Mamta Yadav v. Union of India

2. The petitioners were provided with Unit Line/Barrack accommodation within the residential complex of the CISF. They were deployed for, duty at Indira Gandhi International Airport (IGIA), New Delhi. Buses or official transport was provided for travel from the barracks to the Airport and return.

3. The petitioners contend that they are entitledto transport allowance for they were not given government or official transport facilities from the barrack to Kote/Quarter Guard and back.

4. The payment of transport allowance is governed by the Ministry of Finance, Departirient of Expenditure Office Memorandum No. 21 (2)/2008'-E-II (B) dated 29.08.2008 and Office Memorandum NO. 21(8)/2010-E-II (B) dated 01.08.2012. The Office Memorandum dated 29.08.2008 stipulates that the transport allowance shall not be admissible to employees who have been provided government transport facility. - V >

5. Similar controversy had arisen before the High Court of Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 10331/2009, Rajeev Kumar vs. Union ofIndia and Ors., decided on 24.01.2011. The contention of siinilarly situated employees was rejected in the following words: "14. The case projected by thepetitioner in the rejoinder. affidavit is that the transport is not provided from the residence i.e. the barracks where the jawan actually resides, but is provided from the quarter guard. The petitioner states that the distance between the quarter guard and the barrack ranges between 500 meter to 800 meter.

15. For purposes of security, the CISF barracks are housed in a large complex which includes the quarter guard. Now, public transport does not enter within the precincts ofthe complex and picks up and drops persons at the gate. The quarter guard is next to the gate.

16. Let us take the case of a person residing in a-multi storeyed complex, on the 30th floor, of a multi-storeyed building. Surely, Government transport cannot reach the floor on which the person resides. He has to either walk down the staircase or use a ramp or lift to reach the ground floor and therefrom take transport to reach his destination. Can such a person state that notwithstanding he using Government transport, but since the same is not afacilityfrom hisflat and that he has to come down to the ground floor to avail the transport facility, notwithstanding his availing the transport facility, he is entitled to a transport allowance?

17. Since law has to be interpreted with commonsense and with practicality and not in a pedantic manner, the obvious answer would be that such a person would not be entitled to transport allowance. V

18. The example may be in the extreme, but certainly helps us in identifying theprocess ofreasoning needed to be adopted in the instant case.

19. Housing complex of CISFjawan has entry from the main gate. There would be a play field, a small little, shopping areia, may be a medical unit, a bank, a post office and the residential barracks. We could have understood ifthe area was spread into a couple ofsquare hns. We could have understood if to reach the gate one had to take transport from the barrack where the residential units were located. But, to walk 500 meters or 800 meters is neither here nor there. It is as good as a transport facility which can be said to be a pick up and drop downfacilityfrom the residence to the workplace. " For the ratio expounded, the petitioners are not entitled to transport allowance, unless, they are able to establish and show that the distance between the barrack/residential accommodation in the unit and the Kote/Quarter Guard, was such that they were required to either use public transport or their personal transport. The petitioners are unable to establish the said case in the present writ petitions. Mere statement that the distance between the barracks/residential accommodation and the Kote/Quarter Guard was approximately 1/1.[5] kilometre as averred in W.P.(C) NO. 6375/2016 filed by Vikas Kumar Chaudhary & Ors. and W.P. (C) NO. 9047/2016 filed by Nitesh Kumar & Ors. is not sufficient. These are vague assertions. The Kote/Quarter Guard and barracks/residential accommodation were located in the same residential complex. This assertion is not made in the other writ petitions. -V

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners have submitted that other employees and the petitioners were paid transport allowance 'when deputed for duty at locations other than IGI Airport and therefore, there is discrimination and violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. In W.P.(C) No. 7769/2016 Dhiraj Kumar Nath has stated that he was denied transport allowance, when posted at IGI Airport, but on being posted at Nirman Bhawan, transport allowance was/is being paid. Other petitioners have raised similar contentions.

7. Grant of transport allowance is subject to and has to be in terms of the Office Memorandums dated 29.08.2008 and 01.08.2012. The Office Memorandums ensure uniformity, clarity and mandate and require conformity. In case, the Office Memorandums are defied and flouted, the deviation and irregularity should be corrected. We would hesitate and not direct perpetuation of a continuous wrong. The plea of negative equality cannot be accepted. This is an aspect for the respondents to examine and take remedial measures as required. If the transport allowance is to be paid, it should be uniformly paid to all similarly situated employees. It should not depend upon, the place ofdeployment.

8. The respondent authorities should look into the said allegation and ensure uniformity in practice. The decision taken by the respondent ^ ' authorities interms ofthe directions given above, would be communicated to the petitioners within a period of two months from the date when a copy of this order is received.

9. The petitioners have relied on Jaspal Singh Mann v^. Union of India & Ors., 2008 (103) DRJ 513 (DB). This was a case of non-grant of HRA for the reason that the said facility was extendable only to a certain •J V percentage of persons on the strength of the cadre, in a particular town. The said criteria or ground to deny HRA to those who had not been provided official accommodation was struck down. The issue involved in the present case is entirely different.

10. With the aforesaid observations, we dispose of the present writ petitions. No orders as to costs. Pending applications also stand disposed of •//c SANJIVKHANNA, J 1/ ANIL KUMAR CHAWLA, J ^ APRIL 24, 2017 rs V