Council for Advancement of Peoples Action & Rural Technology v. B.R. Suman

2. This is the second round of litigation, as the Tribunal vide order dated 6th May, 2011, had earlier quashed the charge memo itself, whereupon CAPART had filed W.P. (C) No. 4126/2011, which was allowed with an order of remand. The relevant and operative portion of the High Court’s 2017:DHC:651-DB order dated 6th May, 2011 is reproduced below:-

3. After having noticed the aforesaid observations of the High Court, the Tribunal in the impugned order has referred to the contentions raised by the respondent in brief and thereafter, the Tribunal has abruptly and in a cryptic manner has recorded their final conclusion without any discussion on the enquiry report and the findings recorded therein with reference to the file notings etc. The impugned order is bereft and devoid of any reason and elucidation for the final conclusion. The relevant portion of the impugned order reads:-

4. In order to ensure that a second order of remand is not passed, we have perused and studied the enquiry report, which is elaborate and discusses several facets and aspects. The enquiry report refers to the file notings dated 27 and 28th October, 1994 made by the Research Assistant who was junior to the respondent-B.R. Suman, as well as the senior officers who had initiated the said notings. Negative and disapproving findings have been recorded against the respondent on the basis of file notings. The enquiry report also refers to the sanction letter which was given by hand on 31st October, 1994. The project holder had requested release of 75% of the sanctioned amount, which file was also processed and signed on 31st October, 1994. Approval was granted on 10th November, 1994. The oral evidence including statement of M.P. Singh, Research Assistant, has been elaborated and commented. After referring to the respondent’s defence, the enquiry report sums up the entire findings as under:- “Promptness or haste or urgency in handling of cases in Govt. or its instrumentalities is not culpable by itself; in fact these are qualifites that deserve appreciation. But when promptness or haste or urgency begin to smack of being “undue”, particularly in matters involving finances, financial sanctions or release of funds or other benefits, the whole exercise begins to look suspect. When the examination and handling of such matters is found to be incomplete, improper, perfunctory, superficial, mechanical or slip shod, the suspicions of malafide or improper motive get strengthened. In the instant case, there has been inexplicable “Haste” in its processing. The “Haste” was “Undue” for there was no justification for skipping over proper and detailed examination. Coupled with “undue haste” examination, or “misleading examination”. The case has therefore all the elements that make the entire exercise look motivate.” But before we record our findings on the charge, we would like to observe that the onus for improper, or motivated, or as mentioned in the imputations “slip shod” examination does not lie along on the lower levels of the hierarchy; each one of the functionaries handling a matter at his level has to share the responsibility if anything is found amiss. In fact, the higher the ladder, the higher the accountability. In the instant case, while the lower levels reveled (sic) in “slip shod” examination, the higher levels “indulgently acquired” to such examination and granted recommendation and/or approval without raising eyebrows. In equity, such a situation warrants independent probe to ascertain the culpability of the action of the senior officers also. Findings: In final analysis of the evidence on record and all the facts and circumstances of the case I hold the charge as proved.”

5. We have not reproduced other portions of the enquiry report to avoid prolixity, but have taken time to examine and peruse the original file relating to departmental proceedings. Another reason why we have not reproduced the relevant portions of the enquiry report is to avoid any prejudice, as was also submitted by the counsel for the respondent.

6. In these circumstances, the Tribunal, we hold, was not justified in allowing the Transfer Application without detailed elucidation as to the facts and material, by simply recording that the enquiry report was based on suspicion and was presumptuous.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that M.P. Singh, the Research Assistant was awarded punishment of stoppage of one increment for one year. She is not aware whether any punishment was imposed on S.S. Machhal. As per the respondent, Mr. Prasad, who was the Deputy Director General, was not proceeded against. Counsel for the petitioner, however, submits that this is not correct. He states that Mr. Prasad had expired and, therefore, proceedings could not culminate in a final order. These contentions will have to be examined by the Tribunal after ascertaining the correct position.

8. We accordingly allow the present writ petition and set aside the order dated 8th September, 2016 passed by the Tribunal allowing T.A. NO. 1446/2009 with an order of remand for fresh decision in accordance with law. We clarify that we have not expressed any opinion on merits in favour or against any party. As this is an old matter, the Tribunal would dispose of the matter expeditiously, preferably within six months.