Dr Sunil Kumar v. Union of India & Ors.

54. An action for contempt - though instituted through a petition or an application - is essentially in the nature of original proceedings, as held by this Court in High Court of Judicature at Allahabad v. Raj Kishore Yadav43; a fortiori, a prayer for condonation of delay in presenting the petition/application alleging contempt would not be maintainable. The express negative phraseology used in section 20 of the Act, as a legislative injunction, places a fetter on the court's power to initiate proceedings for contempt unless the petition/application is presented within the timeframe stipulated therein. However, since section 20 also uses the expression “date on which the contempt is alleged to be committed” as the starting point of the period of one year to be counted for reckoning whether the petition/application has been presented within the stipulated period, the high courts ought to be wary of crafty and skilful drafting of petitions/applications to overcome the delay in presentation thereof. … …

55. The Act, which is a special law on the subject of contempt, does not expressly or by necessary implication exclude the applicability of sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act. This Court, in State of West Bengal v. Kartick Chandra Das44 has held that in terms of section 29(2) of the 1963 Act, provisions contained in section 5 of the 1963 Act can be called in aid by a party who seeks condonation of delay in presentation of an appeal under section 19(1) of the Act. Similarly, in exceptional cases, provisions like sections 12, 14, 17, 22, etc. of the 1963 Act could be invoked to seek exemption from the law of limitation, which is distinct from condonation of delay. In an appropriate case, it would be open to the party who has not petitioned the court within the period of one year, as stipulated in section 20 of the Act, to seek exemption from the law of limitation in line with the principle flowing from Order VII Rule 6, CPC45, by showing the ground upon which such exemption is claimed. We have no hesitation to hold that in a case where a civil contempt is alleged by a party by referring to a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” and such allegation prima facie satisfies the court, the action for contempt is not liable to be nipped in the bud merely on the ground of it being presented beyond the period of one year as in section 20 of the Act. Applicability of the principle underlying Order VII Rule 6, CPC for granting exemption would only be just and proper having regard to the object and purpose for which the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is exercised by the courts if, of course, the court is satisfied that benefit of such an exemption ought to be extended in a given case. At the same time, it must be remembered that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. Inspiration in this regard may be drawn from the decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh46. However, as observed earlier, contempt proceedings being in the nature of original proceedings, akin to a suit, application of section 5 of the 1963 Act to seek condonation of delay is excluded.

56. A caveat needs to be added here. For a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” to be accepted as a ground for seeking exemption in an action for contempt, the party petitioning the court not only has to comprehend what the phrase actually means but would also be required to show, from his pleadings, the ground resting whereon he seeks exemption from limitation. Should the party fail to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to outright rejection. Also, the court has to be vigilant. Stale claims of contempt, camouflaged as a “continuing wrong/breach/offence” ought not to be entertained, having regard to the legislative intent for introducing section 20 in the Act which has been noticed above. Contempt being a personal action directed against a particular person alleged to be in contempt, much of the efficacy of the proceedings would be lost by passage of time. Even if a contempt is committed and within the stipulated period of one year from such commission no action is brought before the court on the specious ground that the contempt has been continuing, no party should be encouraged to wait indefinitely to choose his own time to approach the court. If the bogey of “continuing wrong/breach/offence” is mechanically accepted whenever it is advanced as a ground for claiming exemption, an applicant may knock the doors of the Court any time suiting his convenience. If an action for contempt is brought belatedly, say any time after the initial period of limitation and years after the date of first breach, it is the prestige of the court that would seem to become a casualty during the period the breach continues. Once the dignity of the court is lowered in the eyes of the public by non-compliance of its order, it would be farcical to suddenly initiate proceedings after long lapse of time. Not only would the delay militate against the legislative intent of inserting section 20 in the Act (a provision not found in the predecessor statutes of the Act) rendering the section a dead letter, the damage caused to the majesty of the court could be rendered irreparable. It is, therefore, the essence of justice that in a case of proved civil contempt, the contemnor is suitably dealt with, including imposition of punishment, and direction as well is issued to bridge the breach. … …” [Emphasis supplied]

16. Since each of the said orders dated 30.07.2021, 13.08.2021 and 08.12.2021 were passed in different context and at a different point of time, as the factual circumstances were then, they all are distinct and had a different cause of action(s) qua them, which arose separately. It was not and could not be a case of recurring cause of action therein. In any event, the petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge them in one breadth vide a common petition like the present one, merely by combining them with the subsequent orders passed by this Court. Even otherwise, each of the said orders were passed in different context altogether, which cannot be combined by the petitioner in one petition like the present. The challenge thereto by this common petition is not maintainable under the garb of combining them with the subsequent orders dated 08.08.2025 and 26.08.2025 qua which the prescribed statutory period of one year under Section 20 of the Contempt Act is available with the petitioner.

17. Even otherwise, for maintaining an action for civil contempt like the present one, the petitioner is required to satisfy the Court that there exists a “wilful disobedience” in terms of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act. The same becomes of utmost relevance in view of the fact that every violation of a judgment or order or decree or direction or writ or other process of a court or an undertaking given to a court by the respondent will not ipso facto amount to contempt. It is for the party initiating contempt proceedings to establish that the violation/ disobedience of a judgment or order or decree or direction or writ or other process of a court or an undertaking given to a court by the alleged contemnor, if any, was/ is conscious/ deliberate/ wilful, meaning thereby, there has to be something purposeful and clear intention to flout the same.

