Full Text
Judgmentreservedon:7'^^ecember,2018
Judgmentpronouncedon December,2018
+ CRL.L.P.720/2018
RAMESH .... Petitioner
Through : Mr.Rajendra Yadav,Advocate.
Through: Ms.Radhika Kolluru,APP for the State with
STR.anbir..Singh,PS-Neb Sarai.
HON'BLE MS.JUStA SANffrf&liTOGRAi^ik&^L
SANGITADHINGRASEHG^Sfl^lMli^■■ ■'0; t! ■' ■ ' ■ '%
CRL.L.P. 720/2018 1
1, ■■i) i':! ir.fr.-l I
In view of the decision o#the!Mhyble Supreme Court of India in
^ ■' ■ ■ ■ ' -"I-
MallikarjUn Kodagali thmugh Legal
Represemidiyes ^s^^SMe^bf^iitmitaM at 2018 (14)
SCALE 32, tne/victini'^fe^imo longeiyi€qui!iMi^tofitoly for leave to appeal against the 6rddf®oS.aeJ[M'%
Consequently, the present criminal leave to appeal is allowed. The matter is directedto be registered as a Criminal Appeal.
CRL.A. 1^73 72018 (To benumbered!
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is arising out of the judgment dated 31.08.2018 passedby the learned Additional Sessions Judge (ASJ)/Special Judge, NDPS (South), Saket Court Complex, New Delhi in case FIR No. 776/2016 registered at Police Station - Neb Sarai, filed on behalf of the victim. Crl.A. /18(to benumbered) Page1of19 Ramesh Vs State (GNCTD) & Ors. 2018:DHC:9377-DB whereby the respondents were acquitted ofthe charge under Section 498A/304B/306/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as'IPG').
2. Brieffactsofthe case as noted bythelearned Trial Courtis asunder. "...the accused Rakesh is husband, Shyam Singh is thefather-in-law, Reshma is the mother-in-law andDeepak is brother-in-law ofthe deceased Ms. Shobha. The accused Rakesh got married to the deceased Ms. Shobha on 30.04.2011. On 30.09.2016, M^.^0ip^^i^afi^allmgfrom thesecondfloor ofthe holA^se^ofadcusf:^dfe. A238, Devli Extension. 6 Singh reachedM^&i^^^iM.,^HamdfrdN^gar wfhat.Manen$^^^gDDNofm!fe dbtaihed the Mll$0^^^^obha and took t^e statement of "fSr^M^and Dharmendep Dharmender told that\MisASbobha hadgone to the terrace to she fell dopn. vhile ASIRanbMsinkkm^l^^ of Dharmender,familffE^Eers pf'M;\decfased, their relatives and'^^neighbodrj,^attacked the inlaws ofthe deceds^t^d_m^dri^sing damage oftheproperty ofthe-'hospitdT With lotofefforts, the situation was brought under control by the local police and policefrom PS-Neb Sarai. The in-laws of the deceased ran away from the hospital to save their lives..."
3. After investigation was over,charge-sheetagainstthe accused persons was filed before the concerned Court for the offences punishable under Sections 498A/304B/34 ofIPG as well as offences punishable /18(to benumbered) ^ CrlA._ Ramesh VsState(GNCTD)& Ors. under Section 306/34 to which they denied the allegations and claimed to be tried. To substantiate the accusation, the prosecution examined twelve witnesses in all. Statements of accused persons under Section 313 of Cr.P.C were recorded wherein they reiterated their innocence and examined one witness in their defence.
4. The learned Trial Court,upon analysis,examination and evaluation of the prosecution evidence and after considering the rival submissions recorded acquittal ofthe accused personsforthe charged offences.
