Sarlarani v. Mithlesh Devi

1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.

2. The applications are disposed of. Page 1 of[5] 2018:DHC:8787 RSA 95/2018. RSA 96/2018 & RSA 97/2018

3. These three Regular Second Appeals, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), impugn the separate but near identical judgments [all dated IT^ May, 2018 in RCA Nos.20/2017, 22/2017 and 21/2017, all of the Court of Additional District Judge (ADJ)-04, South-West District, Dwarka Courts, New Delhi] of dismissal of First Appeals under Section 96 of the CPC preferred by the appellant in each of these appeals, against the judgments all dated 19"^ January, 2017 in suits, being CS Nos.27022/2016, 27023/2016 and 27024/2016 filed by the respondent in all these appeals against each of the appellants herein of ejectment of each of the appellants from the shop in their respective tenancy in property No.WZ-12B, Gulab Bagh, Nawada, New Delhi-110059.

4. The counsel for all the three appellants has been heard.

5. The respondent had filed the suits, from which, these second appeals arise, claiming (i) that the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 did not extend to the locality where the property aforesaid in which the shops in the tenancy of each of the appellants was situated; and, (ii) that the respondent was not desirous of continuing with the tenancy of each ofthe appellants and was entitled to eject each ofthe appellants and to recover mesne profits from the appellants.

6. Each of the appellants though contested the suit by filing written statement, but did not dispute the relationship of landlord and tenant with the respondent.

7. The respondent filed applications under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC for decree on admissions and which applications were allowed and a decree for ejectment passed in favour of the respondent and against each of the appellants with respect to the shop in the tenancy of each ofthe appellants.

8. - The first appeal preferred by the appellants as aforesaid remained unsuccessful. Page 2 of[5]

9. The counsel for the appellants contends that the appellants having paid pagdi for becoming tenant in the shops in their respective tenancy, the tenancy in favour of the each of the appellants is a permanent one and the appellants are not liable to be ejected and the respondent is not entitled to determine the tenancy of the appellants by filing the suit for ejectment.

10. I have enquired from the counsel for the appellants as to how the appellants, even if prove to have paid pagdi for becoming a tenant in the shop in their respective possession / tenancy, can claim permanent tenancy or tenancy for, any fixed period, in the absence of a registered lease deed.

11. The counsel for the appellants obviously has no answer in view of settled legal position.

12. The only other argument is, that as per the respondent also, the father ofthe appellant in RSA No.97/2018 was inducted as a tenant in the shop subject matter thereof and the appellant, against,whom the suit was filed, is only one of the legal heirs of his father and that the other legal heirs also ought to have been impleaded.

13. The said question is also no longer res integra. Supreme Court, in H.C. Pandey Vs. G.C. Paul (1989) 3 SCC 77 held that on death of a tenant, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs - it is a single tenancy which devolve on the heirs; there is no division ofthe premises or of rent payable therefor; the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants; thus notice served on some of the heirs was enough. In accordance with the said principle, the suit against one of the heirs only, is also sufficient. Supreme Court, m Surayya Begum (Mst.) Vs. Moltd. Usman (1991) 3 SCC 114 has held that the* principle of representation of interest of a person through a named party is not unknown. It is not the case that the interest of appellant in RSA No.97/2018 is adversorial to the other legal heirs of his father or that the said appellant is in collusion with the respondent. Rather, the very factum Page 3 of[5] of the appellant contesting the suit and preferring this appeal shows that the appellant is acting bonafide. It is also not the case that save for the said appellant, any other heir of his father is in possession of the shop or has paid rent thereof or asserted any rights.

14. No other argument has been urged by the counsel for the appellants.

15. When I was about to start dictating the judgment of dismissal of these second appeals, the counsel for the appellants, under instructions from the appellants in RSA Nos.96/2018 and 97/2018 and under instructions from Mr. Inderjeet, husband of the appellant in RSA No.95/2018, all stated to be present in Court, states that the appellants do not press these appeals and withdraw the same and only desire time of one, one and a half years to vacate the shops. The counsel for the appellants also states that the appellants in RSA No.96/2018 and 97/2018 and the husband of the appellant in RSA No.95/2018 are duly authorized in this regard and undertake to this Court to, upon the respondent agreeing to grant of time, vacate the premises and deliver vacant peaceful physical possession of the shops subject matter of each of the suits to the respondent on or before the date till when time to vacate is granted.