Asha Chitkara v. North Delhi Municipal Corporation

Delhi High Court · 11 Dec 2018 · 2018:DHC:9356-DB
The Chief Justice; V. Kameswar Rao
LPA 535/2016
2018:DHC:9356-DB
property appeal_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court held that licenses granted by NDMC through open tender cannot be converted into leasehold rights post facto, affirming the necessity of public auction for disposal of municipal property and dismissing appellants' claims for leasehold conversion.

Full Text
Translation output
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date ofdecision: 11'^ December,2018
LPA 535/2016 & CM.No.35819/2016
ASHA CHITKARA Appellant
Through: Mr.R.K.Saini, Ms.Sonia Sharma, Mr.Rishi Khanna,Ms.Neha Chugh, Advs.
VERSUS
NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL COPRORATION & ORS. Respondents
Through: Ms.Mini Pushkama,Standing Counsel with Ms.Swagata Bhuyan,Ms.Shiva
Pandey and Ms.Neha Goel, Advs.for NDMC.
Mr.Shailen Bhatia,Ms.Tdvta Nayar Saini, Ms.Neelam Pathak and
Ms. Vidushi Chandna,Advs. AND [,PA 499/2018 & CM.Nos.35389/2018 and 35390/2018
ART]RANI Appellant
Through: Mr. Viraj R.Datar, Adv. with Mr.Rajeev Sirohi & Mr.Chetan
Lokur, Advs.
VERSUS
NORlH D M C & ORS Respondents with Ms.Swagata Bhuyan, Ms.Shiva
Pandey and Ms.Neha Goel,Advs.for NT)MC.
AND
-r LPA 612/2018 & CM.Nos.44802/2018,44803/2018,44804/2018, 44805/2018 and 48777/2018
LPA 535/2016 and connected matters Page 1 oj28
2018:DHC:9356-DB ARTI RANI Appellant
Through: Mr.Viraj R.Datar,Adv. with Mr.Rajeev Sirohi& Mr.Chetan
Lokur,Advs.
VERSUS
NDMC & ANR. Respondents with Ms.Swagata Bhuyan,Ms.Shiva
Pandey and Ms.Neha Gcel,Advs.for NDMC.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO V.KAMESWAR RAG.J.
(ORAL)
CM.No.44802/2018 in LPA 612/2018 Exemption allowed subject to alljust exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
CM. No. 44805/2018 (for condonation of 15 days delay in filing the appeal)in LPA 612/2018
CM.No.35390/2018 in LPA 499/2018 For the reasons stated in the applications, the delay is condoned. Applications stand disposed of.
LPA 535/2016 & LPA 499/2018
JUDGMENT

1. These t\vo appeals arises from the order dated March 02, 2016 whereby the learned Single Judge decided tv/o writ petitions being W.P.(C)No. 2347/2015 filed by Asha Chitkara and W.P.(C) LPA 535/2016 and counected matters Page 2of2H No. 3146/2015 filed by Arti Rani impugning the refusal of the North Delhi Municipal Corporation to grant leasehold rights to them in respect ofshop Nos.[2] and 1 respectively in MCD Market,Karol Bagh, New Delhi licensed to them and further seeking a restraint against the North Delhi Municipal Corporation from taking any coercive action for the eviction/dispossession ofthe appellants from the said shops till leasehold rights therein are granted to them and with the further relief of mandamus to the North DMC to grant leasehold rights with respectto the shops licensed to each ofthem.

