Poonam Srivastav v. State of Delhi

6. As per the prosecution, Arti had died prior to 1.30 p.m. because on 30.05.1998 when Dalip made the second call to his sister at 1.30 pm, he was informed that his sister was lying in an unconscious state. As per the chemical report, Arti had consumed poison and a tin of baygon spray was lying near her body. To bring home the guilt of the appellants, the prosecution has examined 17 witnesses in all. Statements under Section 313 were recorded wherein all the appellants denied the allegations and stated that they were innocent and have been falsely implicated.

7. Mr. K.T.S. Tulsi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the appellants have been falsely implicated in this case. There was no harassment to the deceased much less for the demand of dowry. While relying on the cross-examination of two star witnesses, being the father and the brother of the deceased, PW-1 and PW-2, respectively, learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that both these witnesses admitted that the appellants were well-to-do, they were well-established, they owned shops, separate businesses were being carried out by both the brothers and, thus, there was no occasion for them to have demanded dowry or petty amounts to the tune of Rs.11,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and Rs.50,000/-, as claimed by the prosecution.

8. In support of his argument so raised, Mr. Tulsi has relied upon Sanjiv Kumar v. State of Punjab, reported at (2009) 16 SCC 487, more particularly para 19, which reads as under:

9. Senior counsel further contends that in fact the deceased was suffering from depression on three counts; firstly, despite treatment being carried out at Gayatri Nursing Home, she was unable to conceive, Secondly, she had an affair prior to her marriage with one, Tarun. A locket with the initials of Arti and Tarun was found, Thirdly, Arti‟s sister was keen that she should marry Sanjay, who was her husband‟s younger brother, but parents of Arti were not interested. On account of these three factors, Arti remained depressed and consumed poison for which the appellants cannot be blamed but with a view to harass the entire family the prosecution has roped each and every member including the married sister-in-law (Nand), Sonia, who was subsequently acquitted by this Court vide judgment dated 04.02.2016 rendered in Criminal Appeal No.1/2004 titled as Sonia v. State.

10. Mr. Tulsi further submits that the demands sought to be relied upon by the prosecution are not only vague but also general in nature and they lack material particulars. Mr.Tulsi further submits that all the family members have been roped in. The demands are exaggerations and, thus, cannot form the basis of conviction either under Section 498A of the IPC and much less under Section 304B of the IPC. Learned senior counsel contends that as per the testimony of the material witnesses, the father of the deceased had paid a sum of Rs.11,000/- through his son, Dalip, on 07.12.1997 on the eve of the wedding anniversary of the couple and Rs.15,000/- was paid on 01.02.1998. Thus, there is no live link between the demands of dowry, the taunting and Arti‟s death. Resultantly, Section 304-B of the IPC would not be made out. Senior counsel further contends that the demand, if any, for starting a business would not be covered under the definition of dowry. This demand, according to the prosecution, was raised on 23.02.1998 and continued up to one day prior to the date of the incident i.e. 29.05.1998, when Arti left her parent‟s house in the morning and was taken back to the matrimonial home but with a threat given by the husband, Deepak, that she was digging a pit for her grave.

11. Mr. Tulsi argued that as far as the allegation with respect to the demand of Rs.2.00 lakhs for opening a shop is concerned, the same would not fall under the definition of dowry. In support of this submission, Mr. Tulsi has relied upon Rajinder Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2015) 6 SCC 477, more particularly para 11 which reads as under:

12. Learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that merely because according to the prosecution witnesses, Arti was taunted for bringing insufficient dowry or bringing sub-standard items or bringing a Maruti-800 car instead of a Maruti Esteem Car, the same would not be covered under Section 304-B of the IPC.

13. Additionally, learned senior counsel for the appellants submits that the testimonies of the brother and the father, PW-1 and PW-2, are neither trustworthy nor reliable. The testimonies are full of improvements and contradictions, thus, it would be highly unsafe to convict the appellants under Section 304-B of the IPC. Learned senior counsel has also relied upon the testimony of PW-1 wherein he admitted that it was customary to provide gifts, which they gave to them at the marriage of the sister-in-law of the deceased. It is further submitted that PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3 have testified that there were external injuries on the body of the deceased which in fact is not supported by the scientific evidence and the same is also not borne out either from the death report, as per which there were no external injuries, nor on the basis of the post-mortem report and thus, no weightage can be given to such witnesses. Senior counsel also submits that although the deceased reached the hospital by 3.30 pm, there has been gross unexplained delay in registering the FIR, which was registered at

11.30 p.m., thus, giving ample opportunity to the family members of Arti to cook up exaggerated general allegations without assigning any specific role to any family member.

