Tajinder Singh Bakshi & Anr. v. Daljit Kaur & Ors.

(ii) The fact that the respondent no.1 had planned to execute gift deed with respect to one flat each in favour of her three daughters on 06.05.2015 and then suddenly a day prior i.e. 05.05.2015 transferred 4 flats in favour of the petitioner no.2, was found to be “suspicious”. Since the registration of the gift deed dated 05.05.2015 in favour of the petitioner no.2 happened hastily inasmuch as the purchase of the stamp paper and the registration of the gift deed occurred in the course of a few hours, it can only be concluded that the petitioners attempted to defraud the respondent no.1.

(iii) The petitioners had failed to provide basic amenities and take care of the basic physical needs of the respondent no.1, as a result of which, the respondent no.1 was living with one of her daughters.

(iv) The Appellate Authority was unable to accept the contention of the petitioners that the respondent no.1 had transferred the four flats in the subject property to the petitioner no.2 out of her own free will and that the respondent no.1 was later “abducted” by her daughters. The Appellate Authority further reasons that the petitioners had been unable to address the issue as to how the respondent no.1 was allegedly abducted by her daughters “so easily”; why the petitioners did not file a police complaint upon the respondent no.1 being allegedly abducted by her daughters; why the petitioners did not allow peaceful re-entry of the respondent no.1 after her alleged abduction and why the respondent no.1 was required to seek police assistance when she attempted to “reclaim her possessions”. On this basis, it was observed that the respondent no.1 had indeed been defrauded by the petitioners.

(v) It has been found that the facts in the instant case are distinguishable from the facts in Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1684 inasmuch as the respondent no.1 had specifically made contentions / pleaded as regards the condition/s attached to transfer, before the Tribunal. It has also been observed that the respondents have accepted the said condition in their pleadings filed before the Tribunal by admitting that the transfer of property in favour of the petitioner no.2 was out of love and care and because the petitioner no.2 took care of the respondent no.1. Since the transfer of property by respondent no.1 was made out of love and affection for the petitioner no.2, she expected, and it was implicit that the petitioner no.2 would continue to care for the respondent no.1. However, the material placed on record and the conduct of the parties shows that the caring did not continue and the petitioners ended up abandoning the respondent no.1 and did not even allow respondent no.1 to have access to her own belongings.

(vi) There was an implicit condition attached to the transfer of property by the respondent no.1 in favour of the petitioner no.2 thereby satisfying the twin conditions for attracting Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act laid down in Sudesh Chhikara (supra).

(vii) Upon specifically questioning the respondent no.1, the Appellate

Authority found that there was no substance in the contention of the petitioners that the respondent no.1 had been pressurised into initiating proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act.

13. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order is liable to be set aside inasmuch as the necessary precondition/s for invoking Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act as laid down in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) have not been satisfied in the present case.

14. It is submitted that in terms of the decision in Sudesh Chhikara (supra), the twin conditions attached with the transfer of property must be pleaded in the petition under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act and be established. However, neither the said conditions were pleaded in the petition filed by the respondent no.1 under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act nor did it form part of the gift deed dated 05.05.2015, which was an unconditional gift deed duly accepted by the transferee.

15. It is also submitted that the Appellate Authority failed to take into consideration the stand of the respondent no.1 which has been recorded in the order dated 20.12.2019 as well as the rejoinder recorded before the learned Maintenance Tribunal, that the respondent no.1 does not require maintenance from the petitioners and that she is the one who has been maintaining the petitioners.

16. It is submitted that the Appellate Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to enquire into issue/s of force, fraud, coercion and misrepresentation inasmuch as the same falls within the domain of the Civil Court. It is submitted that in terms of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, the deeming fiction thereunder is contingent upon the twin conditions mentioned therein. Reliance in this regard is placed on a judgment dated 30.01.2023 of the Calcutta High Court in Himangshu Mondal v. Sachirani Mondal [Case No. C.O. 1891/2021].

17. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that if the terms for revocation of a gift deed are not mentioned thereunder, the same cannot be revoked. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment in N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board 2024 SCC OnLine SC

3037.

18. It is submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside inasmuch as the gift deed in question could not have been cancelled by the Appellate Tribunal inasmuch as the condition/s for revocation of the gift deed is not mentioned therein and as such, there was no oral agreement to this effect prior to the execution of the gift deed.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that pursuant to Section 123 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the terms and conditions for revoking a gift deed must be “written terms and conditions” and a pleading to that effect in the petition under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, is a pre-requisite.

20. It is submitted that a pleading made in the petition under Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act forms the basis for exercise of jurisdiction by the Maintenance Tribunal and the burden is on the applicant to establish the existence of the twin conditions attached to the transfer of the property under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act.

21. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 draws the attention of this Court to the conduct of the petitioners. It is submitted that subsequent to the petition under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act being filed by the respondent no.1, the petitioners executed a sale deed dated 19.01.2016 and 10.05.2016 with respect to two of the four flats transferred by the respondent no.1 in the favour of the petitioner no.2 and executed an agreement to sell dated 03.06.2016 for the third flat, without intimation to the Court. Furthermore, the fourth flat was put on rent. It is submitted that the aforesaid sale deeds and agreement to sell are under challenge before the learned trial court.

22. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits that the suffering of the respondent no.1 at the hands of the petitioners has been mentioned in the 12 letters sent by her to the Presiding Officer of the Maintenance Tribunal and the same have been annexed as annexure P-8 (colly) to the present petition.

23. It is submitted that the condition that a son needs to take care of his mother cannot be expected to be documented as an “express condition” and the basis for such a condition is required to be inferred from the pleadings as an “implied condition”. It is submitted that the petitioner no.1 has admitted to ‘taking care’ of the respondent no.1 and the same ought to be construed as an implied condition that such care would continue throughout the lifetime of respondent no.1 and thereby need not be expressed as a written condition.

24. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 draws a comparison between the facts in the present case with the facts in Sudesh Chhikara (supra). It is submitted that while the Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) had observed that the petition under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act did not contain a pleading as regards the transfer of property therein being subject to the condition of the transferee providing ‘basic amenities’ and taking care of the physical needs of the senior citizen therein, the application under section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act filed by the respondent no.1 in the present case contains such a pleading in prayer ‘b’ of the said application.

25. It is also submitted that in addition to prayer ‘b’ of the aforesaid application under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, the respondent no.1 had also sent a representation dated 14.05.2016 to the Presiding Officer of the Maintenance Tribunal stating that the petitioners took advantage of the poor physical and medical condition of the respondent no.1 subsequent to the death of her husband (father of the petitioner no.1) in the garb of the false promise to take care of the respondent no.1. Furthermore, attention is also drawn to another representation dated 08.07.2015 sent by the respondent no.1 to the Presiding Officer of the Maintenance Tribunal seeking that directions be issued to the petitioners to deliver the personal belongings of the respondent no.1 including her dentures, clothes, medical card, ID cards, cash etc.

26. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 submits that the condition for taking care of the senior citizen need not be express and can be gathered from the pleadings. In this regard, reliance has been placed on the judgment dated 10.04.2024 in Nitin Rajendra Gupta v. Deputy Collector, Mumbai [W.P.(C) 590/2023]; judgment dated 01.09.2023 in Mohammed Dayan v. District Collector, Tiruppar District and Others [W.P.(C) 28190/2022]; judgment dated 06.03.2025 in S. Mala v. District Arbitrator & Others [W.A. 3582/2024] and Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit (2025) 2 SCC 787.

REASONING AND CONCLUSION

27. At the outset, it is relevant to take note of the relevant statutory provision under which the application had been filed by the respondent no.1 before the Maintenance Tribunal seeking that the gift deed dated 05.05.2015 be declared as void. The said provision reads as under –

28. A perusal of the language of Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act clearly sets out that the transfer of property by a senior citizen, by way of a ‘gift deed or otherwise’, is deemed to be vitiated by fraud, coercion or undue influence and thereby can be declared as void by concerned Tribunal provided that (i) the transfer of property should have been made subject to a condition that the transferee shall provide “basic amenities and basic physical needs” to the senior citizen / transferor and (ii) the transferee fails to fulfil such a condition.

