Shakuntla & Anr v. Rajinder Singh Deswal

2. In order to examine the issues involved in the present case, it is imperative to cull out the relevant facts in brief, which are set forth hereinafter.

3. On 20.08.1973, the Testator vide a perpetual sub-lease deed acquired the property bearing No. 8, Northwest Avenue Road, Punjabi Bagh Extension, New Delhi-110026, admeasuring 300 sq. yds.[4] Pursuant to the acquisition, a house was constructed on the suit property by the Testator using his own funds. Thereafter, vide a registered Will dated 24.02.1993, the Testator bequeathed the suit property in favour of his wife, Mrs. Nanki Devi. The Testator passed away on 18.10.1993, leaving behind his widow, Mrs. Nanki Devi, and their children namely Mrs. Shakuntla[5], Mrs. Krishna Prakash[6], and Mr. Rajinder Singh Deswal[7].

4. Mrs. Nanki Devi passed away on 20.08.2014. Prior to her demise, she executed a registered Will dated 26.08.2013, whereby she bequeathed equal shares in the suit property in favour of her three children. It is, however, clarified that the Will dated 26.08.2013 is not a subject matter of the dispute in the present case. The dispute at hand is an offshoot of a suit for partition filed by the two daughters of the Testator, which has been contested by the son, Mr. Rajinder Singh Deswal.

5. In pursuance thereof, the learned Single Judge, upon observing the validity and legality of the Will as not being contested by the parties, proceeded to hear the arguments on the merits of the case and ultimately dismissed the Civil Suit.

6. Learned senior counsel representing the parties have filed their respective written submissions and have relied upon judgments with the Appellants filing an additional submission thereof. The Hereinafter referred to as „the suit property‟ Plaintiff No. 1 before the learned Single Judge Plaintiff No. 2 before the learned Single Judge Defendant before the learned Single Judge contentions along with judgments relied upon by the parties are examined hereinafter.

7. Learned senior counsel representing the Appellants contended that Clause 4 of the Will uses the expressions “absolute and exclusive”, which unequivocally reflects the intention of the Testator to confer an absolute right of ownership upon Mrs. Nanki Devi, to the exclusion of all others. It is further contended that with respect to suit property no. 8, Northwest Avenue Road, Punjabi Bagh Extension, New Delhi-110026, the remaining clauses of the Will are redundant, and as such, the Respondent cannot derive any benefit from Clause 7, in view of the overriding effect of Clause 4. Additionally, it is also contended by the learned senior counsel that the learned Single Judge has failed to examine the effect of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956[8].

8. In order to substantiate his arguments qua the intention of the Testator, the learned senior Counsel representing the Appellants has relied upon Madhuri Ghosh & Anr. v. Debobrata Dutta & Anr.9; Vikrant Kapila & Ors. v. Pankaja Panda & Ors.10; Sadaram Suryanarayana & Anr. v. Kalla Surya Kantham & Anr.11; Mauleshwar Mani & Ors. v. Jagdish Prasad & Ors.12; Judge Pal Khera v. Chand Rani Khera13; Gopal Menon v. Sivaraman Nair14; Ram Kishore Lal & Anr. v. Kamal Narayan15; (Kunwar) Hereinafter referred to as „the Act, 1956‟

2012 SCC OnLine Del 2271 AIR 1979 SC 1345 AIR 1963 SC 890 Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. (Thakurain) Balraj Kuar, Thakurain & Ors.16; Sathish Kumar Chojar v. Subhashani Chopra & Ors.17; Mathai Samuel & Ors. v. Eapeneapen (dead) by LRs18; Mysore Minerals ltd. MG Road, Bangalore v. Comm. Of Income Tax, Karnataka, Bangalore19; Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal & Ors.20; Bandura Ramamurty v. Koppula Vajram & Ors.21; and Mohan Singh v. Gur Devi22.

