Dilshad Khan v. Govt of NCT of Delhi

32. Thus, from the scheme of the Arbitration Act as well as the aforesaid judgments, condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has to be seen in the context of the object of speedy resolution of disputes.

33. The bulk of appeals, however, to the appellate court under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, are governed by Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act. Sub-section (1-A) of Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum for appeals as well as the limitation period to be followed, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act being a special law as compared with the Limitation Act which is a general law, which follows from a reading of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act lays down a period of limitation of 60 days uniformly for all appeals that are preferred under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. [As held in BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, whereas Section 37 of the Arbitration Act provides the substantive right to appeal, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act provides the forum and procedure governing the appeal (see para 13).]

34. The vexed question which faces us is whether, first and foremost, the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded by the scheme of the Commercial Courts Act, as has been argued by Dr George. The first important thing to note is that Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act does not contain any provision akin to Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act only provides for a limitation period of 60 days from the date of the judgment or order appealed against, without further going into whether delay beyond this period can or cannot be condoned.

35. It may also be pointed out that though the object of expeditious disposal of appeals is laid down in Section 14 of the Commercial Courts Act, the language of Section 14 makes it clear that the period of six months spoken of is directory and not mandatory. By way of contrast, Section 16 of the Commercial Courts Act read with the Schedule thereof and the amendment made to Order 8 Rule 1 CPC, would make it clear that the defendant in a suit is given 30 days to file a written statement, which period cannot be extended beyond 120 days from the date of service of the summons; and on expiry of the said period, the defendant forfeits the right to file the written statement and the court cannot allow the written statement to be taken on record. This provision was enacted as a result of the judgment of this Court in Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344. *****

39. Unlike the scheme of the Central Excise Act relied upon in CCE v. Hongo (India) (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, there are no other provisions in the Commercial Courts Act which provide for a period of limitation coupled with a condonation of delay provision which is either open-ended or capped. Also, the period of 180 days provided was one indicia which led the Court to exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as it was double and triple the period provided for appeals under the other provisions of the same Act. Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, by way of contrast, applies an intermediate period of 60 days for filing an appeal, that is, a period that is halfway between 30 days and 90 days provided by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act. *****

43. The next important argument that needs to be addressed is as to whether the hard-and-fast rule applied by this Court in N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 is correct in law. Firstly, as has correctly been argued by Shri Shroti, N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, does not notice the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act at all and can be said to be per incuriam on this count. Secondly, it is also correct to note that the period of 90 days plus 30 days and not thereafter mentioned in Section 34(3) of the Arbitration Act cannot now apply, the limitation period for filing of appeals under the Commercial Courts Act being 60 days and not 90 days. Thirdly, the argument that absent a provision curtailing the condonation of delay beyond the period provided in Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act would also make it clear that any such bodily lifting of the last part of Section 34(3) into Section 37 of the Arbitration Act would also be unwarranted. We cannot accept Shri Navare's argument that this is a mere casus omissus which can be filled in by the Court. *****

52. For all these reasons, given the illuminating arguments made in these appeals, we are of the view that N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 has been wrongly decided and is therefore overruled.

53. However, the matter does not end here. The question still arises as to the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to appeals which are governed by a uniform 60-day period of limitation. At one extreme, we have the judgment in N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109 which does not allow condonation of delay beyond 30 days, and at the other extreme, we have an open-ended provision in which any amount of delay can be condoned, provided sufficient cause is shown. It is between these two extremes that we have to steer a middle course. *****

55. Reading the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act as a whole, it is clear that when Section 37 of the Arbitration Act is read with either Article 116 or 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, the object and context provided by the aforesaid statutes, read as a whole, is the speedy disposal of appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. To read Section 5 of the Limitation Act consistently with the aforesaid object, it is necessary to discover as to what the expression “sufficient cause” means in the context of condoning delay in filing appeals under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act. *****

63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction, negligence or laches.” (emphasis supplied)

6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Borse Brothers Engineers (supra) categorically held that the limitation period prescribed under Section 34(3) of the A&C Act does not apply to appeals under Section

37. The Court explained that the “hard stop” applicable to Section 34 proceedings cannot be mechanically extended to Section 37 appeals. Instead, such appeals are governed either by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or by Section 13(1A) of the CC Act, depending on whether the dispute qualifies as a commercial dispute of “Specified Value”. Accordingly, from Borse Brothers Engineers (supra), the following legal position emerges:

(i) For commercial disputes of “Specified Value” under the CC

Act, the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 37 is sixty days, as provided in Section 13(1A) of the CC Act; and

(ii) In all other cases, for filing an appeal under Section 37, the limitation periods prescribed under Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, will apply.

7. In the said Judgement, the Hon’ble Court further emphasised that while Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits condonation of delay, such discretion must be exercised with caution. It is confined to “short delays” and is to be invoked only where the appellant demonstrates bona fide conduct, absence of negligence, and lack of prejudice to the respondent.