29. In the present case, the gift deed dated 05.05.2015 does not contain any explicit recital stipulating / incorporating a condition that the petitioners shall continue to maintain or take care of the basic amenities and physical needs of the respondent no.1 pursuant to transfer of property. The same only refers to “love and affection” as basis on which the transfer was effectuated by the respondent no.1.

30. Thus, the question that arises for consideration in the present proceedings is whether the “conditions” stipulated under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act (that the petitioners would continue to maintain and / or take care of basic amenities and basic physical needs of the senior citizen) can be implied or inferred.

31. At the outset, it is necessary to consider the scope, purport and import of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act. Time and again it has been emphasized that the beneficial nature of a legislation must guide the interpretation and application of the statutory provisions therein.

32. The Supreme Court in Urmila Dixit (supra), while construing the provisions of the Senior Citizens Act referred to the judgment of K. H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob, (2020) 14 SCC 126, in which it has been held as under:- “11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented approach. [Kerala Fishermen's Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food, (1995) 4 SCC 341] The Act should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn., (2009) 9 SCC 61: (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court's duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation. [Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, (1986) 2 SCC 614: 1986 SCC (L&S) 335] ***

13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first be identified, and then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161: (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social welfare legislations should be given strict construction. [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik, (1984) 1 SCC 588] that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council [Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2008 HCA 48: (2008) 237 CLR 285], Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be construed narrowly.”

33. Taking note of the dicta laid down in K. H. Nazar (supra) and the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Senior Citizens Act, the Supreme Court in Urmila Dixit (supra) held as under: -

interpreted and a construction that advances the remedies of the Act must be adopted.

15. Before adverting to the provisions of the Act, we must be cognizant of the larger issue that this case presents i.e. the care of senior citizens in our society. This Court in Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai [Vijaya Manohar Arbat v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai, (1987) 2 SCC 278: 1987 SCC (Cri) 354] highlighted that it is a social obligation for both sons and daughters to maintain their parents when they are unable to do so.

16. In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse [Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse, (2014) 1 SCC 188: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 51], this Court observed that when a case pertaining to maintenance of parents or wife is being considered, the Court is bound to advance the cause of social justice of such marginalised groups, in furtherance of the constitutional vision enshrined in the Preamble. Recently, this exposition came to be reiterated in Rajnesh v. Neha [Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324: (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 220: (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 749].

34. Further, in Urmila Dixit (supra), the Supreme Court also referred with approval, the observations laid down in Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 636, wherein it has been observed as under:-

35. In Sudesh Chhikara (supra), a judgment strongly relied upon by the petitioner, it has also been acknowledged that the Senior Citizens Act “has been enacted for the purpose of making effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens”.

36. Undoubtedly, and concededly, if a gift deed makes an explicit and express reference to the condition/s of maintenance of the concerned senior citizen, it is open for the senior citizen to invoke the beneficent provisions of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, in the event of infraction of the said conditions. This Court finds no cogent rationale for denying the same dispensation to a senior citizen if the said conditions are not expressly set out, but can be inferred or implied from attendant circumstances. The same would be consistent with the beneficent objects and purposes of the Senior Citizens Act.

37. It would be apposite to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) which are as under:-

14. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal.

15. Careful perusal of the petition under Section 23 filed by respondent no. 1 shows that it is not even pleaded that the release deed was executed subject to a condition that the transferees (the daughters of respondent no. 1) would provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to respondent no. 1. Even in the impugned order dated 22nd May 2018 passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, no such finding has been recorded. It seems that oral evidence was not adduced by the parties. As can be seen from the impugned judgment of the Tribunal, immediately after a reply was filed by the appellant that the petition was fixed for arguments. Effecting transfer subject to a condition of providing the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor - senior citizen is sine qua non for applicability of sub-section (1) of Section 23. In the present case, as stated earlier, it is not even pleaded by respondent no. 1 that the release deed was executed subject to such a condition.

