Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 2nd July, 2025
MRS MADHURBHASHANI & ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Devna Soni, Mr. Jatin Sehgal, Mr. Ashish Garg, Ms. Simran Bajaj and Mr. Shubham Aggarwal, Advocates.
Through: Mr. S.C. Singhal, Mr. Saideep Kaushik and Mr. Parth Mahajan, RC.REV. 112/2014, CM APPL. 70084/2024
MRS MADHURBHASHANI & ORS .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Devna Soni, Mr.Jatin Sehgal, Mr. Ashish Garg, Ms. Simran Bajaj and Mr. Shubham Aggarwal,
Through: Mr. Sajan Kr. Singh, Ms. Sangeeta Singh, Mr. Hem Kumar and Ms. Sona Singh, Advocates.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
JUDGMENT
By way of the present revision petitions filed under section
25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 („DRC Act‟) read with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 („CPC‟), the petitioners challenge similar but separate judgments dated 25.07.2013 passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi („ARC‟).
2. Notice on these petitions was issued on 26.02.2014 and 12.03.2014 respectively. Written submissions dated 26.02.2025 have been filed by the petitioners in both the petitions. Written submissions dated 01.03.2025 and 28.02.2025 have also been filed by the respondents in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and RC. REV. No. 112/2014 respectively. No reply has been filed in either of the petitions.
3. The court has heard Ms. Devna Soni, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners; as well as Mr. S.C. Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and Mr. Sajan Kr. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in RC. REV. NO. 112/2014, at length.
4. For the sake of completeness, it ought to be recorded that vide two separate orders, both dated 20.08.2019, the legal representatives of deceased respondent in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 and deceased respondent No.2 in RC. REV. No. 112/2014 were impleaded in the present proceedings and amended memos of parties were taken on record.
5. Furthermore, as recorded in order dated 29.04.2025, the additional documents placed before this court in RC. REV. No. 95/2014 have not been considered in the present revisional proceedings, since those documents did not form part of the record before the learned ARC.
FACTUAL MATRIX
6. Briefly, RC. REV. No. 95/2014 pertains to premises bearing No. II/40/8, Dalip Singh Block, Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi and RC. REV. 112/2014 pertains to premises bearing No. II/40/9, Dalip Singh Block, Sadar Bazar, Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi respectively, which premises are presently fetching paltry rents of Rs. 40/- per month each. As the record would show, both premises have been in the occupation of the concerned respondents for the last more than 50 years. The premises are stated to be old constructions and no rent agreement is stated to have been executed between the landlord and the tenant(s). Both the above-mentioned premises are hereinafter, individually and jointly, referred to as the „subject premises‟.
7. Two eviction petitions, both dated 17.04.2009, were filed by the petitioners under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act seeking eviction of the respondents (tenants) from the subject premises on the ground that petitioner No.2, who runs 02 restaurants by the name of „Dhaba‟ in London, United Kingdom bona-fidé requires the subject premises for expanding his business in India.
8. The respondents filed their respective applications seeking leave to defend, which applications came to be allowed vide orders dated 08.09.2009 and 17.11.2009 respectively passed by the learned ARC. The eviction proceedings culminated in passing of the impugned judgments dated 25.07.2013, which judgments, while acknowledging the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, proceeded to dismiss the eviction petitions on the ground that the petitioners had failed to prove that they had any bona-fidé requirement for the subject premises.
