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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 7732 of 2011
Foreshore Co-operative Housing Society Limited
..Appellant(s)
..Respondent(s)
Razia Amirali Shroff and others ……Appellant(s)
Civil Appeal No. 5515 of 2012
Razia Amirali Shroff and others ……Appellant(s)
Civil Appeal No(s). 3396 of 2015
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.24880 of 2012)
Nusli Neville Wadia …..Appellant(s)
Civil Appeal No(s).3397 of 2015
(Arising out of SLP (C) No.2989 of 2012)
Punam Co-operative Housing Society
…..Appellant(s)
Civil Appeal No(s).3393-95 of 2015
(Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.16373-16375 of 2013)
Rama Vijay Kumar Oberoi thr. GPH …Appellant(s)
JUDGMENT
M. Y. EQBAL, J.
Leave granted.
2. In these appeals question has been raised about the ambit and scope of Section 9A CPC as inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act 1977 vis-àvis the provision of Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Before adverting to the legal question, it would be proper to mention the nature of the orders passed by the Bombay High Court in these appeals.
3. In Civil Appeal No. 7732 of 2011 (Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Limited vs. Praveen D. Desai (Dead) thr. Lrs. and others) the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld the order of the learned Single Judge dismissing the appellant’s suit on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation. In Civil Appeal No.5514 of Page 4 2012, the appellants are aggrieved by the impugned Order dated 15.3.2012, whereby the Division Bench refused to interfere with order dated 24.1.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge in Notice of Motion No.3616 of 2010 in Suit No.2901 of 2010. The Notice of Motion was taken out by the plaintiffs seeking certain interim reliefs pending hearing of the suit. The learned Single Judge by the said order directed the defendants to file reply to the Notice of Motion and also directed that the Notice of Motion itself be placed for final hearing. Grievance of the plaintiffs before the Division Bench was that the learned Single Judge has declined to pass any ad-interim order in favour of the plaintiffsappellants without giving any reason for doing so. The Division Bench noticed that the defendant-respondents had raised objection to the maintainability of the suit itself as also on the question whether the suit is filed within the period of limitation. In Civil Appeal No.5515 of 2012, the appellants are aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the prayer for grant of ad-interim relief Page 5 was declined pending hearing on the preliminary issue raised by the defendants under Section 9A, CPC, till the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit is decided. The Division Bench in the matter of Nusli Neville Wadia (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.24880/2012) set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and directed inter alia that the issue “Whether the claim of the Plaintiff in the suit is barred by limitation” be raised under Section 9A and tried as a preliminary issue. Whereas while dealing with the appeal against the order of learned Single Judge framing a preliminary issue under Section 9A with regard to limitation and decided to try it as preliminary issue, the Division Bench in the matter of Punam Co-operative Housing Society (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.2989/2012 ) upheld decision of the Single Judge. In the matter of Sou. Rama Vijay Kumar Oberoi (Civil Appeal arising out of SLP(C)Nos.16373- 16375/2013), the defendant raised an objection that the suit was barred by limitation, the trial court held that the issue of limitation being a mixed question of fact and law could not Page 6 be framed as a preliminary issue under Section 9A, CPC. In appeal, learned Single Judge of the High Court in the impugned order directed the trial court to frame a preliminary issue under Section 9A as to whether the suit was barred by limitation.
4. Since the question of law in all these appeals is similar, we would like to narrate the factual matrix of the case pertaining to Civil Appeal No.7732 of 2011 (Foreshore Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.) which relates to the rights enjoyed by the parties therein over the suit property. The Appellant is a co-operative housing society consisting of owners of various flats in the building ‘Advent’ which exists on the suit property. The Appellant filed Suit No.2939/1999 for declaring that Respondent Nos.1-6 and 8 have no rights whatsoever over the suit property and that they were not entitled to carry out construction of the building by name of ‘Divya Prabha’ within the suit property and for permanently Page 7 restraining them from doing so. The Appellant also prayed for declaring the revalidation of the I.O.D. (Intimation of Disapproval) and commencement certificate by Respondent No. 7 - Municipal Corporation in 1998, 2004 and 2005 in favour of Respondent Nos. 1-6 and 8 to carry out construction of the building by name of ‘Divya Prabha’ in the suit property to be illegal.