14. Mr. Tulsi further contends that the testimonies of the star witnesses would show that the same are full of exaggerations and embellishments. It has further been contended by Mr. Tulsi that provisions of Sections 498A and 304-B of the IPC were primarily enacted to prevent the menace of dowry. It is further submitted by Mr. Tulsi that Courts have frequently noticed that complaints are not bonafide, they are filed with oblique motives and unscrupulous persons invoke these provisions to wreck personal vendetta and unleash harassment by frivolous complaints. Reliance is placed by Mr. Tulsi on Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India And Others, reported at (2005) 6 SCC 281, more particularly para 19 which reads as under:

16. On the contrary, Ms. Aashaa Tiwari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State and Mr. Bahl, learned counsel for the complainant submit that the testimonies of the star witnesses are of sterling quality; contradictions, if any, are only minor; there are no improvements; and even otherwise, it has been repeatedly held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia where all the particulars are to be furnished. Learned counsels contend that from the statement made to the SDM on 30.05.1998 at 11.10 p.m. on the basis of which Rukka was sent, the statements of the father stand duly corroborated by the statements of the brother of the deceased. Reliance is placed by Ms. Tiwari on V.K. Mishra and Another v. State of Uttarakhand and Another, reported at (2015) 9 SCC 588, more particularly para 13, which reads as under:

17. Learned counsel for the State and the complainant further submit that no leniency can be shown to the appellants on the ground of their age. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on para 42 of V.K. Mishra and Another (supra). Para 42 reads as under:

18. Learned counsel for the State and the complainant further submit that the evidence placed on record would show the poor conduct of the appellants. It is contended that Dalip, brother of the deceased, had made a telephone call to his sister on the fateful day at around 1.30 p.m. in the afternoon, when the appellant Poonam had informed him that his sister, Arti, was busy in some work and when Dalip called subsequently he was informed that Arti is lying unconscious. No effort was made by the mother-in-law and sister-in-law who were present in the house to remove Arti to the hospital or provide first aid to her and in fact they waited for Dalip, brother of Arti, to come and take Arti to a hospital in his car. There are no justifiable reasons for this conduct.

19. Learned counsel for the State and the complainant further submit that merely because the appellants are well-to-do, it does not necessarily mean that they were not demanding dowry. The demands have been consistent and since their demands were not fulfilled Arti was sent back to her parents house and when she was taken back to her matrimonial home by her brother and father, the appellant Deepak had stated that she had dug a pit for herself. It is further submitted that the attitude and conduct of the mother-in-law and sister-in-law were very strange as when Arti was being removed to the hospital by her brother in his car, all the jewellery of Arti was being removed by her motherin-law and sister-in-law, which speaks volumes of their lust for dowry. It is further contended that as far as the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants are concerned that Arti was depressed due to her inability to conceive or that she had a premarital affair with one Tarun and also that she was not allowed to marry one, Sanjay, are baseless. Such submissions cannot be entertained in the absence of any iota of evidence. Furthermore, in case Arti was taking any treatment in Gayatri Hospital as she was unable to conceive, records from the said nursing home could have been produced/filed to substantiate this baseless allegations. There is no evidence, whatsoever, to show that she was in a state of depression.

20. Mr. Bahl, learned counsel for the complainant, in response to the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants that the demand of Rs. 2 lakh for opening a shop would not come under the definition of dowry has relied upon para 20 of Rajinder Singh's case (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

40. As is evincible from the post-mortem report of the deceased that the cause of death was due to carbamate insecticidal poison.

41. The first question which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the evidence available on record is sufficient to bring home the guilt of the appellants under Section 498A and Section 406 of IPC or not?

42. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the conviction of the appellants is not contested before this Court for the offence committed under Section 498A, subject to the condition that the sentence of all the appellants, except the husband of the deceased, be modified to the period already undergone.