2. Suffice it to state, the learned Single Judge has noted the facts from W.P.(C) No. 2347/2015, as the facts in both the writ petitions are similar. The facts as noted by the learned Single Judge are - (a) that the appellant was granted licence to the shop in pursuance to a bid made by her in response to a notice dated March 26, 1997 inviting tenders;(b)that the said licence was for a period offive years;(c)that the market in which the shop is situated was constructed in the year 1976 by the Municipal Corporation ofDelhi (MCD)being the predecessor in interest ofthe respondent NrDMC;' (d)that the market initially comprised of65 shops all ofwhich were given on licence basis;(e) however the MCD vide Resolution NO. 982 dated March 05, 1979 decided to grant99 years leasehold rights LPA 535/2016andconnected matters Page3of^8 to the licensees ofshops in the said market and accordingly licences of approximately 45 shops in the market were converted into leasehold;(f)that inspite ofthe said resolution of 1979,the MCD in the year 1997 allotted shop to the appellant on licence basis;(g)that the licence ofthe appellant was renewed for a further period offive years;(h)that the appellant vide application dated March 01,2007 applied for conversion ofthe licence into leasehold;(i) MCD vide letter dated April 02, 2007 called upon the appellant to make payment ofconversion charges of?30,28,410/- and which was paid by the appellant on August 29. 2007; (j). MCD however did not grant leasehold rights compelling the appellant to upon coming to an end in October, 2007 of the second term of five years of the licence, applied for renewal ofthe licence;(k)however the licence was not renewed and on the contraiy MCD vide letter dated August 13, 2009 cancelled its earlier letter dated April 02, 2007; (1) however the amount of ^30,28.541/- received from the appellant was not refunded and it was merely stated that the same would be adjusted against the outstanding dues of licence fee/overstay;(m) that the MCD vide letter dated February 03,2009 called upon the appellantto vacate the pi'emises;(n)thatthe respondentNorth DMC LPA 535/2016andconnected mutters Page4of28 is discriminating against the appellant in not converting the licence of the appellant into leasehold though the same had been allowed for other shops in the market.

3. Insofar as the counter affidavit filed by North DMC is concerned,the learned Single Judge has taken out the defence as set out in W.P.(C)No. 3146/2015. The facts as pleaded by the North DMC are,(i)that the subject municipal market at Saraswati Marg, Karol Bagh containing various Shops, Halls, Tharas, Kothries and Office Spaces was inhabited on licence basis through auction process after fixing reserve price, in terms of MCD Resolution No.181 dated October 30, 1977; (ii) that various licence holders were not regular in payment oflicence fees,due to which huge dues accumulated as arrears;(hi)representations were also received from the Association of Allottees for allotment of shops to them on 99 years lease; (iv) MCD Resolution No.982 dated March 05, 1979 was passed agreeing to grant 99 years leasehold rights to existing licencees of the market on fulfilment of certain conditions;(v)the said Resolution applied only to "existing licencees" as is evident Irom Commissioner's letter No.l28/C&C dated January 05, 1979; (vi)the genesis ofthe said Resolution was to earn more per month LPA 535/2016 amicumiectecl matters P'-W ^ by converting licences into leaseholds on the conditions stipulated;

(vii) on further demand of licencees of the said market, the conditions were varied vide MCD Resolution No.1137 dated February 18, 1980;(viii)that vide MCD Resolution No.1317 dated March 23, 1987 it was resolved that extension oflicences of[5] years at a time, upto total of 10 years should be allowed in respect of canteens, tourist sites, open air restaurants, office units, shops and halls licenced by the MCD;(ix).that since the Resolution No.l317 dated March 23, 1987 provided for allotment only on licence basis, subsequently a decision was taken vide MCD Resolutions No.494 dated November 29, 2005 and 495 dated November 29, 2005 to allow conversion from licence to leasehold on certain conditions; (x)that though the said Resolutions dated November 29,2005 were with the concurrence ofthe Commissioner MCD,there were certain amendments by the Standing Committee and fresh proposals were mooted by the Commissioner but which were not finally approved and accepted-no Rules and Regulations in pursuance thereto were formulated; (xi) no consensus having been reached between the Commissioner and the Standing Committee ofthe MCD,which is the sine qua non for disposal ofimmovable property ofMCD under Section 200-203 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 LPA 535/2016andconnected matters Page6of28 (MCD Act), the policy adopted in the Resolution dated November 29, 2005 was never communicated to the public and never put in public domain and no applications invited thereunder for conversion oflicences into leasehold and no conversion carried out thereunder; (xii)that the subsequent MCD Resolution No.894 dated March 05, 2007 related only to leasehold properties and has no applicability to the subject shops;(xiii) that vide another MCD Resolution No.189 dated July 19,2010 it was decided to allow extension of licence by another 5 year on the terms and conditions contained thereunder and it was specifically stated therein that the policy of 2005 (i.e. vide Resolutions dated November 29,2005)is not applicable in cases of auction and that auction will only be for licence basis and there will be no auction for conversion from licence to lease;(xiv) that in terms of decisions taken in Resolution No.189 dated July 19,2010 and Resolution No.5 dated May 27,2011,a Circular dated July 22, 2013 was published and in which nonapplicability of Resolutions No.494 and 495 dated November 29, 2005 and Resolution No.894 dated March 05, 2007 to properties such as those ofthe appellants was retained;(xv)that the subjectshop was auctioned for 5 years on licence basis; extension of licence was granted for 5 years; no further extension was done after December 11,2007;eviction notice LPA 535/2016.arid ccnuected matters 7of28 dated February 26,2009 was issued also stating that there were dues of ^79,85,994/- for the period from September,2005 till February, 2009 and proceedings under PP Act commenced in the year 2011; (xvi)that though as per existing policy contained in Circular dated July 22,2013,the present occupants ofshops, halls, offices, spaces etc. can continue as licencees subject to clearing dues upto date and enhancement of licence fees as provided therein and the appellant was also given option thereunder and the appellant initially purported to avail but subsequently did not comply with terms and conditions thereof and the case of the appellant was closed;(xvii) that this petition has been filed concealing/misrepresenting facts; and, (xviii) the appellant has no vested right of conversion to leasehold.

