and the desirability of exhaustion of remedies and availability of alternative remedies, as also difference between statutory contracts and non-statutory contracts. In paras 10 and 11 of the judgment it was noted as follows: (SCC pp. 298-99)
affect the principles to be applied. The disputes about the meaning of a covenant in a contract or its enforceability have to be determined according to the usual principles of the Contract Act. Every act of a statutory body need not necessarily involve an exercise of statutory power. Statutory bodies, like private parties, have power to contract or deal with property. Such activities may not raise any issue of public law. In the present case, it has not been shown how the contract is statutory. The contract between the parties is in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. The disputes relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract could not have been agitated in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That is a matter for adjudication by a civil court or in arbitration if provided for in the contract. Whether any amount is due and if so, how much and refusal of the appellant to pay it is justified or not, are not the matters which could have been agitated and decided in a writ petition. The contractor should have relegated to other remedies.”
14. Reference can also be made to State of Gujarat v. Meghji Pethraj Shah Charitable Trust [(1994) 3 SCC 552]. In para 22 it was observed as follows: (SCC pp. 568-69)
15. Again, in State of U.P. v. Bridge & Roof Co. (India) Ltd. [(1996) 6 SCC 22] this Court dealt with the issue in paras 15 and 16 in the following manner: (SCC p. 30)
contentions raised in the writ petition by both the parties and in merely reiterating the effect of the order of the Deputy Commissioner made under the proviso to Section 8-D(1).
16. Firstly, the contract between the parties is a contract in the realm of private law. It is not a statutory contract. It is governed by the provisions of the Contract Act or, maybe, also by certain provisions of the Sale of Goods Act. Any dispute relating to interpretation of the terms and conditions of such a contract cannot be agitated, and could not have been agitated, in a writ petition. That is a matter either for arbitration as provided by the contract or for the civil court, as the case may be. Whether any amount is due to the respondent from the appellant Government under the contract and, if so, how much and the further question whether retention or refusal to pay any amount by the Government is justified, or not, are all matters which cannot be agitated in or adjudicated upon in a writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition viz. to restrain the Government from deducting a particular amount from the writ petitioner's bill(s) was not a prayer which could be granted by the High Court under Article 226. Indeed, the High Court has not granted the said prayer.”
14. Further, this Court notes that Clause 9 of the Master License Agreement, contains an arbitration clause, which reads as under:
15. A perusal of the above sets forth that any dispute or difference between the parties as to the construction or operation of the contract or any right or liability with reference to the contract, will be subject matter of arbitration.
16. Thus, it is apparent that there is an alternate efficacious remedy available in the form of an arbitration clause in the subject contract. It has been held time and again that a writ court would ordinarily not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction, when there exists, an arbitration agreement between the parties.
17. Thus, while holding that seriously disputed questions or rival claims arising out of breach of contract are required to be investigated and determined on basis of evidence, and that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is available to a litigant, he should pursue that remedy and not invoke writ jurisdiction, Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Others Versus Jain Plastics and Chemicals Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 216, has held as follows:
3. Settled law — writ is not the remedy for enforcing contractual obligations. It is to be reiterated that writ petition under Article 226 is not the proper proceedings for adjudicating such disputes. Under the law, it was open to the respondent to approach the court of competent jurisdiction for appropriate relief for breach of contract. It is settled law that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to the litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Equally, the existence of alternative remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to issue writ, but ordinarily that would be a good ground in refusing to exercise the discretion under Article 226. xxx xxx xxx
7. In our view, it is apparent that the order passed by the High Court is, on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. It is true that many matters could be decided after referring to the contentions raised in the affidavits and counter-affidavits, but that would hardly be a ground for exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in case of alleged breach of contract. Whether the alleged non-supply of road permits by the appellants would justify breach of contract by the respondent would depend upon facts and evidence and is not required to be decided or dealt with in a writ petition. Such seriously disputed questions or rival claims of the parties with regard to breach of contract are to be investigated and determined on the basis of evidence which may be led by the parties in a properly instituted civil suit rather than by a court exercising prerogative of issuing writs.
18. Likewise, Supreme Court in the case of Empire Jute Company Limited and Others Versus Jute Corporation of India Limited and Another, (2007) 14 SCC 680, has held as follows:
14. Construction of the contract entered into by and between the parties is in question before us. There exists an arbitration agreement. The arbitration agreement is of wide amplitude; by reason whereof not only the dispute relating to quality of the jute sought to be supplied by Respondent 1 may be gone into, the construction, meaning and operation and effect of the contract or breach thereof, if any, would have also fallen for determination of an arbitrator.
15. It is not correct to contend that Clause 8.0 provides for procedure for claim settlement. The said provision in regard to the quality of jute supplied has in our opinion nothing to do with Clause 9.0. The arbitration agreement entered into by and between the parties is independent of Clause 8.0. It is now well settled that when there exists an arbitration agreement, the writ court ordinarily would not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction to enter into the dispute.
