Ms. PI and Ors. v. Jawaharlal Nehru University and Ors.

1. Pursuant to the order dated 2.5.2018, passed by me, Ms. Rautray, who appears for respondents No.1 to 3, has returned with instructions. Ms. Rautray says that the Fact Finding Committee (FFC) has given its report. A copy of the report has been tendered in Court. Pertinently, copies of the report have not been furnished either to the counsel for the petitioners i.e., Ms. Grover, or the counsel for the other respondents, which includes Mr. Hansaria and Mr. Satyakam.

2. A perusal of the report would show that the FFC apart from, broadly, recording what transpired after complaints were lodged by the petitioners with regard to alleged acts of sexual harassment committed by respondent 2018:DHC:3551 No.4, no finding as such has been returned by it. The report which is dated 11.5.2018, contains Annexures, which, in a sense, is a collation of the material which has been generated in the case. The material collated includes the correspondence exchanged between the members of respondent No.1/Jawahal Lal University (JNU) administration; correspondence with the petitioners/complainants as also the FIRs lodged by the petitioners. 2.[1] There are, in all, twenty two Annexures appended to the report.

3. It may be relevant to note that the FFC was constituted at the behest of JNU, Vice Chancellor (hereafter referred to as ‘VC’). This fact was communicated to this Court by Ms. Rautray at the hearing held on 2.5.2018. 3.[1] As a matter of fact, on that date, I had indicated to Ms. Rautray that since the FFC constituted by the VC consisted only of male members, it may help the process of inquiry if a lady professor is also brought on board. It is based on this suggestion that the FFC was broad based. Thus, apart from two male professors, the FFC evidently included one lady professor as well. 3.[2] The Court was given to believe, at that stage, that apart from the steps already taken in the matter, the FFC would take the matter forward and deliberate on issues, which were not addressed till that date so that a safe working environment could be provided to the petitioners/complainants. It is in this context that I had, inter alia, noted the following in paragraphs 14, 15 and 15.[1] of my order dated 2.5.2018. For the sake of convenience, the said parts of the order are extracted hereafter:

4. It appears that the aspects noted in paragraphs 14(iii), (iv) & (v) remain unaddressed. As a matter of fact, as would be evident, upon perusal of the observations made in Paragraph 15.[1] of the said order I had indicated to respondent No.4 that it would be in his best interest, if he were to take steps that would reduce the chances of his interaction with the petitioners/complainants or even potential witnesses.

5. Given the fact that the FFC has done precious little in respect of the matters adverted to above, I had put to Ms. Rautray as to why these aspects of the matters were not deliberated upon by the FFC. 5.[1] Learned counsel informed me that under the subsisting service condition regime, which stands incorporated in Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and Rule 14(2) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 it is only the Internal Complaints Committee (ICC), which deals with sexual harassment, that can inquire into misconduct, if any, committed by respondent No.4. 5.[2] In other words, Ms. Rautray submitted that the FFC had no jurisdiction to deal with the aspects, which are alluded to hereinabove. Learned counsel went on to state that the ICC would want the petitioners/complainants to depose before it and that for this purpose attempts to establish contact with them, both telephonically as well as via emails have been made. Learned counsel stated that apart from the aforesaid modes of communication, summons/letters were also served on the petitioners/complainants. 5.[3] A summary sheet of the dates and events of the steps taken in that behalf is placed before me. 5.[4] Ms. Rautray, further submitted that if the petitioners/complainants depose before the ICC, then, the inquiry could move forward and steps, if any, qua respondent No.4, could be taken, based on the report generated in that behalf.

6. Mr. Hansaria, learned Senior Counsel, who, appears for respondent No.4, on the other hand, broadly, reiterated his stand, which he had taken on 2.5.2018. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the allegations of the petitioners/complainants were motivated. In addition thereto, Mr. Hansaria contended that respondent No.4 is a well respected professor and that because of ruckus caused by students (not the petitioners/complainants), his family and children had been put to great stress. I was also informed that respondent no.4’s wife is employed as an Assistant Professor in JNU. Furthermore, learned Senior Counsel submitted that students, other than the petitioners/complainants, would require respondent no.4’s academic supervision and therefore, asking him to be removed from the campus would not be appropriate. The contention was that it would not only harm his reputation, but would also affect both, his students as well as family members.

