Full Text
Through: Ms.Gita Dhingra, Advocate.
To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
JUDGMENT
1. This Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) is filed by the defendant in the suit impugning the judgment of the trial court dated 13.02.2015 whereby trial court has decreed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff filed seeking possession of the suit property being the entire ground floor of House No. I-2/182/183, Madangir, New Delhi as shown in red and green colour in the site plan Ex.PW1/6. Damages/mesne profits were also 2018:DHC:539 granted at Rs.2,000/- per month pendente lite and future till handing over possession of the suit property.
2. The facts of the case are that the respondent/plaintiff filed the subject suit for possession and mesne profits with respect to the suit property pleading that he was owner of the suit property in terms of the usual documentation being the agreement to sell, power of attorney, receipt etc dated 20.06.1981 (Ex.PW-1/1 to Ex.PW-1/4). In the plaint, it was pleaded that the appellant/defendant persuaded her husband, being the son of the respondent/plaintiff, to separate from his parents and that one house of the respondent/plaintiff should be transferred in the name of the appellant/defendant. On account of the aforesaid fight on 03.02.2004, intervention took place of the members of the community and after controlling the situation, the Panchayat of the community decided that the son of the respondent/plaintiff viz the husband of the appellant/defendant should live separately from the respondent/plaintiff. Accordingly, the appellant/defendant on the same day i.e 03.02.2004 left with her parents to their house along with all her possessions being jewellery, clothes etc. The son of the respondent/plaintiff namely Sh. Sanjay also started living separately in a rented accommodation. Respondent/plaintiff on account of mental torture caused by the appellant/defendant disowned his son Sh. Sanjay from the properties of the respondent/plaintiff in terms of the publication in the newspaper „Rashtriya Sahara‟ on 14.04.2004. It is further pleaded in the plaint that the appellant/defendant joined the company of her husband in the rented house on 17.04.2004 but on account of her not being able to adjust with her husband, she once again left the company of the son of the respondent/plaintiff on 24.07.2004. Appellant/defendant is pleaded to have filed false complaints against the respondent/plaintiff and his family members before the Crime Against Women (CAW) Cell. Before the CAW Cell, the son of the respondent/plaintiff gave in writing that the appellant/defendant can join his company in the rented house and the matter was adjourned to 24.10.2006, but on 22.10.2006, the appellant/defendant along with her family members broke open and forcibly entered into the ground floor of the suit property. PCR was called and proceedings under Section 107/151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) were initiated. Plaint thereafter makes reference to various other criminal complaints including a complaint filed by the respondent/plaintiff under Sections 452/324/427/448/506/120-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) before the concerned Metropolitan Magistrate at New Delhi where the appellant/defendant along with her associates are facing trial. For the sake of security, it is pleaded in the plaint, that the respondent/plaintiff and his family members shifted to another house belonging to the respondent/plaintiff at I-2/205, Madangir, New Delhi on a plot admeasuring 25 sq. yards. In view of the aforesaid facts, respondent/plaintiff served a legal notice dated 29.12.2012 upon the appellant/defendant for vacating the ground floor of the suit property in unauthorized occupation of the appellant/defendant, but since the same failed to yield the desirable result, hence the subject suit was filed.
3. Appellant/defendant contested the suit by pleading that all the properties including the suit property were Joint Hindu Family properties. It was further pleaded in the written statement by the appellant/defendant that the respondent/plaintiff and his sons are well off earning handsome amounts. It was pleaded that out of the common pool, various properties were purchased including in the native village in Rajasthan. It was further pleaded that the suit property was the matrimonial home of the appellant/defendant and she was entitled to live in the same in view of the provisions of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. Suit was therefore prayed to be dismissed.
4. After pleadings were completed, issues were framed and parties led evidence including documentary evidence. These aspects are noted in paras 4 to 10 of the impugned judgment and these paras read as under:-
4. From the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed on 02.06.2014:- (1) Whether the property is joint Hindu family properties? OPD. (2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of possession as prayed for? OPP. (3 Whether the plaintiff is entitled the mesne profit? OPP. (4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the decree of permanent injunction? OPP. (5) Relief.