19. Similar question arose for consideration in Bisra Lime Stone Co. Ltd. v. Orissa SEB [(1976) 2 SCC 167: AIR 1976 SC 127] wherein it was held that the High Court may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, if there exists a valid arbitration clause stating: (SCC p. 174, para
24)
20. A similar view was taken by this Court in Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 242] holding: (SCC p. 247, paras 12-13)
13. However, access to justice by way of public law remedy would not be denied when a lis involves public law character and when the forum chosen by the parties would not be in a position to grant appropriate relief.”
24. As the disputed facts as also the law are required to be determined by the arbitrator, we are of the opinion that all disputes between the parties should be directed to be resolved upon taking recourse to the arbitration agreement contained in Clause 9.0 of the sale order.
19. Thus, the position that emerges is that in respect of pure contractual matters in the field of private law, having no statutory flavor, the same are better adjudicated upon by the forum agreed to by the parties. (See: Union of India and Others Versus Puna Hinda, (2021) 10 SCC 690, Para 24)
20. Reference may also be made to the judgment in the case of Life Insurance Corpn. of India and Others Versus Asha Goel (Smt) and Another, (2001) 2 SCC 160, wherein, the Supreme Court has categorically held that if the contract entered between the parties, provides an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them. Thus, it has been held as follows:
10. Article 226 of the Constitution confers extraordinary jurisdiction on the High Court to issue high prerogative writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is wide and expansive. The Constitution does not place any fetter on exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. It is left to the discretion of the High Court. Therefore, it cannot be laid down as a general proposition of law that in no case the High Court can entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to enforce a claim under a life insurance policy. It is neither possible nor proper to enumerate exhaustively the circumstances in which such a claim can or cannot be enforced by filing a writ petition. The determination of the question depends on consideration of several factors like, whether a writ petitioner is merely attempting to enforce his/her contractual rights or the case raises important questions of law and constitutional issues, the nature of the dispute raised; the nature of inquiry necessary for determination of the dispute etc. The matter is to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each case. While the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot be denied altogether, courts must bear in mind the self-imposed restriction consistently followed by High Courts all these years after the constitutional power came into existence in not entertaining writ petitions filed for enforcement of purely contractual rights and obligations which involve disputed questions of facts. The courts have consistently taken the view that in a case where for determination of the dispute raised, it is necessary to inquire into facts for determination of which it may become necessary to record oral evidence a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, is not the appropriate forum. The position is also well settled that if the contract entered between the parties provide an alternate forum for resolution of disputes arising from the contract, then the parties should approach the forum agreed by them and the High Court in writ jurisdiction should not permit them to bypass the agreed forum of dispute resolution. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that in the above discussions we have only indicated some of the circumstances in which the High Court have declined to entertain petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution for enforcement of contractual rights and obligation; the discussions are not intended to be exhaustive. This Court from time to time disapproved of a High Court entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters of enforcement of contractual rights and obligation particularly where the claim by one party is contested by the other and adjudication of the dispute requires inquiry into facts. We may notice a few such cases; Mohd. Hanif v. State of Assam [(1969) 2 SCC 782]; Banchhanidhi Rath v. State of Orissa [(1972) 4 SCC 781]; Rukmanibai Gupta v. Collector, Jabalpur [(1980) 4 SCC 556]; Food Corpn. of India v. Jagannath Dutta [1993 Supp (3) SCC 635] and State of H.P. v. Raja Mahendra Pal [(1999) 4 SCC 43].
21. Likewise, in the case M.P. Power Management Company Limited, Jabalpur Versus Sky Power Southeast Solar India Private Limited and Others, (2023) 2 SCC 703, Supreme Court has held as follows:
82.7. The existence of an alternate remedy, is, undoubtedly, a matter to be borne in mind in declining relief in a writ petition in a contractual matter. Again, the question as to whether the writ petitioner must be told off the gates, would depend upon the nature of the claim and relief sought by the petitioner, the questions, which would have to be decided, and, most importantly, whether there are disputed questions of fact, resolution of which is necessary, as an indispensable prelude to the grant of the relief sought. Undoubtedly, while there is no prohibition, in the writ court even deciding disputed questions of fact, particularly when the dispute surrounds demystifying of documents only, the Court may relegate the party to the remedy by way of a civil suit.
22. Considering the aforesaid position of law, it is evident that the present writ petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed. The questions raised before this Court, are purely contractual in nature, with there being an efficacious and alternate remedy by virtue of the arbitration clause in the agreement.
23. In view of the aforesaid finding, this Court is not required to go into the other issues, as raised in the present writ petition.
24. Accordingly, the present writ petition, along with the pending applications, stands dismissed.
JUDGE JULY 1, 2025