Shivanand v. Union of India

4. Considering the above factual position, the Screening Committee recommended that the following persons, out of the 13 persons, recommended for compassionate appointment by the earlier Screening Committee in 2012, may be appointed on compassionate appointment against the existing compassionate quota vacancies in SSF in the grade of Constable:

1. Shri Satish Kumar Tripathi S/o Late Constable S N Tripathi

2. Shri Sachin Kumar S/o Late Constable Bhagwan Singh

3. Shri Shiv Anand S/o Late Constable Surender

4. Shri Dhanesh Kumar S/o Late H/C Nathu Lal Nawaria

5. Shri Anil Kumar S/o Late Constable Suresh Kumar

6. Smt. Rita Parcha D/o Late Constable Laxman Das

7. Smt. Pushpa Devi W/o Late Constable Ashok

8. Ms. Pinku D/o Late Constable Maharaj Singh

9. Shri Amit Kumar S/o Late Constable Surjeet Singh

10. Shri Deepak Sharma S/o Late Constable Subhash Chand Sharma

11. Shri Ashish Kumar S/o Late Constable Khanchid Singh”

11. Thus, after the doors of compassionate appointment had practically been thrown open to the petitioner, there was a complete hiatus after the aforesaid minutes of the Screening Committee. Something, presumably, happened in the interregnum as, on 3 September 2019, the following communication came to be addressed to the petitioner by the MHA: “No.I.25016/29/2018-SSO-I Government of India/Bharat Sarkar Ministry of Home Affairs/Grih Mantralaya *** NDCC-II, New Delhi, Dt. 03 Sept 2019 To Shri Shivanand, S/o Late Shri Surender Kumar, R/o H.No. 875, Village Bakhtawar Pur Delhi-110036. SUB: Request for appointment on compassionate ground – reg. Sir, With reference to your letter dated 01.08.2019 addressed to Hon'ble Home Secretary, it is intimated that the name of Shri Shivanand S/o Late Shri Surender Kumar was considered alongwith other candidates for appointment on compassionate ground. However, name of Shri Shivanand was not approved for compassionate appointment in terms of guidelines issued by DoP&T vide their Ο.Μ. Νο. 14014/02/2012-Estt(D) dated 16.01.2013. Yours faithfully, (S. Samanta) Under Secretary to the Govt. of India Tel. No. 2309 8052”

12. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner has approached this Court, praying that the respondent be directed to grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner.

13. We have heard Ms. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Neeraj, learned SPC for the respondents at length. Apart from pointing out the aforesaid facts, Ms. Chatterjee has placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Syed Khadim Hussain v State of Bihar[4], The Manager, AUP School v The State of Kerala[5] and Malaya Nanda Sethy v State of Orissa[6].

14. Ms. Chatterjee particularly emphasises the fact that, in Syed Khadim Hussain, the Supreme Court allowed a plea of compassionate appointment by the petitioner, who was only 13 years of age at the time when he had applied on the ground that, by the time his case was taken up for consideration, he had crossed the age of 18 and could therefore be considered for appointment.

15. Mr. Neeraj, who appears on behalf of the respondent, submits, per contra, that the petitioner’s case could not have been considered for compassionate appointment as he was only 17 ½ of age at the time of this application. He places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Delhi Jal Board v Nirmala Devi[7]. Analysis

16. Having considered the submissions of both sides, we deem it appropriate, at the outset, to reproduce paras 17 and 18 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Malaya Nanda Sethy, which contain the following exordium:

employee while in service. We have, therefore, directed that such applications must be considered at an earliest point of time. The consideration must be fair, reasonable and based on relevant consideration. The application cannot be rejected on the basis of frivolous and for reasons extraneous to the facts of the case. Then and then only the object and purpose of appointment on compassionate grounds can be achieved.” The present case, we are constrained to observe, presents a textbook example of the malaise noticed by the Supreme Court in para 17 of Malaya Nanda Sethy.

