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HIGH COURT OF DELHI
JUDGMENT
2615/2025 & CRL.M.A. 4547/2025 MOHD AMJAD THAKUR .....Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
Through: Counsel (appearance not given)
1. By way of the present application, the petitioner seeks condonation of delay of 3457 days in filing the above-captioned revision petition against the impugned order dated 08.05.2015, passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Courts, South East District, Saket Courts, Delhi in Execution Petition No. 246/2022 titled ‘Sarah @ Sonia Dhir v. Mohammad Amjad’.
2. Briefly stated, the marriage between the parties was solemnized on 14.12.2005 as per Muslim rites and ceremonies in Delhi. The respondent-wife, originally a Hindu, had converted to Islam on the date of marriage, supported by a Fatwa issued by the Maulvi. The respondent left the matrimonial home in the year 2008 due to marital discord and refused to return to the company of the petitioner. It is stated that the respondent was gainfully employed before marriage and holds B.A. and MBA degrees. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 [Cr.P.C.] seeking maintenance. Vide order dated 08.05.2015, the learned Family Court allowed the petition and granted the following reliefs:
3. Thereafter, the respondent filed a petition under Sections 2(iv), 2(viii), 2(viii)(f), 2(ix) and the second proviso to Section 4 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939. However, the said petition was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on the ground that the marriage was ab initio null and void, as the respondent had not obtained a divorce from her previous husband, whom she had married according to Hindu rites, prior to marrying the petitioner and converting to Islam.
4. The petitioner claims that under mistaken legal advice, he continued to comply with the maintenance order dated 08.05.2015 and defended various execution petitions filed by the respondent. He had earlier approached this Court in Crl. Rev. P. 1299/2019, challenging the orders passed in the execution proceedings, but the said petition was withdrawn on 11.11.2022 with liberty to take appropriate legal recourse. It is contended that this Court had verbally advised the petitioner to approach the Family Court.
5. Pursuant to that, the petitioner claims that he had filed an application before the learned Family Court in August, 2023 seeking dismissal of all execution petitions, placing reliance on the judgment of this Court in Crl. Rev. P. No. 129/2021 titled ‘Sunder Lal Saini v. Meena Saini’. However, it is stated that the said application is still pending. Meanwhile, vide order dated 12.11.2024, the learned Family Court passed the following order: “Submissions heard. Record perused. As per office report, a sum of Rs. 77,000/- is due towards the JD. Last opportunity was given to JD to clear the arrears which he has failed to avail. Issue warrant in form no. 19 in Second Schedule of Cr.P.C. against the JD, addressed to the SHO concerned, on filing PF, returnable on the next date.”
6. The petitioner, appearing in person, submits that the delay in challenging the order dated 08.05.2015 was not deliberate but due to his ignorance of the applicable legal position. He contends that the impugned order has become infructuous and non-maintainable, and that he remained under the mistaken belief that no further remedy was available. It is submitted that he has already paid a total amount of Rs. 4,27,000/- (approximately) towards compliance with the said order.
7. It is further submitted that, vide order dated 12.12.2024, the Predecessor Bench of this Court made the following observations in the present case: “By way of the present petition filed under section 442 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita 2023, the petitioner impugns 03 orders dated 13.09.2024 passed by the learned Family Court, that have been appended to the petition at pages 28, 32, and 36. On a perusal of the orders, it will be seen that there is nothing to impugn in those 03 orders, quite apart from the fact that the said orders are clearly interlocutory in nature and therefore not amenable to challenge in the revisional jurisdiction of this court. When this is put to learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, she seeks leave to amend the petition appropriately to challenge the orders for grant of maintenance, with which the petitioner is aggrieved. Let requisite amendments be made before the next date…”.
8. On 18.12.2024, the Predecessor Bench of this Court had observed as under:
9. Thereafter, the petitioner had amended the present petition and assailed the order dated
10. In view of the above, the petitioner submits that the delay in filing the present revision petition is not intentional or deliberate, but has occurred due to bona fide and compelling circumstances as detailed hereinabove.
11. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent opposes the present application and submits that no sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of the inordinate delay of 3457 days in filing the revision petition. It is argued that the petitioner was well aware of the maintenance order since 2015, having complied with it for several years, and the plea of ignorance of law or mistaken advice cannot justify such prolonged and unexplained delay. It is further submitted that the present petition is a belated attempt to avoid compliance with a binding judicial order and deserves outright rejection.