9. Per Contra, learned senior counsel representing the Respondent has submitted that for the purpose of interpretation of the Will, the same is required to be read in entirety and efforts should be made to harmoniously construe all its clauses. An attempt has to be made to give meaning to each and every clause in the Will, and in any case, as per Section 88 of Indian Succession Act, 192523, if two Clauses of the Will are irreconcilable so much so that they cannot stand together, the last shall prevail. He further submitted that the Plaintiffs have never claimed that Mrs. Nanki Devi had any pre-existing right or claim including right of maintenance in the suit property. It is submitted that she was having her own business of shorthand and typing coaching college under the name of Dayanand Commercial College. She became the owner of the shop at Ram Bagh Road in June, 1990 and even purchased a residential plot measuring 400 sq. yds. in Delhi in the year 1972. Even after the demise of her husband on 18.10.1993, AIR 1935 Privy Council 187

1905 SCR 766 1960 SCC OnLine Ori 63 AIR 1931 LAHORE 767 Hereinafter referred to as „the Act, 1925‟ she continued to receive pension, along with the benefit of investments and savings left behind by her husband.

10. Learned senior counsel representing the Respondent has further placed reliance on Raghbir Singh v. Budh Singh24; S. Rajagopal Chettiar v. Hamasaveni Ammal25; and Navneet Lal v. Gokul26.

11. This Court has heard learned senior counsel representing the parties at length and, with their able assistance, has perused the paper book as well as the trial court record.

12. This Court has duly considered the submissions advanced by the learned senior counsel for the parties and the judgments relied upon thereby. Upon a harmonious reading of the Will in its entirety, it becomes evident that the intention of the Testator was to confer a life/limited interest upon his wife and not an absolute or exclusive right in the suit property. Undoubtedly, Clause 4 of the Will uses the expressions „absolute and exclusive‟, however upon careful perusal of Clauses 7, 8 and 9 of the Will, it becomes amply clear that the Testator bequeathed limited life estate in favour of his wife Mrs. Nanki Devi.

13. Moreover, while deliberating upon the intention of the Testator, this Court also deems it appropriate to refer to the Introductory Clause in conjunction with Clause 11 of the Will. A plain and literal reading of the Introductory Clause ascertains that the Will was authored personally by the Testator. This assertion further finds corroboration in Clause 11 of the Will, wherein the Testator has expressly stated that AIR 1978 Delhi 86 AIR 1992 SC 704 AIR 1976 SC 974 the Will was typed by him. In view of the aforestated, this Court finds it appropriate to observe that, since the Will was typed by the Testator himself, the usage of words/expressions therein were in pursuance of the standpoint of a layman and his own understanding of the vocabulary used in a general parlance. By virtue of the same, the intention of the Will cannot be circumscribed by usage of expressions “absolute and exclusive” under Clause 4 of the Will. It is apposite to note that when a testamentary instrument is authored by a layman, the linguistic acumen and the terminology used therein must not be read stricto sensu, by putting the usage of expressions to examination through the lens of an expert. On the contrary, the language used must be construed in light of the Testator‟s intention coupled with an understanding of the expressions, which remains unembellished by technical legal interpretation.

14. In view of the aforestated observations, the argument advanced by the learned senior counsel representing the Appellants lacks substance and is devoid of merit. In this regard, the attention is drawn towards Section 82 of the Act, 1925, which is reproduced hereinbelow- “82. Meaning of clause to be collected from entire Will-The meaning of any clause in a Will is to be collected from the entire instrument, and all its parts are to be construed with reference to each other.” A plain reading of the above provision makes it manifestly clear that the meaning of any clause in a Will is required to be understood in the context of the entire instrument and not in isolation.

15. Moreover, reference may also be made to the Sections 87 and 88 of the Act, 1925, reproduced herein below-

Section 87 of the Act, 1925 underscores that the intention of the Testator has to be given effect to, as far as possible. Whereas Section 88 provides that if two clauses of a Gift or a Will are so irreconcilable that they cannot possibly stand together, the latter shall prevail.

