Parmeet Singh Anand & Anr. v. Subhash Chand Aggarwal & Anr.

5.2. The Defendants raised a preliminary objection of maintainability of any claim under the said Agreement against Defendant No. 2. It is stated that Defendant No. 2 had admittedly not signed the alleged Agreement. It is stated that Defendant No. 2 did not authorize Defendant No. 1 to execute any Agreement on her behalf. In these facts, it is contended that the Plaintiffs have no cause of action against Defendant No. 2.

5.3. The Defendants have specifically denied receipt of first legal notice dated 27.09.2020. With respect to the e-mail dated 21.09.2020, it is averred that only after receiving the paper-book of this suit, the said e-mail was discovered in the spam folder.

5.4. It is averred that notwithstanding the Defendants plea of the said Agreement is forged, the conduct of the Plaintiffs from July, 2020 until November, 2022 as per the pleadings in the plaint, show that the Plaintiffs were aware that the Defendants were not/never willing to sell the suit property to the Plaintiffs.

5.5. It is stated that the sale price of Rs. 4.82 crores proposed by the Plaintiffs under the said forged Agreement is 50% of the market value and the Plaintiffs are trying to compel the Defendants to sell the suit property at this depressed rate through the present legal proceedings.

5.6. It is stated that the Plaintiffs, who were the erstwhile owners of the suit property, sold the suit property on 26.05.2009 [to a third-party] and are now seeking to wrongfully buy-back the same at depressed prices.

6. In the facts of this case, the disputed signatures of Defendant No. 1 as appearing on the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 were referred by this Court to Forensic Science Laboratory [‘FSL’] for verification. The FSL in its report dated 29.11.2024 has concluded that the said document does not match with the specimen signatures of Defendant No. 1. Arguments on behalf of the Plaintiffs

7. Mr. J.P. Sengh, learned senior counsel for the Plaintiffs states that the existence of an agreement for sale between the parties is corroborated from the e-mails dated 14.07.2020 and 21.09.2020 sent to Defendant No. 1. He states that the submission of the Defendants that the said e-mails were in the spam folder and were discovered in 2022, only after service of the paper-book of this suit, is technologically not possible.

7.1. He states that the broker, who witnessed the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 has filed an affidavit before this Court confirming that Defendant No. 1 signed in his presence.

7.2. He states that even if this Court was to ignore the Agreement-cum- Receipt dated 12.07.2020 in view of the FSL report, the Court can note that an oral agreement for sale existed as evidenced from the aforesaid two emails.

7.3. He states that the FSL report dated 29.11.2024 would have to be tested at trial and the objections of the Plaintiffs would be put to the CFSL expert during cross-examination.

7.4. He states that the Plaintiffs are ready and willing to perform the said Agreement and has deposited a sum of Rs. 5 crores with the Registry of this Court in pursuance to the order dated 24.05.2024.

7.5. He states therefore, the interim injunction be confirmed. Deliberations and findings

(i) Reference to FSL and its findings

8. In view of the categorical stand taken by Defendant No. 1 with respect to the forgery of the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020, this Court vide order dated 24.05.2024, referred the disputed signatures of Defendant No. 1 as they appear on the said Agreement along with specimen signatures of Defendant No. 1 for examination to Forensic Science Laboratory [‘FSL’]. This Court vide order dated 24.05.2024 observed that the interim order dated 30.11.2022 was extended subject to the submission of the FSL report.

8.1. The FSL report dated 29.11.2024 [in a sealed cover] was filed before this Court and during the hearing on 27.03.2025, the FSL report was perused by this Court. The said FSL report unequivocally confirms that the signatures purportedly attributed to Defendant No. 1 on the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 do not match with the specimen signatures of Defendant No. 1.

8.2. After perusing the FSL report, the Plaintiffs filed their objections dated 28.04.2025 to the said FSL report, wherein the objections are set out in paragraph ‘13’ therein. The Plaintiffs have also filed I.A. No. 10857/2025 seeking leave of this Court to engage its own handwriting expert for getting another opinion on the signatures of Defendant No. 1 as they appear on the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020. The Plaintiffs in its objections and in application I.A. No. 10857/2025 have alleged that the FSL report is a ‘procured report prepared at the instance of the Defendants’; this allegation was unconditionally withdrawn by Plaintiff No. 1 by way of an affidavit dated 05.05.2025. In this regard, Mr. J.P. Sengh, learned senior counsel for the Plaintiffs states that the intent of the Plaintiffs was to contend that the FSL report is incorrect and conceded that use of the word ‘not procured’ was inaccurate.

