State v. Govinda @ Golu

1. The present revision petition is directed against order on charge dated 27th October, 2020 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge-02 (Central District), Tis Hazari Court in SC No. 211/2020, titled “State v. Govinda @ Golu”. These proceedings emanate from FIR No. 358/2019, registered at P.S. Kashmere Gate under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 18601.

2. The case of the Prosecution is that the deceased, Chander Shekhar, and the Respondent were acquainted with each other, having previously resided in the same neighbourhood and often engaged in playing cards together. On 8th December, 2019, the Respondent visited the deceased’s “IPC” Dgitally dhaba to play cards, during which an altercation broke out after the deceased allegedly reprimanded him. Pursuant thereto, the deceased and the Respondent began physically assaulting each other by slapping and kicking. Later the same day, at around 5:00 p.m., another confrontation took place between the deceased and the Respondent near Bara Bazaar Road, in front of Tilak Gali, Kashmere Gate, Delhi, over a card game. This encounter, again reportedly over a card game, escalated into a fight during which the Respondent is alleged to have landed a forceful fist blow to the deceased’s head and kicked him in the stomach. The deceased collapsed at the scene and sustained serious injuries. He was rushed to the hospital but was declared brought dead. Based on these allegations, the present FIR was registered and the Respondent was arrested. Statements of eyewitnesses were recorded, a post-mortem examination was conducted, and a chargesheet was filed against the Respondent for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

3. Upon hearing arguments on the point of charge, the Trial Court, by the impugned order, framed a charge against the Respondent under Section 304(2) of the IPC, while discharging him of the offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC. Aggrieved by the said order, the State has preferred the present revision petition challenging the framing of charge under the lesser provision and seeking restoration of the charge under Section 302 IPC.

4. Mr. Tarang Srivastava, APP for the State, contends that the impugned order is founded on conjectures and surmise, inasmuch as the Trial Court discharged the Respondent for the offence under Section 302 IPC, without any substantive or factual basis. He argues that at this preliminary stage, the Dgitally Court is only required to ascertain whether a prima facie case is made out on the basis of the material produced by the prosecution, and that a meticulous evaluation of evidence or an assessment of probable defences is neither required nor permissible.

5. It is further submitted that the Respondent inflicted injuries on the deceased that were, by their very nature and severity, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The fact that the assault may not have been premeditated, it is urged, cannot by itself serve as a ground to exclude the application of Section 302 IPC. The absence of planning does not, per se, negate the presence of intent or knowledge required under Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC. Mr. Srivastava argues that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to evaluate the probative value of evidence or engage in a detailed scrutiny of competing versions. The Prosecution’s case, if taken at face value, discloses sufficient material to proceed under Section 302 IPC, and the Trial Court was obliged to consider the entirety of the record with judicial circumspection before altering the nature of the charge.

6. The Court has considered the aforenoted contentions. The legal principle that, at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is not required to conduct a meticulous evaluation of evidence or assess its probative worth is indeed well settled. What is required is the existence of a prima facie case based on the materials placed on record. However, it is equally well settled that while the final determination of guilt is not to be undertaken at the stage of charge; yet, the material on record and the facts emerging therefrom must be consistent and compatible with the charge sought to be framed. The test is whether the material on record, if accepted as true without any additions Dgitally or qualifications, is sufficient to ground the charge in law. The Supreme Court, in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh,[2] discussed the principles to be considered by Courts at the stage of framing of charge or discharging an accused. The relevant observations made by the Supreme Court are as under:

7. Further, the Supreme Court, in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala & Anr.,[3] examined the scope of discharge under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., and observed as follows:

Dgitally there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing.” If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this stage he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal. Further, the words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused” clearly show that the Judge is not a mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the prosecution.”

8. In the recent judgement of Shashikant Sharma v. State of U.P.,[4] the Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that if necessary ingredients of an offence are not made out, the Court is not obligated to frame charge for such offence against an accused.

9. Keeping the afore-noted principles in mind, we proceed to examine the relevant portion of the impugned order, which reads as follows:

10. The Trial Court, in its reasoning, observed that the incident in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1599 Dgitally question stemmed from a sudden and unplanned altercation between the Respondent and the deceased. Referring to the Prosecution’s own version as set out in the chargesheet, the Trial Court noted that the dispute arose over a card game, escalating into a physical scuffle wherein the Respondent allegedly delivered a forceful fist blow to the head and a kick to the stomach of the deceased, a man aged around 60 years. The Trial Court held that while there was no material to suggest any premeditation or intention to kill, the nature of the assault demonstrated that the Respondent had knowledge that such an act could likely result in death. On that basis, the Court concluded that a charge under Section 302 IPC was not made out and proceeded to frame a charge under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.

11. Indeed, the Prosecution itself describes the event as having occurred in the heat of the moment, during a sudden quarrel arising out of a verbal exchange. The allegation that the Respondent inflicted kicks and a fist blow, while serious, must be viewed in the context of the alleged facts, that a personal dispute escalated into a physical altercation, without weapons or pre-existing animosity, and without any suggestion that the Respondent intended to cause death. Moreover, the injuries recorded in the post-mortem report are not shown to have been inflicted on particularly vital parts of the body, nor do they indicate an assault of such intensity as would, by themselves, support a presumption of intent to kill. The deceased’s postmortem report, indicates the presence of following external injuries: “1. Reddish bruise with swelling 4.5x[3].2cm present at outer aspect of left eye brow. On dissection: infiltration of blood present