Rohtas Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi

13. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

14. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, the Inquiry Report, penalty order, as well as the appellate order, stand vitiated as the Inquiry Officer as well as the appellate authority has placed undue reliance on the statements made in the Preliminary Enquiry as well as the Preliminary Enquiry report, which is inadmissible under Rule 15 (3) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1980 (‘the Rules’). Rule 15(3) of the Rules states that: SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER

documents from the file of the preliminary enquiry, if he considers it necessary after supplying copies to the accused officer. All statements recorded during the preliminary enquiry shall be signed by the person making them and attested by enquiry officer.”

15. The learned counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on the Judgment of Nirmala Jhala v. State of Gujarat and Anr., (2013) 4 SCC 301, in which the Supreme Court has held as under:

adherence to the principle is required, whenever civil consequences follow up, as a result of the order passed. Natural justice is a universal justice. In certain factual circumstances even non-observance of the rule will itself result in prejudice. Thus, this principle is of supreme importance. (Vide S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379: AIR 1981 SC 136], D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [(1993) 3 SCC 259: 1993 SCC (L&S) 723] and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. State of U.P. [(2010) 10 SCC 539: (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 180] )”

16. He submits that the reliance placed upon the preliminary enquiry report and statements recorded therein, vitiated the departmental proceedings and the orders passed on the basis thereof.

17. The learned counsel further contended that the learned Tribunal has completely changed the complexion of the matter by ignoring its earlier Order dated 05.07.2005 and Rules 15(3) of the Rules, by observing that the enquiry conducted by Shri. Uday Sahay was only an ‘initial enquiry’ and cannot be treated as a preliminary inquiry. He submitted that there is no term like ‘initial enquiry’ in service jurisprudence and that if it is assumed that the said enquiry was only an ‘initial enquiry’ then the entire proceedings stand vitiated.

18. He further submitted that Shri. Uday Sahay was not called as a witness in the departmental proceedings and that once a witness turns hostile, his earlier testimony could not have been used in the departmental proceedings.

19. On merits, the learned counsel contended that none of the prosecution witnesses had attributed any role to the petitioner, either in his capacity as Additional SHO or during the brief period when he officiated as SHO. It was urged that no evidence has come on record to establish that any complaint regarding the sale of illicit liquor was ever addressed to the petitioner. In fact, having regard to the circular dated 14.11.1994, which specifically delineated the division of duties between the SHO and the Additional SHO, the petitioner could not have been held responsible for law and order, including for controlling the sale of illicit liquor. According to the learned counsel, this fundamental aspect was completely overlooked by the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority and by the learned Tribunal.

20. He submitted that other individuals who were serving as SHO of the concerned police station, have not been dealt with departmentally and in fact, Shri H.S. Bhardwaj who was the regular SHO, was merely issued a censure notice which was also subsequently withdrawn.

21. He has also highlighted that the tragic incident of the seven deaths after consumption of illicit liquor occurred after the petitioner had been transferred out of the concerned police station.

22. He submitted that therefore the entire departmental proceedings stood vitiated on both, procedure as well as on merits, and the Impugned Order is liable to be set aside.

23. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the Circular dated 14.11.1994, which enunciated the Duties of Additional SHOs in Police Stations/Distts, emphasizing that the petitioner could not escape responsibility for law and order lapses during his tenure. We reproduce the relevant excerpts here below:- SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS

told to the police personnel. This register would help in keeping a record of past instructions and for their repetition of the instructions in case it is needed.

7. The Addl. SHO shall hold Sampark Sabha alternatively with the SHO.

8. Either the Addl.SHO or the SHO should be present in the police station at night time and perform night patrolling in the jurisdiction of the police station.

9. The Addl.SHO should be present in the police station most of the time during the daytime and meet every visitor complainant. He should keep the SHO informed of any important matter that he comes across during such meetings.

10. The Addl. SHO can supervise investigation and prosecution of certain types of nonheinous offences like accidents and Misc. IPC cases.”

24. He highlighted that the respondent being the Additional SHO of the Saraswati Vihar Police station from 02.11.1994 to 21.03.1997 and in the interim, even being the SHO from 18.12.1996 to 16.02.1997, had evidently failed to discharge his duties properly.

25. The learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the Judgment of The State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. Bhupendra Singh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1908, in which it was held:

26. He submitted that the preliminary enquiry is in fact a fact finding enquiry and that the participation and cross examination of the witnesses by the delinquent employee during the same is not warranted. He further submitted that the Inquiry Officer as well as the Appellate Authority had formed an independent opinion on the basis of the evidence available, and did not merely rely upon the report of the Preliminary Enquiry. He highlighted that four additional witnesses were also called upon during the departmental enquiry.

27. He stated that therefore, the orders passed in the departmental proceedings as well as the Impugned Order of the learned Tribunal do not suffer from any infirmity.

28. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

29. We may begin by noting the settled position of law that the scope of interference by this Court in matters pertaining to disciplinary proceedings is limited. This Court does not sit in appeal over the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority, and cannot undertake a re-appreciation or re-evaluation of evidence. However, undisputedly, where the proceedings are vitiated by a breach of the principles of natural justice, or there is a manifest violation of the prescribed procedure, or where the delinquent has been denied a fair opportunity to defend himself, the Court would be justified in exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, we may refer to the decision in Union of India and Ors v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, the relevant extract of which reads as under:

from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

(i) reappreciate the evidence;

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

30. So far as the contention of the petitioner is concerned, that none of the prosecution witnesses have substantiated the charge against the petitioner, it may be mentioned that some of the independent witness, who are residents of the area, indicated that complaints regarding the sale of illicit liquor were brought to the notice of the police prior to the tragic incident, that is, during the tenure of the petitioner as Additional SHO. No doubt as per Delhi Police Circular dated 14.11.1994, it is the SHO who is responsible for all law and order arrangements in the police station, and the Additional SHO should be called only for dealing with a grave emergency with the specific approval of the District DCP, however, in the present case, it is not disputed that the regular SHO was on leave. During this period, several complaints regarding open sale of illicit liquor were received. The record further shows that a pattern of illicit sale of liquor was taking place in Shakurpur and that even a show cause notice had been issued to the petitioner in the past regarding this problem. The petitioner being an Additional SHO, cannot absolve of his duty by merely stating that it was the regular SHO who was responsible for the entire law and order situation in the area. Already a number of complaints, representations, information and the allegations kept on pouring about the open sale of illicit liquor in the area, and he being the Additional SHO, failed in his duty to correct the situation.

31. It may be mentioned that the petitioner initially filed an O.A. before the learned Tribunal against the Inquiry Report, the order of his punishment as well as the Appellate Authority’s order dated 10.07.2003, and his O.A. was disposed of without delving into the other issues and by simply directing the Appellate Authority to pass a reasoned order. Subsequently, and in view of the order dated 08.09.2005 of the learned Tribunal, the Appellate Authority passed a fresh order. Therein, the Appellate Authority has not only examined the appeal but also the Departmental Inquiry file as well as all documents available on the file. It has independently evaluated the material and concurred with the finding of guilt.

32. The learned Tribunal in its Impugned Order, has observed that the petitioner was functioning as SHO PS Saraswati Vihar at least for two months prior to the incident and it was only in that period that maximum complaints regarding the sale of illicit liquor was received, but despite having the knowledge of the same, the petitioner did not take any effective steps to take down the sale of illicit liquor. It has been opined that although certain witnesses turned hostile at the time of their deposition in the departmental enquiry, while others diluted their statements, they have still confirmed that there was indeed an open sale of illicit liquor in the area prior to the festival of Holi in

1997. The testimonies of the witnesses have correctly not been viewed in isolation. It is common knowledge that the petitioner, being the Additional SHO of the area, the common person/public living in the area will definitely have a fear to depose against him, but still, some of the public witnesses have mentioned that they brought to the notice of the police the sale of illicit liquor prior to the happening of the tragic incident. The learned Tribunal rightly observed that public witnesses corroborated the allegation that illicit liquor was being openly sold, and despite knowledge thereof, the petitioner failed to act.

33. We are therefore, not able to find any infirmity in the above findings of the learned Tribunal.

34. As regards the reliance on Preliminary Enquiry material is concerned, while we are unable to agree with the learned Tribunal’s finding that the inquiry conducted by Sh. Uday Sahay had the status of only an ‘Initial Enquiry’ and not a preliminary enquiry, we agree with observation that nonetheless the findings, statement and other documents in the said inquiry were brought on record in the departmental enquiry, by duly supplying all the copies to delinquent officials during the proceeding. We find that Shri. Uday Sahay was in fact called as a witness in the departmental enquiry and that the petitioner had the chance to cross-examine him. We also find that as per the noting of the enquiry proceedings, the inquiry conducted by Shri. Uday Sahay features in the list of documents to be relied upon and the enquiry report mentions that the same was duly supplied to the petitioner. Hence, the technical objections raised by the petitioner of the violation of Rule 15(3) of the Rules, does not hold good. The Judgement of the Supreme Court in Nirmala J. Jhala (supra), therefore, does not come to the aid to the petitioner in the facts of the present case.

35. We find that not only the preliminary inquiry was conducted, but after the preliminary inquiry, the charges were framed. The petitioner was also given full opportunity to cross examine witnesses, lead his defence evidence, and he also produced nine defence witnesses. Whereafter, considering the evidence on record and the statement of the departmental witnesses and the defence witnesses, the Inquiry Officer came to conclusion that the charges stands proved against the delinquent officer, that is, the petitioner. The same was affirmed by the Appellate Authority vide a speaking order dated 12.09.2005 and later by the learned Tribunal vide its Impugned Order.

36. In view of the above facts and circumstances, the Impugned Order of the learned Tribunal is upheld and the petition is accordingly, dismissed.

37. No order as to costs.

MADHU JAIN, J. NAVIN CHAWLA, J. SEPTEMBER 24, 2025/scc/VG/P