Neelam Ranolia v. State NCT of Delhi

(iv) damage or destruction of any property in

India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or (b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or

(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or [an international or inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or] commits a terrorist act. [Explanation.—For the purpose of this sub-section,— (a) “public functionary” means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary; (b) “high quality counterfeit Indian currency” means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates compromises with the key security features as specified in the Third Schedule.] (2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule. xxx

18. Punishment for conspiracy, etc.—Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or [incites, directs or knowingly facilitates] the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to the commission of a terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”

5. He states that since none of the acts done by the Appellant falls within the scope of Section 15 or 18 of the UAPA, these activities cannot come within the ambit of conspiracy or an attempt to commit, or advocate, abet, advise or incite, directly or knowingly facilitate the commission of a terrorist act.

6. He, therefore, states that since the provisions of UAPA are not attracted, the Appellant is entitled to grant of bail as no prima facie case can be said to be made against her. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has also drawn the attention of this Court to the pamphlets which were seized inside the Parliament to state that the pamphlets do not indicate that it was intended to threaten the sovereignty, integrity of India or divide the country. He states that the material on the pamphlets was rather patriotic in nature. The said pamphlet reads as under: "अभी भी जिसका खून न खौला, वो खून नही पानी है, िो देश क े काम न आए, वो बेकार िवानी है" English translation reads as under: "Even now, if your blood does not boil, it's not blood, but water; and if your youth is not dedicated to the service of the nation, it is wasted youth". It is stated by the learned Counsel for the Appellant that the quote written on the pamphlet was given by Freedom Fighter Chandra Shekhar Azad.

7. It is stated by the learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant in CRL.A. 388/2025 that the Appellant was nowhere near the Parliament on the date of the incident and goes on to state that the Appellant was not even in territory of Delhi. He states that as per the call detail records of the Appellant, on the day of the incident, the Appellant was in Rajasthan. Learned Counsel for the Appellant also draws the attention of this Court to the chargesheet to state that the Appellant did not participate in the incident. He states that he was not even a part of the last two meetings organized by Manoranjan D. to finalise the details.

8. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to the statement given by the Lok Sabha Secretariat wherein in an answer to a question as to whether any MP/staff or any other member of the House suffered any injury during the incident, it was reported that no case of injury to any MP/staff of the Parliament or their hospitalization or medical treatment was reported to the Welfare Branch of the Parliament. The learned Counsel contends that it was only a protest/demonstration which does not attract any of the provisions of UAPA, which would disentitle the Appellant to grant of bail.

9. Per contra, learned ASG vehemently contends that the accused had specifically chosen the date of 13th December as on that day all the Members of Parliament would be present in the Parliament to pay homage to the martyrs who laid their life in the Parliament attack which took place on 13.12.2001. He states that the yellow smoke was noxious in nature and had chemicals in it which caused injury to the MPs inasmuch as the eyes of the MPs were burning. He also states that because of the incident, the MPs were terrorised. He states that the purpose of the incident was to overawe the Government. He further states that the Parliament is not a place to stage demonstrations and the choice of 13th December to commit the incident inside the Parliament would mean that it was meant to strike terror. He further states that on 13.12.2023, the Parliament was on high alert as a message had been received that terrorist Gurpatwant Singh Pannu was planning to attack the Parliament House on that day. He states that this is not a case of a prank gone wrong or a case of a simple demonstration or protest. He states that the incident was an attempt to overawe the Government using criminal force and, therefore, the Appellants have committed a terrorist act under Section 15(1)(b) of the UAPA. Learned ASG places reliance on Section 350 of the IPC which defines criminal force.

10. Heard the learned Counsels appearing for the Appellants and the learned ASG appearing on behalf of the State.

11. The facts of the case reveals that on 13.12.2023, after paying homage to the martyrs of terrorist attack which took place on 13.12.2001 in the Parliament of India, the regular proceedings of Lok Sabha began and at about 01:01 PM, two persons jumped from the public gallery No. 4, inside the Lok Sabha main hall and started moving towards the Well of Lok Sabha by jumping over empty seats, throwing pamphlets and shouting slogans. The persons were later identified as Manoranjan and Sagar Sharma. They both took out canister shaped objects and released its contents in the Lok Sabha Central Hall because of which the whole Hall was engulfed in thick, yellow smoke coming out from the canister. At about the same time, the Appellant in CRL.A.263/2025 along with one Amol Shinde, who were outside the Parliament building, committed the same act, which was photographed by the media personnel. The incident outside the Parliament building was video graphed by accused Lalit Jha. Manoranjan, Sagar, Amol Shinde and the Appellant in CRL.A.263/2025 were arrested and were produced before the Court. Lalit Jha and the Appellant in CRL.A.388/2025 surrendered before the Police Authorities on 15.12.2025.

