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" W.P.(C) 1381/2014 & CM 2882/2014 MADAN SINGH AND ORS Petitioners
Through: Mr.Prem Kiimar, Adv.
Through: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. for LAC.
Mr.Peeyoosh Kalra, ASC with Ms.Swati, Adv. for GNCTD.
Ms.Shobha Gupta, Mr.Raghav Porwal, Ms.Padmaja & Ms.Spandana, Adv.forMCD.
Mr.Ajay Verma, Adv. for DDA.
ANOD KUMAR AND ORS Petitioners
Through: Mr.Prem Kumar, Adv.
Through: Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with Ms.Jyoti Tyagi, Adv. for LAC.
Mr.Peeyoosh Kalra, ASC with Ms.Swati, Adv. for GNCTD.
Ms.Shobha Gupta, Mr.Raghav Porwal, Ms.Padmaja & Ms.Spandana, Adv. for MCD.
Mr.Ajay Verma, Adv. for DDA.
2017:DHC:8917-DB
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
30.05.2017
ORDER
1. In these proceedings, the petitioners claim directions that acquisition initiated by the Govt. of NCT of Delhi, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred as "The old Act") stand lapsed under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013
2. The brieffacts are thatthe lands ofthe petitioners were notified und^ Section 4 of the, old Act on 24.08.2006 and declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 24.08.2007. Those land acquisition proceedings were challenged in the Writ Petition being W.P. (C) No. 8289/2007 and W. P.(C) No. 323 of 2008. Both the proceedings were disposed of, one by way of withdrawal and the other by way of judgment. This Court on 19.12.2008 upheld the acquisition through its judgment. Since the challenge of the acquisition failed, Collector proceeded and published the Award dated 21.08.2009. A copy of the said Award has been placed on record. The Award disclosed that since there were some disputes with respect to the shares of compensation, the Collector deposited the amount under Section 30-31 of the old Act i.e. Repeal Act. On 01.01.2014 the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "new Act") came into force.
3. The principle contentions of the petitioners are that by virtue of Proviso to Section 24(2) of the new Act, they are entitled to the release of the land since the acquisition has lapsed.
4. Counsel for the petitioners has made a twofold submission that Proviso of Section 24(2) does not envisage an expiry of five years as a pre condition for declaration that the acquisition has lapsed. Counsel highlighted that by virtue of Section 114, the old Act stood repealed. The purport of Section 24(1) was aimed to preserve the rights of the petitioner. The other submission that was made was that the petitioners are residing in the acquired land for over 50 years and that even ifthe Court omits to apply the provisions under new Act, they would not be denied the right of rehabilitationby way ofalternative accommodation/ allotment.
5. Section 24 ofthe new Act reads as under: "24. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in thisAct, in any case ofland acquisition proceedings initiated under theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, a) Where no award under section 11 of the saidLand Acquisition Acthas been made, then, all provisions ofthis Act relating to the determinationofcompensation shall apply; or b) Where an award under saidsection 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the saidLand Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to.the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not beenpaid the said proceedings shall be deemed, to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, ifitso chooses, shall initiate the
6. proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance wth theprovisions ofthis Act: Provided that where, an award has been made- and.: compensation in respect ofa majority ofland holding has. not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all benejiciaries- specified in the notification •for acquisition under section 4of the saidLand Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.". It is evident that Section 24(1) of the Act provides that where steps was initiated underthe oldAct, in view ofthe procedure prescribedtherer^ any one may seek that the Award be passed within the period prescribed under the old Act. Further, in the present case, it is.important that the main purpose ofSection 24(2) ofthe Act is that ifthe period offive years or more have lapsed before the date of the commencement of the Act and the appropriate Government or authority fails to take the physical possession of the land or to pay the compensation, the acquisition shall be deemed to have lapsed. The Proviso deals with the specific situation where several land holding rights are affected. The Proviso ensures that in case the majority of the land owners had not received the compensation, the beneficiaries shall be entitled to compensation inaccordance with the law.
7. In these cases, it is evident that the Award was made on 21.08.2009, five years period therefore, lapsed only on 21.08.2014. The petitioners have approached this Court prior to the lapse of five years period. Therefore, by virtue of none of the concerned provisions i.e. 24(1), 24(2) and Proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act can it be said that the acquisition of the land is deemed to have lapsed. Accepting the mandate ofthe provision andproviso. Page 4 of[5] the Court cannot disagree with the statutory mandate offive years which is granted to the executive to take over the possession or to pay compensation. This extended period has to apply qua all the classes of acquisition. Significantly, the Proviso deals with the cases where there was amultiplicity of land owners.
8. So far as the second contention of the petitioners is concerned, the factual history of these cases was that the challenge of the acquisition was made by them on the very same ground and the same was dismissed. The Court cannot redress this situation much less in the writ petitions, in the absence of any prescribed policy.
9. In view of above discussion, there is no merit in the writ petitions. The same are dismissed.
S.RAVINDRABHAT, J MAY 30, 2017 NAVIN CHAWLA, J