5. The suit property was originally leased to the Golwals. In 1958, the Golwals entered into an agreement dated 17.03.1958 granting development rights over a portion of the suit property to Respondent No.1 and also executed a Power of Attorney in his favour. Respondent No. 1 in turn transferred these rights in favour of his company- Respondent No. 2 vide agreement dated 23.10.1959. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 constructed the building ‘Advent’ whose flat owners are the members of the Appellant Society. The Municipal Corporation granted I. O. D. and Page 8 commencement certificate to Respondent No.1 in 1966 for constructing a building by the name of ‘Divya Prabha’ in the suit property. In 1968, the Municipal Corporation issued notices for stopping the construction of ‘Divya Prabha’ on account of irregularities therein. Respondent No. 1 filed a suit challenging these notices, however after the plaint was returned for presentation before the proper court, the same was not pursued.
6. In 1968-69, disputes arose between the Golwals and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 in relation to the land development agreement and the Power of Attorney executed in favour of Respondent No. 1 was revoked. The Golwals then assigned their entire leasehold interest in favour of the Appellant society vide agreement dated 25.03.1969 and the Appellant was confirmed as the lawful assignee by the Municipal Corporation. Page 9
7. The Appellant pleaded that in 1987, Respondent No.3 entered into the suit property and began carrying out construction of ‘Divya Prabha’ on the basis of an agreement purported to have been executed by Respondent Nos.[1] and 2 in his favour in 1980 and on the basis of the agreement and power of attorney purported to have been executed in his favour by Golwala in 1984 and 1986 respectively. The Corporation is said to have issued a notice in 1987 to Respondent No. 3 to stop the construction and a suit challenging the same was filed by Respondent No. 3. The Appellant further pleaded that Respondent Nos.1-6 had executed a deed of assignment dated 14.10.1994 in favour of Respondent No. 8 selling the suit property and the building ‘Divya Prabha’ to the latter.
8. The Appellant filed Suit No. 6734/1994 in October, 1994 before the City Civil Court for declaring that Respondent Nos. 1-6 and 8 have no rights over the suit property, that they Page 10 were not entitled to carry out construction within the suit property and for declaring that the revalidations of I. O. D. and the commencement certificate were illegal. On 28.06.1996, the validity of the I. O. D. and the commencement certificate of 1966 were extended till 19.06.1997 and the suit was amended to challenge the same. When the validity of the I.O.D. and commencement certificate expired, learned Single Judge of the High Court permitted Respondent Nos. 1-6 and 8 to apply again for revalidation and directed them to communicate any such order to the Appellant. Respondent No. 8 was alleged to have forcibly entered into the suit property on various occasions in 1998 and begun construction of ‘Divya Prabha’ without informing the Appellant of any grant of permission whereupon the Appellant filed a suit for injunction.
9. Revalidation certificates dated 18.09.1998 and 05.10.1998 were issued in relation to the I. O. D. and the Page 11 commencement certificate, and the Appellant amended the plaint to challenge the same. However, by an order dated 16.04.1999, the plaint in Suit No. 6734/1994 was returned for presentation before the proper court as it was improperly valued and exceeded the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. The Appellants filed an appeal against the said order, but afterwards withdrew it. In 1999, Appellant then filed a suit being Suit No. 2939/1999 before the Single Judge of the High Court, which was amended to challenge the revalidation certificates granted on 08.03.2004, 09.03.2004, 08.07.2004 and on 06.08.2005 during the pendency of the suit. This suit was also permitted to be amended in 2005 for incorporating pleadings to the effect that Suit No. 6734/1994 was filed and prosecuted before the City Civil Court in good faith and with due diligence.
10. The Appellant filed Notice of Motion for grant of injunction and Respondent No. 8 raised preliminary Page 12 objections regarding the maintainability of the suit. Learned Single Judge noted that Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for hearing an objection regarding the jurisdiction of the court to entertain a suit as a preliminary issue when such objection is raised in an application for grant of interim relief. In view of the same, learned Single Judge framed a preliminary issue as to whether Suit No.2939/1994 was barred by limitation or not. Learned Single Judge held that though the matter in issue in Suit No.6734/1994 and Suit No.2939/1999 was the same, the Appellant was not entitled to the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act as it had failed to prove that the earlier suit was pursued with due diligence and good faith. Learned Single Judge noted that the plaint initially did not have any pleadings for availing the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and that the same was incorporated by way of an amendment in 2005 after the reply to the notice of motion was filed and preliminary issue regarding jurisdiction was framed. The Appellant was required to prove not only Page 13 the diligent prosecution of Suit No. 6734/1994 but also its diligent institution and the Single Judge held that the Appellant had failed to do so having been unable to show that the said suit was incorrectly valued despite due care and caution. The Appellant was also held to have not cited any particulars or evidence for having pursued the earlier suit in good faith. Learned Single Judge dismissed the suit as barred by limitation vide judgment dated 20.01.2006.
11. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Single Judge, Appellant filed an appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court. The Appellant pleaded that the bar of limitation was not a bar on the jurisdiction of the court and that the question of limitation was a question of law and fact which had to be decided along with the other issues in the suit. The Appellant also contended that it was entitled to the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and that even assuming that it was not so entitled, the suit would still be Page 14 within the period of limitation as the cause of action arose when the I. O. D. and the commencement certificate were revalidated on 18.09.1998 and 05.10.1998 and when the Respondents trespassed into the suit property on various occasions in 1998.
12. After hearing learned counsel on either side, the Division Bench held that the moment the issue of jurisdiction was raised under Section 9A of Code of Civil Procedure, such issue had to be decided first as the same was mandated under Section 9A and as valuable time could be saved in case it is found that the court does not have jurisdiction. The term “jurisdiction” under Section 9A was held to have been used in a wider sense and subject to any statutory bar on the maintainability of a suit. The Division Bench held that the court was bound to dismiss a suit barred by limitation as it had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. The plea of limitation was held to be a question of law which related to Page 15 the jurisdiction of the court and the court was held to be precluded from adjudicating the matter on merits when the suit was barred by limitation. The Division Bench went on to hold that the suit herein, which was filed on 18.05.1999, was barred by limitation as the cause of action arose in April,
1994. The view of the Single Judge that the plaint initially did not have any pleadings for availing the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and that the same was incorporated by way of an amendment in 2005 was upheld. The Division Bench held that the Appellant was not entitled to the benefit under Section 14 of the Limitation Act as there was no proof of the earlier suit having been prosecuted with due diligence and good faith and dismissed the appeal vide the impugned judgment.
13. Hence, the present appeals by special leave by the appellants. Page 16
14. We have heard Mr. F.S. Nariman, Mr. P. Chidambaram, Mr. Shekhar Naphade, Mr. Jaideep Gupta, learned senior advocates appearing on behalf of the appellants. We have also heard Mr. Kapil Sibal, Mr. Salman Khurshid, Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Mr. Ashwini Kumar, Mr. A. Sharan, Mr. Shyam Divan and other learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents.
15. At the very outset, Mr. Nariman drew our attention to the aim and object of bringing Section 9A by Maharashtra Amendment in the Code of Civil Procedure. According to the learned senior counsel, Maharashtra Legislature used the word ‘jurisdiction’ in all matters concerning jurisdiction, i.e. the pecuniary or territorial, notwithstanding that in Order XIV Rule 2 preliminary issue is to be raised only when it is of law. It cannot be raised when the issue of jurisdiction is a mixed issue of law and fact. According to Mr. Nariman, ‘jurisidction’ used in Section 9A is confined to its textual interpretation Page 17 i.e., any plea as to the jurisdiction of the court with reference to the subject matter, territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, which ousts the jurisdiction of the court. Mr. Nariman submitted that initially Section 9A was enacted by Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1969 because of judgments rendered by the Bombay High Court. It was only for the purpose of deciding objections as to the jurisdiction either territorial or pecuniary, Section 9A was inserted. Learned senior counsel submitted that since the date of enactment of Section 9A in 1970 the questions of territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction have been decided. Mr. Nariman then referring the decision of this Court in the case of Mathai vs. Varkey Varkey, (1964) 1 SCR 495, submitted that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong, and that even though it decided wrong it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. In other words, courts having jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though decide Page 18 wrong, the decree rendered by them cannot be treated as nullity. The gist of the argument of Mr. Nariman and other counsel is that a preliminary objection as to jurisdiction under Section 9A would not include an objection that it is barred by limitation. Learned counsel put heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in Ramesh B. Desai and Ors. vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Ors., (2006) 5 SCC 638.