9. In arriving at this conclusion, the learned ARC relied on the fact that the petitioners are Non-Resident Indians („NRIs‟) who have been residing outside India since the 1970s; and on the evidence of PW- 1/petitioner No.2 recorded on 22.05.2010, where he stated that given the measurements of the subject premises, a restaurant cannot be run from those premises alone. Furthermore, the learned ARC also reasoned that petitioner No.1 (who is the mother of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3) cannot run a business due to her ill-health; and since petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 are settled-in and are running their businesses in London and Dubai respectively, the petitioners did not require the subject premises for their “subsistence or survival”; and therefore their bonafidé requirement did not amount to being an “actual need”; and that two of the eviction petitioners (petitioners Nos. 1 and 3) did not even depose in the proceedings. PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSIONS
10. Ms. Devna Soni learned counsel for the petitioners would submit, that the learned ARC has failed to appreciate, that it is settled law that tenants cannot dictate the terms of use of a tenanted property to their landlords. In this regard, counsel has relied on the decision of a Coordinate Bench of this court in Satya Pal Pathak vs. Vijay Kumar Kaushik.[1]
11. Inasmuch as PW-1‟s statement dated 22.05.2010 is concerned, Ms. Soni would argue that the learned ARC has only selectively appreciated that statement, and in doing so, has erroneously concluded that the petitioners do not have any bona-fidé requirement for the subject premises. To substantiate this argument, learned counsel has drawn attention of the court to the following excerpt of PW-1‟s statement recorded on 22.05.2010 “… The tenanted premises has now fallen to my share out of the ancestral property and I therefore want to use the same for opening a restaurant in Delhi where I have been born and brought up. It is incorrect to suggest that this eviction petition has only been filed because the same has fallen to my share. According to me the approximate measurement of the tenanted premises is 15’ X 12’. It is correct that a restaurant cannot be run from this shop alone. Vol. I can however run a take away/delivery joint from the said shop.…” (emphasis supplied) Ms. Soni accordingly would submit that the learned ARC has failed to appreciate that even if the subject premises alone cannot be used to run a sit-down restaurant, it can certainly be used to operate a food take-away business or delivery joint, which is essentially like running a restaurant. Counsel would further submit that the petitioners have also filed proceedings seeking eviction of tenants from other contiguous premises; and the combined size of these premises would 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8846 even allow the running of a full-fledged restaurant. To further substantiate this argument, counsel has also drawn attention of this court to the following excerpt of statement dated 17.09.2010 of PW-2, who is the power of attorney holder of PW-1/petitioner No.2:
12. Insofar as the learned ARC‟s conclusion is premised on the petitioners being NRIs and being well-established abroad is concerned, Ms. Soni would place reliance on verdicts of the Supreme Court in Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal,[2] and Raghunath G. Panhale vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co.,[3] to argue that it is neither unnatural for a landlord to seek eviction to expand his business; nor should a landlord necessarily be on the verge of destitution to seek to establish his business. In this regard counsel has also relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in Prativa Devi (Smt.) vs. T.V. Krishnan,[4] and Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,[5] to submit, that a landlord is free to decide his own requirements and it is unnecessary to enquire into “how else the landlord could have adjusted himself”.
13. Additionally, Ms. Soni would also cite a judgment of a Co-ordinate Bench of this court in Satpal Singh Sarna vs. Satya Prakash Bansal,[6] to argue that an NRI need not settle in India nor return to India permanently to show his bona-fidé requirement.
14. Upon being queried as regards the limited jurisdiction vested in this court in a revision petition, learned counsel would place reliance on Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani,[7] to submit that though this court would not ordinarily interfere in pure findings of fact arrived-at by the learned ARC, such findings can however be set-aside if they are based on a wrong legal premise. Learned counsel would also rely on John Impex (P) Ltd. vs. Dr. Surinder Singh,[8] to argue that “the scope of scrutiny in a rent revision would be more than a revision petition under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.”
15. Ms. Soni would accordingly submit, that since the learned ARC has dismissed the eviction petitions by enquiring into whether the petitioners need to expand their business, and such enquiry is impermissible in law as per the judgments cited, the impugned judgments passed by the learned ARC deserve to be set-aside. RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS
16. On the other hand, Mr. S.C. Singhal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in RC.REV. No. 95/2014 would argue that the learned ARC has justifiably rejected the eviction petitions, since the
2006 SCC OnLine Del 1505 petitioners were unable to make-out a case of bona-fidé need even after a full-dressed trial. In this regard, Mr. Singhal has principally made the following 03 arguments:
16.1. First, that the petitioners are neither owners of the subject premises nor are they landlords of the respondent;
16.2. Second, that the petitioners are NRIs and British passport holders, who had migrated from India in the 1970s; and
16.3. Third, that the petitioners have themselves admitted in the course of their deposition that a „restaurant‟ – which is their pleaded bona-fidé requirement and which is fundamentally distinct from a take-away/delivery joint – cannot be run from the subject premises by reason of its small size. Furthermore, the contention is that the petitioners have even admitted that they “do not require the tenanted premises for any subsistence and survival”.
