Baljeet and Ors v. Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board and Ors

1. The petitioners in these petitions assail the common order dated 11.08.2015, whereby the Central Administrative Tribunal Principal Bench, New Delhi (CAT/ Tribunal) dismissed O.A. No.299/2015 & 145/2015.

2. At the outset, it would be seen that the petitioners have approached this Court with substantial latches and delay since the impugned order was passed nearly 20 months ago. The said delay, and in the facts ofthe case, is pertinent.

3. The respondent/ DSSSB issued an Advertisement No.004/2009 to invite applications to fill up, inter alia, 4,500 posts ofTeacher (Primary) in Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The closing date for receipt of the applications was fixed as 15.01.2010. The closing date was subsequently extended to 17.10.2011. However, the cut-off date for eligibility was retained as 15.01.2010.

4. Several candidates- like the petitioners, who were not eligible as on 15.01.2010 challenged the decision to retain the said cut-off date for determination of eligibility, even though the last date for submission stood extended to 17.10.2011 by filing, inter alia, O.A. No. 3663/2011. The Tribunal allowed the same on 30.03.2012 and directed the respondents to "33 treat the closing datefor receipt ofapplications of the applicants in terms of the impugned notice dated 13.09.2011 i.e. 17.10.2011 based on the Recruitment Regulations, 2011 as crucial datefor determining the eligibility y of the applicants with regard to their educational qualifications, age, etc as well. "

5. The DSSSB challenged the said order by preffering W.P. (C.) NO. 3397/2012, which was disposed of by this Court on 06.02.2013. The decision of the Tribunal directing the change of the cut-off date from 15.01.2010 to 17.10.2011 was reversed. The reasoning adopted by the High Court in its decision dated 06.02.2013, which is also extracted in the impugned order, reads as follows: "24. The first reason of the law which acts as our compass is that ordinarily vacancies have to befilled upfrom amongst the eligible Candidates pertaining to the yearofthe vacancy andif for some reasons the selection process ispostponed, only those who were eligible in the year of the vacancy should be considered. The second reason of the law which acts as our compass is that wherever in an ongoing process a derailment takes place at a particularpoint, the rail should be put back at the point where it derailed after removing the cause of derailment and letting the train chug along.

25. Guided by the aforesaid two reasons of law we unhesitatingly reach the conclusion that the only corrective action which could be directed to be taken was, as was directed by the Tribunal when the Original Applications filed by A Candidates who pointed out a hiatus between retaining the upper age limit of 27 years and the classification of the post was decided with a direction to amend the Recruitment Rule and issue a Corrigendum making eligible Candidates up to the age of 30years; requiring the cut-offdate January 15, 2010 to be retained. The subsequent decision mandating that the eligibility cut-off date should be shifted to October 17, 2011 wouldamount to modifying the track and as a result making ineligible many Candidates who cross the age of 30 years as of January 15, 2010. It must be also remembered that the vacancies pertained to the vacancy year 2010 and this explains the cut-offdate being January 15, 2010.

26. Accordingly, we dispose ofthe WritPetition setting aside the impugned judgment and order dated March 30, 2012 leaving the parties to bear their own costs." (emphasis supplied)

6. The petitioners were those who were affected due torestoration ofthe cut-off date as 15.01.2010 since as on that date they did not possess the requisite qualification. Consequently, they preferred the aforesaid Original Applications. The Tribunal did not find merit in their applications, and dismissed the same by applying the ratio of the decision of this Court in W.P. (C.) No. 3397/2012. The Tribunal also observed that despite the earlier selection process having been concluded, alarge number ofvacancies still remain to be filled, and in the next round, the petitioners would have a fair chance to compete.

7. The petitioners have sought to explain the delay by claiming that after the decision of the Tribunal in the impugned order, they represented to the Government. The said explanation is not satisfactory. Once there was already a judicial pronouncement existing against the interest of the petitioners, they should have promptly approached this Court ifthey were h< < aggrieved by passing of the impugned order. Not having done so and delayed the filing of the present petition, in our view, these petitions are liableto be dismissed onthe ground of delay and latches alone.

8. Even otherwise, we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned order since the Tribunal has followed the ratio of the decision of this Court in W.P. (C.) No.3397/2012 decided on 06.02.2013. Moreover, the selection process in question is already completed and the same cannjot'' / be re-opened at the instance ofthe petitioners.

9. For all the aforesaid reasons, the petitions are dismissed.

APRIL 28, 2017 B.S. Rohella VIPIN SANGHI, J ^ E St-OK IS DEEPA SHARMA, J