16. We have perused the counter affidavit filed by respondent no. 1. Even in the counter, it is not pleaded that the release was subject to such a condition. It is merely pleaded that the appellant had no intention to take care of her mother. Thus, the order of the Maintenance Tribunal cannot be sustained as the twin conditions incorporated in sub-Section (1) of Section 23 were not satisfied. Unfortunately, the High Court has not adverted to the merits of the case at all.”

38. From the above observations, it is evident that even though the relevant conditions (viz. that the senior citizen would be looked after) were not specifically mentioned in the concerned gift deed, the Supreme Court embarked upon consideration of the relevant pleadings before the Tribunal to ascertain whether any reference was made therein to such pre-conditions.

39. Thus, the fact that the conditions were not explicitly set out in the gift deed, did not foreclose the matter. The judgment recognises that it is permissible to look at attendant circumstances, including the pleadings in the proceedings under the Senior Citizens Act, to ascertain whether the existence of the conditions is made out.

40. No doubt, in the facts of Sudesh Chhikara (supra), the Supreme Court found that the twin conditions incorporated in sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act were not satisfied, hence, the relief was denied to the senior citizen. However, the said judgment does not lay down a blanket proposition, as sought to be contended on behalf of the petitioners, that absence of any express incorporation of the “conditions” referred to in Section 23 (1) of the Senior Citizens Act, in the gift deed, would by itself foreclose the matter and shut the door on the senior citizen.

41. Even in Urmila Dixit (supra), the relevant conditions were not expressly incorporated in the gift deed in question. Instead, reliance is sought to be placed on attendant circumstances viz. conditions incorporated in a separately executed “vachan patra” / promissory note. Taking note of the same, it was held as under:-

cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.”

42. In Gandhimathi v. The Sub Divisional Magistrate/Revenue Divisional Officer, Salem and Ors., MANU/TN/0208/2024, the Madras High Court considered the issue as to whether a settlement deed or a gift deed whereby the transfer was effectuated by the senior citizen could be declared as void even in the absence of specific recital / incorporation of the twin conditions referred to Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act. In that context, it was observed as under:-

17. Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, contemplates “where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal”.

43. Again, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in S. Mala v. District Arbitrator & District Collector and Others, 2025 SCC OnLine Mad 1764, held as under:-

35. Thus, Section 23(1) emphasizes the protection of senior citizens from exploitation or neglect after they have transferred property in trust, often based on love and affection. The law provides an important safeguard, recognising that these transfers are typically made with an implicit understanding that the senior citizen will be cared for in their old age. If the transferee fails in this duty, the transfer can be annulled, ensuring that the senior citizen's dignity and security are upheld.”

44. In reaching the conclusion, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court relied upon the observations of the Supreme Court in S. Vanitha v. Commr., Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730, Sudesh Chhikara (supra) and Urmila Dixit (supra).

45. Further, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Sunny Paul v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2017 SCC OnLine Del 7451, held as under:-

46. A Division Bench of this Court in Sunny Paul v. State of NCT of Delhi and Others, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11640, while upholding the aforesaid judgment, observed as under:-

