M/S. MINDRAY MEDICAL INDIA PVT. LTD. v. M/S. VISION RAY HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD.

Delhi High Court · 20 Aug 2025 · 2025:DHC:7340
Purushaindra Kumar Kaurav
ARB.P. 901/2025
2025:DHC:7340
other appeal_allowed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that at the Section 11 appointment stage, judicial scrutiny is limited to prima facie existence of an arbitration agreement and appointed the sole arbitrator despite objections on impartiality.

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$-6 HIGH COURT OF DELHI
ARB.P. 901/2025
Date of Decision: 20.08.2025 IN THE MATTER OF:
M/S. MINDRAY MEDICAL INDIA PVT. LTD.
REGISTERED OFFICE AT: - UNIT NO. 1061, SOLITAIRE CORPORATE PARK, ANDHERI KURLA ROAD, CHAKALA, ANDHERI (EAST), MUMBAI, INDIA- 400093.
CORPORATE OFFICE AT: - 16TH FLOOR, BUILDING 9B, DLF CYBER CITY, PHASE-III, GURGAON, HARYANA. ..... PETITIONER
Through: Ms.Nahid Aman, Advocate.
VERSUS
M/S. VISION RAY HEALTH CARE PVT. LTD.
REGD. OFFICE AT:
B-1/33, (BASEMENT), SHRI RAM MANDIR MARG, PASCHIM VIHAR, DELHI -110063. .... RESPONDENT
Through: Mr.Tarun Gaur, Advocate.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV
JUDGEMENT
PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J. (ORAL)
JUDGMENT

1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11 of the Arbitration KUMAR KAURAV and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the 1996 Act) by the petitioner seeking appointment of an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes that have arisen between the parties under Exclusive Distribution and Supply Agreement dated 01.01.2023.

2. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

3. On notice being issued, Mr.Tarun Gaur, learned counsel appears on behalf of the respondent. He submits that the respondent has no objection to the appointment of an arbitrator to decide the dispute in the present case.

4. The facts of the case indicate that disputes have arisen between the parties concerning the unsatisfactory performance and services rendered by the respondent in its capacity as distributor under the Exclusive Distribution and Supply Agreement dated 01.01.2023. It is further noted that the petitioner issued an arbitration notice dated 25.03.2025 under Section 21 of the 1996 Act, invoking the arbitration clause (Clause 6) and seeking recovery of Rs. 47,48,000/- along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum. The petitioner also called upon the respondent to either pay the said amount or consent to the nomination of a proposed official as sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties within 15 days.

5. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that, in its reply dated 07.04.2025, the respondent acknowledged the existence of an arbitral dispute but expressed reservations regarding the impartiality and integrity of the proposed official, who holds the position of Manager – Legal and Compliance. Consequently, the respondent declined to consent to the appointment of the proposed arbitrator. Hence, the petitioner has filed the present petition under Section 11(5) of the 1996 Act.

6. The Court takes note of the Clause 6 of Exclusive Distribution & Supply Agreement dated 01.01.2023, which reads as under:- “''6. Article 15 of the Agreement is deleted in its entirety and are replaced with tl,e follows:

"15. Dispute Resolution. The Parties agree to use their best reasonable efforts to resolve all disputes, controversies and differences which may arise out of or in connection with this Agreement in an amicable manner. If the settlement fails to be reached, the disputes arising from or in connection with this contract shall be referred to Arbitration in accordance with the statutory provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Arbitration shall be referred to the Sole Arbitrator by mutual agreement or consent of the Parties. The arbitral award is final and binding upon both parties. The arbitration shall be conducted in English, and the place of arbitra tion shall be New Delhi, India."”

7. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well settled. This Court as well in the order dated 24.04.2025 in the case of ARB.P. 145/2025 titled as Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v. Air Works India Engineering Pvt Ltd has extensively dealt with the scope of interference at the stage of Section

11. The Court held as under:-

“9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning1, while considering all earlier pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 Act, 1996 & the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re 2 has held that scope of inquiry at the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing else.

10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no.114 in the case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd that observations made in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn.3, and adopted in NTPC Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd.,[4] that the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re: Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no.114 in the case of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd reads as under:-

“114. In view of the observations made by this Court in In Re: Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of enquiry at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the issue of “accord and satisfaction” under Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the subsequent decision in In Re: Interplay (supra).”

11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P) Ltd.5, however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11 must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a timeconsuming and costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other parties to the arbitration.

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12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:-

“20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1754 : 2024 INSC 532] , frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the referral court should not decide at the stage of Section 11 as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to adjudicate the same. 21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the limited jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11 must not be misused by parties in order to force other parties to the arbitration agreement to participate in a time consuming and costly arbitration process. This is possible in instances, including but not limited to, where the claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent and mala fide claims through arbitration. 22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial interference of the referral courts with the interests of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a determination of the merits of the matter before us, which the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to determine.”

13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11 proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to the extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of the referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act and further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural safeguards but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the arbitral process. Any transgression beyond this limited judicial threshold would not only contravene the legislative intent enshrined in Section 8 and Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk undermining the sanctity and efficiency of arbitration as a preferred mode of dispute resolution. The referral Court must, therefore, exercise restraint and refrain from venturing into the merits of the dispute or adjudicating issues that fall squarely within the jurisdictional domain of the arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen that the scope of enquiry at the referral stage is conservative in nature. A similar view has also been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel”6.

9. In view of the fact that disputes have arisen between the parties and there is an arbitration clause in the agreement, this Court is inclined to appoint an Arbitrator to adjudicate upon the disputes between the same.

10. Accordingly, Mr. Arnav Mittal, Advocate (Mobile No.+91 8588916612, e-mail id:- advarnavmittal@gmail.com ) is appointed as the sole Arbitrator.

11. The Sole Arbitrator may proceed with the arbitration proceedings, subject to furnishing to the parties the requisite disclosures as required under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

12. The Sole Arbitrator shall be entitled to fee in accordance with the IVth Schedule of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act or as may otherwise be agreed to between the parties and the learned Sole Arbitrator.

13. The parties shall share the arbitrator's fee and arbitral cost, equally.

14. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the claims/counter claims are kept open, to be decided by the Sole Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.

15. Needless to state, nothing in this order shall be construed as an expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy. All rights and contentions of the parties in this regard are reserved. Let the copy of the said order be sent to the appointed Arbitrator through the electronic mode as well.

16. Accordingly, the instant petition stands disposed of.

PURUSHAINDRA KUMAR KAURAV, J AUGUST 20, 2025 Nc/sph