Sarjit Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

Delhi High Court · 14 May 2018 · 2018:DHC:3179-DB

G.S. Sistani; Sangita Dhingra Sehgal

W.P. (C) No.3352/2018

2018:DHC:3179-DB

constitutional other Significant

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The Delhi High Court held that land validly acquired for one public purpose can be diverted to another public purpose without invalidating acquisition, distinguishing cases involving transfer to private parties.

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W.P. (C) No.3352/2018 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Order: 14th May, 2018

W.P.(C) 3352/2018
SARJIT SINGH AND ORS. ..... Petitioners
Through Mr. B.R. Sharma, Advocate

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. ..... Respondents
Through Mr.Yeeshu Jain, Standing Counsel with Ms. Jyoti Tyagi, Advocate for
L&B/LAC.
Mr. Namit Suri, Advocate for DDA.

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL G.S.SISTANI, J. (ORAL)

JUDGMENT

1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the petitioners. The petitioners seek a declaration that the acquisition proceedings with respect to the land of the petitioners is deemed to have lapsed as physical possession has not been taken, although compensation has been paid. Another ground which has been raised before us is that the land was acquired for the purposes of Rohini Residential Scheme, however, the land is sought to be diverted to the Delhi State Industrial Development Corporation (DSIDC) for creation of industrial zone and it is prayed that on this ground alone the notifications and the award should be quashed.

2. Mr. Sharma, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has relied upon the judgment in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Anr. v. G.Jayarama Reddy and Ors., reported at 2011 XI AD 2018:DHC:3179-DB (SC) 132 in support of his submission that the land acquired for a specific purpose cannot be transferred for another purpose. Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Sharma on para 25, which is reproduced below:

“25. The next question which merits examination is whether

the High Court was justified in directing restoration of land to

respondent No.1. In Mrs. Behroze Ramyar Batha and

others v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (supra), the

Division Bench of the High Court categorically held that the

exercise undertaken for the acquisition of land was vitiated due

to fraud. The Division Bench was also of the view that the

acquisition cannot be valid in part and invalid in other parts,

but did not nullify all the transfers on the premise that other

writ petitions and a writ appeal involving challenge to the

acquisition proceedings were pending. In Annaiah and others

v. State of Karnataka and others (supra), the same Division Bench specifically adverted to the issue of diversification of purpose and held that where the landowners are deprived of their land under the cover of public purpose and there is diversification of land for a private purpose, it amounts to fraudulent exercise of the power of eminent domain.”

3. Mr. Namit Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA submits that this ground is not available to the petitioners and the judgment sought to be relied upon by Mr. Sharma would not apply to the facts of the present case. Mr. Suri has traced the law on this issue while relying upon the judgment in the case of Gulam Mustafa and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at (1976) 1 SCC 800, more particularly paragraph 5. Mr. Suri submits that the same view was endorsed by a Bench of three Judges in the case of Mangal Oram and Ors. v. State of Orissa and Anr., reported at (1977) 2 SCC 46 when the Supreme Court observed “apart from that, we find that this Court has recently held in the case of Gulam Mustafa v. State of Maharashtra that there is no principle of law by which a valid, compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the declaration.” Mr. Suri further contends that a similar view was expressed in the case of Union of India and Ors. v. Jaswant Rai Kochhar and Ors., reported at (1996) 3 SCC 491; Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., reported at (1996) 6 SCC 405; State of Maharashtra v. Mahadeo Deoman Rai Alias Kalal and Ors., reported at (1990) 3 SCC 579; Sulochana Chandrakant Galandi v. Pune Municipal Transport and Ors., reported at (2010) 8 SCC 467; V. Chandrasekaran and Anr. v. Administrative Officer and Ors., reported at (2012) 12 SCC 133 and Govt. of A.P. and Anr. v. Syed Akbar, reported at (2005) 1 SCC 558.

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4. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties. A careful reading of the aforesaid decisions relied upon by the counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA would show that the law is well-established that after the land is acquired it vests with the State and can be utilized for any other purpose. In the case of Mahadeo Deoman Rai Alias Kalal and Ors.(supra), in para 6 it was held as under:

“6. Besides, the question as to whether a particular Scheme framed in exercise of statutory provisions is in the public interest or not has to be determined according to the need of the time and a final decision for all times to come cannot be taken. A particular scheme may serve the public purpose at a given point of time but due to change of circumstances it may become essential to modify or substitute

it by another scheme. The requirements of the community do not remain static; they indeed, go on varying with the evolving process of social life. Accordingly, there must be creative response from the public authority, and the public scheme must be varied to meet the changing needs of the public. At the best for the respondent, it can be assumed that in 1967 when the resolution in his favour was passed, the acquisition of the land was not so urgently essential so as to call for his dispossession. But for that reason it cannot be held that the plots became immune from being utilised for any other public purpose for ever. The State or a body like the Municipal Council entrusted with a public duty to look after the requirements of the community has to assess the situation from time to time and take necessary decision periodically. We, therefore, hold that the Resolution dated February 13, 1967 was not binding on the Municipal Council so as to disable it to take a different decision later.”

5. It would also be useful to reproduce the observations made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of Gulam Mustafa and Ors.(supra). Para 5 reads as under:

“5. At this state Shri Deshpande complained that actually the Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land marking them out into separate plots for a housing colony, apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, once the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the Section 6(3) declaration.”

6. The judgment sought to be relied upon by Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, in our view, would not apply to the facts of the present case, as the question which arose for consideration in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Anr.(supra), was noticed by the Supreme Court of India in para 1 of the judgment, which reads as under:

“1. Whether land acquired by the State Government at the instance of the Karnataka State Tourism Development Corporation (for short, `the Corporation') for the specified purpose i.e. Golf-cum-Hotel Resort near Bangalore Airport, Bangalore could be transferred by the Corporation to a private individual and corporate entities is the question which arises for determination in these appeals filed against the judgment of the Karnataka High Court whereby the acquisition of land measuring 1 acre 3 guntas comprised in Survey No.122 of Kodihalli village, Bangalore South Taluk was quashed.” (Emphasis added)

7. In the backdrop of the questions which had arisen, the Apex Court in para 25 which is relied upon by Mr. Sharma, would show that in the aforesaid matter, the land was acquired for the purpose of tourism, but post the acquisition the land was sought to be transferred to private individuals and corporate entities, which the Supreme Court held could not be done and it would amount to fraudulent exercise of power of eminent domain. In our view, the judgment in the case of Royal Orchid Hotels Limited and Anr.(supra) would not apply to the present case. We are of the considered view that this ground would not be available to the petitioners herein.

8. We appreciate the assistance rendered by Mr. Namit Suri, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the DDA in deciding this issue.

9. However, since it has been alleged that the possession of the land is still with the petitioners, we issue notice to the respondents. Counsels appearing on behalf of the respondents accept notice.

10. Counter affidavit be filed within six weeks. Rejoinder, if any, be filed within four weeks thereafter.

11. List on 09.08.2018. G.S.SISTANI, J. SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J. MAY 14, 2018 pst

Sarjit Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.

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