5. Plaintiff examined himself as PW-1 who filed his affidavit in his examination-in-chief reiterating the content of the plaint and relied upon following documents:-
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ and relied upon following documents :- │ │ Sl.No. Documents Exhibit Inference/remarks │ │ No. │ ├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤ │ 1. Agreement to sell, GPA, PW1/1 to Purchased for Rs.13,860/- │ │ affidavit and receipt, all PW1/4 when his son i.e. husband of │ │ dated 20.06.1981 of defendant was around 3 years of │ │ property No. I-II/182-183 age. As per documents, when │ │ executed by Ram Chand this property was purchased it │ │ Verma in favour of was a plot with some │ │ plaintiff (Suit property) malba/ superstructure on it. │ │ RFA No.1059/2017 Page 5 of 26 │ │ 2018:DHC:539 │ │ 2. GPA, receipt and affidavit PW1/5 Purchased for Rs.22,000/- │ │ dt.15.12.1986 of property when his son i.e. husband of │ │ No.I-II/205, Madangir, defendant was │ │ New Delhi measuring 25 around 8 years of age. │ │ sq. yds. executed by Sh. The purchase of second │ │ Mool Chand in favour of property after 5 years for │ │ plaintiff Rs.22,000/- in the year 1986 │ │ shows that the plaintiff was │ │ having sufficient earnings │ │ and therefore, he would │ │ have definitely raised │ │ construction upon the │ │ property I-II/182-183 before │ │ the purchases of I-II/205 as │ │ in these documents the │ │ defendant is shown the │ │ residence of I-II/182-183. │ │ 3. Site plan of suit property PW1/6 │ │ 4. ID card of plaintiff and his PW1/7 & Showing their age of 55 and 59 │ │ wife PW1/8 years as │ │ on 01.01.2008 (Irrelevant) │ │ 5. Water and Electricity PW1/9 In the name of plaintiff. │ │ bills of suit property Colly │ │ 6. Copy of application written PW1/11 It is a letter signed by the │ │ to Chowki Incharge by defendant, her father and the │ │ father of defendant on plaintiff also in the form of │ │ 03.02.2004. settlement, wherein the father of │ │ the defendant is mentioning that │ │ he is taking his daughter i.e. │ │ defendant with him. No cross- │ │ examination was done on this │ │ document. │ │ 7. Medical record of wife of PW1/12 This document was proved in ord │ │ plaintiff of Safdarjung er to prove the incident of │ │ Hospital dt. 23.10.2006 22.10.2006 when defendant │ │ with the history of assault allegedly forcibly entered into the │ │ on abdomen and chest at 9 suit property. No cross │ │ a.m. examination was done on this │ │ document. │ │ 8. Copies of complaint lodged PW1/13 It mentions about the incident of │ │ by the plaintiff dated 22.10.2006 when defendant and │ │ 22.10.06 made to SHO PS his brother Virender allegedly │ │ Ambedkar Nagar entered │ │ forcibly into the suit property. │ │ 9. Copies of complaint lodged PW1/14 It mentions that because of │ │ by the plaintiff dated defendant's quarrel some nature, │ │ RFA No.1059/2017 Page 6 of 26 │ │ 2018:DHC:539 │ │ 23.10.06 made to SHO PS the biradhari had separated them │ │ Ambedkar Nagar and DCP and they started living separately │ │ on first, second │ │ 262 Madangir on rent. It also │ │ mentioned about the incident │ │ of 22.10.2006 when she allegedly │ │ forcibly entered into the suit │ │ property. │ │ 10. Certified copy of PW1/15 │ │ summoning order of │ │ defendant in complaint case │ │ filed by the plaintiff │ │ 11. Copy of Complaint PW1/16 It mentions about the incident of │ │ dt.31.10.2006 made to SH 22.10.2006 when defendant │ │ O PS Ambedkar Nagar and his brother Virender entered │ │ forcibly into the suit property. │ │ It is signed by 30 │ │ neighbourers. │ │ 12. Copy of interim protection PW1/17 │ │ of Ld. ASJ, New Delhi │ │ 13. Copy of discharged PW1/18 Irrelevant │ │ summary medical record of │ │ plaintiff of Batra │ │ Hospital dt.08.11.2012 i.e. │ │ after 2 days of his │ │ admission. │ │ 14. Copy of Newspaper dated PW1/19 Vide which the plaintiff │ │ 14.04.2014 “Rashtriya disowned his son Sanjay and his │ │ Sahara” wife Sunita i.e. defendant from │ │ his estates │ │ 15. Copy of divorce petition PW1/20 Irrelevant │ │ pending between defendant │ │ and son of plaintiff │ │ 16. Copy of legal notice dt. PW1/21 │ │ 29.12.2012 along with to │ │ postal receipts, courier PW1/24 │ │ receipt and AD card │ │ 17. Copies of complaints made PW1/25 It is about the incident of │ │ to SHO and Commissioner colly 27.04.2008 │ │ of Police by plaintiff on │ │ 28.04.2008 against │ │ defendants. │ │ 6. During his cross examination, he admitted that he does not have │ │ the registered sale deeds of the suit properties. He deposed that he │ │ purchased the property on the basis of GPA, Agreement to Sell, Will │ │ etc. He admitted that both the properties belong to MCD Slum Department │ │ RFA No.1059/2017 Page 7 of 26 │ │ 2018:DHC:539 │ │ and they are not capable of being sold. He stated that defendant after │ │ marriage came to the suit