4. The arguments ofthe counsel for the appellants before the learned Single Judge were (i) that there are in all 65 shops in the market and of which 50 were already converted into leasehold till the year 2002;(ii) that the respondent NrDMC cannot discriminate between different shops in the same market and cannot at its ipse dixit give leasehold rights with respect to some, creating permanency, and deprive others thereof by keeping them as LPA 535/2016 andconnected matters P^8^^of28 licencees i.e. on temporary basis;(iii)that as is evident from the file noting dated February 14,2005 ofthe MCD,the conversion offive licenced shops including two of the petitioners was for consideration-with respect to the other three,no proceedings under PP Act also had been initiated till date, while the petitioners are being sought to be evicted; (iv) that the petitioner in WP(C) No.2347/2015 having been made to deposit over ?30 lacs towards conversion charges and which money is still lying with the MCD, cannot be denied such conversion; (v) that the petitioners under Resolution No.494 dated November 29, 2005 of the MCD are entitled to conversion; (vi) that the petitioners under MCD Resolution No.856 referred to in the noting dated February 14,2005 are entitled to conversion; (vii) that it was the- contention of the counsel for the MCD and as recorded in Ashima SecuritiesPvt.Ltd Vs. MCD 2010(115)DIU161 that MCD has adopted in totality the L&DO policy pertaining to conversion from licence to leasehold and from leasehold to freehold basis, and that Resolution No.494 contemplated creation ofMCD Price Fixation Committee and as per resolution No.894,the detailed policy ofthe L & DO is to apply in toto including the rates prescribed therein;(viii) that as late as of LPA 535/2016 and connected matters Page 9of28 February 20, 2015, MCD has been publishing advertisements offering shops in the same market on leasehold basis and there is no reason to deny conversion to the appellants.

5. It was also argued on behalf ofthe North DMC(i)that the matter is purely contractual and writ petitions are not maintainable;

(ii) that the claim in the petitions is barred by time; (iii) that the

MCD Resolution No.982 dated March 05, 1979 was only for the then "existing licencees" and the appellants are not covered thereby as they were not"existing licencees";(iv)thereafter vide Resolution No.1317 dated March 23, 1987 it was decided to make allotments on license basis only;(v)the said Resolution No.1317 dated March 23, 1987 was in force at the tim.e of allotment of the shops in the year 1997 to the appellants; (vi) that the Resolution 494 dated November 29, 2005- v/as merely a proposal and which never fructified; (vii) that the manner of disposal of the property of the MCD is provided in Section 59 r/w Section 200 ofthe MCD Act;

