State v. Ajay Sunil & Ors.

2. In the aforesaid circumstances and keeping in mind the decision of the Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State ofPunjab and Another (2012)10see303,holding thateven a non-compoundable offence can also ^ be quashed on the ground ofa settlement agreement between the offender and the victim,ifthe circumstancesso warrant;by observing as under: "58 However, certain offences which overwhelmingly andpredominantly bear civilflavour having arisen outofcivil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry,etc. or thefamily dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective ofthefact thatsuch offences have not been made compoundable,the High Court may within theframework ofits inherent power, quash the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face ofsuch -r' settlement, there,s hardlyanylikelihoodofthe offender being TTf, criminalproceedings,justice shallbecasualtyandendsofJusticeshallbedefeated."

3. The amicable resolution of cases like the present one is an abiding objective. ThedictumofGianSingh(supra)hasbeen affirmed by theApexCourtinNarinderSingh& Ors. Vs.StaleofPunjab&Anr.2014 6see466while observing: "29. In view ofthe aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down thefollowingprinciples by which the High Court would e guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between theparties andexercising itspower underSection 482 o)the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to acceptthesettlement with direction to continue with thecriminalproceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482ofthe Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code No doubt, under Section 482 ofthe Code, the High Court has inherentpowerto quash thecriminalproceedingseven in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, thispower is to be exercisedsparinglyand with caution.

29.2. When theparties havereachedthesettlementandon that basispetitionforquashingthecriminalproceedingsisfiled,the guidingfactorinsuch cases wouldbetosecure: (i)ends of justice, or (ii)topreventabuseoftheprocessofanycourt. While exercising the power the High Court is toform an opinion on eitherofthe aforesaidtwo objectives.

29.3. Such apower is notto beexercisedin thoseprosecutions which involveheinousandseriousoffencesofmentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are & not pmate m nature and have a serious impact on society Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed u^erspecialstatute like the Prevention ofCorruption Actor theoffencescommittedbypublicservantswhile workingin that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim andtheoffender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelminglyandpredominantlycivilcharacter,particularly those arising outofcommercialtransactions or arising outof matrimonialrelationship orfamily disputesshould be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. Whileexercising itspowers,theHigh Courtis toexamine as to whether thepossibility ofconviction is remote and bleak and continuation ofcriminal cases wouldput the accused to greatoppression andprejudice andextreme injustice would be causedto him by notquashingthecriminalcases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPG would fall in the category ofheinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPG in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision.It would be open to the High Courtto examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307IPG is therefor thesake ofItor theprosecution has collectedsufficientevidence, which proving the charge under Section 307 IPG.Forthispurpose,itwouldbeopentotheHigh Courttogo by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries si^jered by the victim can generally be the guidingfactor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examineas to whetherthere isastrongpossibilityofconviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the formercaseitcanrefusetoacceptthesettlementandquashthe criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be P~hlefortheHigh Courttoacceptthepleacompounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties Atthisstage the Courtcan also beswayed bythefactthatthe ^^ttl^^ent between the parties is going to result in harmony betweenthem which mayimprovetheirfuturerelationship. 29.[7] While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 ofthe Code or not, timings ofsettlementplay a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission ofoffence and the ^^tter IS still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal m accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because ofthe reason that at thisstagethe investigation isstillon andeven thecharge-sheet has not beenfiled Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed butthe evidence isyettostartorthe evidenceisstillat infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessmentofthe circumstances/material mentionedabove. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost completeoraftertheconclusion oftheevidencethe matterisat thestage ofargument, normallytheHigh Courtshouldrefrain from exercising itspower underSection 482ofthe Code,as in such cases the trial court would be in aposition to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to ^hethertheoffence underSection307IPCiscommittedornot. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittaloftheoffender who hasalready been convictedbythe trial court. Here charge isproved under Section 307IPCand conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore,there is no question ofsparingaconvictfoundguilty ofsuch a crime."

4. Since the complainantsthemselves do not wish to pursue their r complaint against the petitioners, the substratum of the complaints/FIRs dissipates and any further proceeding apropos the same FIRs would be an exercise in futility. Since the parties have settled their Us amicably,nothing survives in the matter.It would therefore be in the interest ofjustice to quash the FIRs in question. Therefore,FIR No. 1579/2015 & FIR No. 1580/2015 dated 31/12/2015 registered under sections 448/380 IPC at Police Station, Burari,Delhi and all the proceedings emanating therefrom are quashed.

5. At this stage,the learned counsel for the petitioners states that because of the unwarranted work load, caused by them upon the administrative machinery engaged in the maintenance oflaw and order, as their expression ofremorse and contrition,they voluntarily undertake to pay some costs. Accordingly,the petitioners are directed to pay a costs of Rs. 5,000/- each to the Chief Minister's Distress ReliefFund, Govt. ofKerala and a cheque for the said amount favouring "Principal Secretary(Finance) CMDRF Kerala" shall be delivered to the office of the Resident Commissioner for the State ofKerala at 3, Jantar Mantar Road,New Delhi within two weeks.

6. The petitions stand disposed-offin the above terms. NAJMIWAZIRI,J