Chhatarpur Farm Welfare Society v. Priyanshu Agrawal & Ors.

1. Present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellants challenging the order dated 19.05.2025 (hereinafter referred to as “impugned interim order”) passed by this Court in W.P.(C) 6353/2021 titled “Priyanshi Agarwal & Ors. vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors.”, wherein the learned Single Judge has directed that the private respondents/writ petitioners as well as the general public shall be allowed access through the roads in question, and that they shall not be charged any money for using the said roads.

2. It is the case of the appellant/society that the streets/passages in question at DLF Chattarpur Farms are not “public streets” within the meaning of Section 2(44) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, (hereinafter referred to as “DMC Act”) but are “private streets” as defined under Section 2(38) of the DMC Act. The appellant submits that these passages were carved out voluntarily by individual farm owners from their private lands for their own ingress and egress, and the ownership thereof was transferred to Qutab Garden Colony Co-operative Multipurpose Society Ltd., which is responsible for their maintenance. The appellant further states that the revenue records duly reflect the said passages as being in the private ownership and possession of the above-mentioned Co-operative Society.

3. The appellant submits that had these passages been public roads, the same would have been reflected as such in the revenue records and Aks Sizra/Map of Village Chattarpur. The absence of such recording demolishes the case of the private respondents/writ petitioners. The appellant further submits that neither Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), Delhi Development Authority (DDA), nor the Revenue Authorities have any right, title, authority, or jurisdiction in respect of these passages, which are private in nature, maintained at the expense of the Society and exclusively used by its members for their access, convenience, safety, and security.

4. The appellant submits that despite the above factual and legal position, the private respondents/writ petitioners have filed the underlying writ petition seeking demolition and removal of the gates installed at points A, B, C and D on the subject property.

5. The appellant further submits that the learned Single Judge vide impugned interim order dated 19.05.2025 has directed that the private respondents/writ petitioners as well as the general public shall be allowed access through the roads in question, and that they shall not be charged any money for using the said roads. Hence, the appellant/society filed the present appeal.

6. Mr. Rao, learned senior counsel, submits that learned Single Judge vide the impugned interim order has infact granted the final prayer sought by the private respondent nos.[1] to 11 who are the original writ petitioners, which is contrary to law. He submits that it is trite that where the interim prayer as also the final prayer sought in the legal proceeding are identical, interim relief ordinarily ought not to be granted. He submits that the fundamental issue raised by the appellant in respect of the subject area and the roads/streets constructed therein is whether they fall within the definition of “private streets” under section 2(39) of the DMC Act or “public streets” under section 2(44) of the DMC Act. He asserted that the entire area of the appellant is a private land and the roads which were constructed therein were common areas surrendered/relinquished by the members of the appellant for their own convenience or thoroughfare. He emphasizes that the learned Single Judge overlooked that the Act itself contemplated existence of private roads, and had assumed that all roads in Delhi would invariably be “public roads”. If that were the case, according to learned senior counsel, the definition of “private street” in Section 2 (39) of the Act would be rendered otiose. He submits that there is no layout plan of the area in question. He further forcefully submits that the roads in question are not maintained by the MCD and therefore, the order impugned could not have been passed opening up the private streets for the public.

7. Mr. Anup Kumar, learned counsel for private respondents vehemently opposed the submission made on behalf of the appellant and states that all the roads falling within the subject area are “public streets”. He emphasizes that the area under the appellant society is very large and the illegal and unlawful prohibition and restriction enforced by the appellant society from accessing such roads is contrary to the MPD 2021 and various provisions of the Act. He submits that before the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in the year 2020, the appellant society never stopped the public residing in areas surrounding the appellant society from accessing these roads, and therefore, the submission that these are private roads/private streets is an afterthought and contrary to law. He stoutly defended the observations and findings recorded by the learned Single Judge and prayed that the appeal be dismissed.

8. We have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, examined the impugned interim order and scrutinized the records of the case.

9. Conceptually, the DMC Act envisages existence of not only public streets but also private streets. The private street is defined under sub section (39) of Section 2 of the Act to mean any street which is not a public street and includes any passage securing access to two or more places belonging to the same or different owners. Whereas sub-section (44) of Section 2 defines public street to mean any street which vests in the Corporation as a public street or the soil below the surface of which vest in the Corporation or which under the provisions of this Act becomes, or is declared to be, a public street. It is apparent from these definitions that a private street is clearly not a public street and a public street would mean a street which vests in the Corporation or the land below vests in the Corporation or has been declared to be a public street. Apparently, the observation of the learned Single Judge in para 14 of the judgment appears to have overlooked the statutory definition given to “private street”.

10. Notwithstanding the aforesaid analysis, we are purposely not entering into the arena to decide whether the subject streets are “private” or “public”, since that is yet to be decided by the learned Single Judge in the underlying writ petition. The aforesaid analysis was necessitated only to cull out the proposition that the Act does, in fact, envisage existence of “private street”.

11. Another relevant aspect which needs consideration by this Court is as to whether the learned Single Judge could have passed the impugned interim order which, according to the appellant, amounts to adjudication and disposal of the writ petition itself. A perusal of the prayers of the writ petition indicates that prayers (II) and (III) have literally been decided and disposed of vide the impugned interim order. For a clarity, prayers (II) and

(III) are extracted hereunder:

“II. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or an appropriate writ(s)/order (s)/direction(s) commanding Respondent No.8 and 9 not to obstruct the free movement of the residents of Chhatarpur Extension including petitioners and/or other adjoining areas arid also not to obstruct the movement of their vehicles and other vehicles including ambulances/autorickshaw/taxi/cab services hired/used by Residents of Chhatarpur Extension and other adjoining areas; and

III. Issue a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or an appropriate writ(s) /order(s)/direction(s) commanding Respondent No.3 to 6 to ensure the unobstructed and unhindered free movement of the residents of Chhatarpur Extension including petitioners; and” In order to appreciate the aforesaid submission, it would also be appropriate to extract the operative portion of the impugned interim order. It would be apposite to extract paras 14 to 18 of the impugned order which reads thus-