18. Although, to buttress his submissions that the respondents were guilty of committing contempt, learned senior counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to the ‘Affidavit of Compliance’ filed on 05.01.2022 by the respondents in response to the directions issued by the Court vide order dated 13.08.2021 and 08.12.2021 in CONT.CAS(C) 286/2020. In the opinion of this Court, this does not come to the aid of the petitioner, since in view of the averments made therein, there is no case of any contempt made out against the respondents. The relevant extracts of the said ‘Affidavit of Compliance’ are reproduced herein as under:

placed on record along with affidavit dated 16.12.2021.

6. Thereafter, SSB also vide its letter dated 23.12.2021 requested the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (“MoH&FW”) to accommodate the Petitioner in CHS cadre in equivalent rank in Pay Matrix Level 13A. A copy of the MHA letter dated 23.12.2021 issued to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure A-1.

7. In response to the above communications, MoH&FW vide its office memorandum No. A. 45011/14/2021-CHS-II/V (FTS No

8145195) dated 29.12.2021, informed MHA that the MoH&FW is unable to absorb the Petitioner in CHS since (a) there is no such provision regarding absorption of ex-cadre doctors in CHS and (b) Pay Level 13A is not applicable to CHS doctors. A copy of the Office Memorandum dated 29.12.2021 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure A-2. From the above, it is clear that the best endeavour on the part of the MHA to place the Petitioner, outside SSB, has not succeeded for the time being. However, the MHA will engage with other Ministries and Departments to explore if the Petitioner can be absorbed in any suitable service or slot, other than the SSB.......” [Emphasis supplied]

19. There was a “wilful disobedience” in terms of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act by anyone like the respondents, is an intrinsic, basic and fundamental requirement of any proceedings like the present one. In the present case, the aforesaid ‘Affidavit of Compliance’ filed by the respondent therein reflects that the respondents had in fact acted as per the direction(s) and/ or undertaking(s) therein. Thus, this is not a case of there being any “wilful disobedience” by the respondents. Therefore, for the purposes of proceeding with the present petition, the said well-reasoned ‘Affidavit of Compliance’ filed by the respondents is, in fact, sufficient for this Court to conclude that there was no non-compliance and/ or wilful disobedience by the respondents of the orders dated 13.08.2021 and 08.12.2021 passed by this Court. In fact, contrary thereto, it reflects that there was an obedient compliance by the respondents of the earlier orders. Be that as it may, admittedly, it is not the case of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there was any non-action and/ or noncompliance of the said orders on the part of the respondents, since the only challenge is to the manner of steps taken by the respondents.

20. The sequitur to the above is that in order to establish a case of ‘continuing wrong/ breach/ cause of action’ in a contempt petition, the petitioner is required to establish the said proposition from his pleadings. In the event, if the party fails to satisfy the court, the petition is liable to be rejected at the outset. Moreover, the Court has to be vigilant and ought not entertain stale claims camouflaged under the ‘continuing wrong/ breach/ cause of action’.

21. Regarding the subsequent orders dated 08.08.2025 and 26.08.2025 of which the petitioner has alleged contempt by the respondents in this very same petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to conjointly file a common petition challenging them along with the earlier orders, which are indeed barred by limitation. Even otherwise, as evident from the said orders dated 08.08.2025 and 26.08.2025, they were passed in a different context altogether, which have no correlation with any of the earlier orders sought to be contended by the petitioner. For the sake of clarity, as per paragraphs 5, 6 and 8 of the order dated 08.08.2025, the direction of this Court was to not give effect to the orders dated 05.08.2025 and 06.08.2025 as also any subsequent order relieving the petitioner that may be passed. Similarly, as per order dated 26.08.2025, only the interim order granted on 08.08.2025 was extended till the next date of hearing. In any event, the petitioner has been unable to show any act of contempt by the respondents against any of the said orders.

22. Although it is the case of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that since the present is a recurring cause of action, wherein the respondents have been guilty of non-compliance and wilful disobedience of the order dated 15.10.2018, passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.940/2016, however, in view of the aforesaid findings qua maintainability of a contempt petition like the present one, the present petition qua the said orders dated 05.08.2025 and 06.08.2025 is also, per se, not maintainable.

23. Furthermore, it is also relevant to mention that there are no pleadings showing/ reflecting that there was/ is any “wilful disobedience” in terms of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act by the respondents in the present petition. Also, based on the lengthy arguments addressed by learned senior counsel for the petitioner there was/ is nothing in the nature of there being any ‘continuing wrong/ breach/ cause of action’.

24. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid facts, circumstances and settled position of law, since no case of contempt is made out by the petitioner, and that too against multiple orders, which include stale claims, this Court has no reason for issuing notice thereon.

25. As such, the present petition along with the pending applications being devoid of merits is dismissed in limine.

SAURABH BANERJEE, J. SEPTEMBER 17, 2025