5. Assailing the impugnedju^gmentqMr.^.^aday,lear^ counselforthe appellant contended that Yhe,,^yiew'"''ahd |lip^ftjtimate conclusion recorded by the learned Trial;Gqurtv;in''acquittirig'.'theviaccused persons for the offences punishable. 498A/3^,B/306/34 ofIPG is manifestly perverse,unsUstsM^^^ainted with non-|pplication of.| ifil Ij'll'. Il. mind to the vitaP evidences^ila^^fesult of wrong inteipretation of fi evidence ofthe eye witness(and^oiher'isubstantial evidences,which has led to miscarriage ofjustiee.^j^|^|f' ^ W.V
6 Mr Raiendra Yddav,learned counsel.Tof%ePapp^^^^^ submitted that the statements of the proSeeiifton wi^dssesf-the parents(PW-1 and PW-4)and the brother(PW-35Wtlfdieceased,on record,corroborate with each other and inspire confidence,thus should be relied upon.He further contended that the trial court erred in placing reliance on the testimony of PW-8(neighbour ofthe victim), as he resiles from his statement.
7. Lastly,the learned Counsel forthe Appellant has contended thatthere is evidence on record to show thatthe deceased had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused persons in connection with the /18(to he numbered) P<^S^ of19 CrLA.__ demand ofdowry which led the deceased to take the extreme step of committing suicide.
8. We heard learned counsel for the appellant and perused the entire material available on record.
9. Before delving into merits of the case, we deem it appropriate to discuss the relevant provisions which are involved in the present case. The respondents were acquitted for the offence punishable under Section 304B ofIPG,which reads as under: "304-B Dowry lDeath?y(^ death ofa woman is caus^^yMr^biirifis^<^o^<^njury or occurs' otherwise ^mhan undera'%prmal ^ circumstances ofher^^mdrmage ' andithshown'f^id^^^^erdeA^dwas subjectedto crueMforf^Wssr^entby her husband or any relative^'^^d^r^^sband for, or||« connection with any^ide^apd for dowry, su^^h death shall be ca\t^ ^oath" and such husband or reldiwe0l0ll^0e deemed to hdve,, '■''-#fs yi< d causedher deatnp,^:.^4^if, ^ ExDlanation - Forjhe purpose-pfthfslsi^section 'dowry' shall '^fUl^gt^dsj-^'^Section 2 oftheDowryPfdjjiihikoh-Aetf^^^ 8of1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonmentfor life."
10. In Raman Kumar Vs. State ofPunjab: (2009) 16 SCC 35, Hon'ble Supreme.Court observed: "13. The provision has application when death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury CrLA. /18(to be numbered) Puge 4 of19 Ramesh Vs State (GNCTD) Ors. g' or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years ofher marriage and^it is shown thatsoon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassmentby her husband or any relatives of her husband for, or in connection with any demandfor dowry. In order to attract application ofSection 304B IPC, the essential ingredients are asfollows:
(i) The death ofa woman should be caused burns or bodily injury or otherwise than under a normal circumstance. (ii)Such d'deatji\^lioiili h^e/^ccurped within seven,years ojmer mamiqge. % (Hi)She must or harassment by relativej)Pfer hushand. imm& ^\ (iv)Such cruelty should beforfer inconnectionwithd^^m^^^dowry. | (%) Such cruelty0ht$ami^^0mt is shown to have been metedioutldthfMfwmi^,sm%before//her V^jfSMTWlfHWV'X // death ' // uauiri., ^ //
14. xxxxxxxxxx
15. xxxxxx:Kfxx,Ms'ijpel^tl00^hifl^^ "dowry death" in Sectidn-SWBZlP^and'the wording in the presumptive Section 11SB ofthe Evidence Act, one ofthe essential ingredients, amongst others, in both the provisions is that the woman concerned must have been "soon before her death"subjected to cruelty or harassment "for or in connection with the demand for dowry". Presumption underSection 11SB is apresumption of law. On proof of the essentials mentioned therein, it becomes obligatory on the court to CrLA. /18(to be numbered) Page5of19 raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. The presumption shall he raised only on proofofthefollowing essentials: (1) The question before the court must be whether the accused has committed the dowry death ofa woman,(This means that the presumption can be raised only if the accused is being triedfor the offence underSection 304BIPC.) (2) The woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives (3) Such cruelty-^dr^fiar^ for, or in connection'withahy'domand&ftdowrys^ (4) Such crdelty'or harassment wqQspoh^before her death.
