Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of
JUDGMENT
PRITAM PAL SHARMA ...Petitioner
Through: Mr.Atul Bandhu, Advocate.
Through: Mr.Kamal Mehta, Advocate.
1. The petitioner has invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of a writ of mandamus or certiorari or any other appropriate writ for setting aside the impugned Award dated 21.09.2017 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court No.2, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi (in brief „Industrial Adjudicator‟) in ID No.29/2014 on making a Reference No.L-17012/21/2013/IR(M) dated 07.10.2013 made by the Ministry of Labour, Government of India, in the following terms:- “Whether the action of the management of Life Insurance Corporation of India, in terminating the services of Shri Pritam Pal Sharma, ex-Sub Staff with effect from 27.02.2009, is legal and 2018:DHC:3382 justified? What relief the workman is entitled to?”
2. On completion of pleadings by the parties, the Industrial Adjudicator framed the following issues:- “(i) Whether the enquiry conducted by the management is just, proper, fair and legal. If so, its effects?
(ii) Whether the action of the management of
Life Insurance Corporation of India in terminating the services of Shri Pritam Pal Sharma, ex-Sub staff with effect from 27.02.2009 is legal and justified? If so, its effects?
(iii) To what relief the workman is entitled to and from which date?”
3. Both the parties have adduced their respective evidence on the preliminary issue. On 27.04.2017, the issue with regard to legality and fairness of the domestic inquiry conducted by the respondent/Management was decided by the Industrial Adjudicator as enquiry being legal and fair and in consonance with the principles of natural justice. The findings of Industrial Tribunal on issue No.1 attained finality.
4. By impugned award dated 21.09.2017, the Industrial Tribunal while considering the issue No.2 and 3 found that the punishment of termination inflicted on the petitioner/workman is justified and consequently the award was passed against the petitioner/workman and in favour of the respondent/Management.
5. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the punishment of termination inflicted on the petitioner does not commensurate with his guilt. He submits that the petitioner had to go on leave due to his own sickness and that of his wife and son. He submits that he had to take some of the leave at the time of death of his mother. He submits that since the petitioner had taken the leave either on account of his own illness or of his wife and son and some leave due to death of his mother, such harsh view should not have been taken.
6. Per contra, it is submitted by learned counsel for the respondent that since the inquiry issue has been decided in favour of the respondent/Management by order dated 27.04.2017 and has attained finality, there is no occasion for the Tribunal or for the High Court to interfere with the order of the punishment inflicted by the Competent Authority. He submits that the Industrial Adjudicator has rightly not interfered with the punishment given to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority.
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
8. The petitioner was working as a Sub-Staff with effect from 07.05.1990 with the respondent. The petitioner was issued a charge-sheet dated 18.10.2008 for his unauthorized absence from duty during the months April, 2008 to August, 2008 on various dates for 76 days. In his reply dated 06.01.2009, Ex.MW-1/2, the petitioner has admitted the charges against himself. After the Inquiry Officer found the charges having been proved against the petitioner vide report dated 15.01.2009, show-cause notice dated 30.01.2009 was issued to the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority and after considering his reply and the inquiry report, by an order dated 27.02.2009, the petitioner was removed from service under clause 39(1)(f) of the LIC of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. The appeal of the petitioner was rejected by the Appellate Authority on 08.05.2009. The memorial dated 09.06.2009 filed by the petitioner was further rejected by the Chairman of the respondent/Management on 26.09.2009.
9. The scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court time and again. In B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion. The Para No.18 of the judgment reads as under:-
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in DG, RPF Vs. Sai Babu (2003) 4 SCC 331 again elaborated the legal position about the extent of power of the High Court or Tribunal to interfere with the punishment thus imposed. The para No.6 of the judgment reads as under:- “6… Normally, the punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority should not be disturbed by the High Court or a tribunal except in appropriate cases that too only after reaching a conclusion that the punishment imposed is grossly or shockingly disproportionate, after examining all the relevant factors including the nature of charges proved against, the past conduct, penalty imposed earlier, the nature of duties assigned having due regard to their sensitiveness, exactness expected of and discipline required to be maintained, and the department/establishment in which the delinquent person concerned works.”
11. Again in State of Meghalaya Vs. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that scope of interference is very limited and para No.14 of the judgment reads as under:-
12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Administrator, Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli Vs. Gulabhia M. Lad (2010) 5 SCC 775 has discussed the entire law so developed on the power of the High Court/Tribunal to interfere with the punishment awarded to the employee by the Disciplinary Authority and para No.14 reads as under:-
13. In view of this settled position in law, the High Court/Tribunal cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Disciplinary Authority/Appellate Authority unless such discretion suffers from illegality or material procedural irregularity as that would shock the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal.
14. The question of long absence of the workman and his consequent termination came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Corporation Vs. Sardar Singh 2004 (7) SCC 576 and it was held that when an employee absents himself from duty even without sanctioned leave, for a very long period, it prima facie shows the lack of interest in work. It was further held that the conclusion regarding negligence and lack of interest can be arrived at by looking into the period of absence, more particularly when the same is unauthorized. However, the burden is on the employee, who claims that there was no negligence or lack of interest established by placing relevant material.
15. The petitioner remained unauthorizedly absent from duty for 76 days on various dates during the months of April, 2008 to August, 2008. The Tribunal has also taken note of the fact that in the past the penalty was imposed by the Disciplinary Authority on the respondent/Management six times which is detailed as under:- Order dated Penalty imposed 22.11.1993 Censure 13.07.1995 Reduction in basic pay by one stage 10.07.1997 Reduction in basic pay by two stages 27.10.2005 Reduction in basic pay to minimum Appeal order dated Reduction in basic pay by 5 05.04.2006 stages Memorial dated 18.10.2006 Reduction in basic pay by 5 stages
16. Having considered the facts of the case in light of the law laid down by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court, the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority on the petitioner for his removal from service has rightly been not interfered with by the Industrial Adjudicator by the impugned award dated 21.09.2017.
17. I do not find any merit in the petition and the same is dismissed.
JUDGE MAY 22, 2018 dkb