Punjab & Sind Bank v. K S Sethi

1. These cross-appeals have been filed by Punjab & Sindh Bank[1] and Mr. K.S. Sethi[2], an employee of the Bank, challenging the Judgment dated 21.10.2013[3], passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) 8072/2010 titled as “K S Sethi vs. Punjab & Sind Bank”.

2. LPA 968/2013 has been preferred by the Bank against the modification of the punishment order imposed upon the Employee, while LPA 11/2014 has been preferred by the Employee against the limited portion of the Judgment whereby the learned Single Judge upheld the finding of guilt.

3. The Employee in his appeal has also challenged the order dated 12.08.2008 passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the order dated 06.04.2009 passed by the Appellate Authority, and the order dated 14.09.2010 passed by the Reviewing Authority, while seeking directions for grant of service benefits as if he remained in service throughout the period from the date of dismissal, along with all consequential, including financial, benefits.

4. Learned counsel for the Bank, [the Appellant in LPA 968/2013], would argue that the punishment imposed by the Disciplinary Authority through its Order dated 12.08.2008, and subsequently upheld by both, the Appellate Authority and the Reviewing Authority, was not liable to interference, for the Employee’s guilt had been duly established, and although the learned Bank Single Judge did not interfere with the finding of guilt, he nevertheless modified the punishment which, according to counsel, had been rightly imposed. She, therefore, would submit that such interference was beyond the narrow scope of writ jurisdiction, particularly in matters concerning disciplinary action.

5. Learned counsel for the Bank would further submit that the penalty imposed was absolutely proportionate to the misconduct committed by the Employee, and to further substantiate the same, she would refer to the charge-sheet dated 24.07.2007, wherein the charges had been framed and later proved, and thus, she would maintain that the findings of the Disciplinary Authority were supported by evidence and hence, did not warrant judicial interference.

6. Learned counsel for the Bank would also submit that, as a result of the Employee’s dereliction of duty, the Bank had suffered financial losses which were directly attributable to his conduct, and since the Bank is a Public Sector Undertaking, such losses ultimately amounted to a loss to the public exchequer, thereby aggravating the seriousness of the misconduct and justifying the punishment imposed.

7. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel for the Employee [Appellant in LPA 11/2014], would refer to various portions of the Impugned Judgment, particularly paragraphs 91 and 92 thereof, to contend that the Bank had failed to follow the relevant rules and that the proceedings stood vitiated due to violation of the principles of natural justice.

8. Learned Senior Counsel, thereafter, would take this Court through several documents and, in particular, pointed out that one of Impugned Judgement the major allegations against the Employee was that he had permitted actions against various creditors to lapse. He would further submit that this allegation was factually incorrect, since during his tenure, none of the claims were becoming time-barred; on the contrary, it was an admitted position that certain suits had actually been filed for recovery of debts owed to the Bank.

9. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that, in his reply dated 13.06.2008 to the inquiry report, the Employee had highlighted contradictions by demonstrating, with reference to the Bank’s own guidelines, that the loan accounts could have become time-barred only after his tenure, and yet liability was sought to be fixed on him, which, according to the learned Senior Counsel, reflected mala fide conduct on the part of the superior officials.

10. It would further be contended by the learned Senior Counsel that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted in violation of the Punjab & Sind Bank Officer Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1981, inasmuch as Rule 6(3) thereof, expressly mandates that the charge sheet must be accompanied by a statement of allegations, a list of documents with copies, and a list of witnesses with their statements. He would then submit that none of these mandatory requirements were complied with, and yet the inquiry was permitted to proceed.

11. Learned Senior Counsel would also point out that during the inquiry proceedings held between 30.11.2007 and 11.12.2007, the presenting officer produced 64 Management Exhibits, most of which were created after the issuance of the charge sheet, and by way of illustration, Management Exhibit 1 (MEX[1]) was the petitioner’s reply to the charge sheet and Management Exhibit 2 (MEX[2]) was an extension of Annexure A of the Chargesheet and MW[2] was instructed to put his signature on this document at the instance of the Management. This, according to him, would demonstrate that the charge sheet had been issued without any supporting documents, and that the entire inquiry was conducted in violation of the Principles of Natural Justice.

12. It would be further argued by the learned Senior Counsel that the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings had been pre-determined, as the Inquiring Authority mechanically held all charges to be proved despite clear contradictions in the record. He would further argue that, on one hand, it was alleged that the loan accounts had become timebarred, while on the other, it was simultaneously recorded that the Employee’s successor had filed suits in respect of the very same accounts, and thus, this revealed bias and mala fide intent on the part of the concerned authorities.

13. After hearing the matter at length, this Court was of the opinion that various aspects of the matter which were sought to be canvassed at length appeared to be missing from the consideration accorded by the Learned Single Judge in the Judgment impugned herein. The Court posed a query to the Counsel as to whether it may not be appropriate that the matter not be referred back to the learned Single Judge to facilitate the rendering of findings in respect of the various issues, particularly in view of the limited scope of interference permitted in exercise of LPA jurisdiction.

14. It is trite that the scope of interference by this Court is extremely limited. It is confined to rectifying errors of law and does not extend to re-appreciating evidence or substituting its own findings for those of the learned Single Judge, unless such findings are shown to be perverse or lacking any evidentiary basis.

15. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple[4], which has also been relied upon by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in M/S Sawhney Rubber Industries v. Workmen[5]. The relevant extract from Baddula Lakshmaiah (supra) reads as under:- “2……A letters patent appeal, as permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-court appeal whereunder the Letters Patent Bench, sitting as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Bench. Such is not an appeal against an order of a subordinate court. In such appellate jurisdiction the High Court exercises the powers of a Court of Error. So understood, the appellate power under the Letters Patent is quite distinct, in contrast to what is ordinarily understood in procedural language…..”