16. As far as the submission made by the learned senior counsel representing the Appellants that the learned Single Judge failed to adequately consider the plea under Section 14(1) of the Act, 1956, this Court relies on the learned Single Judge‟s order dated 28.07.2015. The relevant paragraph from the Order is reproduced herein below- “4.With the consent of the counsels for the parties, only one issue is framed from the present- (1) what is the effect of clauses 4 and 7 contained in the registered will dated 24.02.1993, executed by late Sh. Mamchand Deswal father of the parties? (Onus upon parties)

5. Counsels for the parties state that in view of the fact that the legality and validity of the will dated 24.02.1993 executed by Shri Mamchand Deswal is undisputed, they be permitted to address arguments on the aforesaid issue in the first instance. The aspect of the legality and validity of the document dated 26.08.2013, stated to be a will executed by the mother of the parties in respect of the suit premises, shall be examined later on.” A perusal of the above-stated paragraphs show that no claim or issue was raised by the Appellants before the learned Single Judge against its claim raised under Section 14 of the Act, 1956 before this Court. Paragraph 5 of the Order, at the outset, reflects that the parties sought permission only to address the dispute arising out of the Will dated 24.02.1993 and accordingly, the issue was framed upon their request. Consequently, the contention of the learned senior counsel representing the Appellants that the learned Single Judge did not consider the plea under Section 14 of the Act, 1956, does not hold any merit, particularly in view of the background that the order dated 28.07.2015 was passed with the consent of the Parties. Therefore, in absence of any independent claim or subsequent issues framed with respect to Section 14 of the Act, 1956, the Appellants cannot at this stage press for relief under this Section, since the same was not pressed before the learned Single Judge.

17. The judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel representing the Appellants are, upon careful examination, clearly distinguishable and thus inapposite to the adjudication of the present dispute. The Appellants‟ reliance on Ram Kishore Lal (Supra), Ram Gopal (Supra), Mathai Samuel (Supra) is misplaced, as these cases pertain to distinct testamentary instruments effectuated for bequest. Consequently, the above-stated judgments are of no assistance in the interpretation of the Will.

18. With regard to the remaining judgments cited by the learned senior counsel representing the Appellants, it is noted that the judgments enunciate the principle that, in case of conflict between two clauses of a Will, the intention of the Testator/Executor on comprehensive reading of the instrument is required to be gathered. Hence, this Court finds such a proposition to be of limited relevance in view of the statutory provisions and interpretive principles delineated in the preceding paragraphs.

19. Learned senior counsel representing the Respondent has also placed reliance on Raghbir Singh (Supra), in this case the Supreme Court while dismissing the findings provided by the Trial Court, observed that the interpretation of the Trial Court, which gave effect solely to the first part of the Will, ran contrary to the rules of construction under the provisions of Sections 82, 83, 85 and 86 of the Act. The Court highlighted that one cannot isolate the part granting an “absolute estate” to the widow. Rather the testamentary instrument that appears absolute must be construed as a life estate if the language of the Will, considered contextually, suggests such intent.

20. Alternatively, learned senior counsel representing the Respondent has placed its reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Navneet Lal (Supra), which lays down the settled principle of testamentary interpretation. It unequivocally affirms that the intention of the Testator is the guiding light in construing a Will, and as such a holistic reading of the entire document is necessitated. Isolated expressions must not be construed in a vacuum, rather the Will must be interpreted in the context of the Testator‟s personal background, familial relations, and understanding of the language/expressions used.

21. In S. Rajgopal Chettiar (Supra), the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court, upholding that the word „absolutely‟ cannot be read in isolation, de hors the entire bequest. In view of the Supreme Court having adjudicated upon a similar set of facts, the decision therein provides authoritative guidance and serves as a valuable reference point for the present dispute. Accordingly, this Court finds it suitable to consider the rationale therein while rendering its own determination.

22. In light of the aforestated statutory provisions and the observation of this Court upon the judgments relied upon by the learned senior counsel representing the parties, the arguments of learned senior counsel representing the Appellant that the bequest qua the suit property will stop at Clause 4 of the Will, is untenable and cannot be accepted in view of Section 82 of the Act, 1925. Notably, the Testator in Clauses 8 and 9 bequeathed a sum of Rs.21,000/- (Rupees Twenty-One Thousand Only) each to his two married daughters, whilst categorically recording that they were well-settled in their respective matrimonial homes. The wordings used in the Clauses 8 and 9 of the Will, further reinforces the inference that the intention of the Testator was not to grant an absolute estate to his wife rather the intention was to create a limited interest, with a subsequent bequest in favour of his son.

23. Therefore, this Court finds no merit in the present Appeal, and the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending application also stands closed. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. AUGUST 20, 2025/sv/jn/hr