17. Elucidating on the first prong of his argument, learned counsel for the tenant would submit, that the subject premises forms part of a residential building that was held by one Dalip Singh HUF; and the father of petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 had ceased to be a member of that HUF prior to 1960. Furthermore, it is argued that a partition suit pertaining to the residential building was disposed-of based on a settlement agreement, and it is under such settlement that the petitioners are claiming to be owners and landlords of the subject premises; however, that settlement and disposal of the suit based thereon cannot be said to be good in law, since it was entered with one Jasbir Singh Loyal, who was neither Karta nor Manager of the HUF and an application challenging the decree passed in that suit has already been moved by one Kuldeep Singh Loyal.
18. Inasmuch as the second and third arguments are concerned, Mr. Singhal would submit that the petitioners are well-settled abroad, and admittedly do not need the subject premises for their survival, and as a result, their claimed bona-fidé need is merely a desire or want and cannot be the basis for evicting statutorily protected tenants from the subject premises. It has also been highlighted by counsel that petitioners Nos. 1 and 3 did not even step-into the witness box to prove their alleged bona-fidé requirement.
19. In this regard, learned counsel would also rely on the decision of the Supreme Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Mahesh Chand Gupta (Dr),[9] to submit that: “the phrase “required bona fide” is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation”.
20. It has accordingly been argued that since the petitioners are wellsettled abroad and have not shown any intention of returning to or settling in India, least of all for setting-up a business here, the learned ARC has rightly rejected the eviction petitions.
21. Furthermore, counsel for the respondent would also emphasize the limited scope of scrutiny available in the revisional jurisdiction. In this behalf Mr. Singhal would rely on the decision of the Supreme
Court in Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua,10 to submit that while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, the High Court is not to substitute or supplant its views in place of those of the trial court.
22. Counsel would also rely on the Supreme Court decision in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works vs. Rangaswamy Chettiar,11 to submit, that findings of fact arrived-at by the Rent Controller ought not to be interfered-with merely because the High Court does not agree with those findings.
23. In the circumstances, Mr. Singhal would submit that the learned ARC has correctly appreciated the evidence and material on record to conclude that the petitioners‟ alleged bona-fidé requirement is only a fanciful and whimsical desire; and that such a finding ought not to be interfered-with by this court; and in his case the impugned judgment deserves to be upheld.
24. Mr. Sajan Kumar Singh, learned counsel appearing for the respondent in RC. REV. No. 112/2014 has essentially adopted the submissions made by Mr. Singhal and would call for dismissal of the present revision petitions, on merits as well as on the ground that the scope of these revisional proceedings is limited.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
25. Upon considering the arguments made on behalf of the parties, while being conscious of the narrow scope of the revisional jurisdiction of this court under section 25B(8) of the DRC Act, this court is persuaded by the aspects of the matter as discussed hereinafter.
26. First and foremost, this court notices the observations of the Supreme Court in Ram Narain Arora, wherein the Supreme Court has held the following: “12. It is no doubt true that the scope of a revision petition under Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act is a very limited one, but even so in examining the legality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out whether he had correctly or on a firm legal basis approached the matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with, but (sic, if) in a given case, the finding of fact is given on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to interfere with such a matter. In this case, the Rent Controller proceeded to analyse the matter that non-disclosure of a particular information was fatal and, therefore, dismissed the claim made by the landlord. It is in these circumstances that it became necessary for the High Court to re-examine the matter and then decide the entire question. We do not think that any of the decisions referred to by the learned counsel decides the question of the same nature with which we are concerned. Therefore, detailed reference to them is not required.”