16. A conjoint redding d^^^tion 113B^^f he Evidence Act anX^8Bl^4B IPC shows tM there must be material tdfushow that soon befqre i, her death the victirnidvdsysdbjpcted to crueltygor ■. rr,l han " possibility to bring itCwitMn.~Jhe pm\f^"^offdhgE"death occurring othpr^isei, xfthq^''^yin''' normal circumstances'h'They^^^siofr''soon before" is very relevant where Section 113B ofthe Evidence Act and Section 304B IPC are pressed into seiwice. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in thatregard has to be led in by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances ofeach case and no straitjacketformula can be _/I8(to be numbered) Page6of19 CrLA._ Ramesh VsState(GNCTD)tfi: Ors. laid doyvn as to what would constitute aperiod of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate anyfixed period, and that brings in the importance ofa proximity test both for the proofofan offence ofdowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113B ofthe Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304B IPG and Section 113B of the Evidence Act is present, with the idea of proximity test. No definite periods- has 'beeh^indicated and the expression' "^d^ned. A reference t6hh:e expre0pp^ "soon b^ore"''used in Section 114Illustrati^'$if^Mie Evi3mee%ctis relevant. It lays down thMgdm^ourt may^pxesume thata man who is in thepg^sion ojgoddssopn after the theft, is either^t^hiefwhohas received the goods knowing thehi'ffk be stolen, unless ike can accountfor his:f)Qkfe0^p§. The determination of the period:,^wfiQhf^'^f0^ the f^m "soon befbreff^is the courts, depending Mpon^fagts-^and'^icifc'u^stances ofeach case,Si^eeiEQW0^fifpAMi thatthe expression "sdoh--<h.^Q^^malU'^normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassmentconcernedand the death in question. There mustbe existence ofa proximate and live link between the effect ofcruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged Incident ofcruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental eauilibrium ofthe woman concerned, it would be ofno consequence." CrLA. /l8(1o he numbered) ^ Rantesh VsState(CNCTD)& Or.s.
11. In Amar Singh v. State ofRajasthan:(2010) 9 SCC 64, Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: ''29...What is punishable Under Section 498-A or Section 304-B Indian Penal Code is the act of cruelty or harassment by the husband or the relative ofthe husband on the woman. It will be also clearfrom Section 113-B ofthe Evidence Act that only when it is shown that soon before her death a woman,Jhas Ifeeh-s^^ by anyperson to cruelty or hamsftmrii fop;}} ok ih^connection with, any demand fop^.r,dowry, th^fcpurt shall presume that suchfpkrsSh'iMd.,causewt.he dowry death within thhh^mifihgytS^dtion 304\BlIndian Penal Code. ^ wbmdrMo I 7..Vs., cruelty or harassntertt^fbrs04" connection with, " J '^1 H any demandfor doyvfylBpfthe accused, therefore, 7 7. 7 J'- 7?1 ^7^77^..• /• il ---'^--^ --'^^--■-00:,pj'QSQCUtion jor tf". „J 1:^ ll'Ll must be establisheSpy'htJi^prosecution for the court to presumetthan.me hckusedfias causedkhe dowry death. 'U / ' A \h ^ y-' ■■ ■