(ii) Prima facie Plaintiffs have failed to prove that Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 was executed

9. The Plaintiffs have approached this Court on a specific plea that parties have entered into Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 for sale of the suit property for a sum of Rs. 4.82 crores out of which a sum of Rs. 5 lakhs have been paid towards advance by way of gold (on 12.07.2020) and Rs. 20 lakhs have been paid by way of advance through two (2) cheques (on 12.07.2020); the Plaintiffs admit that the cheques have not been encashed by the Defendants; therefore, the advance payment is limited to value of Rs. 5 lakhs by Gold. The Plaintiffs admit that the sale transaction had to be concluded on or before 30.09.2020 and since September, 2020, Plaintiffs became conscious that Defendants were unwilling to execute a sale deed, leading to issuance of the first legal notice dated 28.09.2020. The Plaintiffs admit that in December, 2021, brokers informed the Plaintiffs that the Defendants were looking for third-party buyers in contravention of the agreement dated 12.07.2020; however, the Plaintiffs approached this Court belatedly on 25.11.2022 (i.e., 2-½ years later).

10. The Defendants at the outset have disputed the genuineness of the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 and have denied its execution as also receipt of the alleged advance of Rs. 5 lakhs by way of gold or receipt of alleged two cheques for the sum total value of Rs. 20 lakhs.

11. The issue of genuineness of signatures of Defendant No. 1 as they appear on the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 was referred to FSL and the report of the FSL confirms the stand of Defendant No. 1 that the purported signatures on the said Agreement do not pertain to Defendant No. 1.

12. In these disputed facts, this Court has to first decide the issue whether Plaintiffs have a prima-facie case in its favour with respect to existence of Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020. In view of the FSL report dated 29.11.2024, this Court is of the view that the stand of Defendant No. 1 that he has not executed the Agreementcum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 has to be accepted, at this prima facie stage. The objections raised by the Plaintiffs to the FSL report would be considered at trial; however, at this interim stage, the FSL report has to be considered in favour of Defendant No. 1. The objections dated 28.04.2025 raised by the Plaintiffs to FSL report dated 29.11.2024, fails to persuade the Court at this prima facie stage to disregard the findings of the said report.

12.1. It is a matter of record that Defendant No. 2 did not execute the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 and therefore, prima facie, Defendant No. 2 is not bound by the said Agreement.

12.2. In these facts, this Court is of the prima facie opinion that Plaintiffs have failed to persuade this Court that there exists a validly executed Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020.

(iii) Prima facie Plaintiffs have failed to prove that any advance payment was made to the Defendants

13. The Plaintiffs have averred that they paid an advance sum equal to value of Rs. 5 lakhs through handing-over of Gold to Defendant No. 1 on 12.07.2020. The Defendant No. 1 has denied the receipt of any Gold. The Plaintiffs have not placed on record any corroborative evidence, which would show the existence of this mode of payment. Also, this Court takes note that this is highly unusual mode of payment and is contrary to all known market practices. Thus, at this prima facie stage, this Court is not persuaded to believe that any payment by way of handing-over of Gold for a value of Rs. 5 lakhs was affected upon the Defendants. The Plaintiffs would have to prove this at trial.

13.1. Next, the Plaintiffs have pleaded that two (2) cheques for a sum total of Rs. 20 lakhs were handed over to Defendant No. 1, however, the Plaintiffs admit that the said cheques were not encashed by Defendant No. 1 in September, 2020. The Defendants have denied receiving any such cheques The Plaintiffs allegedly issued a legal notice dated 27.09.2020 on the Defendants calling upon them to execute the sale deed. In this legal notice, the Plaintiffs do not refer to the cheques nor call upon the Defendants to encash the said cheques nor make any grievance qua its non-encashment. The omission to refer to the non-encashment of the cheques in the said legal notice raises a doubt with respect to the alleged hand over of the said cheques.

13.2. In these facts, prima facie this Court is of this opinion that Plaintiffs have been unable to prove payment of advance to the Defendants. Thus, this Court prima facie holds that no payment has been received by Defendants as advance in pursuance to the said disputed Agreement between the parties.