7. Ms. Grover, who, appears for the petitioners/complainants, on the other hand, reiterated her stand which was taken on the previous dates i.e., that the petitioners/complainants had the autonomy to choose the course of action that they would want to take in a situation such as the one obtaining in the present matter. According to her, complainants under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (hereafter referred to as ‘2013 Act’) had the autonomy to choose not to take recourse to the ICC and, instead, trigger the criminal process. 7.[1] Learned counsel submitted that the reason such a decision had been taken was on account of the fact that the petitioners/complainants had very little confidence in the ICC as presently constituted. 7.[2] Ms. Grover also contended that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners/complainants had taken recourse to the criminal process, JNU was duty-bound under the 2013 Act to provide a safe working environment at workplace which would include safety from persons who would come in contact at such workplace. In other words, according to Ms. Grover, JNU was obligated to provide a safe working environment to the petitioners/complainants which would firewall them against any intrusion that may be caused by the presence of respondent No.4 on the campus. 7.[3] Ms. Grover went on to say that, as a matter of fact, JNU is obligated to render every assistance to the petitioners/complainants, in their prosecution of the pending criminal case. In support of her submission, learned counsel relied upon the provisions of Section 19(a) and 19(g) of the 2013 Act. 7.[3] To buttress her submission, Ms. Grover also referred to Rule 8 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Rules, 2013 (hereafter referred to as ‘2013 Rules’). According to the learned counsel, the principle analogous thereto could be applied to the present case, notwithstanding the fact that the petitioners/complainants had not taken recourse to the ICC. Furthermore, Ms. Grover also adverted to Section 30 of the JNU Act, 1966. Based on this provision it was contended that the V.C. had the power to deal with such ‘misconduct’ and, whenever found necessary, this power had been exercised in the past to suspend the delinquent. By way of example, reference was made to Annexure P-19. 7.[4] Ms. Grover was at pains to emphasize that petitioner No.1 and 4 did not have access to Laboratory No.409. In this context, it was submitted that the relevant samples/strains were available in the very same Laboratory, which were, I was told, required to be accessed by petitioner No.1 and 4 for the purpose of their research work. 7.[5] In this behalf, Ms. Grover took me through the additional affidavits filed in the matter by petitioner No.1 and 4, on 21.5.2018. Based on the Annexures appended to the additional affidavits, which included communications exchanged between petitioner No.1, the Dean and other faculty members, it was sought to be demonstrated that respondent No.4 continued to have access to Laboratory No.409. In this behalf, specific reference was made to e-mail dated 4.5.2018 sent by Mr. S.K. Goswami, Dean, School of Life Sciences to respondent No.4. Ms. Grover submitted that insofar as petitioner No.1 was concerned, she was required to submit her thesis by the 3rd week of July, 2018. It was, thus, stressed by the learned counsel that not only petitioner No.1, but also petitioner No.4, required new supervisors to be appointed as without the signatures of a supervisor, the Ph.D. thesis prepared by them cannot be submitted for due consideration by the relevant authority.

8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, according to me, clearly, despite the directions contained in the order dated 2.5.2018 that respondent No.4 will not use Laboratory No.409, there is material to show that he still has access to the said laboratory. As indicted above, these directions were invited by JNU on 2.5.2018. 8.[1] Therefore, the directions contained in paragraph 14(i) to (iii) are reiterated.

9. Insofar as the appointment of alternate supervisors as far as petitioner No.1 and 4 are concerned, I had directed that the VC would do the needful in the shortest possible time. Ms. Rautrary informs me that though a search was conducted to find suitable supervisors, presently, the exercise conducted has not reached fruition. She, however, did indicate that if petitioner No.1 and 4 could make any suggestions in this behalf, the same could be considered by the V.C. 9.[1] Accordingly, petitioner No.1 and 4 are given liberty to make suitable suggestions in that behalf to the V.C. The V.C. will consider the same and if the persons suggested are found suitable he will appoint the concerned persons as supervisors qua petitioner No.1 and 4. It is made clear, though, that this will not relieve JNU from its obligation to provide alternate supervisors to petitioner No.1 and 4. The needful will be done by the VC within 10 days from the receipt of a copy of this order.

10. This brings me to the other more peculiar issue as to whether respondent No.4 should be asked to remove himself from the campus till such time the matter is inquired into by the concerned authority.

11. I have no hesitation in holding that in view of the provision of Section 19(a) of the 2013 Act, JNU is duty bound to provide a safe working environment to the complainants/petitioners, even if they do not take recourse to the ICC route to seek redressal. The scheme of the 2013 Act clearly gives autonomy to the complainants in this behalf; a fact which is evident even upon a bare perusal of Section 19(a) and 19(g) of the 2013 Act.

12. Having said so, it is clear that there is no finding, as yet, returned qua the complaints made against respondent No.4. Respondent No.4, it appears, is also supervising other students other than the petitioners/complainants. Besides this, respondent No.4 says that the measures other than those which have been already taken qua him would apart from anything else, impact his students, family and his reputation irreversibly. 12.[1] That being said, I must indicate that in every infraction of law, there is always, unfortunately, some amount of collateral damage. The administrative or quasi judicial or even judicial authority while ruling on such like matter need to bear in mind that the victim who is possibly vulnerable and weak, also needs protection. It takes a lot for the victim to bare her life to public at large. Therefore, the delay in reporting and the contours of the complaint lodged have to be looked at from that prism.