12. In the case of RajindenlSingHpi:St0^i0rPu^d reported in (2015) 6 SCC477, the Supreme (Sdurtahasiobs'efVed asunder: "7. The primary ingredient to attract the offence under Section 304B is that the death of a woman must be a "dowry death" "Dowry" is defined by Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which reads asfollows: "2. Definition of "dowry".-In this Act, "dowry" means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either directly or indirectly- (a) by oneparty to a marriage to the otherparty to the marriage; or CrlA. /18(to tye numlyered) Page 8 of19 Ramesh Vs State (GNCTD) Ors. (h) by theparents ofeitherparty to a marriage or by any other person, to either party to the marriage or to any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage ofthe saidparties, but does not include dower or mahr in the case ofpersons to whom the Muslim PersonalLaw (Shariat)applies. Explanation L-[***] Explanation. II.-The expression "valuable security" has the same meaning as in Section 30 oftheIndian Penal Code(45 of1860)." W 8. A perusal ofMhis—Ssptipn^ shows that this definition can-Efbr^ke^i^tosixdistinctparts: (1) Dowif musf)fiPs^consisLoffm);^pr or valuable security - tl^'efW^rd "any"4js^a word of width arid woufijyf^i^^^-Jncludd^iih^ it property and ^fdl^dbW'hM^cMrity of %ind whatsoever. W 2)Such property be given or even agreed to-be W^^p(ctual giving ofstich nrnnfirfv nr KpnurithlA-itWdkefore. notnecessarv.U property orsecuri1yi§ftlfe^0pre, notnecessary.
3) Such property'-0r(dsecwM>\ can be given(for -- ' \ift 6-^ ivj j. 1 IJ agreed tapeM^ 4) Such not onlyfpdrie'party to g^arriagedpff^e other but also Ey by any other persoritdA§ither~pantyf^fih0fim or to anv other person, ft~ivffr'~5e noticed that this clause again widens the reach ofthe Act insofar as those guilty ofcommitting the offence ofgiving or receiving dowry is concerned. 5)Such giving or agreeing to give can be at any time. It can be at, before, or at any time after the marriage. Thus, it can he many years after a marriage is solemnised. 6)Such giving or receiving must be in connection with the marriage ofthe parties. Obviously, the expression "in connection with" would in the CriA. /18(to be numbered) Page9of19 12. context ofthe social evil sought to be tackled by the Dowry Prohibition Act mean "in relation with"or "relating to".
9. The ingredients of the offence under Section 304B have been stated and restated in many judgments. There arefour such ingredients and they are said to be: (a) death ofa. woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death musthave occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (h) such death must haversccurred within seven years ofher mdfriagetr "if
(c) soon before'Bki^'deciih, Wefihusj'have been subjectedtp cruelty or harassment husband or any relative ofher husb;qnd;:.and \
(d) such cruelty or Haf0sment mustf'fejmn connection with the demahf^ordowry."
13 The law as it exists is that to bring/home the guilt ofan accused under - ■ ' ^ ji Section 304B ofIPG,the proseWMs obliged to provpjthat; (a)death of a woman miist-lldve2be^?c^@>|)y anyjaums or bodily injury or her death must have"6cci^^,-0fi^^^'^jian under normal circumstances; (b)such death musthav^-occi^^^itiiafiriseven yearsofher marriage; (c)soon before her death,she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or anyrelative ofher husband,and (d)such cruelty or harassment mustbe in connection with the demand for dowry.
14. Two ofthe ingredients ofSection 304B ofthe Indian Penal Code are answered in the affirmative as it is notin dispute that,firstly,the death of the deceased was within seven years of marriage and secondly, CrLA. /18(to l)e numljered) Page10of19 Ramesli VsState(GNCTD)& Ors. death ofthe deceased was otherwise than under normal circumstances. Now, we have to examine, whether the respondents treated the deceased with cruelty or harassment on account of demand ofdowry and abetted herin committing suicide and that the cruelty meted outto the deceased was so as to provoke herto end her life.