property. He is admitted that all his family │ │ members are having a common counsel in the criminal case including his │ │ son Sanjay. He deposed that he did not sent any communication to Sanjay │ │ and his wife regarding disowning. He volunteered that he orally informed │ │ both of them as they were residing 4-5 houses │ │ away from his residence. He deposed that he does not have any document │ │ to show that the suit properties were constructed by him. He volunteered │ │ that he had constructed them in piecemeal and still some part is not │ │ complete. He admitted that he has not filed any document in the present │ │ case to show that the defendant took all her belongings in the year 2004. │ │ 7. Sh. Ashok Kumar, son of plaintiff was examined as PW-2 who │ │ filed his affidavit in his examination-in-chief stating that it was his father │ │ Chottey Lal who is exclusive owner of the suit property │ │ and it was him who purchased the suit property and constructed the same. │ │ During his cross examined he remained stick to his stand and denied that │ │ suit property was purchased from the common funds of the family. │ │ 8. Thereafter PE was closed. │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
30. No doubt, the definition of 'shared household' in Section 2(s) of the Act is not very happily worded, and appears to be the result of clumsy drafting, but we have to give it an interpretation which is sensible and which does not lead to chaos in society.”
(iii) In Navneet Arora case (supra), benefit was granted to the daughter-in-law to stay in the property owned by the father-in-law on the ground of the same being a shared household only on the ground that the daughter-in-law had never left the matrimonial home. These observations are contained in paras 11 to 17 and 119 and which paras read as under:- “11. Pithily stated, the question arising for the consideration of this Court revolves around the interpretation of the term „shared household„ as envisaged under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and if the present case stands squarely covered by the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court of India reported as (2007) 3 SCC 169 S.R Batra & Anr. v. Taruna Batra (Smt.).
12. Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 reads as under:-
13. Learned Counsel for Ms.Surinder Kaur had contended that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Taruna Batra‟s case (Supra), a daughter-in-law, as the present appellant before us, is precluded under the scheme of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 to claim a „right of residence‟ in a premises exclusively owned by her mother-in-law even though she has admittedly resided therein with her husband and his family members in a domestic relationship. He would thus submit that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from no impropriety and is not liable to be interfered with in the present proceedings.
14. Since Ms.Surinder Kaur has planked her submissions on the decision of the Supreme Court in Taruna Batra‟s case (Supra) and we find that the conclusion expressed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is also essentially premised on the said decision, it would therefore be incumbent upon us to carefully examine the dictum in Taruna Batra‟s case (Supra) with a view to ascertain the factual conspectus and the issues which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court, in order to appreciate the observations contained in the said judgment.
15. A microscopic analysis of the said decision would reveal that Ms.Taruna Batra was married to the son of S.R.Batra and his wife on April 14, 2000. After the marriage the couple started residing together as husband and wife at second floor, B-135, Ashok Vihar, Phase-I, Delhi. It was not in dispute that the said property exclusively belonged to S.R.Batra„s wife i.e. the mother-in-law of Taruna Batra. It would be pertinent to note that S.R.Batra and his wife resided separately on the ground floor of the said property. It was an admitted position that Ms.Taruna Batra had shifted to the residence of her parents owing to matrimonial acrimony with her husband. It was only much later that she sought to re-enter the suit property only to find a lock at the main entrance. In wake of such attending circumstances, she filed a suit seeking mandatory injunction to enable her to enter the house. It was the case of S.R.Batra and his wife before the Supreme Court and the Courts below that before any order came to be passed in the said suit, Ms.Taruna Batra along with her parents forcibly broke open the locks of the suit property. It was also contended by S.R.Batra and his wife that their son – Amit Batra, the husband of Taruna Batra, had shifted to his own flat at Mohan Nagar, Ghaziabad before the litigation between the parties had ensued.