(viii) that though Resolutions no.494 and 495 dated November 29,

2005 entitling.the Commissioner MCD to convert licences intvO leases were passed but the same were not operationalised by the Commissioner;(ix) that the appellant in WP(C)No.2347/2015 in collusion with some officials of MCD.got the letter dated April 02, LPA 535/2016andconuect'^d matters.. _. Page 10of28 2007 issued in her favour but which was withdrawn subsequently;

(x) that the prevalent policy Vvith respect to MCD properties is contained in the circular dated July 22, 2013 and under which the appellants are not entitled to the conversion to the leasehold as claimed; (xi) L&DO has a scheme for conversion of licences to leases and conversion of leasehold rights into freehold; (xii) however that policy with respect to the L&DO properties which has been adopted by the MCD vis-a-vis L&DO properties under its management cannot be made applicable to the MCD's own properties;(xiii)that more than crores are due from each ofthe appellants; thus, the question of refunding the amount about ?30 lacs to the petitioner in WP(C)No.3146/2015 does not arise;(xivj that the reference by the counsels for the appellants to the cuiTent mode ofdisposition of property by MCD is misconceived;(xv)the properties are now being disposed of only through open tender on leasehold basis; (xvi) reliance is placed on -(a) Judgment dated October 29, 2014 of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No.9951/2014 titled HUDA Vs. Kedar Nath,(b) Judgment dated March 08, 2013 of the Division Bench of this Court in LPA 742/2012 titledSuresh Cltand Gupta Vs. MCD,(c)Union ofIndia LPA 535/20J6cr.d connected n:atters Page 11 oj^8 Vs. Charak Pharmaccuiicals(India) Ltd.(2003)11 SCC 689\(d) Bharti Cellular Ltd. Vs. Uol(2010) 10 SCC 174\ and (e) M.P. Mathur Vs. D.T.C.(2006)13SCC 706.

6. During the course ofthe submissions it was represented by the North DMC that action has been taken against the Officers who in collusion with the,appellant issued the letter dated April02,2007.

7. The learned Single Judge has rejected the writ petitions on a finding that the appellants are not entitled to the relief in terms of his findings in para 14 ofthe impugned order. In gist,the findings are:-

"A. The petitioners came into possession ofthe shops on allotment thereofinfavour ofpetitioners on licence basis in an open tenderprocess, Thepetitioners atthattime did not contend that since MCD had converted the shops granted on licence basis at the time ofestablishment of the market into leasehold, the tenders invited by the MCD for allotment ofremainingshops in the marketon licence basis were faulty or that the MCD was discriminating between the shops in the same market by allotting the same on different terms.
B. The petitioners were then happy to enter the market and have a shop therein as a licenseefor aperiod offive years only. LPA 535/2016andconnected matters PageIj,of28 C There may have been a large number ofotherpersons who may not have responded to the notice inviting tender, being not desirous ofacquiring shop on licence basisfor a period offive years only and with no permanency therein. Thus the petitioners, in bidding for the said shops, competed only with those who were willing to take the shops on licence basis and being the highest bidder, were allotted the shops. In my view, the petitioners having come into possession ofthe shops through open bidding tender process and as per the terms whereofthe rights being created in the shops were ofa licenceefor a period offive years only, may be with a renewalforfive years, cannot demand conversion of the licence into leasehold and the MCD cannot convert the said licence into leasehold. D.It cannot beforgotten that the subjectshops arepublic property, the disposal whereofhas to be in public interest and for public purpose and yielding the maximum possible price therefrom. It is well nigh possible that if the MCD in the Notice Inviting Tenderfor the subject shops had provided that the shops once taken on licence would entitle the licencees to have the same converted to leasehold, the shops may have fetched a much higher price than thatpaid by the petitioners. To allow a person who enters into possession as a licencee to have his licence converted into a lease would amount to allowing LPA 535/2016 and connected matters Puge 13of28 a backdoor entry into thepremises, to the detrimentofthe public interestandpublic exchequer. E.Ifsuch aprocedure is given a stam.p ofapproval by the Court, it would allow vested interest in public authorities tofirst induct persons oftheir choice into occupation of public premises at throwaway prices by initiallyframing the tender conditions so, as to notfetch the bestprice and to thereafter convert the terms into morefavourablefor the persons so inducted into public premises at throwawayprices.
F. A licence does not create any interest or right in the property and merely allows the licensee a right to enter and use the property. On the contrary, leasefor a period of99years, as the petitioners are claiming, is a valuable property right in the property and there is a sea ofa difference between the price fetched while offering a licence for 5 years and the pricefetched by offering a leasefor 99years.
G. We have to see the claim ofthe petitioners in the said light. Seen in the said light, the petitioners are clearly disentitledfrom the relief.
H. Merely because the respondent NrDMC is nov^ again allotting shops in the market on leasehold basis would not entitle the petitioners who entered the shops as a licencee, to conversion of their licences obtained by concessional rates into leasehold. LPA 53i/20l[6] and connected matters Page 14 of28 9^