15. Returning to the facts of the present case, the marriage between the respondent No. 1 and the deceased took place on 30.04.2011 and the deceased died on 30.09.2016 other than in normal circumstances within 7 years ofthe marriage.;-^dega0'cfiQn has been created to the ■> t't V fey effect that in the event if if is establishe'd'thdt soon before the death, the deeeasedwas subjected to crueltefof^harasshfent By her husband or any of'his relative; for or in,cpnhe|iroh with any^dferiipd of dowry, such death shall be called and suchhusband or relative ufhiflW ^ ^.....1]. shall be deemed to have caiisedlWeflddath. To establish that the cruelty 1:1 was meted to the deceased of dowry sppn before her death, the prosecution exanhhed,«;idhe' (phfehts^.and^rother of the deceased. J
16. Father of the deceased stepped!Mg^e^^tness box as PW-1- and deposed that; ■ "...After thefinalization ofmarriage andbefore its actual performance, the father of Dharmender had asked four wheeler from me, on whichI replied that it is not in my capacity to give four wheeler to him and hereafter, whenIreturned to my house, Shyam (father ofaccusedDharmender) and one relative namely Deewan(Bhanja) had telephoned me andasked, if Ican give motorcycle to them, on whichIreplied them,Ican give Crl.A. /18(to t)e nuinhere(t) Page11of19 Ramesit Vs State (GNCTD) Ors. \r motorcycle along with other dowry artcles as per my means. Thereafter, marriage was solomnized on 30.04.2011. After three months of marriage, accused Shyam came to my house to take money for the vehicle. I told him thatI cannot arrange the moneyfor the same asIhad already told him prior to the marriage about thesame. The in laws and the husband of the deceased Soma used to beat and maltreat her also demanding the car. ^ The deceased along with the husband was residing at a rented''Mf^modgUo^^ in Sangam Viharfor abouttwoy^rstsbefofpfhis'^m^ent. " My daughter used^ttOt tell to smy. wife that i" KM 4-A T acctised persons used'.tglf^qafand torfur.e'he^^and she was not telling mfcgsf;s09wasfeeling^tlratI will be tensed..." „ ^ \\ ■■ i;, Y|4-i, j| |1
17. Brother of the deceased wdsl^xamihed as PW-3 and mother of the deceased was examined as on the lines ofPW-1,:y. '"l"! rfldVj father ofthe deceased that theifdspp.Ments?^^^ making ^ demand far afour wheeler,
18. A conjoint reading oftestimdhies dStfiese^withesses goestoshowthat the alleged demand of dowry^^ms^gdheral. The witnesses failed to ascribe thai the deceased was harassed "soon before her death" for or in connection with demand of dowry. It is pertinent to mention here that during cross examination, PW-1 categorically stated that "It is correct that 1 had siven all the articles for domestic and daily use as per my own wish." Pie further added that It is correct that my daughter was stavinson rentedaccomodation along with her husband before the time ofdelivery". From the testimonies of these material Crl.A. /18(to be numbered) 19 Ramesh VsState(GIS'CTD)& Ors. \b witnesses, it emerges that,the deceased was residing with her husband separately in a rented accomodation for two years before the incident. The alleged ill treatment, harassment and cruelty meted to the deceased is merely hearsay, speculative, arbitrary and based on no verifiable data. The general Rule ofevidence is that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Hence, we find it difficult to accept that the in-laws used to harass and torture the deceased on a regular basis.
