Tej Pratap Singh v. Union of India & Ors.

21.2. (ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10.

(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11.

(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12.

(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13.

(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”

11. We would respectfully observe that the aforesaid principles would squarely apply to the appellate proceedings under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, when question of condonation of delay arises for consideration.

12. There are certain aspects which we must bear in mind when we deal with the question of compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, for the said Act relates to and deals with compulsory acquisition of land. Erstwhile owner or right holder is not a consenting party and not given an option and choice. There are a number of cases including decisions in Dhiraj Singh (supra), Imrat Lal & Others versus Land Acquisition Collector and Others, (2014) 14 SCC 133, Samiyathal & Others versus SPL Tahsildar & Others, 2013 Law Suit (SC) 1295, K. Subbarayudu and Others versus The Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition), 2017 (8) SCALE 61 and Ranjit Singh & Another versus State of Haryana & Others, 2014 (9) SCALE 291 wherein delay going up to 4000 days or delay exceeding 10 years, have been condoned. Recently in Narendra and Others versus State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2017) 9 SCC 426, the Supreme Court highlighted need to award just and fair compensation to those whose land was acquired under the same notification and were similarly situated, notwithstanding that a particular appellant had prayed for a lower compensation and had accordingly paid court fee. There was no cap of maximum amount of compensation that the Court could award for the law does not restrict and restrain the Courts from awarding only that amount as prayed in the application. In this context, reference was made to Section 28-A and its salutary objective. Adversarial form of adjudication has element of limitations in social context adjudication and the Courts must promote and administer fair justice to marginalised section of the society, otherwise the latter being unequal would be discriminated. In such cases, Courts should adopt problem solving therapeutic approach to ensure payment of just compensation to bridge the gap between law and life. Core of jurisprudence behind the said reasoning predicated on fair and distributive justice is elucidated in paragraph 13 of the said judgment, which reads:-

Our reasoning resonates the said view.

13. Invariably the underlying reason to condone delay in the land acquisition appeals was social and economic status of the appellants, whose land was acquired. The appellants/claimants were agriculturists and not men of means, thus the acquisition by the all powerful government had deprived them of their source of livelihood. The question invariably related to access to justice and denial of equal treatment, for the appellants/claimants did not have ability, resources and money to approach the Court in time and pay the court fee. In this context, it was observed that the Court would be taking hyper-technical view rather than a pragmatic, just and equitable approach if delay in such cases were not to be condoned.

14. Such cases have to be distinguished, and cannot be treated at par with the cases where land had been transferred and sold and is under ownership of investors who seek to derive benefit from rising prices. All appellants are not equal and cannot claim violation of principle of equality when their social and economic status is different. Land is an asset and is also transferable and, therefore, can be bought and sold. Over a period of time, due to rising population and limited availability and other reasons, land has become a precious and priced possession. Galloping and zooming land prices have made investments in land as most paying and lucrative.

15. Courts would accept and be considerate to an agriculturist primarily dependent upon agricultural income for sustenance, therefore would merit highest degree of indulgence. This factual position may not be universally true, especially in Delhi where we have luxurious farm houses purportedly on agricultural land and there is speculative buying and sales in view of increasing land prices. This deprives and denies majority of the middle and marginalised landless from having a roof over their head. Owning a house is a distant dream for a many due to exorbitant land prices, totally disproportionate to the per capita income of an average Indian. Universal and omnibus dictum, whether or not explanation regarding “sufficient cause” should be accepted, would have its pitfalls and drawbacks. On one hand, the land owner is deprived of his land, which may be his only source of livelihood and on the other hand land is required for housing for poor and landless and creating jobs required for jobless.

16. Law of compulsory acquisition predicated on the principle that acquisition of land was in larger public interest and for greater good of society, yet past is replete with cases of compulsory acquisition of land at minimal price and exorbitant profits being made by those to whom land was transferred post acquisition on the pretext of public interest. Law, justice and equity require balance and equanimity, and not strait-jacket uniformity notwithstanding difference in circumstances and backgrounds. Condonation of delay would always be a matter of discretion exercised on the basis of principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, albeit on consideration of the facts and circumstances.

17. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we would hold that the question of condonation of delay in filing of appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is case and factual matrix specific. The Court, while examining the question of delay, must keep in mind the social and economic status of the appellant and whether he had limited access to justice being a person of paltry means who has also been deprived of his source of livelihood. This first factor could constitute the sole and compelling reason that may justify condonation of delay even for extremely long periods and in such cases, principle of equality in treatment in view of higher compensation paid to those who had the means and resources to approach the Court would be a good second or additional ground to excuse the delay. The fact that in other cases, higher compensation had been paid may be a relevant consideration but would not be the sole and only consideration to satisfy the test of sufficient cause. It would be incorrect to state as a principle, that regardless of the social and economic status of the appellant, delay in filing of appeal howsoever long it may be, must be condoned by applying the principle of equal treatment. The said principle cannot be accepted and applied as determinative criteria to decide whether cause for delay was justified and stood explained.

18. While examining and interpreting newly enacted Section 28A of the Land Acquisition Act in Babua Ram and Others versus State of U.P. & Another, (1995) 2 SCC 689, the Supreme Court had held that benefit of Section 28A would not be available to a person, who had sought and secured reference under Section 18A but had not filed any appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act inasmuch as law recognizes finality to a decision or judgment which is not challenged. Doctrine of res judicata operates and is not to be ignored. Argument of violation of Article 14 when different compensation was paid was rejected. Similarly, in Mewa Ram (supra) there are observations that enhanced compensation granted in some other case would not alone be a good ground for condonation of delay to seek enhancement.

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the reference is answered in the following manner:-

(i) Article 116 of the schedule of the Limitation Act applies to appeals preferred before the High Court under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.

(ii) The expression “sufficient cause” as interpreted is an elastic term, which has to be meaningfully interpreted to sub-serve the purpose of justice and on the basis of the principles laid down in Katiji (supra) and Esha Bhattacharjee (supra).

(iii) The principles laid down in Katiji (supra) and Esha

Bhattacharjee (supra) are guidelines for exercise of discretion but whether the discretion is to be exercised and delay should be condoned in a particular case would be situation and case specific.

(iv) Codonation of delay is not a vested right or to be granted on asking in all appeals seeking enhancement of compensation on acquisition of land. The social and economic condition of the appellant, including his educational background and other limitations are the most important and determinative factors to be taken into consideration so as not to deny justice and correct disparity. At the same time, indulgence need not be bestowed to the negligent and fence sitters, who had economic resources and were well versed and could have enforced right to appeal but for multifarious reasons were satisfied and did not pursue and enforce their right to appeal.

(v) Enhanced or higher compensation awarded in other cases may be a relevant factor while considering application for condonation of delay, but would not be the sole or even dominant consideration. Social and economic condition of the appellant when the delay is substantial and long would be the primary and dominant consideration. In such cases, award of higher compensation in appeals preferred by others would justify condonation of delay for long periods. Principle of equality may also come into play and would be a relevant factor when issue of condonation of delay is equally balanced.

20. Reference is answered in the aforesaid terms. Individual cases will be listed before the single Judge for disposal of the applications for condonation of delay on 25/4/18 when a date of hearing will be fixed. (SANJIV KHANNA) JUDGE (RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW) JUDGE (JAYANT NATH)

JUDGE APRIL 13th, 2018 NA/ssn/VKR