16. Per contra, Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the application of Section 9A comes at the very initial stage of the suit whereas the provision of Order XIV Rule 2 can be invoked at the time of framing of issues. Learned counsel submitted that no prejudice would be caused inasmuch as the Court may in its discretion refuse to hear the preliminary issue. According to the learned counsel, question of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the Court as the limitation goes to the root of jurisdiction. Mr. Sibal, relied upon a three Page 19 Judges Bench decision of this Court in Official Trustee W.B. vs. Sachindra (1969) SC 823, National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451.
17. Dr. A.M. Singhvi submitted that insertion of Section 9A by Maharashtra Amendment is a legislative policy decision of the State to entertain objection to jurisdiction at the initial stage and to decide it as preliminary issue. According to the learned counsel, the question of limitation is the question of jurisdiction and it has to be decided as a preliminary issue. Learned counsel put reliance on ITW Signode India Ltd vs. Collector of Central Excise, (2004) 3 SCC 48; Manick Chandra Nandy vs. Debdas Nandy and Others, (1986) 1 SCC 512; Kamlesh Babu and Others vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma and Others, (2008) 12 SCC 577. Page 20
18. We have also heard Mr. Salman Khurshid and Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned senior advocates appearing for the respondents. The submissions of learned counsel are as under:- The juridical and jurisprudential meaning of the term “jurisdiction” as used inter-alia in Section 9A of the CPC (as amended in 1977), and by virtue of Order XIV Rule 2 (b) initially interpreted in a catena of judgments, cannot be limited in its sweep to exclude a case where the suit/any part of the alleged cause of action is barred by limitation. Section 9A provides a self contained scheme and given its non-obstante clause, must prevail. A plea pertaining to the bar of limitation has been consistently held by the Supreme Court and followed by High Courts, as one giving rise to the issue of jurisdiction. An issue of limitation refers to a statutory bar to the exercise of jurisdiction. Page 21
19. Learned counsel further submitted that upon a harmonious construction of the two provisions and considering the consistent judicial dicta whereby an issue of limitation is treated as a jurisdictional issue, Clauses (a) and (b) of Rule 2(2), Order XIV of the CPC ought to be read as jurisdictional issues although arising under different pleas.
20. Learned counsel further submitted that even otherwise the non-obstante clause inserted by the Maharashtra Amendment of 1977 in Section 9A of CPC and the express mandate of Section which is a self-contained scheme and a later expression of legislative intent, the policy and intention of the law is to decide an issue relating to jurisdiction of the court, on whatever grounds raised, as a preliminary issue, notwithstanding of any other provision in the CPC. Such an issue is to be decided at the hearing under Section 9A when Page 22 the court is not precluded from considering the facts either on prima facie basis or otherwise.
21. Learned counsel also referred a catena of decisions for the proposition that question of limitation concerns the jurisdiction of court and such issue goes to the root of jurisdiction and may oust the jurisdiction of the court.
22. Similar argument have been advanced by Mr. Shyam Divan and other learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents.
23. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers power and jurisdiction to Courts to try all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. For better clarification, Explanations (I) Page 23 and (II) have been added. Section 9 with explanations reads as under:-
24. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision would show that all suits of civil nature can be entertained by civil Courts. However, Explanation (I) clarifies as to what a suit of a civil nature is. Page 24
25. Immediately, after Section 9, Section 9A was inserted by Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act,
1970. Section 9A as inserted in the Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act of 1970 reads as follows:- “9A. Where by an application for interim relief is sought or is sought to be set aside in any suit and objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as preliminary issue at hearing of the application. (1) If, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection for the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case be adjourned to the hearing of the suit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction.”
26. In the year 1976, the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 was extensively amended by the Code of Civil Procedure Page 25 (Amendment) Act, 1976. Section 97 of the Amendment Act of 1976 inter alia provided that any amendment made in the Code by the State Legislature before commencement of the Amendment Act of 1976 shall, except insofar as they are consistent with the Code as amended by the Amendment Act, 1976 shall stand repealed. As a result, those amendments made in the CPC by the State Legislature which were inconsistent with the amendments brought in 1976 stood repealed.