12. Material on record reveals that the plan to stage a protest inside the Parliament was hatched in February, 2022 and meetings were organized by Sagar Sharma at the behest of Manoranjan. It is stated that in the said meeting, Manoranjan proposed the idea of disruption of the present system of Constitutionally ordained governance by creating chaos and disruption in the Parliament which will help them gain media attention. Material on record further reveals that in the second meeting, discussions were held for inclusion of a woman member to bring in gender equality towards the greater goal of disrupting the Parliament. Material on record reveals that after the second meeting, only Manoranajn, Sagar, Amol, Lalit and Mahesh continued with the plan whilst everyone else quit. Appellant in CRL.A.263/2025 came in touch with the accused and joined the group. The facts of the case further reveals that meetings were held from 07.08.2023 to 11.08.2023, all the six accused visited Delhi to discuss the plan and microdetails of the plan were finalised. The idea of the accused was to disrupt the Parliament.

13. The Status Report reveals that the Appellant - Neelam Ranolia in CRL.A.263/2025 refused to enter the Parliament but pledged complete support to the plan and volunteered to replicate the actions being carried out inside the Parliament at a nearby location, i.e. outside the Parliament. Lalit and Mahesh were to make the video of the incident and upload it on various internet-based forums and groups for immediately sensationalizing the matter. The plan was put in action.

14. The short question which arises for consideration is as to whether the Appellants herein should be granted bail or not under UAPA.

15. The parameters of bail under Section 43(D)(5) of the UAPA has now been crystallized by the Apex Court in a number of judgments. In Kekhriesatuo Tep v. NIA, (2023) 6 SCC 58, the Apex Court has held that while deciding a bail petition filed by the accused against whom offences under Chapters IV and VI of the said Act have been made, the court has to consider as to whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true. The Apex Court has held that the words used in Section 43(D)(5) of UAPA are “prima facie” while the words used in TADA, MCOCA and NDPS Act are “not guilty”. The Apex Court has held that the degree of satisfaction required in a case of “not guilty” under TADA, MCOCA and NDPS is much stronger than the satisfaction required in a case where the words used are “prima facie” in UAPA.

16. In NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1, the Apex Court has held as under: "23............. By its very nature, the expression “prima facie true” would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is “prima facie true”, as compared to the opinion of the accused “not guilty” of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act.........

24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise." (emphasis supplied)

17. Similarly, in Vernon v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 15 SCC 56, the Apex Court, after making reference to Watali (supra) has held as under:

committed the offence relating to support given to a terrorist organisation.

47. The second set of materials include the witness statements. There also no covert or overt act of terrorism has been attributed to the appellants by the three witnesses. We have dealt with the summary of their statements earlier in this judgment. We have also observed earlier that mere possession of the literature, even if the content thereof inspires or propagates violence, by itself cannot constitute any of the offences within Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act. " (emphasis supplied)

18. In a recent Judgment of the Apex Court in Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 5 SCC 403, the Apex Court, while explaining the Judgement in Watali (supra), has observed as under: "Test for rejection of bail: Guidelines as laid down by Supreme Court in Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383]

31. In the previous section, based on a textual reading, we have discussed the broad inquiry which courts seized of bail applications under Section 43-D(5) of the UAP Act read with Section 439CrPC must indulge in. Setting out the framework of the law seems rather easy, yet the application of it, presents its own complexities. For greater clarity in the application of the test set out above, it would be helpful to seek guidance from binding precedents.

32. In this regard, we need to look no further than Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383] which has laid down elaborate guidelines on the approach that courts must partake in, in their application of the bail limitations under the UAP Act. On a perusal of paras 23 to 24 and 26 to 27, the following 8-point propositions emerge and they are summarised as follows:

32.1. Meaning of “prima facie true”: (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 24, para 23) On the face of it, the materials must show the complicity of the accused in commission of the offence. The materials/evidence must be good and sufficient to establish a given fact or chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.

32.2. Degree of satisfaction at pre charge-sheet, post charge-sheet and post-charges — compared: (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 28, para 26)

32.3. Reasoning, necessary but no detailed evaluation of evidence: (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 27, para 24) “24. … the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage—of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail—is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.”

32.4. Record a finding on broad probabilities, not based on proof beyond doubt: (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 27, para 24) “The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.”

32.5. Duration of the limitation under Section 43-D(5): (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 27, para 26) “26. … the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof.” 32.6.Material on record must be analysed as a “whole”; no piecemeal analysis: (Watali case [NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali, (2019) 5 SCC 1: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 383], SCC p. 28, para 27)

19. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court, the established facts of the case are that the accused chose the Parliament to raise their voice. The Parliament represents the very basis of our Democracy. It cannot be said that what the accused have done is a legitimate form of protest or demonstration. At the same time, the Appellants have not propagated any movement which can be said to be against the interest of the nation. The activities of the Appellants are of the nature of propagation of ideological messages and in the opinion of this Court prima facie do not constitute a terrorist act and does not satisfy the ingredients of Section 15 or 18 of UAPA Act.