27. In fact the view taken in Ram Narain Arora has been re-articulated by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh,12 in the following words: “43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on reappreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to reappreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity.”
28. When the present cases are viewed in light of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it is clearly discernible that the learned ARC has attempted to foist his own assessment of whether the petitioners could run a restaurant from the subject premises, by holding that the size of the subject premises is too small to run a „restaurant‟ [not even taking into account that there are contiguous premises for which also the petitioners have filed eviction petition(s)]. The learned ARC has also ignored the deposition of PW-1/petitioner No. 2 who had clarified, that while it may be true that it is not possible to run a „restaurant‟ from the subject premises taken individually, the petitioners may run a food take-away facility or delivery joint from the subject premises; and, if the petitioners obtain eviction of the other contiguous premises, they may yet be able to run a sit-down restaurant from the combined premises.
29. Upon a meaningful reading of the eviction petitions and the depositions of the petitioners‟ witnesses, it is clear that the bona-fidé requirement that the petitioners are canvassing is, that since they are engaged in the restaurant business in London, United Kingdom, they would want to open a food-related business in Delhi, India which is where they originally belong. Now, whether they are able to run a full-fledged, sit-down restaurant or a smaller food take-away vend is entirely the petitioners‟ prerogative; and the bona-fidés of their requirement cannot be discounted based merely on the learned ARC‟s assessment of whether a food business can be run from the subject premises. This view taken by the learned ARC is flawed when tested on the touchstone of the Supreme Court‟s observations in Ram Narain Arora and Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd.
30. As a matter of fact, the Supreme Court has yet again articulated the same position as referred-to above in its most recent judgment in Kanhaiya Lal Arya vs. Mohd. Ehshan13:
“10.The law with regard to eviction of a tenant from the suit premises on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord is well settled. The need has to be a real one rather than a mere desire to get the premises vacated. The landlord is the best judge to decide which of his property should be vacated for satisfying his particular need. The tenant has no role in dictating as to which premises the landlord should get vacated for his need alleged in the suit for eviction.”
31. Next, the learned ARC has also accepted the respondents‟ contention that since the petitioners had migrated from India in the 1970s and are presently British passport holders and NRIs, and especially since they have done well for themselves financially and do not require the subject premises for their subsistence or survival, the requirement cited in the eviction petitions is not bona-fidé but a mere desire, whim or fancy which cannot be the basis for the respondents‟ eviction. This view taken by the learned ARC is wholly uncalled-for and illegal especially in light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Raghunath G. Panhale, the relevant extract of which reads as follows: “11. It will be seen that the trial court and the appellate court had clearly erred in law. They practically equated the test of “need or requirement” to be equivalent to “dire or absolute or compelling necessity”. According to them, if the plaintiff had not permanently lost his job on account of the lockout or if he had not resigned his job, he could not be treated as a person without any means of livelihood, as contended by him and hence not entitled to an order for possession of the shop. This test, in our view, is not the proper test. A landlord need not lose his existing job nor resign it nor reach a level of starvation to contemplate that he must get possession of his premises for establishing a business.……”
32. Furthermore, it may be observed that the financial well-being of a landlord, or the financial ill-health of a tenant, are not relevant considerations while deciding an eviction petition under section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act.
33. In the impugned judgments, the learned ARC also records that it is not considered necessary to delve into the question of availability of suitable, alternate accommodation, observing that since the petitioners had failed to make-out a case of bona-fidé requirement, there was no need to delve into the other aspect of section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. Para 26 of the impugned judgments may be perused for this purpose: “26. Suitable alternative accommodation: Once this Court has reached to a conclusion that the requirement of the petitioners in respect of tenanted shop is not bonafide and genuine then the question whether the petitioners have any other suitable accommodation available with them or not is not required to be gone into.” (emphasis in original)
34. However, now that this court is of the view that the petitioners have been able to substantiate their bona-fidé requirement, the aspect of availability of suitable, alternate accommodation must also be assessed.
