Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 08.08.2025
SMT. POONAM & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Mr. Kunal Narwal and Ms. Jyoti Nambiar, Adv.
Through: Mr. Prashant Diwan, Adv.
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU TARA VITASTA GANJU, J.: (Oral)
JUDGMENT
1. The Petitioners had filed the Writ Petition vide W.P.(C) 16714/2023 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950, inter alia, praying that Respondents No.1 to 3 be directed to release the complete compensation amount inclusive of interest and without any deductions to Petitioners No. 1 to 3 in the following terms: “(a) Pass a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to the respondents No.1 to 3 to release the complete compensation amount i.e., Rs. 18,71,586/- alongwith 15% interest w.e.f. 09.10.2015 separately to petitioners No. 1 and petitioner No. 2 each and Rs. 5,07,896/alongwith 15% interest w.e.f. 09.10.2015, of Special Rehabilitation Package to Petitioner No. 3 in respect of having 1/9th share in land bearing Khasra No. 17//12 MIN. (4-2), 18(4-16), 19/1 (3-00), 2//14 (1-17), 17(3-18), 9(2- 00), 12 (4-16), 13(4-04), 18 (4-16), and 19(4-16) total measuring 38 Bigha and 05 Biswas situated in the revenue estate of village Karala, Delhi- 110081 as per the order passed by the Additional Secretary, Land and Building i.e. respondent no. 3 bearing order No. F.9(20)80/L&B/LA/VOL.II/8226-44 dated 01.10.2008.”
2. Briefly the facts were that pursuant to acquisition proceedings initiated by the Respondents, the land of the Petitioners was acquired in
2008. The Petitioners however did not receive any compensation for the acquired land, which led to the filing of the present Petition.
3. By an Order dated 22.12.2023, this Court had while noting that the amounts due to the Petitioners had not been disbursed due to the lack of funds, had directed disbursal.
4. Subsequently, the Petition was disposed of by this Court by an order dated 12.02.2024 [hereinafter referred to as “Order in Review”], since Respondents had handed over the cheques of the principal compensation payable to the Petitioners after deduction of TDS. The Court also directed the Respondents to compute the interest and pay the said amount within a period of eight weeks to the Petitioner.
5. The Respondents, have, filed this Review Petition seeking review of the Impugned Order and recall of order/direction with regard to entitlement of interest in terms of Section 34 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter referred to as “LA Act”].
6. Learned Counsel for the Respondent/Review Petitioner makes only one submission. He submits that since the compensation was paid to the Petitioners in terms of a Special Rehabilitation Package Policy, thus, interest is not payable under Section 34 of the LA Act.
7. This submission of the learned Counsel for the Review Petitioner is without merit. In the first instance, it has not been disputed that the lands in issue were acquired pursuant to notifications under Section 4 and Section 6 of the LA Act on 25.08.2005 and 10.07.2006 respectively and that the Award for the same was made on 26.05.2008. Secondly, the Rehabilitation Package was announced after the passing of the Award and in view of general increase in the price of land acquired. The Petitioners had applied for the Special Rehabilitation Package Policy and interim compensation was given to the Petitioner No. 3 on 01.10.2008 but not to the Petitioner Nos. 1 and 2. It was in this background and in view of the fact that the compensation to be paid was essentially in terms of the previously notified lands and the Award dated 26.05.2008, that the Court had directed payment of interest. This also formed part of the Order-in-Review.
8. Thus, the award of compensation to the Petitioners was not pursuant to the Special Rehabilitation Package Policy but in pursuance of the acquisition of the subject lands under the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act.
9. The Court in the Order in Review had already given a finding that the compensation paid, was essentially for lands acquired under Sections 4 and 6 of the LA Act, and thus, the Petitioners would also be entitled to interest in terms of Section 34 of the LA Act. The plea of the Respondent was thus adjudicated by this Court and upheld in favour of the Petitioners.
10. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be exercised by the Court merely to re-examine a judgment which has already been examined by this Court. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati[1], has held that the application for review is entertained only under the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 including on account of a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record. A review proceeding cannot be equated with an original hearing unless there is a glaring omission or similar grave error which leads to a miscarriage of justice, the power cannot be exercised. The relevant extract of the Kamlesh Verma case is reproduced below: “18. Review is not rehearing of an original matter. The power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. This Court in Jain Studios Ltd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 501], held as under: (SCC pp. 504-505, paras 11-12) “11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned, the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been sought at the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived. Once such a prayer had been refused, no review petition would lie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It is settled law that the power of review cannot be confused with appellate power which enables a superior court to correct all errors committed by a subordinate court. It is not rehearing of an original matter. A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. The power of review can be exercised with extreme care, caution and circumspection and only in exceptional cases.
12. When a prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant herein had been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heard and was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirect method by filing a review petition. Such petition, in my opinion, is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissible and unwarranted and cannot be granted.”
19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In review jurisdiction, mere disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction. Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki [(1921-22) 49 IA 144: (1922) 16 LW 37: AIR 1922 PC 112] and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius [AIR 1954 SC 526: (1955) 1 SCR 520] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. [(2013) 8 SCC 337: JT (2013) 8 SC 275]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.” [Emphasis Supplied]
11. No error has been shown to the Court which would require this Court to exercise jurisdiction under its powers for review, given the settled law as discussed above.
12. The Review Petition is accordingly dismissed. All pending Applications stand closed.
TARA VITASTA GANJU, J NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, J AUGUST 8, 2025