Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
PARAMJIT SINGH .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Hrishikesh Baruah, Mr. Kshitij Palliwal, Mr. Sumit Saini, Mr. Prabhpreet Singh
Wadhwa, Mr. Vipul Biala and Mr. Utkarsh Dwivedi, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Prashant Mehta, Mr. Dhruv Chawla, Mr. Vaibhav Chawla and Ms. Aadya Sinha, Advocates for Respondent Nos.
1(A) to 3.
Mr. Siddharth A. Advocate for Respondent No. 1 (B).
Mr. Aviral Tiwari, Advocate for Respondent No. 4.
Mr. Dhiraj Sachdeva, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 5 and 6.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR
1. The present appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908[1] read with Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, impugns the Order dated 06.05.2025 2 passed by the CPC Impugned Order learned Single Judge of this Court in CS(OS) 166/2023 titled as Paramjit Singh vs. Hardaman Singh & Ors.
2. Issue notice. Notice is accepted by Mr. Prashant Mehta, Advocate on behalf of Respondent Nos.1(A), 2 & 3, Mr. Siddharth A., Advocate on behalf of Respondent No.2, Mr. Aviral Tiwari, Advocate on behalf of Respondent No.4 and Mr. Dhiraj Sachdeva, Advocate on behalf of Respondent Nos.[5] & 6.
3. The short question that arises in the instant appeal relates to the time period within which the replications on behalf of the Plaintiff/Appellant herein, to the written statements on behalf of Defendant/Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3; and Defendant/Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 had to be filed.
4. The relevant facts which led up to the filing of this appeal are stated hereinbelow:
5. Learned counsel for the Appellant would first refer to Rule 5, Chapter VII of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018[3], which reads as follows:
Rules, 2018 replication is filed within the extended time also, the Registrar shall forthwith place the matter for appropriate orders before the Court. An advance copy of the replication together with legible copies of all documents in possession and power of plaintiff, that it seeks to file along with the replication, shall be served on the defendant and the replication together with the said documents shall not be accepted unless it contains an endorsement of service signed by the defendant/ his Advocate.”
6. Learned counsel for the Appellant states that as per said Rule 5, the prescribed period for filing that replication is 30 days, beyond which the condonable period within which the replication may be filed is “a further period not exceeding 15 days but not thereafter”.
7. Learned counsel for the Appellant would thereafter refer to Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018, which reads as under:-
8. Learned counsel for the Appellant also refers to the definition of “the Court”, which is set out in Rule 4(e), Chapter I of the Rules, 2018, as well as “Registry”, which is set out in Rule 4(m), Chapter I of the Rules, 2018.
9. The primary contention based on the afore-extracted/stated provisions is that, if limitation expires on a day when the Court is closed, then that day and any succeeding dates on which the Court remains closed for the day or a part thereof are to be excluded.
10. He would submit that, given the factual scenario in the present case, since the last day for filing of an application expired in the midst of the Court vacations (a term now referred to by the Hon’ble Supreme Court as “Partial Working days”), the entire period of the vacations being days when the Court was closed would have to be excluded and the period for reckoning the condonable period would commence from the first working day after the reopening of the Court.
11. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the Appellant that the said Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 does not make any distinction between prescribed period and condonable period and, therefore, even in respect of the condonable period, Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 would have to apply and the entire period during which the Court was not working would need to be excluded from the calculation of the period of limitation.