27. After the aforesaid Section 9A of Maharashtra Amendment stood repealed, the State Legislature felt that certain amendments made by the Maharashtra State Amendment Act were useful and required to be continued. Hence, the State Legislature of Maharashtra re-enacted Section 9A with the assent of the President of India as required under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, so that the same may continue to prevail. Hence, by Section 3 Page 26 of Maharashtra (Amendment) Act of 1976, it again inserted Section 9A in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 9A which has been inserted in the 1977 by the State Legislature reads as under:- “9-A. Where at the hearing of application relating to interim relief in a suit, objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as a preliminary issue.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other law for the time being in force, if, at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting any interim relief, whether by way of stay, injunction, appointment of a receiver or otherwise, made in any suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Any such application shall be heard and disposed of by the Court as expeditiously as possible and shall not in any case he adjourned to the hearing of the suit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in Subsection (1), at the hearing of any such application, the Court may grant such interim relief as it may consider necessary, pending determination by it of the preliminary issue as to be jurisdiction.” Page 27
28. As noticed above, Section 9A was for the first time inserted by Amendment Act of 1970. The statement of objects and reasons for such amendment is quoted hereunder:- “The effect of the judgment of the High Court in Institute Indo-Portuguese vs. Borges (1958)
60 Bom. L.R. 660 is that the Bombay City Civil Court for the purposes of granting interim relief cannot or need not go into the question of jurisdiction. Sometimes declaratory suits are filed in the City Court without a valid notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Relying upon another judgment of the High Court recorded on the 7th September, 1961 in Appeal No.191 of 1960, it has been the practice of the City Court to adjourn a notice of motion for injunction in a suit filed without such valid notice, which gives time to the plaintiff to give the notice. After expiry of the period of notice, the plaintiff is allowed to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh one. In the intervening period, the Court grants an ad interim injunction and continues the same. The practice of granting injunctions, without going into the question of jurisdiction even though raised, has led to grave abuse. It is therefore, proposed to provide that if a question of jurisdiction is raised at the hearing of any application for granting or setting aside an order granting an interim relief, the Court shall determine that question first.” Page 28
29. For the purpose of re-inserting Section 9A in 1977, after Section 9A stood repealed by 1976 CPC Amendment Act, the statement of objects and reasons of the relevant portion of said Bill is extracted hereinbelow:-
30. The question that arises for consideration before this Court is as to whether the phrase “an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such a suit” as used in Section 9A of the Maharashtra Manual would include an objection with regard to limitation. In other words, whether an issue relating to a bar to the suit created by law of limitation can be tried as preliminary issue under Section 9A of the Code. Page 30
31. For better appreciation of the object and interpretation of Section 9A, it would be proper to have a comparison with the provision contained in Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Rule 2 of Order XIV reads as under:-
32. Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, confers power upon the Court to pronounce judgment on all the issues. But there is an exception to that general Rule i.e., where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit and the Court is of the opinion that the case or any part thereof Page 31 may be disposed of on the issue of law, it may try that issue first if that issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by any law.
33. Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as it existed earlier reads as under:- “Issues of law and of fact: Whether issues both of law and of fact arise in the same suit, and the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be “disposed of on the issues of law only, it shall try those issues first and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined”.
34. A comparative reading of the said provision as it existed earlier to the amendment and the one after amendment would clearly indicate that the consideration of an issue and its disposal as preliminary issue has now been made permissible only in limited cases. In the un-amended Code, the categorization was only between issues of law and Page 32 of fact and it was mandatory for the Court to try the issues of law in the first instance and to postpone the settlement of issues of fact until after the issues of law had been determined. On the other hand, in the amended provision there is a mandate to the Court that notwithstanding that a case may be disposed of on a preliminary issue, the Court has to pronounce judgment on all the issues. The only exception to this is contained in sub-rule (2). This sub-rule relaxes the mandate to a limited extent by conferring discretion upon the Court that if the Court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of "on an issue of law only", it may try that issue first. The exercise of this discretion is further limited to the contingency that the issue to be so tried must relate to the jurisdiction of the Court or a bar to the suit created by a law in force.
35. The moot question, therefore, that falls for consideration is as to whether courts shall be guided by the provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 9A Page 33 of the Code as amended by Maharashtra Amendment Act, in the matter of deciding the objection with regard to jurisdiction of the court which concerns the bar of limitation as a preliminary issue.
36. Indisputably, the subject of Civil Procedure, including all matters included in the Code of Civil Procedure, is placed under Entry 13 in the Concurrent List of the VII Schedule appended to the Constitution of India. After Section 9A of Maharashtra Amendment Act stood repealed by Section 97 of the CPC Amendment Act of 1976 being inconsistent with the Code, the State Legislature of Maharashtra felt that certain amendments made by the earlier State Amendment Acts were useful and required to be continued. To leave no room for confusion as to whether the State Amendments continued to be in force or repealed, Section 9A was again re-enacted with the assent of the President of India under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution of India. Page 34
37. As noticed above, Section 9A of the Maharashtra Amendment Act is a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the inconsistency contained in the Act of the Parliament viz., the Code of Civil Procedure and the provisions contained in Section 9A of the State Act, having regard to the fact that the assent of the President was received, the provisions of the said Section has to be complied with and can be held to be a valid legislation.