I. The petitioners, even ifdesirous ofthe same premises, have tofirst vacate the premises and to thereafter when the bids are invited for allotment thereof on leasehold basis, participate in the competition and if successful, then re-enter thepremises on leasehold basis.

34,347 characters total
J. Further seen in this light, the Resolution dated 5th March, 1979 i.e. ofa date much prior to the petitioners coming into occupation of the premises, cannot create any right infavour ofthepetitioners.
K. Supreme Court In Re: Natural Resources Allocation

(2012) 10 see 1 though touched upon the extension of doctrine of public trust to property but chose not to expound thereon. However, in the discussion under Article 14 ofthe Constitution ofIndia while relying on the decision in Bennett Coleman Vs. Union ofIndia (1972)2 see 788 it was reiterated that the only norm which the Constitution furnishes for distribution oj material resources ofthe community is elastic norm of common good and observed that the achieving goal ofcommon good under Article 39(b)ofthe Constitution is partofthe Directive Principles. It wasfurther held that the manner in which common good is best subserved would depend on the economic and political philosophy of the Government and revenue maximization is not the only way in which the common good can be subserved. It was further clarified that where "revenue maximization is the LPA 535/2016andconnected matters Page15of28 & object ofa policy, being considered qua that the resource at that point oftime to be the best way to subseiwe the common good, auction would be one of the prejerable method, though not the only method".

L. It is not the case of the petitioners that they are entitled to continue in the subject shops for any other consideration. It has thus but to be held that the common good in the matter ofdisposal ofthe subject shops by the respondent NrDMC is by revenue maximization and y.^hich can be achieved only by auction, especially when Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the method of securing public interest in the matter of disposal of property is to sell by public auction or by inviting tenders.
M. Reference may also be made to RashbihariPanda Fs.

State ofGrissa (1969) I SCC 414 cited with approval by the Supreme Court in the judgment aforesaid, laying down that the scheme ofoffering to enter into contracts with the old licensees and to renew their tertns is open to grave objection since it arbitrarily excludes many persons. It was held that the right to make offers to the persons with whom contracts had been made earlier, shutting out new entrants, is exfacie discriminatory and imposes unreasonable restrictions upon the right of persons other than existing contractors to cany on business and gives rise lo monopoly. It wasfurther held LF.i 535/2016andconnected mutters Page 16of28 "b y that exclusion ofall persons interested in the trade who were not theprevious year licensees, is exfacie arbitrary; the scheme adopted by the Government,first ofoffering to enter into contracts with certain licensees and later inviting tendersfrom licensees who had in the previous year carried out their contracts satisfactorily, was held to be void on the ground ofunreasonably excluding others.

N. Supreme Court in Aggarwal and Modi Enterprises

Pvt. Ltd.Vs. New Delhi Municipal Council(2007)8SCC 75, interpreting Section 141 (2) of the New Delhi Municipal Council Act 1994 held that the mandate thereof is that any immovable property belonging to NDMC is to be sold, leased, licensed or transferred on consideration which is not to be less than the value at which such immovable property could be sold, leased, or transferred in fair competition. It wasfurther held that NDMC Is obligated to adopt the procedure by which it can get maximum possible return/considerationfor such immovable property and that public auction not only ensuresfair price and maximum return, it also militates against any allegation offavouritism on the part ofthe Government authorities while giving grantfor disposing ofpublicproperty.It was also held thatdisposalofpublic property partakes the character oftrust and it should be for publicpurpose and in public interest. Pertinently, the claim in that case ofthe existing licensee to develop the property or apreferential treatment was negated. LPA 535'2016andconnected matters Page17of28 7-