16. Perusal of the judgment further reveals that the learned Trial Judge vide order dated March 04, 2003, had held that Ms.Taruna Batra was in possession of the suit property and consequently granted temporary injunction in her favour. The said order of the learned Trial Judge was assailed in appeal before the learned Senior Civil Judge, Delhi, who vide order dated September 17, 2004 held that Ms.Taruna Batra was not residing in the second floor of the suit premises and also observed that her husband – Amit Batra was not living in the suit property, therefore, the matrimonial home could not be said to be a place where only the wife was residing. Laying a challenge to the order of the Appellate Court, Ms.Taurna Batra invoked the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court by filing a petition under Article 227 of Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge of this Court was pleased to hold that the second floor of the suit property was the matrimonial home of Ms.Taruna Batra and the fact that her husband shifted to Ghaziabad later would not make Ghaziabad the matrimonial home.
17. The Supreme Court after taking into consideration the factual matrix highlighted above, was pleased to observe in paragraph 21 of its judgment that this Court fell in error by interfering with the findings of the learned Senior Civil Judge who had categorically held that Ms.Taruna Batra was not residing in the suit premises. The Supreme Court was of the considered view that findings of fact rendered by Courts below could not be upset in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution.
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119. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, before Navneet Arora married Gurpreet Singh, he was living as one family with his parents Harpal Singh and Surinder Kaur. His brother Raman Pal Singh and his sister Sherry were also residing in the same house. The kitchen was one. The two sons and their father were joint in business and the kitchen used to be run from the income of the joint business. They were all living on the ground floor. Sherry got married and left the house. Navneet married Gurpreet. Raman Pal married Neetu. The two daughter-in-laws joined the company not only of their husbands but even of their in-laws in the same joint family house i.e. the ground floor of B-44, Vishal Enclave, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi. All lived in commensality. Navneet never left the joint family house. She was residing in the house when her husband died. She continued to reside there even till today. Under the circumstances her right to residence in the suit property cannot be denied, and as regards issues of title, we have already observed that the right of residence under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the same would have no bearing. She may enforce it in civil proceedings. But her right of residence in the shared household cannot be negated.”
8. As already observed above, with reference to the findings of the trial court on issue nos. 2 to 4, trial court has held that the appellant/defendant had in fact left the matrimonial home and for which purpose reference has been made to the document Ex.PW1/11 as also Ex.DW1/XP-1. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra (supra) squarely applies to the present case and the judgment in the case of Navneet Arora (supra) is distinguishable. In fact, I would like to add that if conduct of the appellant/defendant as found in this case is permitted then there will be lawlessness and anarchy because a daughter-in-law by using force will be held to be forcibly entitled to enter into premises belonging to the parents-in-law and this Court would not like to allow such a situation to be called a legal entitlement of a daughter-in-law in a shared household as defined under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act. 9.(i) Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant firstly argued that the documents which have been proved by the respondent/plaintiff as Ex.PW1/1 to EX.PW1/4 cannot confer ownership rights because these documents cannot be taken to be a sale deed, and to buttress this argument reliance is placed by learned counsel for the appellant/defendant upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited Vs. State of Haryana and Another (2012) 1 SCC 656.
