Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of
JUDGMENT
RAJIV KUMAR RAI ..... Appellant
Through Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Mr. Deepak Sinha and Mr. Ashutosh Dixit, Advocates
ANR. ..... Respondents
Through Mr. Gagan Mathur and Mr. Varun Kumar, Advocates
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL G.S. SISTANI, J. (ORAL)
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of. CM APPLs 40600/2018 (delay in filing) and 40602/2018 (delay in refiling) & LPA. 557/2018
3. The present appeal filed by the appellant is directed against the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 10.10.2013, by which the writ petition has been allowed in part and a compensation awarded to the tune of Rs.20,000/- has been increased to Rs.40,000/-. Along with the appeal, an application (CM.APPL 40600/2018) has been filed seeking condonation of 1572 days delay and another application (CM.APPL 40602/2018) has been filed seeking condonation of 180 days in re-filing the present appeal. 2018:DHC:6429-DB
4. The present appeal is opposed by the counsel for the respondents on the ground that the appeal is blatantly barred by limitation. The learned counsel for the appellant has, however, justified the delay on the ground that the appellant was suffering from financial hardship and he could not approach the Court to challenge the order of the learned Single Judge. It has also been averred in the application that the present counsel was approached in the first week of January, 2017, who agreed to prefer the present appeal with negligible fees.
5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. The application seeking condonation of delay reads as under:
6. The grounds raised in this application seeking condonation of delay is financial hardship and, in fact, this is the only ground taken by the appellant. Reading of the application would show that even after the appellant had approached the present counsel in the first week of January, 2017, the appeal was only filed in the month of February, 2018 and there is also delay in re-filing the present appeal.
7. The Supreme Court of India has repeatedly held that the expression “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be given a liberal interpretation to advance substantial justice. It has also been repeatedly held that length of delay is not to be considered provided the explanation is genuine and the delay was caused for sufficient reasons.
8. In the case of Brijesh Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., reported at AIR 2014 SC 1612, the Apex Court has held as under:
v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7 SCC 510; Rajendar Singh and Ors. v. Santa Singh and Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448).
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC 1856, this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.
10. Applying the settled law to the facts of the present case, we find that the appellant has failed to either plead or establish sufficient cause for the condonation of delay. The only ground raised by the appellant for condonation of delay is that due to financial hardship, he could not approach the Court within the stipulated time to challenge the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court. There is no explanation rendered in the application as to how at this stage the position of the appellant is any different than earlier. This, in our view, is not a reason good enough to condone the delay. The present application does not disclose justifiable and sufficient grounds for condoning the delay of 1572 days in filing the present appeal. Accordingly, we find no grounds to entertain the applications.
11. The applications are dismissed.
12. Since the application seeking condonation of delay has been dismissed, consequently the appeal is also dismissed. G.S.SISTANI, J. SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL, J OCTOBER 03, 2018 pst