(iv) Prima facie Plaintiffs have failed to prove that they were ready and willing to perform the contract

14. The Plaintiffs have averred in the plaint that the transaction of sale was for a total price consideration of Rs. 4.82 crores and it had to be completed on or before 30.09.2020. However, on the Plaintiffs’ own showing, the Plaintiffs were aware since September 2020 that the Defendants were unwilling to conclude the sale and were unwilling to execute the sale deed. The Plaintiffs on their own showing were aware that Defendants had not encashed the two (2) cheques for Rs. 20 lakhs and this itself was evidence of Defendants’ lack of intent to sell the suit property to the Plaintiffs.

14.1. The unwillingness of the Defendants to sell the suit property to the Plaintiffs is also evident from the admission of the Plaintiffs at paragraph nos. 12 and 13 of the plaint, where to the knowledge of the Plaintiffs as per the averments, Defendants were looking for third-party purchasers since December 2021.

14.2. However, the Plaintiffs patiently waited from September, 2020 and elected to file this suit, belatedly in November, 2022. The Plaintiffs have averred oral assurances of the Defendants as an explanation for waiting; however, there is admittedly no document on record issued by the Defendants addressed to the Plaintiffs extending the time for performance of the said Agreement to a date after 30.09.2020. In overall conspectus of the facts of this case [where Defendants have not even encashed the two cheques], the pleadings in the plaint alleging oral extension for time of performance by the Defendants in September, 2020 and in December, 2021 as alleged in the plaint fails to persuade this Court, at this prima facie stage.

14.3. The Plaintiffs’ action of approaching this Court in November 2022 [more than 2-½ years after the date fixed for execution of the sale deed i.e., 30.09.2020 as per its own pleading] for seeking specific performance of the said Agreement would be hit by delay and laches. This delay and laches of 2- ½ years has had a material effect on the market price of the suit property, which has escalated.

14.4. The Supreme Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan 1 and Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi[2] has held that in a contract for specific performance of an immovable property, the fixation of the sale consideration is time sensitive and a willing purchaser has to approach the Court within reasonable time for seeking specific performance. Since, real estate prices are dynamic and are increasing exponentially at short intervals, approaching the Court after a considerable time [even if within limitation] would indicate lack of readiness and willingness on behalf of the proposed purchaser. In the facts of this case, the Plaintiffs delay of 2-½ years in approaching this Court is detrimental and given the increase in the real estate prices in the metropolis of Delhi, this Court is of the prima facie view that the Plaintiffs were not ready and willing. The relevant paras of the Supreme Court judgement in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (supra) read as under: -

(2011) 12 SCC 18 [Paragraph nos. 36, 37, 41, 42, and 43] and prices of immovable properties have increased steeply, by leaps and bounds. Market values of properties are no longer stable or steady. We can take judicial notice of the comparative purchase power of a rupee in the year 1975 and now, as also the steep increase in the value of the immovable properties between then and now. It is no exaggeration to say that properties in cities, worth a lakh or so in or about 1975 to 1980, may cost a crore or more now.

37. The reality arising from this economic change cannot continue to be ignored in deciding cases relating to specific performance. The steep increase in prices is a circumstance which makes it inequitable to grant the relief of specific performance where the purchaser does not take steps to complete the sale within the agreed period, and the vendor has not been responsible for any delay or non-performance. A purchaser can no longer take shelter under the principle that time is not of essence in performance of contracts relating to immovable property, to cover his delays, laches, breaches and “non-readiness”. The precedents from an era, when high inflation was unknown, holding that time is not of the essence of the contract in regard to immovable properties, may no longer apply, not because the principle laid down therein is unsound or erroneous, but the circumstances that existed when the said principle was evolved, no longer exist. In these days of galloping increases in prices of immovable properties, to hold that a vendor who took an earnest money of say about 10% of the sale price and agreed for three months or four months as the period for performance, did not intend that time should be the essence, will be a cruel joke on him, and will result in injustice. Adding to the misery is the delay in disposal of cases relating to specific performance, as suits and appeals therefrom routinely take two to three decades to attain finality. As a result, an owner agreeing to sell a property for rupees one lakh and received rupees ten thousand as advance may be required to execute a sale deed a quarter century later by receiving the remaining rupees ninety thousand, when the property value has risen to a crore of rupees. …