O. I see no reason why the principle enunciated in the judgment aforesaid should not apply to respondent NrDMC. Section 200(d) of the MCD Act governing respondent NrDMC also provides that the consideration for which the immovable property may be sold, leased or otherwise transferred shall not be less than the value at which such immovable property could be sold, leased or otherwise transferred in normalandfair competition.
P. It is also a settled principle oflaw (See Monarch

Infrastructure (P) Ltd.Vs.Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation (2000)5 SCC 287)that ifa term ofthe tender is deleted after the players entered into the arena, it is like changing the rules ofthe game after it had began and therefore, if the Government or the Municipal Corporation wasfree to alter the conditions, freshprocess oftender is the only alternativepermissible.

Q. Applying the said principle here, ifit were to be held that after inviting tendersfor occupation ofshops as a licensee, the licence can be converted into leasehold, it would amount to changing the rules ofthe game after it had begun.
R. Supreme Court, asfar back as in Ramana Dayaram

Shetty Vs. International Airport Authority ofIndia(1979) 3 SCC 489 negatived the contention that those who had not participated in the tender process cannot challenge the same. It was held that they are entitled to challenge LPA 535/2016andconnected matters Puge18of28 9-, on the ground that ifit were known that non-fulfilment of condition ofeligibility would be no bar to consideration, they would also be entitled to apply and would have applied

S. Similarly here, if it was known that licence can be converted into leasehold, others could have participated in the tender process through which the petitioners initially came intopossession ofthepremises.
T. The petitioners have not been able to controvert the chronology of resolutions of MCD as set out in the counter affidavit filed in WP(C) No.3146/2015 and as detailed by me hereinabove. Thepetitioners cannot derive any benefit ofthe lacunas ifany in the counter affidavit filed in V/P(C) No.2347/2015 especially when the two petitions are being considered together. The petitioners on the basis ofthe MCD Resolution of23rd March, 1987 i.e. of a date prior to their occupation of the premises cannot claim any right. The only right which the petitioners could have claimed and claim was under the MCD resolutions No. 494 and 495 dated 29th November, 2005 WP(C) No.2347/2015 & 3146/2015 Page 21 of23 but which resolutions according to the NrDMC were never operationalized and did not come into effect. It is not the case of the petitioner that the benefit thereof was/has been given to any otherperson.In the lightofthe position oflaw as discussed by me hereinabove, the said LFA 535/2016andconnected matters Page19of28 resolutions were in any case contrary to law and discriminatory and arbitrary and cannot be enforced. The only other Resolution on which the counsels for the petitioners can possibly rely and rely is the Resolution No.856referred to in the note dated 14th February,2005. HoweverI need viot gofurther into the said aspect as the reference by the counsel for NrDMC in WP(C) No.2347/2015 on Anuradha Sharma supra is apposite in this context. The Division Bench ofthis Court therein was also concerned with a claim for conversion ofa licence granted by the MCD in respect ofan open air restaurant into leasehold. Reference therein was also placed on the Resolution No.856 (dated 17th February, 2004) and on Resolution No.494 (dated 29th November, 2005) but the claim was negated relying inter alia upon Nirmal Kumar Jain supra. It would thus be seen that the question is no longer res Integra. Else, the controversy is also squarely covered by M.Pl Mathur supra relied upon by the counsel for NrDMCin WP(C)No.3146/2015.
U. It also follows from the judgments cited by the counselsfor the respondent NrDMC and referred to in theprecedingparagraph that the question ofany estoppel by acceptance ofthe sum ofabout Rs.30 lacsfrom the petitioner in WP(C) No.2347/2015 does not arise. The demandfor the said amount vide letter dated 2nd April, 2007 was clearly unauthorisedand had no sanction ofthe authority ofthe respondent NrDMC/MCD empowered to LPA 535/2016 undconnected matters Page20of28 dispose of immovable property and cannot create any rights infavour ofthepetitioner.