12. Learned counsel for the Appellant, in support of his contention, would rely upon paragraph Nos. 16 and 17 of Order dated 03.07.2025 in CS(OS) 243/2021 titled as Anil Jain v. Paritosh Jain, which reads as under:
separation between the prescribed and condonable periods, also acknowledged that such a rigid construction effectively precluded any relief in light of the legislative intent for expedition embedded in the Arbitration Act. The observations of the Supreme Court must, therefore, be understood within the specific statutory framework governing arbitral disputes, which prioritizes finality and speed over procedural flexibility, and such interpretation should not be dovetailed with matters of purely civil nature.” (Emphasis Supplied)
13. It is also apposite to refer to Section 4 of the Limitation Act,, which reads as follows:
14. Learned counsel for the Appellant would strenuously argue that the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Manhar Sabharwal v. High Court of Delhi[5], has categorically held that under Section 129 of the CPC, High Courts are empowered to frame their own rules of procedure, and such rules would prevail over the generic provisions of the CPC to the extent of any inconsistency. He would, thus, submit that the provisions of Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 reads in a manner, such as to suggest that if the last day of the reckonable period expires on the day when the Court is closed, then the entire period of the vacation would need to be excluded from the calculation of limitation. RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS: Limitation Act
15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Respondents would state that the said argument is “preposterous” as it goes against the fundamental concept of limitation and the manner in which it is to be calculated. Learned counsel for the Respondents refers to the applications filed for condonation of delay in filing of the replications and states that the case as sought to be set up in appeal is not maintainable, given what is contended in the said applications, even as per the calculation of the Appellants herein.
16. Learned counsel for the Respondents would state that the period of Court Vacations is not a period where the Court is not functioning insofar as the Registry is concerned, and what needs to be considered, especially for the purposes of filing, is the factum of the functioning of the Registry of the Court.
17. He further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra[6], and its paragraph No. 6 thereof, to contend that the judicial sittings of the Court may not be transpiring, but the offices of the Court remain open for presentation of the pleadings. The Court is, therefore, open for the purpose of presentation of pleadings even though the Judge is not engaged in judicial functions or present in the Court itself. Paragraph No. 6 of the said judgement reads as follows:
deposited. Turner, C.J., speaking for himself, Kernan, Kindersley and Muttusami Ayyar, JJ., (Innes, J., dissenting) observed in Nachiyappa Mudali v. Ayyasami Ayyar: [ILR (1882) 5 Mad 189, 192] “The judicial sittings of the Court may be adjourned; but the offices of the Court may still remain open for the presentation of pleadings. The Court may be open for this purpose although the Judge is not engaged in judicial functions or is not present in the Court-house or in the place where the Court is held.” A Bench of the Madras High Court in In re Thokkudubivyanu Immaniyelu [AIR 1948 Mad 521: (1948) 1 MLJ 49] dealt with a similar practice which is followed by all High Courts and this Court for the summer vacation when the Courts close. The notifications in respect thereof specify a period between Monday to Friday both days inclusive as the vacation. The Court reopens on a Saturday, but judicial work starts only on the following Monday. It was held that the first day of the Court was a Saturday which was the day for receiving papers though the Judges actually sat for judicial work on Monday, as such an application, for which the prescribed period of limitation expired on Saturday the 5th when the Court was open and was not filed on that day, but on Monday the 7th, was held to be barred. See also Dwarka Prasad v. Union of India; [AIR 1954 Pat 284: ILR 1954 Pat 176] and Sajjansingh v. Bhogilal Pandya [AIR 1958 Raj 307: ILR (1958) 8 Raj 912].” (Emphasis supplied)
18. Learned counsel further relies upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Gupta v. Raju[7], and paragraph No. 2 thereof, wherein again it is reiterated that simply because the Court is closed for vacation, it is not always a holiday for the Registry.
19. Learned counsel for other Respondents would also rely upon the Notification No. 103/I-G-4/Genl.-I/DHC of the High Court of Delhi dated 28.10.2022, in respect of Vacations and contend that the same does not denote that the Registry would be shut during the period of vacations.
ANALYSIS
20. We have heard the counsel for the parties. In our view, there is no error in the Order dated 06.05.2025 of the learned Single Judge. The relevant portion of the Impugned Order is as follows: “I.A. 15437/2023 (for condonation of delay)
1. This is an application filed by the plaintiff seeking condonation of delay of 16 days in filing the replication to the written statement of defendant nos. 1 and 3.
2. Although, the application prays for condonation of 16 days‟ delay, what the applicant intends to plead is, that the delay is of 16 days beyond the statutorily permissible period of 45 days. The applicant is therefore, seeking condonation of delay of 61 days and not 16 days.
3. In view of the judgement of the Division Bench in Ram Swaroop Lugani & Another v. Nirmal Lugani [2020 SCC OnLine Del 1353 at paras 21 to 25], and in view of the Rule 5 Chapter VII, Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, the relief sought is not permissible and barred in law.