12. This Court has heard arguments addressed on behalf of both the parties and has perused the record.
13. At the outset, this Court notes that the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, recently in Pathapati Subba Reddy v. LAO: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513, had observed as under in respect of condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act:
Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression „sufficient cause‟ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” (Emphasis added)
14. In the present case, it is evident that the petitioner did not challenge the impugned order dated 08.05.2015 for a period of almost 10 years. As per his own submissions, he complied with the said order and continued to pay maintenance to the respondent for at least four years following its pronouncement. The petitioner submits that the marriage between the parties was subsequently declared null and void by the learned Family Court in the year 2019, on the ground that the respondent-wife had not obtained a divorce from her earlier husband before contracting a second marriage with the petitioner. Based on this declaration, the petitioner assumed that the maintenance order would no longer survive and consequently stopped making payments to the respondent.
15. Thereafter, upon receipt of summons in the execution proceedings filed by the respondent, the petitioner resumed partial payment of maintenance. He also approached this Court in the year 2019, challenging the execution proceedings. However, the said revision petition was later withdrawn in the year 2022, when this Court directed the petitioner to approach the learned Family Court and seek appropriate relief. This Court had further observed that the petitioner may draw the attention of the Family Court to the judgment of this Court in Sunder Lal Saini v. Meena Saini (supra), where it was held that a woman who contracts a second marriage during the subsistence of her first marriage (commonly referred to as a bigamous marriage) is not entitled to maintenance.
16. Pursuant to the liberty granted by this Court, the petitioner filed an application before the learned Family Court seeking dismissal of the execution petitions and cancellation of the warrants. However, as per his submissions, the said application is still pending consideration before the learned Family Court.
17. The petitioner now seeks to challenge the original order dated 08.05.2015 by way of the present revision petition, filed after a delay of 3457 days. His argument is that once the marriage was declared void by the learned Family Court in 2019, the maintenance order could no longer be sustained, and therefore the said declaration should be treated as a fresh cause of action to assail the original maintenance order.
18. The sole ground urged in the application for condonation of delay, that the impugned order dated 08.05.2015 has become „infructuous and non-maintainable‟, is neither tenable nor sufficient to justify the extraordinary delay of over 3457 days. Merely stating that the order has become infructuous does not demonstrate any compelling or unavoidable circumstance that prevented the petitioner from approaching the Court within a reasonable period. Such a ground, by itself, cannot form the basis for condoning an inordinate and unexplained delay of nearly a decade.
19. It is material to note that in the main petition itself, it is mentioned that “the maintenance order dated 08.05.2015 (SUPRA) became infructuous and nonmaintainable however, was never challenged or appealed by the petitioner as he was unaware about the settled law of land”. The argument of the petitioner that he was unaware of the legal position or the “law of the land” also cannot be accepted. Ignorance of law is not a valid ground for condonation of delay, especially when the petitioner had been actively participating in related proceedings and had even approached this Court in 2019. If such a plea were to be accepted, it would open the floodgates for litigants to justify such delays on assertions of ignorance of law, thereby defeating the very purpose of the law of limitation.
20. While this Court takes note of the fact that the petitioner may not have been aware of his remedies during the initial period between 2015 and 2019, it is significant to note that even after the declaration of nullity of marriage in 2019, the petitioner waited until 2025 to file the present petition. Even if the benefit of doubt is extended in favour of the petitioner and the delay between 2015 to 2019 is condoned on account of compliance with the order, there still remains an unexplained delay of more than six years thereafter.
21. The petitioner has failed to offer any plausible or sufficient justification for this prolonged delay between 2019 and 2025. It is well settled that the remedy of revision must be invoked within the stipulated limitation period, and any unexplained and gross delay cannot be condoned mechanically. In the present case, the delay of 3457 days cannot be treated as either reasonable or bona fide.
22. Accordingly, this Court finds no ground to entertain the present application seeking condonation of delay of 3457 days.
23. However, it is clarified that the petitioner shall be at liberty to raise all his grievances, including those raised in the present proceedings, before the learned Family Court in the pending execution petitions. Since it has been submitted by the petitioner that he had already filed an application before the Family Court in the year 2023 in this regard, and the same is yet to be decided, the learned Family Court is directed to consider and decide the said application (if filed by the petitioner) expeditiously, in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of hearing to all concerned parties.
24. The present application seeking condonation of delay is thus dismissed. As a consequence, the accompanying revision petition as well as all other pending applications are also dismissed.
25. It is however clarified that the dismissal of the present revision petition on the ground of delay shall not preclude the petitioner from taking any other steps permissible in law for redressal of his grievances.
26. The judgment be uploaded on the website forthwith. DR.
SWARANA KANTA SHARMA, J JULY 28, 2025