19. So far as the contention regarding cruelty is concerned,it is essential to extract the said section and lay emplmsis'^on.it, i,..... ^ Scction?498A. HusBand or relativeyOBBiusband of a wp'man ■subjecdn^''^m0qycnielt)^>'^h&jp^er, beififfdBe husband 6rfth3f0atpe of tHkhusonnd V Vx of a.woman, subieets^kiehWPV^^^ to cruelty-shall be punished with imfjri$^rm^ntfor a term whi^h may extendto threeyfar^fc^dshallalso be liable ^ il l' tofine..; - / "SIX-.' ■c^.r.r t/ (a) afiyfwilfMfionduct which ispofsiXph,fifidture as is likely to drive'the Womanft/O^ommitfsm^ or to cause gravO life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the wotnan; or (b), harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demandfor any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related.to her to meet such demand." CrLA. /18(io h^/numbered) Page13 of19 Ramesh Vs State (GNCTD) & Ovs. n
20. On a plain reading of Section 498A it transpires that if a married woman is subjected to cruelty by the husband or his relative, the offender is liable to be punished with the sentence indicated in the Section. But cruelty can be ofdifferent types and therefore what kind of cruelty would constitute offence has been defined under the explanation. As per first definition contained in Clause(a)it means a willfiil conduct of such a nature which is likely to drive the victim woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injuries to health and life, limb or health(mental-ofphysieaB-. Toother definition ofcruelty is in Clause(b)andis afi^aefed when a woman isNharassed with a view to coercing her^br^^y ofhel5rMti&i^^^ ahy'^jiml^ful demand for any prope^td^valuabl^sdemtfe® account^of^failure to meet ^ // cc'r ■ ^ \\ suchdein^nd. |
21. Under th^ present case the)pi-fe^eMon has failed to prove that the victim was subjected to Jfdeltw,-s|f0^^^ her deatli and that the incident leking t6^^db^l«ii,npt^hn|^ |he Appellant is Wttfiefflsasw-' //' contending thd^afefor^such harassmenTwliich'^alls squarely under Clause(b)ofthe^5^ti^^lf_^^i^^ofthe IPC.Butthey were unable to produce any~crear~evidence for the same; conviction cannot be done on general statements ofthe appellant so we find no good reasonto take a differentview thanthatofthetrial court.
22. The Apex Court held the same view in the case of, Gopal vs.State of Rajasthan:AIR2009SC1928,relevantportionis quoted below:
12. Sofar as Section 498A(b)is concerned, there must be an evidence ofdemand ofdowry. There is no evidence in that regard adduced by the prosecution. That being so, as rightly contended Crl.A. /18(to benumbered) Page14of19 Rantesit VsState(GNCTD)& Ors. J by learned Counsel for the appellant Section 498A(b)has no application.
23. The learned Trial Court has alternately charged the resondents for the offence punishable under Section 306 IPG. Section 306 IPG reads as under: "Section 306; Abetment of suicide - If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonmentofeither-descriptionfor a term which may^e^ind to fon'iyeaf;sjMhd:.^sJiall also be liableto..fite.X^%^^^ ^
24. In the instant pase^ P\%9,hpr.^l|^MQBhardwaj conducted the // Aj ^ postmortem,opined that, injuries afe^caiised due to the ■ // \l deceased/falling from the^teiTaepiSpM^ second floor ibf her house. 11 ° 'r irvv^'A w U IT i 1 Accordirig to this witness,i^juFieso^^ and 11 being self-inflicted are \i ■ I- lA/atl
25. The alleged incident is stated to have been witnessed by PW-8, Krishan Kumar, a neighbour, who was standing on the terrace at the relevanttime.PW-8 deposed that: ".../saw that one lady Shobha hadfallenfrom the roofofher house. When i come down and after taking tea Isaw that the relatives ofShobha had taken her to hospital.Ihad not noticed as to what ^ Shobha was doingon the roofofher house.Later onIcometO'fft^Jl^at=Shobhq^dd^expireddueto injury:feceiveddi)y Tier. Police official had- visited /ffh. ^ myMbuse-dhdre:e^rfi'dkfhylStatement.'.H%}^ if %^\ li: ci?" ^
26. From the//perusal of the rChbhhsM^^^^ pertinent to mention that the railing oriithe roof,wheretbieldeceasea was standing priorito her death, n irnm " // was onlyi[2].[5] ft. in height./^-S,Qphe:<^^ ofa person slipping and falling from ther&V^ann^)t^JbA deposed in his examination ifedhte^thatT/saw that on§'Addf0hdblfa hadfallenfrom the roofofher/2pM^^^'%^fesfhMistated'^iiout'th^^^^ ofany other person on the roof. FhrthermorepqE)rr''D.N. Bhardwaj, Professot, Forensic Medicine, AIIMS hospital had opined that ""'the cause of death in our opinion was shock due to head injury alongwith spinal injury caused by blunt force impact and it is possible fall from height": So the medical evidence ascertains that the injuries sustained by the deceased were due to the fall only. Moreover, as discussed earlier the charge ofcruelty against the accused persons has not been proved. Taking into account the facts of the present case, the CrLA. /18(to be numbered) Page16of19 likelihood ofthe deceased falling from the roofaccidentally cannot be ruled out.