4. Even otherwise, the grounds set out in the application do not make out any sufficient ground for condonation of delay.
5. The application stands dismissed. I.A. 15441/2023 (for condonation of delay)
6. This is an application filed by the plaintiff seeking condonation of delay of 22 days in filing of replication to the written statement of defendant nos. 5 and 6.
7. Although the application prays for condonation of 22 days‟ delay, what the applicant intends to plead is, that the delay is of 22 days beyond the statutorily permissible period of 55 days. The applicant is therefore, seeking condonation of delay of 77 days and not 22 days as pleaded.
8. In view of the judgement of the Division Bench in Ram Swaroop Lugani (supra) and in view of the Rule 5 Chapter VII, Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018, the relief sought is not permissible and barred in law.
9. Even otherwise, the grounds set out in the application do not make out sufficient grounds for condonation of delay.
10. The application stands dismissed.”
21. The replications themselves came to be filed on 17.07.2023. As per the statutory limitation, the replication to the written statement on behalf of Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 was supposed to be filed by 08.06.2023, and the replication to the written statement on behalf of Respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was supposed to be filed by 14.06.2023. However, the replications along with their respective applications for condonation of delay came to be filed only on 17.07.2023. For the sake of convenience, a tabular representation of the timelines with respect to both the IAs is as follows:
I. A. No. 15437 of 2023- for condonation of delay of 16 days in filing replication to written statement of Defendant/ Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 Commencement of the limitation 15.05.2023 Expiry of 30-Day Period under Rule 5, Chapter VII 14.06.2023 Expiry of Condonable Period of 15 days, which commenced after the expiry of Prescribed Period under Rule 5, Chapter VII 29.06.2023
I. A. No. 15441 of 2023- for condonation of delay of 22 days in filing replication to written statement of Defendant/ Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 Commencement of the limitation period 09.05.2023 Expiry of 30-Day Period under Rule 5, Chapter VII 08.06.2023 Expiry of Condonable Period of 15 days, which commenced after the expiry of Prescribed Period under Rule 5, Chapter VII 23.06.2023 Both IAs admittedly filed on 17.07.2023
22. Rule 6, Chapter I of the Rules, 2018 is not a rule which relates to reckoning of the period of exclusion from when the “Court” is closed but for reckoning of the period to be excluded from when the “office of the Court is closed”. The fundamental fallacy of the Appellant’s argument lies in the attempt to ignore the words “office of the”.
23. The office of the Court can mean nothing but the Registry of that Court, and the same is also clarified from the extracted paragraph No. 6 of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hukumdev Narain Yadav (supra).
24. We are of the opinion that the Order of the learned Single Judge in Anil Jain (supra) stipulates that it would also regulate the manner in which condonable period would be brought within the protective ambit of Rule 6, Chapter I of Rules, 2018. The said Order holds that it is due to this protective ambit that any pleadings sought to be filed could have been so filed, on the immediate working day upon the reopening of the Courts. The said Judgment, in our opinion, militates against the view sought to be canvassed by the Appellant herein.
25. We are of the opinion that it would be necessary that Section 4 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would need to be read harmoniously with the above-referred rules of the Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules, 2018.
26. The result of such a harmonious reading would suggest that, in the event the condonable period of limitation expires during the vacations, the same would be permitted to have the benefit of being filed on the first re-opening day post-vacations. If the arguments suggested by the Appellant are accepted, it would not only constitute a rewriting of the statute of limitation, but it would also encourage indolence on part of such parties who are not vigilant about exercising their rights. Such an interpretation is neither warranted nor desirable.
27. We are also of the view that, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for Respondents, it was the Appellant’s own understanding that the period of vacations of the Court did not bring to a halt the running of the clock, and which is the reason why the applications bearing I. A. No. 15437 of 2023 and I. A. No. 15441 of 2023 expressly states that there was a delay of 16 and 22 days in the filing of the replication.
28. In view of the afore-stated, there is no merit in the appeal and the same is rejected.
29. The appeal, with all pending application(s), if any, is disposed of. No order as to costs. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. JULY 29, 2025/v/er