43. Cruelty as defined in Section 498A of IPC must meet the following requirements: i) There should be harassment of the woman; ii) Harassment should be with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet the unlawful demand of property or valuable security; iii) The harassment may be even where on account of failure by the woman or any person related to her to meet any such demand earlier made.

44. In this regard, it would be necessary to analyse the evidence available on record. As per the testimony of PW-1 Dalip Kumar Srivastava, all the appellants used to taunt his sister that by giving a Maruti-800 car in the marriage, they have been insulted and a Maruti Esteem car ought to have been given. The deceased was also taunted that instead of Philips T.V., a Sony T.V. should have been given. Moreover, she was taunted for bringing inferior quality clothes. It has come in evidence that to stop the taunting of the appellants, PW-1 gave Rs. 50,000/- which was paid in three installments of Rs. 10,000/-, Rs. 25,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- to the parents of the appellant Deepak Srivastava. The law in this regard is well settled that taunting made by the parents-in-law or the relatives of the deceased with regard to the inferior goods brought in the dowry does not amount to demand of dowry.

45. Another Division Bench of this Court, of which one of us (G. S. Sistani, J.) was also a member, in the case of Sonia vs. State of Delhi MANU/DE/2064/2016, while acquitting the appellant Sonia (one of the co-accused whose Criminal Appeal No. 1/2004 was decided on 04.02.2016) under Section 498A of IPC held that the name of the appellant Sonia did not find mention in the alleged demands of dowry made by the in-laws of the deceased. The allegations against the appellant Sonia were found to be weak, vague and general in nature.

46. We may profit from the view taken in the case of Bimla Gupta and Ors. vs. State of Delhi reported at MANU/DE/8245/2007 whereby the charges framed against the accused persons by the Trial Court under Section 498A, 304B read with Section 34 of IPC were set aside due to insufficient evidence against them including the evidence of taunting by her in-laws. Relevant para 20 reads as under: “20. The evidence relied upon is the statement that Geeta was taunted, by her in-laws after marriage. As far as the Petitioners are concerned, it is alleged that they asked the deceased to arrange for a further amount, to help her brother-in-law's business. This is no doubt some evidence; it may even be said to raise suspicion. However, in my opinion, this material, by itself cannot constitute grave suspicion, warranting charges. I am Therefore of the opinion that there is insufficient evidence, to conclude that the petitioners, prima facie, were involved in commission of the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC.” (Emphasis Supplied) (Also see Smt. Neera Singh vs. The State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors. reported at 138 (2007) DLT 152, (Paragraph 1, 2, 6 and

7)

47. In the light of the aforesaid dicta, we are of the considered view that mere taunting will not bring the offence of Section 498A of IPC, unless it is brought out that it was intended to compel the deceased to take the extreme step of taking her life.

48. We may note that the learned Trial Court was influenced by the fact that the deceased was not taken to the hospital by her in-laws and when the first call was made by Dalip Srivastava (brother of the deceased), he was being informed that his sister was busy doing some household work. Additionally, the deceased was only removed to the hospital by the brother of the deceased after he reached her matrimonial home. The Trial Court further noted that the greed of the in-laws of the deceased is evident from the fact that all the jewellery items were removed by her mother-in-law while removing her to the hospital.

49. Adverting to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has established its case against all the appellants beyond reasonable doubt to the effect that deceased was harassed or meted with cruelty for or in connection with the demand for dowry. Thus, we conclude by convicting all the appellants Poonam Srivastava, Jitender Srivastava, Veena Srivastava, Deepak Srivastava and Rajinder Srivastava for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC.

50. Coming to the conviction of all the appellants under Section 304B of IPC, we shall consider the role played by the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava on one side and the case of Rajinder Srivastava, Deepak Srivastava under separate heads. Role of the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC:

51. The next question which comes for consideration before this Court is as to whether the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry by the appellants to attract Section 304B of IPC?

52. In the case of Kans Raj v State of Punjab, reported at (2000) 5 SCC 207, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court laid down the following ingredients which need to be proven against the accused persons before they can be convicted under this Section: a. The death of a woman must be caused by burns or bodily injury or had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; b. Such death should have occurred within 7 years of her marriage; c. The deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or by any relative of her husband; d. Such cruelty or harassment should be for or in connection with the demand of dowry; and e. To such cruelty or harassment the deceased should have been subjected soon before her death.