27. It is a settled law that while deciding an appeal filed by the complainant, in case two views are possible, the High Court must not grant leave, if the trial court has taken one of the plausible views,in contrast thereto in an appeal filed against acquittal. Upon re-appraisal of evidence and relevant material placed on record, in case the High Court reach^^_CGnclusion that another view can reasonably be takeuf'then fthefyieww.wBidhvfavours the accused, should be adpptqd'Uhless thei^High Cod^l';^umyes at a definite conclusion,4iiaQhe findi|i|s^^e§td|dp5^thetrM courtare perverse, the HighACouft would frpfisfrfrsiitMe its own views\ on a totally [i " rli-Ffprpnti-nprc-np'f'.tiA/p* t different(perspective. ff||
28. In Chan^jrappa v.State ofJ^amaipKax^ in(2007)4SCC415, % If the Apex iSpurt has-eujleaput?tfre¥6frp^ powers of the appellat^Co,^fes^VMle'%eallig^ffi an;i^ppedlvagainst an order of acquittal: "42. From ikemlSri^e^ieoi^ considered view, thefollowing geheVdr'principles regarding powers ofthe appellate court while dealing with an appealagainstan order ofacquittalemerge:
1. An appellate court hasfull power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order ofacquittalisfounded.
2. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1873 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions offactandoflaw. CrLA. /18(to be numbered) P 17of19 9A
3. Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sujjicient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of f'lourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance ofan appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power ofthe court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
4. An appellate fOuH, hear in mind thgCfii^ h6^quitta^fiihere>^ double presumptioriinfavpur^f&the accusedf^^irstly, the presumption of£inh0c'eM:ffit0.ypvaild%ie^ td\him unde^ffhe fimd^0edg^^iple ofterminal jurisprudence tK^^0^^^person sHaU \pe Resumedto beinn^b0^0l:0she.isprovedguilp By a competent law. Secondly, t^e accused having his acquittal, the presumption is further reinfbrcedfM(rjljm$i^^ byfihe trial:CoUrtypr^' //
5. If-tyjdyfehsohajDle conclusidhs Urppqssible on the basif\ofthd^eyideme"^mr^hrjdfiki''appellate court should'^mf^pturJDrs^fhpjfM ofacquittal recorded by the tridrCuuftA'
29. In the case ofState ofMadhyaPradesh v.DalSingh & Ors.,reported at 2013 (8) SC 625, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the appellate court while considering the appeal against thejudgment of acquittal shallinterfere only whenthere are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so and ifthejudgment is unreasonable and relevant Crl.A. /18(to benumbered) Page18of19 Ramesit VsState(GNCTD)& Ors. u ■i materials have been unjustifiably ignored, it would be a compelling reason for interference.
30. Keepingin view the aforesaid settled law andthe material available on record, we sum up with the conclusion that the learned Trial Court has rightly observed that the appellant failed to prove its case against the respondents beyond reasonable doubt. In view of the present circumstances, the appeal stands dismissed. GRA SEHGAL, J DECEMBER liT?,2018 /afa H SAN THMRIDUL, J SID Crl.A. /18(to be numbered) Ramesh Vs State (GNCTD) & Ors. Page19 of19