38. In the case of Meher Singh vs. Deepak Sawhny, reported in 1998 (3) MhLJ 940 = 1999 (1) Bom CR 107, the question that referred to the Division Bench for its consideration was whether while deciding the preliminary issue of jurisdiction as contemplated under Section 9-A of the Code Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977 the parties are required to be given opportunity to lead evidence?. The Division Bench noticed that Section 9-A was added to the Civil Procedure Code by Code of Civil Procedure Page 35 (Maharashtra Amendment) Act, 1977. As per the amended provision if in a suit, an objection to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such application the issue as to the jurisdiction as a preliminary issue before granting or setting aside the order granting the interim relief. Before the learned Single Judge, it was contended that when the said issue is raised for determination, the Court is required to permit the parties to lead evidence. The Division Bench considered the amended provision as contained in Section 9-A vis-a-vis Order XIV Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and observed:-
39. From the statement of objects and reasons it is evident that the practice followed in the City Civil Court in filing the suits against the Government without giving notice under Section 80 of the CPC and after the interim relief continued the plaintiff takes permission to withdraw the suit and to file a fresh suit. As a matter of fact, the legislature intended to stop this abuse of process by introducing Section 9A in the CPC by Maharashtra amendment Act. By reason of such amendment the Court is now required to decide the issue of jurisdiction at the time of granting the relief or considering the application for vacating the interim relief. Page 37
40. From reading of the aims and object of the Bill whereby Section 9A was inserted, the term ‘jurisdiction’ is used in a wider sense and is not restricted to the conventional definition either pecuniary jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction as submitted by Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant.
41. The term ‘jurisdiction’ is a term of art; it is an expression used in a variety of senses and draws colour from its context. Therefore, to confine the term ‘jurisdiction’ to its conventional and narrow meaning would be contrary to the well settled interpretation of the term. The expression ‘jurisdiction’, as stated in Halsbury’s Laws of England, Volume 10, paragraph 314, is as follows:
42. In American Jurisprudence, Volume 32A, paragraph 581, it is said that “Jurisdiction is the authority to decide a given case one way or the other. Without jurisdiction, a court cannot proceed at all in any case; jurisdiction is the power to declare law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to a court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” Further, in paragraph 588, it is said that lack of jurisdiction cannot be waived, consented to, or overcome by agreement of the parties.
43. It is well settled that essentially the jurisdiction is an authority to decide a given case one way or the other. Further, even though no party has raised objection with regard to jurisdiction of the court, the court has power to determine its own jurisdiction. In other words, in a case Page 39 where the Court has no jurisdiction; it cannot confer upon it by consent or waiver of the parties.
44. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 clearly provides that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the prescribed period of limitation, subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24, shall be dismissed although the limitation has not been set up as a defence.