53. To attract conviction under Section 304-B of the IPC, the most essential aspect which needs to be proved is that the cruelty or harassment for bringing insufficient dowry must be soon before her death. Now the question which arises for consideration is as to what period may be considered as „soon before her death‟.

54. In the case of Kaliyaperumal v. State of T.N. reported at (2004) 9 SCC 157, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while dealing with the expression „soon before her death‟ held as under: “5. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of the “death occurring otherwise than in normal circumstances”. The expression “soon before” is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led in by the prosecution. “Soon before” is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression “soon before” is not defined. A reference to the expression “soon before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods soon after the theft, is either the thief who has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession. The determination of the period which can come within the term “soon before” is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence.”

55. As far as the role and evidence against the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava for the offence punishable under Section 304B of IPC is concerned, it may be noted that there are no specific allegations against the appellants in the evidence discussed aforementioned with regard to the demand for dowry which can show that soon before her death there was a demand for dowry from the deceased by the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava which had a live link and proximate link to her death and none of the witnesses have alleged any role to the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava. Even otherwise, the amount which was given in installments of 10,000/-, 15,000/- and 25,000/- was handed over to the parents of the appellant Deepak Srivastava.

56. In the case of Amar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan reported at (2010) 9 SCC 64, the Apex Court while modifying the sentence of the appellant under Section 304B of the IPC sentenced him for a period of ten years and also maintained the acquittal recorded by the High Court of Rajasthan in favour of the mother of the appellant (Gordhani) and younger brother of the appellant (Jagdish) of the appellant. Relevant para 29, 31 and 32 read as under:

57. In the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab reported at (2000) 5 SCC 207, the Hon‟be Supreme Court cautioned that in cases where accusations of dowry deaths are made, the overt acts attributed to persons other than the husband are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and by mere conjectures and implications such relations cannot be held guilty for the offence relating to dowry deaths. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court further observed that a tendency has developed for roping in all relations of the in-laws of the deceased in the matters of dowry deaths which, if not discouraged, is likely to affect the case of the prosecution even against the real culprits.

58. It was noticed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India and Ors. reported at (2005) 6 SCC 281, that undoubtedly the object of the provision is prevention of dowry menance. However, now many instances have been noticed where the complaints are not bonafide and had been filed with oblique motive. Relevant para 8 of the judgment reads as under: “19. The object of the provision is prevention of the dowry menace. But as has been rightly contended by the petitioner many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreak personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the courts have to take care of the situation within the existing framework. As noted above the object is to strike at the roots of dowry menace. But by misuse of the provision a new legal terrorism can be unleashed. The provision is intended to be used as a shield and not as an assassin's weapon. If the cry of “wolf” is made too often as a prank, assistance and protection may not be available when the actual “wolf” appears. There is no question of the investigating agency and courts casually dealing with the allegations. They cannot follow any straitjacket formula in the matters relating to dowry tortures, deaths and cruelty. It cannot be lost sight of that the ultimate objective of every legal system is to arrive at the truth, punish the guilty and protect the innocent. There is no scope for any preconceived notion or view. It is strenuously argued by the petitioner that the investigating agencies and the courts start with the presumptions that the accused persons are guilty and that the complainant is speaking the truth. This is too wide and generalized statement. Certain statutory presumptions are drawn which again are rebuttable. It is to be noted that the role of the investigating agencies and the courts is that of a watchdog and not of a bloodhound. It should be their effort to see that an innocent person is not made to suffer on account of unfounded, baseless and malicious allegations. It is equally undisputable that in many cases no direct evidence is available and the courts have to act on circumstantial evidence. While dealing with such cases, the law laid down relating to circumstantial evidence has to be kept in view.”

59. In the case of Karan Singh & Another vs. State of Haryana reported at (2014) 5 SCC 738, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court while modifying the conviction of the appellants from Section 304B to under Section 306 of the IPC observed that the only evidence against the appellants was to the ill treatment and harassment which was not related to any specific demand for dowry. Relevant para 19, 21 to 23 read as under:

As such the ill-treatment and subsequent death of Manju would not fall within the meaning of a dowry death under Section 304- B IPC.