17. This is a case in which, for reasons which may at best be described as recondite, the petitioner has been treated with abject indifference.

18. The petitioner’s mother submitted the application for compassionate appointment just over six months after the death of the petitioner’s father. It was therefore submitted proximate to the death of the petitioner’s father and could not be treated as belated.

19. The respondents sat on the application for six years before communicating with the petitioner on 28 December 2012, stating that he was one of the candidates who had been recommended for appointment on compassionate basis against the 13 vacancies available in the SSF for the said purpose which was later transferred to the CISF.

20. The further communication dated 30 August 2013 in fact called the petitioner to appear before the respondents for being selected for appointment on compassionate grounds.

21. The petitioner appeared. He was never informed of any adverse outcome of his consideration.

22. Rather, on 15 May 2017, the MHA specifically wrote to the petitioner stating that, as the CISF had been unable to appoint the 13 candidates, it was being considered to appoint them on compassionate basis against the existing compassionate quota vacancies. The petitioner was therefore directed to submit the details of his financials. He did so. The screening committee thereafter met on 20 July 2017 and specifically found the petitioner fit for compassionate appointment and recommended his case.

23. A matter of considerable significance, which emerges from para 3 of the recommendations of the Screening Committee, extracted supra, is that, keeping in mind the delay that had occurred in the interregnum, the screening committee decided consciously to consider the eligibility of the candidate as on date. As such, as the Screening Committee was itself considering the eligibility of the candidates for compassionate appointment as on the date of consideration, the respondent cannot be heard to contend that the petitioner was ineligible for consideration, as he was only 17 ½ years of age at the time of the submission of the original application for compassionate appointment by his mother.

24. After this, we see no justifiable reason whatsoever for the respondent to have rejected the petitioner’s case by the impugned order dated 3 September 2019. The order is completely unreasoned and merely makes reference to the guidelines contained in the DOPT OM dated 16 January 2013. However, the submissions of Mr. Neeraj indicate that the reason for rejection of the petitioner’s case was the fact that he was six months short of the appropriate age at the time when his mother had initially applied for compassionate appointment.

25. That, in our view, cannot constitute a justifiable reason to reject the petitioner’s case, for myriad reasons.

26. In the first place, as we have already noted, the Screening Committee in para 3 of its minutes dated 20 July 2017 had itself taken a decision to consider the eligibility of the candidates as on that date. In other words, keeping in mind the delay that had been occasioned at the end of the respondents themselves, as a result of which the candidates had been subjected to unnecessary prejudice, the Screening Committee had taken an expansive and magnanimous view and had decided to consider eligibility as on 20 July 2017. There is no dispute about the fact that, as on date, the petitioner was eligible and was much over 18 years of age.

27. Though, in view of the decision of the Screening Committee, the age of the petitioner at the time of original application ceases to be of relevance, nonetheless, we may note that in Syed Khadim Hussain, the Supreme Court specifically held that, even if at the time of application, the petitioner was only 13 years of age, he could have been considered for compassionate appointment as he had crossed the age of 18 by the time his application was taken up. We may reproduce paras 4 and 5 of the said decision to advantage as under: “4. We have heard the appellant's counsel and counsel for the respondent. Counsel for the appellant points out that after the death of the government servant his wife submitted an application and it was rejected without giving any reasons and the counsel for the State submits that the same must have been rejected as it was not in the prescribed format. If the applicant had not submitted the application in the prescribed format the State authorities should have asked the applicant to submit the application in the prescribed format giving out the details of the procedure. In the matters of compassionate appointments the authorities should extend the service in an effective manner so that the eligible candidate may avail the opportunity. Though the orders of rejection of the application of the appellant's mother was not challenged the appellant pursued the matter and submitted the application later. The contention of the counsel for the State is that the application filed after 5 years after the date of death of the government employee will not be considered and he further submitted that the application filed on 7-9-1995 was rightly rejected by the authorities.