answered by the learned Single Judge by referring to various judgments as relied upon by both the parties. It is noted that in the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has also answered the question whether a claim for eviction before the Maintenance Tribunal is maintainable under Section 23 of Act of 2007 and that too on allegations of forcible ouster and in the absence of a claim for maintenance. The learned Single Judge concluded that Sections 4 and 23 are separate and distinct remedies. In other words, the claim for maintenance is not a condition precedent for passing an order of eviction under Section 23 of the Act of 2007. He referred to two judgments of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in the case of Promil Tomar v. State of Haryana (supra) and Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) v. Union Territory, Chandigarh (supra) in coming to the aforesaid conclusion. We have also considered the aforesaid aspect. On a perusal of the provisions of the Act of 2007, it is seen that the same has been enacted to provide for effective provisions for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The necessity of framing the Act is because of the erosion of joint family system resulting in the elderly parents and senior citizens getting neglected by the children including lack of physical and financial support from them. Section 3 of the Act of 2007 gives the overriding effect over any other enactment/instrument. Chapter II of the Act deals with the maintenance of parents and senior citizens. Section 4 of the Act enables a senior citizen including parent who is unable to maintain himself from his own earnings or out of the property owned by him to make an application under Section 5 for his/her maintenance so that he/she can lead a normal life. Chapter V of the Act of 2007 deals with protection of life and property of senior citizens. Section 23(1) under Chapter V confers a power on the Tribunal to declare transfer of property in certain circumstances as void. Section 23(2) inter-alia stipulates that a senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and if such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right. There is nothing in Section 23, which pre-supposes an application for maintenance as a prerequisite for seeking a relief under it. The scope of Section 23 is to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen with an intent that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor and if such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, in such an eventuality, the transfer of property can be declared void by the Tribunal. A senior citizen may be contended if the transfer of property effected is treated as void so as to enable him to maintain himself from the estate, for which a senior citizen may not seek maintenance. So the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that in the absence of a claim for maintenance by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3, a petition under Section 23 shall not be maintainable, is without any merit. Further, the Delhi Government had initially framed Delhi Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, which have been amended in the year 2016, whereby Sub Rule 3(1)(i) has been incorporated to Rule 22 of the Rules. The same reads as under:— “(i) A senior citizen may make an application before the Dy. Commissioner/District Magistrate(DM) of his district for eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir from his self-acquired property on account of his non-maintenance and ill-treatment. xxxxxxxxx”

12. The said Sub Rule has undergone an amendment in the year 2017 to the following extent:— “(i) A senior citizen/parents may make an application before the Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate of his district for eviction of his son and daughter or legal heir from his property of any kind whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or intangible and include rights or interests in such property on account of his nonmaintenance and ill-treatment.”

13. The said Sub Rule 3 has been incorporated in Rule 22 of the Rules to give effect to Section 23 of the Act and not to Section 4 of the Act. So, it follows that it is not necessary that to invoke Section 23, one has to seek maintenance under Section 4.

14. The learned Single Judge is right in relying upon the judgments in the case of Promil Tomar (supra) and Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan, Chief Justice (Retired) (supra) by holding as under:—

36. The Courts have repeatedly acknowledged the right of the senior citizens or parents to live peacefully and with dignity. In Promil Tomar (supra) the Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that peaceful living for the senior citizens in their property is the apparent objective of the Maintenance Act.

37. In the present case, though the allegation of the respondents No. 2 and 3 is of the trespass and forcible occupation of the property by the petitioners, yet even if it is presumed, as alleged by the petitioner No. 1, that he had been permitted to stay in the property, then also it would amount to transfer of the property in question. Needless to state, that even this permissive use amounts to transfer and that too on the condition that petitioner No. 1-son would not harm them physically or mentally. In fact, in the Indian context, there would be a presumption that the transfer was subject to petitioner No. 1-son providing all the basic necessities and looking after the physical needs of the senior citizens. Since the Maintenance Tribunal has found that the petitioner No. 1-son has committed acts of physical assault and mental cruelty on the senior citizens, the pre-conditions mentioned in Section 23 stand satisfied.

38. There is nothing in the language or purported intent of Section 23 of the Act 2007 to indicate that the Tribunal has the power to declare a transfer of property void if and only if the senior citizen is seeking maintenance under the Act from the opposite party.

39. In Justice Shanti Sarup Dewan (supra), the Punjab & Haryana High Court passed an eviction order under the Act, 2007 where not only no maintenance had been sought by the senior citizen, but in fact the senior citizen had volunteered to pay Rs. 10,000/- as monthly maintenance to his son.