22. But, there is no doubt that Manju and Sunita were subjected to ill-treatment and harassment from time to time by Karan Singh and Mukhtiari though it was not relatable to any demand for dowry. The evidence on record shows that they were turned out from the matrimonial home on more than one occasion. They were even turned out from the matrimonial home within about ten days after Manju gave birth to a baby boy. Ram Kishan had spoken about this to Satbir and Sukhbir but in spite of this, the attitude of Karan Singh and Mukhtiari did not change. As mentioned above, no allegation has been made against Satbir and Sukhbir. Again, a few days before Manju's death, Sunita was subjected to beating and turned out of the matrimonial home. Although, Manju did not accompany her sister, she paid the price for staying back in Village Raiya.

23. From the facts of the case it is quite clear to us that although there may be no evidence of Manju having been compelled by Karan Singh and Mukhtiari to consume poison, they had created a situation over a sufficiently long period of time whereby she was left with no option but to take her life. It is quite unlikely that a young lady, particularly one having a year old child, would take her life unless she had some mental health issues (which is not the case) or was compelled by circumstances to do so. An offence of abetment of suicide punishable under Section 306 IPC is much broader in scope than an offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. [Bhupendra v. State of M.P., (2014) 2 SCC 106]. In this case an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC is clearly made out against Karan Singh and Mukhtiari.”

60. In view of the facts and circumstance of the present case, we find that there are no specific incidents mentioned in the testimonies of the witnesses to show that at different points of time the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava had tortured or demanded dowry from the deceased and her parents soon before her death. Applying law to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we are of the considered view that the allegations against the appellants Poonam Srivastava, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava are vague and general in nature.

61. Undoubtedly, it is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused is to be established beyond any reasonable doubt. There lies a duty on the Courts to find the truth in the prosecution story against the accused and to consider the case of prosecution by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence before an accused can be convicted. A similar view was taken in Sarwan Singh Rattan Singh v. State of Punjab: AIR 1957 SC 637; Anil W. Singh v. State of Bihar, (2003) 9 SCC 67; Reddy Sampath W. v. State of A.P., (2005) 7 SCC 603 and Ramreddy Rajesh Khanna Reddy v. State of A.P., (2006) 10 SCC 172.

62. Having regard to the evidence available on record, the prosecution has failed to bring home the guilt of the appellants Poonam Srivastava, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava beyond reasonable doubt for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC and can only be convicted under Section 498A of the IPC. We are, therefore, of the opinion that in view of the material on record, the Trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava under Section 498A of the IPC. However, the conviction of the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava under Section 304B is erroneous and thus set aside. Role of the appellants Deepak Srivastava and Rajinder Srivastava for the offence punishable under Section 304B of the IPC:

63. It has emerged from the evidence that a demand of Rupees 2 lakhs was made by the appellant Rajender for the purpose of business of the appellant Deepak Srivastava. The said demand was made on two occasions i.e. 23.02.1998 and 29.05.1998. The relevant part of the examination-in-chief of PW[1] Dalip Kumar Srivastava (brother of the deceased) reads as under: “On 23.02.1998 accd. Rajinder, Jitender and Deepak alongwith my sister came to our house when my sister told me that her father in law wanted to start some work for Deepak and for that they were in need of Rs.[2] lacs. On hearing this, I told to accd. Rajinder the father in law of my sister that at that time I was not in a position to pay the said amount and then some time be given to me and whatever I could arrange I will give. On hearing my reply, the accd. persons told me that they required money within a month failing which we should keep our sister at our place (Home). They also told that there was no scarcity of girls for them and that they would get Rs. 10 lacs after remarrying his son. Thereafter, they all left away place. My sister also accompanied them. ….. On 29.05.1998 Deepak alongwith my sister came to our house in the morning and on my insisting to go in our house he did not go in and leaving my sister beneath our house saying that he would come back in the evening and he further commented that he wanted reply by evening to whatever he stated to my sister. I asked from my sister what the matter was. She replied that it was the same matter of Rs. 2 lac. and he further said that Deepak asked her if he did not get Rs. 2 lac she need not to come to him. I asked my sister no matter when Deepak would come in the evening, I will talk to him. In the evening, accd. Deepak came on my refusing not giving money to him he abused me and asked me to keep my sister at my house and said come to our house if I had Rs. 2 lac. and he went leaving my sister at our house. After leaving Deepak in my sister started weeping asking that she was to go to our house (in laws). I said to her that I will leave you to your house and then taking her I reached to Shalimar Bagh. The house of my sister (in laws). At that time except accd. Sonia all the accd. were present in their house (Arti‟s in-laws house). Rajinder said if I had brought the money? I said to him that ahead a sluggish business at that time and I had already told you that I would arrange for the money. As far as the money is arranged I will give to you. On this, Deepak said that Arti was digging well for herself. And after making many emplorements I came leaving my sister in their house (Arti‟s in laws).”

