Ravindra Kumar & Ors. v. The State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) & Anr

1. This petition seeks quashing of FIR No. 268/2016 registered under sections 498-A/406/34 IPG, P.S. Binda Pur pertaining to matrimonial disputes and incidents related to the matrimony with petitioner no. 1, at the instance ofrespondent no. 2/complainant. Ties of matrimony between the complainant and petitioner no. 1 have since brought to an end by way ofa Divorce Decree dated 30.07.2018. It is stated that the parties have settled the Us and their differences amicably by way of a Settlement Deed dated 12.02.2018 under which the complainant was to be paid a total sum ofRs.[4] lacs and of which only Rs. 1 lac remains to be paid to her. It has been so paid to her in Court today by way of a Demand Draft bearing no. 510809 dated 12.10.2018 drawn on ICICI Bank. The complainant has already received her stridhan and personal articles from the petitioners. She is present in Court and has been identified by the Investigating Officer. She does not have a counsel. Accordingly, Mr. Kushal Raj Tater, Advocate, 2018:DHC:8874 n/ present in the Court,is appointed as her counsel for the day.He states,upon instructions, states that the complainant does not wish to pursue her complaint any further.

2. In the aforesaid circumstances and keeping in mind the decision ofthe Supreme Court in Gian Singh Vs. State ofPunjab and Another(2012)10 see 303, holding that even a non-compoundable offence can also be quashed on the ground of a settlement agreement between the offender and the victim,ifthe circumstances so warrant;by observing as under: "58 However, certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civilflavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective ofthefact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may within theframework of its inherentpower, quash the criminalproceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the face ofsuch settlement, there is hardly any likelihood ofthe offender being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justiceshall be casualty andends ofjusticeshall be defeated."

3. The amicable resolution of cases like the present one is an abiding objective. The dictum ofGian Singh(supra)has been affinned bythe Apex Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State ofPunjab <&. Am.20146SCC 466 while observing: ''29. In view ofthe aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down thefollowingprinciples by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 ofthe Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminalproceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 ofthe Code is to he distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundahle, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercisedsparingly and with caution.

29.2. When theparties have reached the settlementand on that basis petitionfor quashing the criminal proceedings isfiled, theguidingfactor in such cases would be to secure: (i)ends ofjustice, or (ii)topreventabuse oftheprocess ofany court. While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either ofthe aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such apower is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are notprivate in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in thatcapacity are notto be quashed merely on the basis ofcompromise between the victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out ofcommercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.

29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility ofconviction is remote and bleak and continuation ofcriminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPG would fall in the category ofheinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307IPG in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision.It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307IPG is therefor the sake ofit or theprosecution has collectedsufficient evidence, which ifproved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPG. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature ofinjury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guidingfactor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In theformer case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would be permissiblefor the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by thefact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve theirfuture relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 ofthe Code or not, timings ofsettlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission ofoffence and the 0> matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because ofthe reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage ofargument, normally the High Court should refrain-from exercising its power under Section 482 ofthe Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the casefinally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal ofthe offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question ofsparing a convictfoundguilty ofsuch a crime."

4. In a similar vein regarding matrimonial disputes the Supreme Courtin Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi & Anr. (2013) 4 SCC58]\q\&. "15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly, when the same are on considerable increase. Even if the offences are non-compoundable, ifthey relate to matrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that theparties have settled the same amicably and without anypressure, we hold thatfor the purpose ofsecuring ends ofjustice. Section 320 of the Code would not be a bar to the exercise ofpower ofquashing ofFIR,complaintor thesubsequentcriminalproceedings.

16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. They institution of marriage occupies an important place and it has an important role to play in the society. Therefore, every effort should be made in the interest ofthe individuals in order to enable them to settle down in life and live peacefully. Ifthe parties ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead offighting it out in a court of law, in order to do completejustice in the matrimonial matters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercising their extraordinaryjurisdiction. It is trite to state that the power under Section 482should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection only when the ^ Court is convinced, on the basis ofmaterial on record, that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process ofcourt or that the ends ofjustice require that the proceedings oughtto be quashed...."

5. Since the complainant herself does not wish to pursue her complaint against the petitioners, the substratum ofthe complaint/FIR dissipates and any further proceeding apropos the same FIR would be an exercise in futility. Since the parties have settled their matrimonial Us amicably,nothing survives in the matter.It would therefore be in the interest ofjustice to quash the FIR in question. Therefore,FIR No.268/2016 registered under sections T 498-A/406/34 IPG, P.S. Binda Pur and all the proceedings emanating therefrom are hereby quashed.

6. The petition stands disposed offin the above terms. [I WAZIRI,J OCTOBER 12,2018/acm $-69 * IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI + W.P.(CRL)3154/2018 RAVINDRA KUMAR & ORS. Petitioner Through None versus THE STATE (GOVT OF NOT OF DELHI)& ANR Respondents Through Mr. Rajesh Mahajan, APP for the State CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE NAJMIWAZIRI ORDER % 31.10.2018 The case has been listed on Office Note that in the order dated 12.10.2018 the FIR number is erroneously typed as FIR No.268/2016 instead ofFIR No.268/2017. The Court would note that the prayer clause of the petition sought quashing ofFIR number 268/2016. However,upon pemsal of the FIR itself, it is revealed that the FIR which ought to have been quashed is FIR No. 268/2017. Accordingly the aforesaid typographical error is rectified and the quashed FIR shall be read as FIR bearing no. 268/2017 registered with Police Station Binda Pur, Delhi. NAyMl WAZIRI,J OCTOBER 31,2018 b