40. Consequently, Section 4 and Section 23 are separate and distinct remedies and the claim for maintenance is not a condition precedent for passing an eviction order under Section 23 of the Act, 2007.” (emphasis supplied)

47. Thus, the absence of any express reference to the pre-conditions referred to in Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act does not preclude the senior citizen from taking refuge under the beneficent provisions thereof, if the existence of the said conditions can be said to be implied or implicit or established in the light of the attendant facts and circumstances.

48. In the present case, the concerned senior citizen transferred substantial part of her property (viz. four flats) to the petitioner no.2. It is true that the gift deed only referred to the said transfer being made on account of “natural love and affection” for the Donee/petitioner no. 2, being her daughter in law. However, from the attendant facts and circumstances, as noticed in a very detailed and well considered order passed by the appellate authority, it is evident that it was an implicit condition that the daughter in law would continue to care for the respondent no.1 (senior citizen).

49. In the present case, appellate authority has found that the petitioners failed to provide basic amenities and / or take care of the needs of the respondent no.1, as a result of which, the respondent no.1 was compelled to live with one of her daughters. There are also unsavoury allegations as to the manner in which the petitioners got the gift deed executed in favour of the petitioner no.2.

50. During the course of proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal, the respondent no.1 sent various letters to the Presiding Officer regarding the suffering / treatment meted out by the petitioners against the respondent no.1. Some of the aforementioned letters are reproduced hereunder:-

51. The above communications reveal a deplorable state of affairs where the senior citizen/respondent no.1 seems struggling even to retrieve her basic items of necessity from her previous residential abode. These include the senior citizen’s dentures, doctors’ prescription, medical card, bank passbook, Id Cards/Adhar Card/Pan Card, jewellery etc. The factual conspectus of the present case reveals a sordid situation where the senior citizen was abandoned soon-after / in the immediate aftermath of the gift deed being executed. This Court is constraint to observe that this is the very mischief which Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act seeks to redress.

52. It is also noticed that the application filed before the Maintenance Tribunal contained a prayer/relief (prayer-b) whereby the respondent no.1 inter-alia sought direction / order to the effect that the petitioners herein be directed to take “all due care” of the respondent no.1 (senior citizen).

53. Further, a perusal of the reply filed by the petitioners in the proceedings under Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act before the Maintenance Tribunal reveals that it was the petitioner’s case therein that they had been taking care of the respondent no.1.

54. Thus, from the above, it is evident that the issue as to whether the relevant pre-conditions, as set out in Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act were satisfied or not, very much arose in the backdrop of the peculiar factual conspectus and the pleadings that were filed by the parties.

55. In the impugned judgment, the appellate authority has rendered the following findings:- “76. It is evident from the record and submissions of the appellant that she has four children (three daughters and one son) and she wanted to gift in equal proportion, one flat each to all her four children from her property no.WZ-406/3,Plot No.49, Janankpuri, Hari Nagar, GhantaGhar, New Delhi-110064 and to keep one flat for herself out of total 5 flats. On 30.04.2015, the appellant got her 3 daughters to purchase separate stamp papers for executing Gift Deeds of one flat each in their favour. She even ensured that appointments were duly taken from the Sub-Registrar office for 06/05/2015 for the registrations of the deeds. It shows the appellant's intention to distribute the flats equally.

77. It is also a matter of record that on 05/05/2015, the respondents took the appellant to the Sub-Registrar Office and got executed a Gift Deed for all her four flats in favour of respondent no.2

78. This sequence of events is suspicious because it is not clear as to why on the one hand appellant would carefully plan to execute deeds for one flat each in favour of her daughters on 06/05/2015 and then suddenly one day before she would execute the impugned gift deed thereby transferring all 4 flats in favour of Respondent No-2. In fact, the registration on 05/05/2015 has happened in so much haste (the purchasing of stamp paper and registration taking place in a short time span of few hours only) that there cannot but be only one explanation to this sequence of events that it was an attempt on the part of respondents to defraud the appellant.