45. A Constitution Bench of five Judges of this Court in the case of Pandurang Dhondi Chougule vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, 1966 SC 153, while dealing with the question of jurisdiction, observed that a plea of limitation or plea of res judicata is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries the proceeding. The Bench held:-
46. In the case of Manick Chandra Nandy vs. Debdas Nandy, (1986) 1 SCC 512, this Court, while considering the the nature and scope of High Court’s revisional jurisdiction in a case where a plea was raised that the application under Order IX Rule 13 was barred by limitation, held that a plea of Page 41 limitation concerns the jurisdiction of the court which tries a proceeding for a finding on this plea in favour of the party raising it would oust the jurisdiction of the court. In the case of National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. vs. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, 2007 (4) SCC 451, this Court considering the similar question under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act held as under:-
48. In the case of ITW Signode India Ltd. vs. CCE, (2004) 3 SCC 48, a similar question came before a three Judges Bench of this Court under the Central Excise Act, 1944, when this Court opined as under:-
49. In the case of Kamlesh Babu vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma, (2008) 12 SCC 577, the matter came to this Court when the trial court dismissed the suit on issues other than the issue of limitation. The Bench held:-
50. Mr. Shekhar Naphade, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent relied upon a recent decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Appeal No. 1085 of 2015 (Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe vs. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar & Ors.) where this Court while considering Section 9A of the Maharashtra Amendments of CPC observed that the expression ‘jurisdiction” in Section 9A is used in a narrow sense i.e. territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction and not question of limitation. The Court observed:-
51. With great respect, we are of the view that the decision rendered by the Division Bench in the case of Kamalakar Eknath Salunkhe vs. Baburav Vishnu Javalkar & Ors. is contrary to the law settled by the Constitution Bench and three Judges Bench of this Court, followed by other Division Bench in Pandurang Dhondi Chougule vs. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR 1966 SC 153, (Five Judges Bench) in Manick Chandra Nandy vs. Debdas Nandy, (1986) 1 SCC 512, National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. vs. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451, Official Trustee vs. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee AIR 1969 SC 823, ITW Page 47 Signode India Ltd. vs. CCE, (2004) 3 SCC 48 and Kamlesh Babu vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma, (2008) 12 SCC
577. The Constitution Bench decision and other decisions given by larger Bench are binding on us. It appears that those decisions have not been brought to the notice of the Division Bench taking a contrary view.
52. Discussing the principle of binding precedents in the case of State of U.P. vs. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. 1991(4) SCC 139, this Court in paragraph 40 and 41 held as under:-
53. The doctrine of binding precedents has been settled by several pronouncements of this Court. The Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, observed as under:- “8. Taking note of the hierarchical character of the judicial system in India, it is of paramount importance that the law declared by this Court should be certain, clear and consistent. It is commonly known that most decisions of the courts are of significance not merely because they constitute an adjudication on the rights of the parties and resolve the dispute between them, but also because in doing so they embody a declaration of law operating as a binding principle in future cases. In this latter aspect lies their particular value in developing the jurisprudence of the law.
9. The doctrine of binding precedent has the merit of promoting a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions, and enables an organic development of the law, besides providing assurance to the individual as to the consequence of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. And, therefore, the need for a clear and consistent enunciation of legal principle in the decisions of a court.” Page 50
54. In the case of Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Mumbai Shramik Sangha, (2001) 4 SCC 448, a Constitution Bench of this Court reiterated the same principle and held that:-
55. This Court in the case of Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community vs. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, held as under:-
56. Mr. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant put heavy reliance on the decision in the case of Ramesh B. Desai vs. Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638, for the proposition that a plea of limitation cannot be decided as an abstract principle of law divorced from facts as in every case the starting point of limitation has to be ascertained which is entirely a question of fact. A plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In our considered opinion, in the aforesaid decision this Court was considering the provision of Order XIV Rule 2, CPC. While interpreting the provision of Order XIV Rule 2, this Court was of the view that the issue on limitation, being a mixed question of law and fact is to be decided along with other Page 52 issues as contemplated under Order XIV, Rule 2, CPC. As discussed above, Section 9A of Maharashtra Amendment Act makes a complete departure from the procedure provided under Order 14, Rule 2, CPC. Section 9A mandates the Court to decide the jurisdiction of the Court before proceeding with the suit and granting interim relief by way of injunction.
57. At the cost of repetition, we observe that Section 9A provides a self-contained scheme with a non-obstante clause which mandates the court to follow the provision. It is a complete departure from the provisions contained in Order XIV Rule 2 CPC. In other words, the non-obstante clause inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act of 1977 in Section 9A and the express mandate of the Section, the intention of the law is to decide the issue relating to jurisdiction of the court as a preliminary issue notwithstanding the provision contained in Order XIV Rule 2 CPC. However, it is made clear that in other cases where the suits are governed by the Page 53 provisions of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, it is the discretion of the court to decide the issue based on law as preliminary issue.
58. We, therefore, after giving our anxious consideration to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure together with the amendments introduced by the State Legislature, hold that the provision of Section 9A as introduced by (Maharahtra Amendment) Act is mandatory in nature. It is a complete departure from the provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2, C.P.C. Hence, the reasons given by the High Court in the impugned orders are fully justified. We affirm the impugned orders passed by the High Court.
59. For the reasons aforesaid, we do not find any merit in these appeals, which are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. …………………………….J. (M.Y. Eqbal) Page 54 …………………………….J. (Kurian Joseph) New Delhi, April 08, 2015. Page 55