5. We are unable to accept the contention of the counsel for the State. In the instant case, the widow had applied for appointment within the prescribed period and without assigning any reasons the same was rejected. When the appellant submitted the application he was 13 years' old and the application was rejected after a period of six years and that too without giving any reason and the reason given by the authorities was incorrect as at the time of rejection of the application he must have crossed 18 years and he could have been very well considered for appointment. Of course, in the rules framed by the State there is no specific provision as to what should be done in case the dependents are minors and there would be any relaxation of age in case they did not attain majority within the prescribed period for submitting application.”

28. In this view of the matter, the reliance by the respondent on the decision in Nirmala Devi ceases to be of much relevance. Even otherwise, the controversy before the Supreme Court in Nirmala Devi was with respect to a candidate who did not possess the requisite academic qualifications on the date when the application for compassionate appointment was made and had achieved the qualifications only at a later date. The reference to age in the said decision is merely by way of an aside and was not the actual issue which was before the Supreme Court.

29. We may also reproduce, in this context, the following passages from the decisions in Manager, AUP School and Malaya Nanda Sethy on which Ms. Chatterjee placed reliance: From Manager, AUP School

State of H.P. v Shashi Kumar, (2019) 3 SCC 653 Union of India v P. Venkatesh, (2019) 15 SCC 613 February 2007 shall stand upheld in terms of the two orders which have been passed by the Sub-District Education Officer and by the Additional Director.

13. We accordingly allow the appeal in part. The claim of the sixth respondent for compassionate appointment on the basis of his application dated 14 February 2007 shall stand affirmed. However, the claim subsequently made in the application dated 12 March 2014 for appointment as a Lower Primary School Assistant shall stand rejected. Necessary steps for granting appointment to the sixth respondent shall accordingly be completed within a period of one month 7 from the date of receipt of this order. While the sixth respondent shall be appointed immediately within a period of one month, the appointment may be adjusted as against any future vacancy that may arise. The State authorities shall accordingly process the claim for approval made by the first appellant for appointment and of all other affected teachers in terms of the present order. Necessary approvals shall be considered and decided in accordance with law afresh within a period of one month from the date of the order. However, we direct that the appointment of the sixth respondent shall take effect from the date it is issued and no arrears of salary or other monetary benefits shall be payable prior to the date of the appointment. The impugned order of the High Court shall stand modified to the above extent.” From Malaya Nanda Sethy

deliberate or for reasons best known to the authorities concerned. Therefore, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, keeping the larger question open and aside, as observed hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the appellant herein shall not be denied appointment under the 1990 Rules.”

30. The italicized words from the extracted passages from the above decisions, particularly those in Manager AUP School squarely apply to the present case.

31. The facts of this case are frankly disturbing. The respondents cannot be permitted to lead the petitioner up the garden path for 12 years after his application for compassionate appointment, ensuring him, in so many words, that he was on the verge of being appointed and, when the petitioner was within kissing distance of the door, shut it in his face.

32. As to why the respondent chose to execute a volte face between 20 July 2017 and 3 September 2019, we do not know, and prefer not to hazard a guess, so as to extend the respondents the benefit of doubt. Decidedly, however, if this Court does not come to the assistance of the petitioner, we would be doing complete disservice to the cause of justice which, at the end of the day, is one of our preambular constitutional goals.

33. In that view of the matter, in the peculiar facts of the present case, we quash and set aside the decision to reject the petitioner’s candidature for compassionate appointment.

34. Following the final decision in Manager AUP School, we direct the respondent to grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner within a period of four weeks from today.

35. The petitioner would be entitled to be treated as having been appointed along with the other candidates who were granted compassionate appointment against the 13 vacancies in the SLP. He would be entitled to continuity of service, as well as all other consequential benefits excepts for back wages, with effect from that date, along with the candidates who had been appointed against the aforesaid 13 vacancies.

36. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.

C. HARI SHANKAR, J.

OM PRAKASH SHUKLA, J. AUGUST 13, 2025