79. That the appellant lodged a complaint in P.S. Janakpuri against the respondents on the same day i.e. the date of execution of Gift Deed (05.05.2015) by alleging that the respondents had gotten transferred her four properties in their name by pressurizing her also shows that the registration took place without her will and wishes. Later, appellant painfully narrated all the cruel and dishonest acts of the respondents alongwith relevant supporting documents to the Ld. Tribunal in her letters dated 08.07.2015, 31.07.2015, 26.05.2016, 17.07.2017, 25.08.2015, 21.01.2016, 30.03.2016, 19.09.2016, 14.05.2016, 26.11.2016 (through Tehsildar), 10.10.2017, 03-06-2019, 14.08.2019, 09.11.2019. These letters clearly show that respondents/transferee refused to provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the appellant/transferor and hence she had to live with her daughter at her house.

80. The arguments of the respondents that this transfer was made by the appellant out of her own free will and that she was later abducted by the sister of respondent No-1 cannot be relied upon for two reasons. First, because, if the transfers were indeed made by the appellant out of her own free will then why would she lodge a Police complaint the very same day and why would she have taken three other appointments for registration in favour of her daughters for the next day i.e. 06/05/2015, Second, because, it is also not clear that if the appellant had transferred the properties out of love and affection for respondents as claimed by them in their pleadings before the Tribunal as well, then how come they let her get allegedly abducted "so easily" by her daughters and why didn't they file any police complaint regarding the same. Moreover, if this was indeed an abduction then why didn't they allow peaceful re-entry of the appellant when she came to reclaim her possession and why did appellant have to seek police help for the same. These issues could not be addressed in any manner by the respondents in their pleadings or oral arguments and hence it is clear that a fraud was indeed played upon the appellant by the respondents.

81. Another argument of the respondents is that there was no condition in the Gift deed that the said transfer is conditional on grant of maintenance or providing of basic amenities and physical needs and hence this appeal itself is not maintainable under the Act. For making this argument the respondents have also relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble S.C. in the case of Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi & Anr. as referred to hereinabove. This was the main contention on the basis of which even the Ld. Tribunal dismissed the petition of the appellant.

82. In order to address this contention, it is important to refer to the provisions of Section 23 of the Act as reproduced hereinbefore. It is evident from the same that the condition that the transferre shall provide the basic amenities and basis physical needs to the transferor need not necessarily be a written condition as part of the Instrument of Transfer. More often than not, senior citizens rely upon their children to draw up the papers for such transfers and merely sign these papers on trust and oral promises/submissions of their children. It cannot be expected that an old lady aged around 85 years would draw up the papers herself and ensure to insert such conditions in the document. Such conditions are to be interpreted from the circumstances and also the pleadings of the parties.

83. In fact the Hon'ble SC in the case of Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi &Anr as referred to hereinabove, has also categorically stated that in that case, the transferor did not specifically plead that the release deed was executed subject to a condition that the transferees would provide the basic amenities. The Apex Court also noted that oral evidence was also not adduced in the said case to establish such a condition. The facts of the instant case are however distinguishable because the appellant has specifically pleaded this argument regarding the condition attached to the transfer before this Court. Moreover, even the respondents have indirectly accepted this condition in their pleadings before the Tribunal where they mentioned that this transfer was out of love and care and because the Respondent No-2 took care of the appellant, It is obvious that in case the appellant transferred her properties to Respondent No-2 because of such care and love and affection, then she expected such caring to continue. But as is evident from the material placed on record before this Court and also from the conduct of the parties before this Court, such caring did not continue and instead the respondents completely abandoned the appellant and did not even allow her access to her own belongings.

84. From the above, it is thus clear that there was an implicit condition attached to this transfer which was not fulfilled by the transferee and hence the instant case fully satisfies the two conditions as explained by the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi & Anr. for attracting Section-23 of the Act. Hence, by a legal fiction, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or undue influence. Such a transfer then becomes voidable at the instance of the transferor and the Maintenance Tribunal gets jurisdiction to declare the transfer as void.