V. Similarly, the arguments ofthe counselfor MCD noted in Ashima Securities Pvt. Ltd cannot create any rights in favour ofthe petitioners.

W. Reference may lastly be made to the Union ofIndia

Vs. Hotel Excelsior Ltd MANU/DE/4222/2010 where a Division Bench of this Court speaking through the undersigned was concerned with a claimfor cotiversion ofleasehold,rights granted by the L&DO intofreehold. It was held that a lessee has no right to claim conversion of the leasehold into freehold or to compel the lessor to so grant conversion. Finding the policy floated by the L&DO for such conversion to be not providing for conversion of the properties qua which the conversion was claimed, the claim was denied. The contention for discrimination was also negatived obserAng that the properties for which conversion had been allowed constituted a different class. It was also observed that such policies/claims are enunciated in the exercise of executivefunction and it is upto the appellant L&DO as lessor of the land to grant or not to grant freehold conversion and once it isfound that the L&DO had not discriminated arbitrarily, the question of the Court interfering in policy matters did not arise. The said I.PA 555/2016andconnected matters Page21 of28 O^J observations of the Division Bench are also apt to the present controversy." LPA 612/2018

8. The challenge in this appeal is to an order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 9334/2018 dated September 10, 2018 wherein the challenge was to an order dated August 07, 2018 passed in PPA Appeal No.30150/2016 ofthe Court ofDistrict Judge(Headquarters)acting as an Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971of dismissal of appeal preferred by the appellant against the order dated January 27, 2016 of respondent no.2 Estate officer of respondent no.i North Delhi Municipal Coi-poration in exercise of powers under Section 5(1) of the PP Act, of eviction of the petitioner from Hall No.1, MOD Market, Saraswati Marg, Karol Bagh, Delhi. Suffice it to state, that the learned Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition. Since the issue involved is connected with two aforesaid appeals, this appeal was also heard along with LPA Nos. 535/2016 and 499/2018 and as such is also being disposed ofwith the aforesaid two appeals. LPA 535/2016 and connected matters Page 22oj28 -0^

9. Mr. Rakesh Saini, learned counsel for the appellant would reiterate the submissions as made by him before the learned Single Judge. He heavily relied upon the judgment ofthe Division Bench in the case of Anuradha Sharma v. Municipal Corporation of DelhiFAO(OS)No.140/2010 decided on October 08,2010 and of this Court in the case ofAshima Securities Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 2010 (115) DRJ 161 to contend that the Division Bench has, in clear terms concluded about the passing of the Resolution No. 494. He has taken us through various documents in support of his contention to say that the appellant having acted on the communication of the respondent No.2 dated April 02,2017 and deposited the amount,the respondents could not have resiled out oftheir own promise.

10. Alternatively, he argued that in teims ofthe Circular dated July 22,2013,the respondents need to consider afresh the allotment and renewal of license of shops on five yearly basis with an enhancement of license fee by 50% after every five years period, after expiry ofthe extended period by 100% enhanced license fee for five years. He also states, that the request ofthe appellant for consideration ofher case also was rejected vide letter dated October LPA 535/2016 andconnected matters P 23of28 15, 2018, a copy of the same was produced in the Court and the same reads as under:- "777/5 is with reference to your representation dated 27.08.2018 for consideration offurther extension of license of Hall No.2, MCD Market, Saraswati Marg, Karol Bagh, New Delhi-05 in pursuance to the North DMC's Circular No.DA(Misc.)/L&E/2013-13/D-4688 dated 22.07.2013. In this connection, it is informed that your similar request has already been rejected vide letter No. DA/KB/L&E (N)/2014/D-198.[6] dated 08.12.2014 and the saidfact is also reflected at Page 4 and 5 of the Order dated 27.01.2016 passed by the Estate Officer, North DMC in PPA Case No. 1336/2011. (Copy ofthe rejection letter is attachedfor ready reference). It isfurther, informed that the outstanding dues payable by you as on 31.07.2018 were to a tune of Rs.7,66,28,138/- and the copy wasfurnished before the Hon'ble High Court in consonance to the orders of Hon'ble High Courtdated 05.07.2018you have deposited 1 Crore (Rs.50 Lac each deposited on 13.07.2018 and 14.08.2018) and the balance of dues as 31.07.2018 remained Rs.6,66,28,138/-. In the light ofabove, your request dated 27.08.2018for consideration under the circular oj North DMC dated lPA 535/2016andconnected matters fuge 24of28 22.07.2013 is rejected by the Competent Authority as your similar previous request stands rejected on 08.12.2014for non-extension oflicense period and nondeposit ofoutstanding Municipal dues."

