Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of
JUDGMENT
ALL INDIA CPWD KARAMCHARI SANGH ..... Petitioner
Through Mr.Naresh Kaushik, Adv. with Ms.Shaili Pande, Adv.
Through Mr.Bhagvan Swarup Shukla, CGSC
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINOD GOEL G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
CM. APPL No.19703/2017 (delay) & Rev. P. No.215/2017
1. This is an application filed by the review-petitioners/respondents seeking 108 days’ delay in filing the review petition. Counsel for the review petitioners submits that the review petition could not be filed within the period of limitation for cogent and valid reasons. It is submitted that the delay was not on account of any inaction or negligence.
2. This application is vehemently opposed by the counsel for the petitioner/non-applicant. Mr. Kaushik submits that the application lacks material particulars, it is made in a casual manner and no 2017:DHC:4438-DB grounds much less any cogent grounds have been stated for condoning the delay in filing the present application.
3. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. We are conscious of the fact that it has been repeatedly held that the Court must take a liberal approach in considering an application seeking condonation of delay. It has also been held that while considering the application seeking condonation of delay, the Court must take into account whether the delay has not been caused on account of negligence, inaction, carelessness or for the reasons which are not explained.
4. To examine the issue in hand and since the application seeking condonation of delay is less than two pages, we deem it appropriate to reproduce the same:
5. A reading of this application shows that the same lacks material particulars. There is no date as to when the review petition was prepared after receipt of the certified copy on 25.01.2017. There is no date as to when it was sent to the Department, when it was received back, except a bald statement has been made that “This process of communication took a lot of time which resulted in delay in filing the present Review Petition.”
6. In the case of Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India Limited and Anr., reported at (2012) 3 SCC 563, it was held as under:
7. It will be appropriate to observe that in the case of Ramey v. M.C.D., reported at 134 (2006) DLT 106 (DB), the Court while dismissing an application for condonation of delay has held as under: “4.Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to two judgments of the Supreme Court, namely, Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another Vs. Mst. Kastiji and others reported as AIR 1987 SC 1353 and Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamoorthy reported as 1998 (7) SCC 123 wherein it has been held that the court should adopt a liberal approach while disposing of applications for condonation of delay and that the word “sufficient cause” Under Section 5 of the Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance the cause of substantial justice.
5. We have perused the aforementioned judgments. There is no doubt that it is settled law that as against a technical and pedantic approach of throwing out a party on grounds of delay and laches, ends of justice are better met by rendering a decision on merits.
6. At the same time, we would also like to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Salil Dutta v. T.M. and M.C. Private Ltd. reported as JT 1993 (4) SC 528, wherein, while distinguishing the decision in Rafiq and Anr. v. Munshilal and Anr. reported as AIR 1981 SC 1400, it was observed as below: The advocate is the agent of the party. His acts and statements, made within the limits of authority given to him, are the acts and statements of the principal i.e. the party who engaged him. It is true that in certain situations, the Court may, in the interest of justice, set aside a dismissal order or an ex-parte decree notwithstanding the negligence and/or misdemeanour of the advocate where it finds that the client was an innocent litigant but there is no such absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief. No such absolute immunity can be recognised. Such an absolute rule would make the working of the system extremely difficult. The observations made in Rafiq must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition.
7. In the light of the above and in the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are not persuaded to exercise our power of condonation of delay in favour of the appellant. We are not inclined to condone the delay of 1203 days in filing the present appeal as the appellant has failed to furnish any satisfactory Explanation in his application warranting condensation of delay. On the contrary, his application does not inspire any confidence. Admittedly, no complaint has been filed against the Advocate who was allegedly not diligent in pursuing the litigation on behalf of the appellant. Putting the entire blame upon the Advocate and trying to portray as if the appellant was illiterate and poor and hence totally unaware of the nature and significance of the pending proceedings, is quite unacceptable, particularly in view of the fact that the appellant has entered into a contract worth Rs. 20 lacs with the MCD and is, therefore, not only business savvy and worldly wise, but quite capable of taking care of his commercial interests. He is not a rustic ignorant villager hailing from the backwaters who has no knowledge of the legal proceedings and the court procedures.”
8. Having regard to the fact that the present application seeking condonation of delay is highly casual in nature, lacks material particulars, we find no grounds to condone the delay. We have also examined the petition seeking review on merits. We find that the review petitioner has relied upon eight documents which did not form part of the writ petition.
9. We find no merits in the petition seeking review. The application seeking condonation of delay as also the review petition stand dismissed.
G. S. SISTANI, J.
VINOD GOEL, J. AUGUST 11, 2017 pst