8. Having regard to the object of both the CC Act and the A&C Act, namely, ensuring speedy resolution of commercial disputes, condonation of delay is permissible only upon establishing “sufficient cause”, i.e., circumstances genuinely beyond the party’s control, and not arising from negligence, inaction, or wilful indifference. This principle has also been succinctly reiterated by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. Rajiv Agarwal[8]. The relevant paragraphs of the said Judgement are as follows:

High Court had taken a view that a delay of 57 days would be liable to be condoned. While dealing with these cases, the Supreme Court observed as under:

13. A conjoint reading of the above two extracts of the judgment in Borse Brothers (Supra) would show that the object of speedy disposal under the Act would only be achieved by making such appeals also bound by the limitation period which is prescribed for filing of petitions under Section 34 of the Act. The delay beyond the prescribed period has been held to be not condonable. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court refused to condone delay of 131 days in State of Maharashtra v. Borse Bros. Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine Bom 427 days in Union of India v. Associated Constructions Co., 2019 SCC OnLine Del 10797 as also 75 days in Borse Brothers (Supra).

14. Coming to the facts of the present case, the present petition has been filed by the Union of India with an application for condonation of delay of 613 days. The reasons given in the application are that the matter was initially marked to different panel Counsel of the Railways and the file movement constitutes sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The relevant portion of the application is set out below: “3. It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant received the Impugned Order passed by the Ld. District Judge, Commercial Court, Delhi, on 05.06.2023. After, receipt of the said order, necessary steps were promptly initiated in relation to the present matter. The case file was thereafter forwarded to the Sr. Law Officer/DLI, Railway, along, and the contesting advocate was requested to furnish a legal opinion on the Impugned order. The legal opinion from the learned counsel was received on 07.08.2023. Subsequently, the Sr. Law Officer/DLI, Railway, also opined in favour of preferring an appeal against the said order. Accordingly, the file was processed for obtaining the requisite approval from the competent authority for filing the appeal. After, grant of the necessary approval, the Appellant approached the Litigation Cell, Delhi High Court, for the nomination of counsel to represent the Union of India in the matter. The Litigation Cell, further sought the opinion of the Deputy DGM/Law, Northern Railway Headquarters, through proper official channels. The said Opinion was duly obtained and forwarded to the Litigation Cell, Delhi High Court. Thereafter, the counsel was nominated by the Litigation Cell for drafting and filing the appeal. Thereafter, the complete set of relevant documents was provided to the nominated counsel on 18.03.2024. However, due to certain administrative issues, the previously nominated counsel was changed, and a new counsel was detailed for filing the appeal. The draft appeal was then prepared, processed, checked, and legally vetted. The same was duly signed and handed over to the present counsel for filing before this Hon'ble Court.

4. That in view of above mentioned obligatory and unavoidable circumstances, there is some delay in filling of the aforesaid appeal which is neither intentional, nor deliberate either on the part of department or any authorities rather due to movement of file and also due to compliance of official procedure by the authorities which was beyond the control of the appellant.”

15. The Court has considered the matter. The law in this regard is quite well settled and clear. Recently, in a similar case involving an appeal under Section 37 of the Act, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Delco Infrastructure Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Intec Capital Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2158 has also refused to condone the delay under Section 13(1)(a) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 in the following terms: “10. In N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, the Supreme Court had taken a view that the delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act cannot be condoned beyond a period of thirty days. However, this decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented By Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460. The Supreme Court held that the power of the court to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 37 (1) of the Act was not restricted to a period of thirty days as specified under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. However, the Supreme Court also observed as under:

58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill pressing negligent and stale claims… ***

63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule….”

11. It is essential to adhere to time lines in matters involving commercial disputes. Any delay in filing appeals under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 cannot be condoned unless the court is satisfied that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the stipulated time. The court must be satisfied that such cause is genuine and not an illusion to disguise lack of diligence.

12. In the facts of the present case, we are unable to accept that the appellants have shown any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal.”

9. It would also be apposite to refer herein to the Judgment of the Coordinate Bench in Delco Infrastructure vs. Intech Capital[9]; the relevant paras whereof read as follows: “9. The application filed by the appellants for seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the impugned order dated 14.02.2023 was rejected by the learned Commercial Court by an order dated 27.04.2024. However, the appellants did not take any immediate steps to file the present appeal. The present appeal was filed on 25.07.2024, that is, almost ninety days after the order dated 27.04.2024. There is no explanation whatsoever as to the cause that prevented the appellants from preferring the appeal immediately after 27.04.2024.

10. In N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, the Supreme Court had taken a view that the delay in filing an appeal under Section 37 of the Act cannot be condoned beyond a period of thirty days. However, this decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in a subsequent decision in Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) Represented By Executive Engineer v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460. The Supreme Court held that the power of the court to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 37(1) of the Act was not restricted to a period of thirty days as specified under the proviso to Section 34(3) of the A&C Act. However, the Supreme Court also observed as under: “58. Given the object sought to be achieved under both the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, that is, the speedy resolution of disputes, the expression “sufficient cause” is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the period provided by the appeal provision itself. Besides, the expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea for the ill pressing negligent and stale claims… * * *

63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration Act and the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals under section 37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days, respectively, is to be condoned by way of exception and not by way of rule….”