64. To rebut the above evidence, learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the cross-examination of PW[1] Dalip Kumar Srivastava whereby he stated as „It is correct that at the time of my sister‟s marriage, the accused party had a good business and they are financially sound. It is correct that they had two shops, one in Model Town and the other in Kingsway Camp. It is correct that both the shops were in existence before the marriage of my sister and they were nicely established.‟

65. In the case of Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab reported at (2015) 6 SCC 477, a three-Judge bench of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court noted down as to what would fall within the term "dowry". Relevant para 20 reads as under: “20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfill the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb case (2007) 9 SCC721 followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal (2013) 3 SCC 684 do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

66. The examination-in-chief of PW[1], which has been extracted hereinabove, would fairly show that soon before the death of deceased Aarti on 23.02.1998, the appellant Rajinder (father-in-law), Jitender (brother-in-law) and Deepak (husband) had come to the house of PW[1] (brother of the deceased) and a demand of Rs.[2] lakh was made. PW[1] had then informed the father-in-law that he was not in a position to pay the said amount and sought time to make arrangement. Further reading of the evidence show that such was the intensity of the demand that PW[1] was informed that if the money was not paid within one month, Aarti should be kept back at her parental home. While threatening PW[1] that there was no scarcity of girls and they would be able to get Rs.10 lakh after remarrying their son, they left the house of PW[1]. In continuation of the demand, again on 29.05.1998, the deceased and her husband came to the house of PW[1] and left Aarti to the parental home and sought a reply by the evening. His sister had informed him that her husband had told her that if she did not get Rs.[2] lakh, she need not go home with him. When the appellant Deepak came in the evening and on PW1‟s refusal to part with the money, he abused PW[1] and told him to keep his sister. A careful analysis of the testimony of PW[1], which in our view is truthful and reliable and corroborated by the fact that the demands were made even in the past and in fact, succumbing to the demand, Rs.50,000/- were paid in three installments, we are of the view that the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the appellant Rajinder and Deepak under Section 304-B of IPC. As far as the appellant Jitender is concerned, we find that an attempt has been made to rope-in all the family members under Section 304-B IPC. Although the appellant Jitender has also been named but keeping in view the cross-examination of PW[9], which we have extracted in para 64 above, we find this part of the testimony of PW[1] to be unreliable.

67. Taking into consideration the law discussed in aforegoing para, and for the reasons mentioned above, Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 2004 preferred by Deepak Srivastava is dismissed. Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 2004 filed by Poonam Srivastava is partly allowed and her conviction under Section 498A of IPC is maintained and is sentenced to the period already undergone by her which as per nominal roll is about 10 months. Criminal Appeal 68 of 2004 includes three appellants out of which the conviction and the sentence of the appellant Rajender Srivastava is maintained under Sections 304B, 498A and 406 of the IPC as held by the Trial Court. The conviction of the appellants Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava under Section 498A of the IPC is maintained and are sentenced to the period already undergone by them i.e. 4 years 2 months 10 days and 2 years 25 days (respectively). In our view, the period already undergone by the appellants Poonam Srivastav, Jitender Srivastava and Veena Srivastava (as under-trial and after conviction) would meet the ends of justice. The fine imposed upon the appellants and the default sentence awarded to them shall remain unaltered.

68. The record shows that the appellants Deepak Srivastava and Rajinder Srivastava are on bail, they both shall serve the sentence as imposed by the learned Trial Court and surrender before the Central Jail, Tihar within three weeks from today. Both shall be taken into custody to serve out the remaining sentence.

69. The appeals are disposed of in the aforestated terms.

70. The copy of this judgment be sent to the Superintendent Jail.

71. Trial Court record be sent back. G.S.SISTANI, J SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J AUGUST 30, 2017 //