11. Mr. Viraj R. Datar, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in LPA 499/2018 and LPA 612/2018 conceding the legal position as has been concluded by the learned Single Judge, would submit that insofar as LPA 612/2018 is concerned, the appellant under a wrong legal advice was pursuing the appeal but in effect in terms ofCircular dated July 22,2013,the respondents are required to consider the case ofthe appellant. He concedes that there is an issue raised by the respondents on computation as the North DMC is claiming an exorbitant amount, which the appellant is disputing and they have also not adjusted the amount already paid by the appellant in the interregnum. He has also drawn our attention to a communication received from the North DMC dated December 04, 2018 wherein the North DMC inter alia stated as under:-. 'This is with reference to your letter dated 29/10/2018 requestingfor clearance ofpending dues / desealing / restoration / occupation of Hall No.l, Mpl. Market, Saraswati Marg,KarolBagh Delhi. LPA 535/2016andconnected matters P^8^75of28 It is informed that the representation has been examined. and it has been obsen'ed that the possession of the subject Public Premises vms taken over by the North DMC on 09.08.2018 in compliance to thejudgment and Order dated 07.08.2018 passed by t4he Hon'ble Distt. Judge in PPA No. 1337/2011. It isfurther, informed that your requestfor re-consideration as per MCD's policy dated 22.07.2013 was also examined and the Competent Authority vide order dated 03.12.2018 has rejected the same as you have notshow'n any inclination to deposit the outstanding dues amounting to Rs.7,29,01,924/- (Seven Crore Twent)' Nine Lac One Thousand Nine Hundred Twenty Four Only) after making the adjustments ofthe payments made by you causing financial losses to the Mpl. Corporation and remained engaged in un-necessary litigations since 2009." CONCLUSION

12. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, we find no infirmity in the order of the learned Single Judge, which we have already reproduced which is well considered Judgment both on facts and in law. fhe submission made by ^4r. Saini by placing reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench ofthis Court in the case of Anuradha Sharma(supra)and ofthis Court in the case ofAshima Securities Pvt. Ltd.(supra) were interlocutory orders. Initially the LP.i 535/2016 amicouriecied mailers Page 26of28 learned Single Judge has vacated the interim protection in favour of the plaintiff therein and in the appeals filed thereof, the protection was granted by the Division Bench. Suffice it to state,the Division Bench in its order dated October 08,2010 has clearly stated that the view taken by it is only a prima facie view and has no bearing on the trial. If that be so, the said conclusion is not final. We have been told that the suit is still pending consideration before this Court. Be that as it may, as concluded above, the learned Single Judge wasjustified in its conclusion, as noted above, we do not see any reason to interfere with the impugned orders, except noting the submissions made by Mr. Saini and Mr. Datar that the case ofthe appellants be considered in terms of Circular dated July 22, 2013 and observing that ifrepresentations are made by the appellants,the Competent Authority shall consider the same in terms ofthe Rules, Policies and such other material as deem fit, without being influenced by the fact that the appellants were pursuing the remedy of appeal before this Court. We may clarif>' that it is for the Competent Authority to take a decision. The appeals are dismissed, except with the aforesaid observations. LPA 535/2016 and connected matters Page 27of28 CM.No.35819/2016 in LPA 535/2016 CM.Nos.35389/2018 in LPA 499/2018 CM.Nos.44803/2018.44804/2018 and 48777/2018 in LPA 612/2018 Dismissed as infructuous. ilil V.KAMESWAlfRAO,J ^ ■ CHIEF JUSTICE DECEMBER 11,2018/«it LPA 531'20'6andconncclcd waiters "J