11. It is essential to adhere to time lines in matters involving commercial disputes. Any delay in filing appeals under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 cannot be condoned unless the court is satisfied that the appellants were prevented from sufficient cause from filing the appeal within the stipulated time. The court must be satisfied that such cause is genuine and not an illusion to disguise lack of diligence.

12. In the facts of the present case, we are unable to accept that the appellants have shown any sufficient cause for condoning the delay in filing the present appeal.”

10. As is evident from the Appellant’s own averments, and in light of the settled legal position, it is clear that the present appeal, arising from a commercial dispute of a “Specified Value” under the CC Act, was required to be filed within sixty days from the date of the impugned order, i.e., on or before 05.04.2025.

11. However, the Appellant failed to do so. The appeal was instituted only on 01.07.2025, much beyond the statutory limit. Accordingly, there exists a delay of 87 days from the expiry of the 60day limitation period. The computation is set out herein below for ready reference: Event Date Remarks Impugned Order passed by the learned District Judge 04.02.2025 Starting point for limitation under Section 13(1A) of the CC Act. Expiry of the 60day limitation 05.04.2025 Last date for filing appeal, without seeking condonation of delay. Actual date of filing 01.07.2025 87 days beyond expiry of limitation (i.e., from 05.04.2025).

12. The sole issue that arises for determination is whether the Appellant has shown “sufficient cause” to justify condonation of the 87-day delay beyond the prescribed limitation period. It is settled law that such discretion is to be exercised sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. The burden rests squarely on the Appellant to furnish a clear, cogent, and convincing explanation for the delay. Condonation is neither a matter of right nor to be granted as a matter of routine.

13. The averments in the application for condonation of delay, already extracted hereinabove, reveal that the Appellant is proceeding on a manifest misconception with respect to the computation of limitation.

14. The first ground urged, that the period of court vacation should be excluded under Section 4 of the Limitation Act, is wholly untenable. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Gupta v. Raju @ Rajendra Singh Yadav10, the benefit of Section 4 cannot be extended where the Registry remains functional during the court vacation. The relevant portion of Ajay Gupta (supra) states as under: -

also, the only extension is what is permitted under Section 4 of the Act, the period coming under court holiday.

6. Thus, both the trial court and the High Court have gravely gone wrong on the first principles on the law of limitation. Therefore, the impugned order is set aside. The application filed by the appellant under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is allowed. Recovery Suit No. 1 of 2011 on the file of the ADJ, Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh is dismissed.”

15. Since it is an undisputed fact that the Registry of this Court remained functional during the summer vacation, the Appellant’s reliance on Section 4 of the Limitation Act is misconceived and cannot be accepted.

16. The second justification advanced by the Appellant is that the certified copy of the impugned order was applied for only after 31 days beyond the statutory 60-day period, and that the additional 18 days consumed in preparation of the copy should also be excluded. This contention too is misplaced. In this regard, observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited11 are relevant, which state as under: -

2025 INSC 533 appellants therein had made active efforts for procuring the said order, and this is evident from the fact that few days after the pronouncement, the counsel of the appellants therein had made inquires as regards the unavailability of the order in response to which he was informed that the order was yet to be signed.

14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) held that the limitation for challenging the same would begin from the date of such communication, the same would be applicable only where despite best of efforts at the end of the parties in procuring the order the same could not be obtained and thereby resulting in unavoidable delay in the filing of appeals. One of the core tenets of the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as to their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a manner whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their own rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue to litigate without being vigilante themselves.

15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the decision of Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said case, this Court while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of the Companies Act, 2013 held that the period of limitation prescribed therein would start running only from the date on which a copy of the order is made available to the person aggrieved. However, yet again in the said case, the appellants therein had made some efforts to procure a certified copy of the order to be assailed during the period of limitation.

16. In the present case we find that after the order in question came to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the appellants herein during the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to why the said order was not available. It was only eight-months after the pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy.

17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific time lines are fixed and there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the Commercial Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice that they have to very carefully contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that failing to comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure, certain adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of application by a contesting party.

18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that does not mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility of endeavoring to procure the certified copies thereof in their own capacity. Any such interpretation would result in frustrating the very fundamental cannons of law of limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act, 2015 of ensuring timely disposals.”

17. Thus, the belated application for a certified copy, filed 31 days after the expiry of the statutory period, coupled with the untenable reliance on court vacation, leaves significant portions of the 87-day delay wholly unexplained. In the context of a commercial matter governed by strict timelines under the CC Act, such explanation is neither credible nor sufficient to overcome the bar of limitation.

18. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the application for condonation of delay filed with the present Appeal is bereft of any cogent or persuasive grounds. The explanation tendered is specious and does not constitute “sufficient cause” in law.

19. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the case, the appeal stands dismissed on the ground of delay and limitation alone.

20. The present Appeal, along with pending application(s), if any, is disposed of in the above terms.

21. No order as to costs. ANIL KSHETARPAL, J. HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J. AUGUST 20, 2025/v/sm/kr