20. This Court has also gone through the FSL report dated 27.05.2025. The opinion of the FSL Report reads as under: "On the basis of ion chromatography analysis of the exhibits, it is evident that the exhibits marked as NFSU/CoE-NDPS/CASE/GCA/01/2024/01 to NFSU/CoE-NDIPS/CASE/GCA/01/2024/07, NFSU/COE-NDPS/CASE/GCA/01/2024/10 and NFSU/CoE-NDPS/CASE/GCA/01/2024/12; contains residual characteristic of smoke bomb compositions, such as chloride, nitrate, sulphate, potassium, and ammonium ions. The presence of these ions suggests that the materials commonly used to manufacture smoke bombs, such as potassium nitrate and ammonium chloride, act as oxidizers and reactants in the production of smoke. Additionally, the detection of sulphate ions may indicate the presence of substances like sulphur or sulphur-containing compounds, which contribute to the smoke's density and opacity. Therefore, the submitted exhibits may act as explosives. "

21. At this juncture, this Court is not making any comment on the opinion of the FSL that the canisters used by the accused persons could have acted as explosives as this would be a matter of trial. The smoke canisters have been purchased from the market and are freely available. Had these canisters generated any substance which can cause death or serious injury, they would not be freely available in the market. This Court can take judicial notice that such canisters are used in IPL games, cricket matches, and in various events and festivals like weddings, parties, Holi etc. The use of canisters which emitted yellow smoke alone does not raise a prima facie case against the Appellants and as to whether those canisters could have acted as explosives or not will be tested in trial. The quantity of noxious substance in the canisters and the propensity to cause injury are also a matter of trial. Further, the Appellant - Mahesh Kumawat in CRL.A. 388/2025 was not in Delhi at the time of offence and the Appellant - Neelam Ranolia in CRL.A.263/2025 was not inside the Parliament building. The effect of smoke of the canister in open air is to be decided in trial and at this juncture, it cannot be said that the smoke from canister can cause any hazardous health injury when used in open air and anyway the same would be decided in trial.

22. Undoubtedly, the place where the Appellants chose to protest is the Indian Parliament which is not the most appropriate place to stage the demonstration. However, the Appellant in CRL.A. 263/2025 did not enter the Parliament. The material on record at this juncture shows that she was not inclined to enter into the Parliament and chose to protest outside the Parliament which is a major distinguishing factor from those persons who entered inside the Parliament. The pamphlets which have been seized from the Appellant do not indicate that it abets, advises or facilitates the commission of a terrorist act. There is nothing on record at this juncture to show that the Appellants before this Court who have not entered the Parliament, intended to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of the country or have committed the act with intent to strike terror. Nor it can be said that the effect of the act is likely to strike terror in the mind of people or a section of people in India or any foreign country.

23. At this juncture, the material on record indicates that at least the Appellant in CRL.A. 263/2025, who was outside the Parliament, who had opened the smoke canister, refused to go inside the Parliament and the Appellant in CRL.A. 388/2025, who was not in Delhi and who had not attended the last two meetings, has not done any act satisfying the ingredients of Section 15 or 18 of the UAPA. There is complete lack of material at this juncture of loss of life, bodily injury or significant property damage. On the contrary, the statement given by the Lok Sabha Secretariat categorically state that no injury occurred during the incident and the Appellant in CRL.A.263/2025, a lady who was outside the Parliament, cannot be said to have committed any act which could have resulted in loss of life, bodily injury or significant property damage. The protest is more symbolic rather than giving apprehension of substantial threat or having been done with terrorist intent.

24. This case at this juncture appears to be a case of protest and political dissent. Even though the choice and the place of the protest is highly deprecable, it cannot be said that ingredients of UAPA are attracted while considering the issue of grant of bail. Much has been argued by the State regarding the choice of date. This would be a matter of trial. However, even assuming that the date was chosen when there was a threat perception, at this juncture, it can be only said that attempt was to sensationalise the event to gain attention of people and get mileage from the incident. However, this fact alone will not deter this Court from granting bail at this juncture. This Court is only going into the parameters of Section 43(D)(5) of the UAPA to decide whether this is a fit case for grant of bail to the Appellants.

25. In the opinion of this Court, the facts of the case do not attract the parameters of UAPA and, therefore, this Court is inclined to grant bail to the Appellants on the following conditions: a) The Appellants shall furnish securities in the sum of Rs.50,000/- each with two sureties of the like amount to the satisfaction of the Trial Court. b) The Appellants are directed not to give any interviews or hold any press conference or address media. c) The Appellants are directed not to post anything on any social media/e-media platform related to the incident. b) The Appellants are directed to continue to reside at the address given in the Memo of Parties before this Court and in case there is any change in the address of the Appellants, the Appellants are directed to intimate the same to the Investigating Officer. c) The Appellants are directed not to leave the city of Delhi without prior permission of the concerned Court. d) The Appellants are directed to report to the local police station on every Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 10:00 AM and the Appellants shall be released within an hour after completing the formalities; e) The Appellants are directed to give their mobile numbers to the Investigating Officer and keep them operational at all times; f) The Appellants shall not, directly or indirectly, tamper with evidence or try to influence the witnesses in any manner; g) The Appellants shall attend all the Court proceedings. h) In case it is established that the Appellants have violated the conditions of bail, the bail granted to the Appellants shall stand cancelled forthwith.

26. The appeals are disposed of, along with pending application(s), if any.

27. It is made clear that this Court has not made any observations on the merits of the case.

SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J HARISH VAIDYANATHANSHANKAR, J JULY 02, 2025