41. A correct perspective relating to the question whether time is not of the essence of the contract in contracts relating to immovable property, is given by this Court in K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan [(1997) 3 SCC 1] (by Jeevan Reddy, J. who incidentally was a member of the Constitution Bench in Chand Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519] ). This Court observed: (SCC pp. 7 & 9, paras 10-11) “10. It has been consistently held by the courts in India, following certain early English decisions, that in the case of agreement of sale relating to immovable property, time is not of the essence of the contract unless specifically provided to that effect. … in the case of urban properties in India, it is well-known that their prices have been going up sharply over the last few decades—particularly after 1973. …

11. … We cannot be oblivious to the reality—and the reality is constant and continuous rise in the values of urban properties—fuelled by large-scale migration of people from rural areas to urban centres and by inflation. … Indeed, we are inclined to think that the rigor of the rule evolved by courts that time is not of the essence of the contract in the case of immovable properties—evolved in times when prices and values were stable and inflation was unknown—requires to be relaxed, if not modified, particularly in the case of urban immovable properties. It is high time, we do so.”

42. Therefore there is an urgent need to revisit the principle that time is not of the essence in contracts relating to immovable properties and also explain the current position of law with regard to contracts relating to immovable property made after 1975, in view of the changed circumstances arising from inflation and steep increase in prices. We do not propose to undertake that exercise in this case, nor referring the matter to a larger Bench as we have held on facts in this case that time is the essence of the contract, even with reference to the principles in Chand Rani [(1993) 1 SCC 519] and other cases. Be that as it may.

43. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in K.S. Vidyanadam [(1997) 3 SCC 1]:

(i) The courts, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, should bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that must have some significance and therefore time/period prescribed cannot be ignored.

(ii) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was “ready and willing” to perform his part of the contract.

(iii) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed merely because it is filed within the period of limitation by ignoring the timelimits stipulated in the agreement. The courts will also “frown” upon suits which are not filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific performance. The three-year period is intended to assist the purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor and possession has been delivered in partperformance, where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser.” (Emphasis Supplied)

14.5. As held by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgment, the plaintiff’s failure to approach the Court immediately after the breach/refusal is indicative of the plaintiff’s lack of readiness and willingness. The Plaintiffs acknowledge the date of completion for transaction was 30.09.2020 and therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to approach the Court immediately thereafter. Thus, in view of the delay and laches of 2-½ years and the corresponding increase in the market price, prima facie it appears that Plaintiffs were not ready and willing and the relief of specific performance would be barred by delay and laches.

(v) No equity in favour of the Plaintiffs even on the assumption that an oral agreement exists

15. Lastly, the Plaintiffs have contended that even if the Agreement-cum- Receipt dated 12.07.2020 is ignored in view of the FSL report, the existence of an oral agreement can be inferred from the e-mails dated 14.07.2020 and 21.09.2020 addressed by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants. This argument also fails to persuade this Court since even assuming an oral agreement existed, no advance has been paid to the Defendants and the Plaintiffs who became aware about the Defendant’s unwillingness in September, 2020 failed to approach the Court immediately considering that the date of performance have been fixed as 30.09.2020. There is no equity in favour of the Plaintiffs on the basis of this oral agreement to justify issuing an interim injunction.

(vi) Pleadings with respect to events of September, 2020 are inconsistent with the documents placed on record

16. A perusal of the contents of the Plaintiffs’ first legal notice dated 27.09.2020 shows that Plaintiffs were conscious that the Defendants are unwilling to execute the sale deed. This legal notice was posted on 28.09.2020 as per the postal receipts placed on record. In this notice, the Plaintiffs called upon the Defendants to execute the sale deed within 15 days. The receipt of this legal notice has been denied by the Defendants. However, in the pleaded facts of the plaint, the Plaintiffs’ stand that on 29.09.2020, it obtained an appointment from the concerned Sub-Registrar for execution and presentation of the sale deed on 30.09.2020 does not stand to reason. The Plaintiffs were aware that no sale deed would be executed on 30.09.2020 and therefore there was no occasion to take the appointment. The reliance placed on this fact shows that obtaining of the alleged appointment from the Sub-Registrar was only to create paper trail, to allege Plaintiffs’ willingness during the trial. It was incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to approach the Court for seeking specific performance as its cause of action arose in September, 2020. These facts also lead this Court to prima facie believe that the Plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform the said agreement in September, 2020 or thereafter.