(ii) In my opinion this argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant is misconceived because rights as arising from the doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, cannot come to existence under an unregistered agreement to sell etc only if the unregistered agreement to sell etc is entered into after 24.9.2001 when by Act 48 of 2001 Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act was amended requiring that for taking benefit of the doctrine of part performance under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act the agreement to sell must be stamped and registered. In the present case, agreement to sell is pre-enforcement of Act 48 of 2001 with effect from 24.9.2001 and therefore it cannot be argued on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the documents being Ex.PW1/1 to Ex.PW1/4 do not create rights in the nature of ownership in favour of the respondent/plaintiff in view of the legal position emanating from Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This aspect has been considered in detail by this Court in the judgment in the case of Shri Ramesh Chand Vs. Suresh Chand and Anr., 188 (2012) DLT 538 wherein this Court has referred to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (supra) that the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (supra) in fact support rights under an agreement to sell, General Power of Attorney and Will, once these documents otherwise satisfy the requirement of relevant provisions of law being Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and which aspects are satisfied in the facts of the present case as there is no breach of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, inasmuch as the documents Ex.PW1/1 to PW1/4 are dated 20.6.1981 i.e prior to 24.9.2001 when there was no requirement of an agreement to sell in the nature of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act to be stamped and registered. The relevant observations of this Court in the case of Shri Ramesh Chand (supra) are contained in paras 1 to 3 and the same read as under:- “1. This Regular First Appeal was dismissed by a detailed judgment on 28.2.2011. A Special Leave Petition was filed in the Supreme Court against the judgment dated 28.2.2011 and the Supreme Court has remanded the matter back for a fresh decision by its order dated 31.10.2011. The order of the Supreme Court dated 31.10.2011 is based on the issue of the Supreme Court passing the judgment in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana and Anr. 183 (2011) DLT 1 (SC), and as per which judgment the Supreme Court overruled the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Asha M. Jain Vs. Canara Bank 94 (2001) DLT 841. Since the judgment of this Court dated 28.2.2011 had relied upon the Division Bench judgment in the case of Asha M. Jain (supra), and which judgment was over ruled the Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the matter was therefore remanded back to this Court.
2. Before I proceed to dispose of the appeal, and which would turn substantially on the judgment in the case of Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it is necessary to reproduce certain paras of this judgment of the Supreme Court, and which paras are paras 12, 13, 14 and 16, and which read as under:-
14. A will is the testament of the testator. It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivo. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator. It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. (see Sections 69 and 70 of Indian Succession Act, 1925). Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.
16. We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immoveable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.” (emphasis added)
3. A reference to the aforesaid paras shows that unless there is a proper registered sale deed, title of an immovable property does not pass. The Supreme Court has however reiterated that rights which are created pursuant to Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 dealing with the doctrine of part performance (para 12), an irrevocable right of a person holding a power of attorney given for consideration coupled with interest as per Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 (para 13) and devolution of interest pursuant to a Will (para 14). Therefore, no doubt, a person strictly may not have complete ownership rights unless there is a duly registered sale deed, however, certain rights can exist in an immovable property pursuant to the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872. There also takes place devolution of interest after the death of the testator in terms of a Will.”
(iii) I, therefore, reject the argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the respondent/plaintiff could not be held as the owner of the suit property.
10. The next argument which was urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant was that appellant/defendant was in settled possession and therefore could not be dispossessed in terms of the subject suit, but I have found this argument very strange and liable to be rejected because the doctrine of settled possession applies for unlawful dispossession by a person and this doctrine will not apply when dispossession of a trespasser is sought to be lawfully made through a suit filed for possession by an owner. Accordingly, in my opinion this argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant does not have any substance whatsoever and is therefore rejected.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant/defendant then argued that appellant/defendant had never vacated the suit property and therefore the ratio of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Navneet Arora (supra) will apply, however, I cannot agree with this argument in view of the finding of the trial court by reference to documents Ex.PW1/11 and Ex.DW1/XP-1, and which documents shows that appellant/defendant had left the suit property and was in fact residing as on 19.9.2006 with her parents at the house of the parents in House No.B-181, Gali No.18, Amrit Puri, Garhi, East of Kailash, New Delhi, and that since a civil case is decided on balance of probabilities hence this Court would not like to interfere with the categorical and clear finding of the trial court of the appellant/defendant having left possession of the suit property noting that the findings of the trial court are in no way perverse. Accordingly, I reject this argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant.
12. It was then argued on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the son of the respondent/plaintiff Sh. Sanjay, and husband of the appellant/defendant, was not living separately in any rented accommodation, and therefore appellant/defendant cannot be asked to vacate the suit property. This argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant however is misconceived because in terms of the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra (supra) a daughter-in-law has no right to the property of the parentsin-law and it is the duty of the husband to provide for and give residence to the wife. The ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Navneet Arora (supra) will also not apply to support the appellant/defendant as the appellant/defendant is found to have herself left the suit premises. This argument of the appellant/defendant is also therefore rejected.
13. For the self-same reasons given in para 12 above another argument urged on behalf of the appellant/defendant that the suit property is a shared household is also rejected by reference to the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.R. Batra (supra) and the ratio of the Division Bench in the case of Navneet Arora (supra) being not applicable to the facts of the present case.
14. In view of the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal and therefore the same is dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
JANUARY 22, 2018 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J AK/pk