35. In this respect, it is seen that in their written statements filed in response to the eviction petitions, the respondents had taken the plea that the petitioners have not disclosed in the petition the “nonavailability of an alternate accommodation to them”. The respondents had accordingly contended, that the petitioners had failed to plead that they did not have any suitable, alternate accommodation available with them.
36. Insofar as this last contention is concerned, suffice it to say, that in the present circumstances, mere omission on the part of the petitioners to specifically say that they have no other suitable, alternate accommodation would not be fatal to their case. It is noteworthy that nowhere in their written statements did the respondents even say that the petitioners had any suitable, alternate accommodation available; nor did the respondents give specifics of any suitable alternate accommodation available.
37. In this view of the matter, it appears that nothing was brought on the record of the learned ARC to show that the petitioners had any alternate accommodation, muchless any suitable alternate accommodation, available with them in Delhi. That aspect would therefore not stand in the way of the petitioners being entitled to recovery of possession of the subject premises from the respondents.14
38. For the sake of completeness, it may also be recorded that the respondents had contended that the petitioners were not owners of the subject premises, and that therefore they were not landlords. This objection was based on the respondents‟ allegation that the petitioners had acquired title to the subject premises under a family settlement entered into in the course of a partition suit; and that the family Ram Narain Arora vs. Asha Rani, (1999) 1 SCC 141, para 11 settlement and partition decree had been challenged by one of the family members of the petitioners.
39. It must be noted that the learned ARC has categorically held that landlord-tenant relationship stands admitted as between the petitioners and the respondents; and the respondents have also admitted that they were paying rent to the HUF of which the petitioners were a part.
40. As a result, the contention raised by the respondents against the petitioners‟ title is also without merit, since regardless of the fate of the challenge to the partition decree, the admitted position today is, that the petitioners are entitled to the subject premises based on the partition decree. It is long-settled that to seek eviction, all that a landlord needs to show is that he enjoys rights to the demised premises that are better than that of the tenant. The vesting of absolute title to a premises in a landlord is not a prerequisite for deciding an eviction petition. The scope of an eviction proceeding does not warrant any further enquiry into this aspect. The observations of the Supreme Court in Shanti Sharma vs. Ved Prabha,15 may be noticed in this behalf: “14.The word “owner” has not been defined in this Act and the word „owner‟ has also not been defined in the Transfer of Property Act. The contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant appears to be that ownership means absolute ownership in the land as well as of the structure standing thereupon. Ordinarily, the concept of ownership may be what is contended by the counsel for the appellant but in the modern context where it is more or less admitted that all lands belong to the State, the persons who hold properties will only be lessees or the persons holding the land on some term from the government or the authorities constituted by the State and in this view of the matter it could not be thought of that the legislature when it used the term “owner” in the provision of Section 14(1)(e) it thought of ownership as absolute ownership. It must be presumed that the concept of ownership only will be as it is understood at present. It could not be doubted that the term “owner” has to be understood in the context of the background of the law and what is contemplated in the scheme of the Act. This Act has been enacted for protection of the tenants. But at the same time it has provided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this context, the phrase “owner” thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof. In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term “owner” is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in this view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term “owner” as is contemplated under this section.……”
41. This court is compelled to record, that while manning the Rent Control Roster it has found that cases abound where very well-off tenants enjoying financial prosperity persist in unjustly occupying premises for decades on-end, paying pittance for rent, while in the process their landlords are forced into impecunious and desperate circumstances, resulting from egregious misuse of an anachronistic piece of legislation, namely the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
42. As a sequitur to the above discussion, this court deems it fit to setaside the impugned judgments, both dated 25.07.2013, passed by the learned ARC in eviction petitions bearing Nos. E-32/09 and E-33/09. Consequently, the eviction petitions are allowed and the petitioners are entitled to evict the respondents from the subject premises and obtain vacant, physical possession thereof, in accordance with law.
43. The revision petitions are disposed-of in the above terms.
44. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J. JULY 02, 2025 HJ/ss