17. To summarize, this Court finds that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove a prima facie case in its favour in view of the following findings against the Plaintiffs: a. In view of the absolute denial of its execution by Defendant No. 1 and the FSL report dated 29.11.2024 substantiating the denial of Defendant No. 1, the Plaintiffs have failed to persuade this Court that there exists a validly executed Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 between the Plaintiffs and Defendant No. 1; b. Defendant No. 2 admittedly did not execute the Agreement-cum- Receipt dated 12.07.2020 and therefore, the said Agreement cannot bind Defendant No. 2. c. The Plaintiffs admit that the two (2) cheques [for a total sum of Rs. 20 lakhs] alleged to have been handed over, were not enchased by Defendant No. 1. The plea of handover would also not be substantiated. That advance payment of Rs. 5 lakhs through handing-over of Gold to Defendant No. 1 could not be substantiated from the record and even otherwise, it is a mode unknown to market practices. Therefore, at this interim stage, Plaintiffs have been unable to prove payment of any advance consideration to the Defendants qua Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020. d. A perusal of the documents relied upon with the plaint and the averments made in the plaint show that the Plaintiffs became aware prior to 30.09.2020 that Defendants had resiled from the alleged Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020. The inaction of the Plaintiffs in approaching this Court for 2-½ years until 25.11.2022, shows their lack of readiness and willingness of performing the said agreement and making its claim stale on account of delay and laches. e. The Plaintiffs have neither paid substantial consideration nor has its received possession of the suit property and therefore there is no equity in their favour.

18. In view of the FSL report dated 29.11.2024, it would be apposite to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi[3], wherein the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Court should be cautious against granting interim orders in light of the prevalent trend of plaintiffs approaching the Courts with forged documents. The Supreme Court held as under: -

“44. Usually the court should be cautious and extremely careful while granting ex parte ad interim injunctions. The better course for the court is to give a short notice and in some cases even dasti notice, hear both the parties and then pass suitable bipartite orders. Experience reveals that ex parte interim injunction orders in some cases can create havoc and getting them vacated or modified in our existing judicial system is a nightmare. Therefore, as a rule, the court should grant interim injunction or stay order only after hearing the defendants or the respondents and in case the court has to grant ex parte injunction in exceptional cases then while granting injunction it must record in the order that if the suit is eventually dismissed, the plaintiff or the petitioner will have to pay full restitution, actual or realistic costs and mesne profits.

45. If an ex parte injunction order is granted, then in that case an endeavour should be made to dispose of the application for injunction as expeditiously as may be possible, preferably as soon as the defendant appears in the court.

46. It is also a matter of common experience that once an ad interim injunction is granted, the plaintiff or the petitioner would make all efforts to ensure that injunction continues indefinitely. The other appropriate order can be to limit the life of the ex parte injunction or stay order for a week or so because in such cases the usual tendency of unnecessarily prolonging the matters by the plaintiffs or the petitioners after obtaining ex parte injunction orders or stay orders may not find encouragement.

47. We have to dispel the common impression that a party by obtaining an injunction based on even false averments and forged documents will tire out the true owner and ultimately the true owner will have to give up to the wrongdoer his legitimate profit. It is also a matter of common experience that to achieve clandestine objects, false pleas are often taken and forged documents are filed indiscriminately in our courts because they have hardly any apprehension of being prosecuted for perjury by the courts or even pay heavy costs. In Swaran Singh v. State of Punjab [(2000) 5 SCC 668:2001 SCC (Cri) 190] this Court was constrained to observe that perjury has become a way of life in our courts.

48. It is a typical example of how a litigation proceeds and continues and in the end there is a profit for the wrongdoer.” (Emphasis Supplied)

19. In the facts of the present case, the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 on basis of which the plaintiffs have built its case, prima facie seems to be forged and fabricated document (in view of the FSL report). Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the plaintiffs should not be given the benefit of prolonging the interim order dated 30.11.2022.

20. This Court in its order dated 24.05.2024 [at paragraph 6 therein] had categorically observed that continuation of the interim order dated 30.11.2022 is subject to the report of the FSL. Since, this Court after perusing the FSL report dated 29.11.2024 has returned a finding that the Plaintiffs have failed to prove a prima facie case in their favour qua the existence of Agreementcum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020, needless to state that there is no balance of convenience also in favour of the Plaintiffs. In view of the findings returned hereinabove, the interim order dated 30.11.2022 is vacated.

21. I.A. No. 20016/2022 filed under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of CPC filed by the Plaintiffs seeking an ex-parte ad-interim injunction, thereby, restraining the Defendants from creating any third-party interest in the suit property is hereby dismissed.