85. These facts were not analysed by the Ld. Maintenance Tribunal and the petition of the appellant was summarily dismissed.

86. Finally, this Court specifically questioned the appellant who was personally present during the hearing whether she was under any kind of pressure or influence from the sisters of Respondent No-1. The reply of the appellant was vehement and categorical that she has been defrauded by the respondents and is not under any kind of pressure from anyone and has herself sought the help of her daughters (sisters of respondent no-1) to pursue her legal remedies. Hence, the contention of the respondents that this appeal and other proceedings are being filed by the appellant under pressure do not hold any water.

56. On a perusal of the record, this Court finds that there is nothing perverse in the findings rendered by the appellate authority, so as to warrant interference in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the contrary, this Court is constrained to observe that the facts of the present case clearly bring out the pitiable condition of the respondent no.1 (senior citizen) on account of breach on the part of the petitioners of the conditions referred to in Section 23(1) of the Senior Citizens Act, which were implicitly a pre-condition of the transfer of the senior citizen’s property to the petitioner no.2. The concerned senior citizen (the respondent no.1) has been virtually left high and dry after transferring the bulk of her properties to the petitioner no.2 (daughter in law) and has been forced to take refuge in the house of one of her daughters.

57. This Court is mindful of the fact that certain other High Courts, notably a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court[1] has interpreted Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act differently. The interpretation is to the effect that the application of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act requires that the conditions referred to therein (viz. obligation to provide basic amenities and basic physical needs to the senior citizen) be expressly stated in the document/s of transfer. This Court is inclined to take a different view inasmuch as (i) the said restrictive definition is not borne out from the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) and Urmila Dixit (supra) and the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court for interpreting/applying the beneficent provisions of the Act; (ii) the statutory text of Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act does not mandate any express recital of the relevant condition/s. Insisting upon an explicit/express stipulation would introduce a requirement which is not borne out from the plain language of the Statute. Such an interpretation would also result in unwarranted reading down of the beneficial provision.

(iii) reading the requirement of express incorporation of the relevant condition/s in the transfer document (gift deed) would also clearly stultify the legislative intent behind the beneficent provision. It would substantially defeat the purpose of the salutary provision/s by restricting its applicability only to such cases where senior citizens have been legally astute enough to insist on incorporation of appropriate express covenants in the transfer document/s (gift deed/s), thereby excluding/denying the applicability of the beneficent provisions to the vast majority of vulnerable elderly / senior citizens. As mentioned in the Appellate Authority’s order itself that “more often than not, senior citizens rely upon their children to draw up the papers for such transfers and merely sign these papers on trust and oral promises/submission their children. It cannot be expected that an old lady aged around 85 years would draw up the papers herself and ensure to insert such conditions in the document. Such conditions are to be interpreted from the circumstances and also the pleadings of the parties”; (iv) It has been implicitly recognized in Sudesh Chhikara (supra) and Urmila Dixit (supra) that Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act, does not exclude / obviate the possibility of the relevant obligation/s being inferred/implied from the nature of the transaction or the attendant circumstances, even if not explicitly set out in the transfer documents; (v) this Court is unable to adopt an interpretation which would encourage / facilitate unscrupulous transferees to exploit senior citizens by obtaining “gift deeds” without express conditions, while intending abandonment of the concerned senior citizen(s), as has happened in the present case. The protection / remedy provided for in Subhashini v. District Collector, 2020 SCC OnLine Ker 4080 Section 23 of the Senior Citizens Act cannot be rendered illusory in such manner.

58. It is also notable that in Ajay Singh v. Khacheru and Ors., (2025) 3 SCC 266, the Supreme Court has taken a view that a writ court shall refrain from reappreciating evidence and arriving at a finding of facts unless the same is perverse in nature or exceeds the jurisdiction of the concerned authority. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:-

any interference.

59. In the circumstances, the present petition is dismissed. The pending applications also stand disposed of.

SACHIN DATTA, J AUGUST 14, 2025/r, dn, sl