Full Text
Date of
JUDGMENT
PAWAN KUMAR ..... Appellant
Through : Mr.U.M.Tripathi
Through : Mr.Rajat Katyal, APP for State
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE CHANDER SHEKHAR G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
1. Present appeal has been filed under Sections 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C.‟) against the judgment dated 07.09.2012 by which the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 („IPC‟) and the order of sentence dated 25.09.2012 whereby the appellant has been sentenced under Section 302 IPC to imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of which to undergo further simple imprisonment for six months; and under Section 201 IPC to rigorous imprisonment for five years and also fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default of which to further undergo simple imprisonment for two months.
2. The Trial Court had noticed the case of the prosecution as under:
17. PW-10 opined that the cause of death was due to the combined effect of asphyxia due to smothering and coma consequent upon head injury, sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. All injuries were ante mortem, fresh and caused by blunt object and smothering due to closure of mouth and nostrils by hand. He also stated that the ligature marks could be post mortem in nature and the time since death was about 30 hours. Having regard to the time of postmortem, the time of death can be computed to be around 7:20 AM on 21.09.2010. His subsequent opinion (Ex.PW-10/B) was also taken in respect of the weapon of offence, i.e. the steel scale wherein he opined that injuries number 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 could have been caused by the weapon of offence. He stated in his cross-examination that incase of fresh injury, the colour of the bruises is red and after one day, it becomes blueblack in colour. His testimony had clearly shown that the hanging of the body was after the death of the deceased in order to cover up the same. We may also notice that the Trial Court had after studying the authorities in this regard, observed that injuries at serial number 2 and 3 (incorrectly mentioned as 2, 3 and 4) were caused while smothering and we find no infirmity in the same. The relevant portion is extracted below:
23. A coordinate bench of this Court, of which one of us (G.S. Sistani, J.) was member, in Kamaljeet v. State, MANU/DE/1752/2017 (paragraph 40) observed that “[t]o bring a case under the exception, fourfold requirement must be satisfied: first, there must be a sudden fight; second, absence of pre-meditation; third, the accused must have been overcome with the heat of passion; and fourth, the accused must not have taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.”
24. In Sayaji Hanmant Bankar v. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 14 SCC 477, the convict had thrown a water pot and a kerosene lamp on the deceased (his wife) after a quarrel with her, the burn was exasperated by the fact that the deceased was wearing a nylon sari resulting in her death. The Apex Court found that there was a sudden fight and modified the conviction from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. The relevant paragraphs read as under: “8. It is clear from the reading of aforesaid Exception 4 that if the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and if the offender does not take any undue advantage or act in a cruel or unusual manner, then Exception 4 will be attracted.
9. We have gone through the evidence carefully. It seems that as soon as the accused entered the house, there appeared to be some quarrel with his wife and in that fight first, he threw a water-pot and thereafter a kerosene lamp. The burning seems to be more out of the fact that unfortunately at that time, the lady was wearing a nylon sari. Had she not been wearing a nylon sari, it is difficult to imagine how she could have been burnt to the extent of 70%. In our view this was a case which clearly falls under Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC since there was a sudden fight. There was no premeditation either. Therefore the appellant-accused is liable to be convicted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I.
10. We, accordingly, alter the conviction of the accused from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC and sentence him to the period already undergone by him. The sentence of fine remains the same.”
25. In Sandhya Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra, (2006) 4 SCC 653 a solitary knife blow was given to the deceased when he attempted to intervene and separate the convicts trying to assault his uncle. The Supreme Court converted the conviction to Section 304 Part I observing as under: “8. For bringing in operation of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, it has to be established that the act was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel without the offender having taken undue advantage and not having acted in a cruel or unusual manner.
9. The Fourth Exception to Section 300 IPC covers acts done in a sudden fight. The said Exception deals with a case of prosecution not covered by the First Exception, after which its place would have been more appropriate. The Exception is founded upon the same principle, for in both there is absence of premeditation. But, while in the case of Exception 1 there is total deprivation of self-control, in case of Exception 4, there is only that heat of passion which clouds men's sober reason and urges them to deeds which they would not otherwise do. There is provocation in Exception 4 as in Exception 1; but the injury done is not the direct consequence of that provocation. In fact Exception 4 deals with cases in which notwithstanding that a blow may have been struck, or some provocation given in the origin of the dispute or in whatever way the quarrel may have originated, yet the subsequent conduct of both parties puts them in respect of guilt upon equal footing. A “sudden fight” implies mutual provocation and blows on each side. The homicide committed is then clearly not traceable to unilateral provocation, nor in such cases could the whole blame be placed on one side. For if it were so, the Exception more appropriately applicable would be Exception 1. There is no previous deliberation or determination to fight. A fight suddenly takes place, for which both parties are more or less to be blamed. It may be that one of them starts it, but if the other had not aggravated it by his own conduct it would not have taken the serious turn it did. There is then mutual provocation and aggravation, and it is difficult to apportion the share of blame which attaches to each fighter. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in IPC. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties have worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression “undue advantage” as used in the provision means “unfair advantage”.” [Also see Abhijeet Raj v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), MANU/DE/1264/2016 and Jagtar Singh v. State of Delhi, 190 (2012) DLT 445]
26. In the present case, we find that though it was the case of the prosecution that the appellant used to regularly beat his wife/the deceased, the same is belied by the medical evidence as no old injuries were found on the body of the deceased. All the contusions and the bruises were red in colour and not blue-black and hence, were less than one day old. Further, it cannot be said that the deceased was beaten all through the night as the call records (Ex.PW-11/D and 11/G) show that the deceased was on call from around 2 AM till 3:30 AM on the fateful day with Ved Prakash (PW-7). In this background, we find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant that the incident occurred due to a husband-wife altercation in the spur of the moment. The altercation led to a sudden fight in which the appellant inflicted blows upon the deceased in the heat of passion. The weapon of offence is also of significance as it was a steel scale, which could have been procured from the place of incident showing no pre-meditation on the part of the appellant and the appellant acted neither in a cruel nor unusual manner. Hence, all the essentials of Exception 4 of Section 300 stand satisfied. The conviction deserves to be converted. Having regard to the injuries on the body of the deceased and the weapon of offence, it cannot be said that the appellant intended to cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. Accordingly, the conviction of the appellant is modified from Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code.
27. We had called for the fresh nominal roll of the appellant, as per which, the appellant has been incarcerated for a period of about 8 years 2 months including remission. Having regard to the culpability of the appellant, we are of the view that the ends of justice would be met if the sentence of the appellant is modified to imprisonment for the period already undergone for the offence under Section 304 Part II.
28. Thus, the appeal is partly allowed and orders of conviction and sentence are modified in the above terms.
29. Trial Court record be returned.
30. Copy of this Judgment be sent to the concerned jail superintendent for updating the jail record.
31. As we have converted the conviction under Section 302 to one under Section 304 Part II to the period undergone and the appellant has already served his sentence under Section 201 IPC, the appellant be released forthwith, if he is not wanted in any other case.
G. S. SISTANI, J.
CHANDER SHEKHAR, J. JULY 28, 2017 //