22. I.A. No. 14311/2023 filed under Order XXXIX Rule 4 CPC by the Defendants seeking modification and/or vacation of the interim order dated 30.11.2022 is hereby allowed.

23. With the aforesaid directions, the captioned applications stand disposed of. Directions to SHO PS-Model Town, New Delhi

24. The Defendant has pleaded that they have filed a police complaint dated 17.01.2023 with SHO PS-Model Town, New Delhi vide DD No. 33A with respect to the alleged forgery of the Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020. The Defendant No. 1 is directed to place the FSL report before the concerned SHO.

25. In view of the FSL report dated 29.11.2024 opining that the signatures of Defendant No. 1 are forged, the concerned SHO is directed to collect the FSL report along with the original Agreement-cum-Receipt dated 12.07.2020 from the Registry and examine the police complaint dated 17.01.2023 in accordance with law. A status report be filed by the concerned SHO before this Court on the next date of hearing. Release from the rigors of Section 52 of the Act of 1882

26. In the facts of this case, it would be apposite to apply the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj[4]. In the said judgment, the Supreme Court held that in an appropriate case, the Civil Court may release the subject immovable property from the rigours of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 [‘Act of 1882’]. The relevant paragraph of the judgment reads as under: -

42. It is well settled that the doctrine of lis pendens does not annul the conveyance by a party to the suit, but only renders it subservient to the rights of the other parties to the litigation. Section 52 will not therefore render a transaction relating to the suit property during the pendency of the suit void but render the transfer inoperative insofar as the other parties to the suit. Transfer of any right, title or interest in the suit property or the consequential acquisition of any right, title or interest, during the pendency of the suit will be subject to the decision in the suit.

43. The principle underlying Section 52 of the TP Act is based on justice and equity. The operation of the bar under Section 52 is however subject to the power of the court to exempt the suit property from the operation of Section 52 subject to such conditions it may impose. That means that the court in which the suit is pending, has the power, in appropriate cases, to permit a party to transfer the property which is the subject-matter of the suit without being subjected to the rights of any part to the suit, by imposing such terms as it deems fit. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that this is a fit case where the suit property should be exempted from the operation of Section 52 of the TP Act, subject to a condition relating to reasonable security, so that the defendants will have the liberty to deal with the property in any manner they may deem fit, in spite of the pendency of the suit.”

27. For arriving at the conclusion that the suit property should be released from rigours of Section 52 of the Act of 1882, this Court has considered the fact that even assuming as correct the Plaintiffs’ case that (i) an agreement was indeed reached between the parties for sale of the suit property on 12.07.2020, and (ii) an advance of Rs. 5 lakhs was paid by way of Gold; however, since as per the Plaintiffs, the parties had agreed to conclude the sale on or before 30.09.2020 and the Plaintiffs despite knowing that Defendants are resiling from the agreement failed to approach the Court for seeking specific performance in September, 2020 and instead approached 2-½ years later, when the market prices of the immovable property have increased; in these facts, there is no equity in favour of the Plaintiffs and they would not be entitled to relief of specific performance as held by Supreme Court in Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (supra)5. Therefore, keeping the property of the Defendants entangled in this litigation would be inequitable. Therefore, in these facts, this Court is satisfied that it is a fit case where the suit property should be exempted from operation of Section 52 of the Act of

1882.

28. For this reason, the suit property [i.e., entire built up first floor of the At paragraph no. 43 (iii) free hold property bearing No. A-22 situated in the layout plan of Gujranwala Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. situated at Gujranwala Town, Delhi-110009 admeasuring 433.75 square yards] is released from the rigours Section 52 of Act of 1882.

29. Since Plaintiffs have been unable to show payment of any advance to the Defendants under the alleged Agreement and there is no claim for damages in this suit, this Court does not deem it fit to impose any conditions on the Defendants for passing the direction vis-à-vis Section 52 of Act of

1882.

30. In view of the dismissal of I.A. No. 20016/2022 and the aforesaid direction of release of the suit property from the rigours of Section 52 of the Act of 1882, this Court directs that the amount of Rs. 5 crores deposited by the Plaintiffs on 24.05.2024 be released to them along with interest accrued thereon.

31. List the matter before the Roster Bench on 29.08.2025.

32. A copy of this order be sent to SHO PS-Model Town for information and compliance. In addition to Standing Counsel (Criminal).

MANMEET PRITAM SINGH ARORA (JUDGE) AUGUST 06, 2025/rhc/MG Click here to check corrigendum, if any