AMCP Edutech Private Limited and Abhinay Sharma v. Rankers Gurukul and Aditya Ranjan

16. The submissions made by Ms. Trivedi have been further controverted by Mr. Jain in his rejoinder submissions.

17. He reiterates that the allegations made by the defendants in the defamatory posts have not been justified in the reply, and any alleged counter-defamatory content cannot justify the defendants’ action without filing any separate legal action. Civil Appeal No.5391 of 2025

18. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record.

19. The law with respect to the grant of an injunction is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in the case of Hazrat Surat Shah Urdu Education Society v. Abdul Saheb[7] recognized a three-part test while granting an interim injunction, requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case and a balance of convenience in its favour, and that irreparable injury would be caused if the injunction is not granted. The aforesaid principles were reiterated by the Supreme Court in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh[8] while delineating the provisions of Order XXXIX of CPC. The Court held as under: -

JT 1988 (4) SC 232

1992) 1 SCC 719 particular act. It is in the nature of preventive relief to a litigant to prevent future possible injury. In other words, the court, on exercise of the power of granting ad interim injunction, is to preserve the subject matter of the suit in the status quo for the time being. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the court satisfying that (1) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and that an act, on the facts before the court, there is probability of his being entitled to the relief asked for by the plaintiff/defendant; (2) the court's interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words, irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at trial; and (3) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction will be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it.”

20. This Court has reiterated the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforementioned cases, in Dr. Rashmi Saluja V. Religare Enterprises[9]. The well-settled legal principle that no injunction can be granted unless the three essential conditions are satisfied, namely, the existence of a prima facie case, a balance of convenience in favour of the applicant, and the likelihood of irreparable injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms, has been applied to the facts therein. The relevant extract of the Rashmi Saluja reads as under:-

2025: DHC: 701 from seeking an injunction, and the Court would be justified in refusing the relief of injunction. On this aspect,reference can be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hazrat Surat Shah Urdu Education Society v. Abdul Saheb[2]. The relevant portion of the said decision reads as under:- “No doubt the District Judge held that there was no prima facie case in the respondent's favour but he further recorded a positive finding that even if the plaintiff respondent had prima facie case there was nobalance of convenience in his favour and if any injury was caused tohim on account of the breach of contract of service he could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money therefore he wasnot entitled to any injunction. The High court failed to notice that evenif a prima facie case was made out, the balance of convenience and the irreparable injury were necessary to exist. The question whether the plaintiff could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money for the injury which may be caused to him on account of the breach of contract of service was not considered by the High court. No temporary injunction should be issued unless the three essential ingredients are made out, namely:(i) prima facie case,(ii) balance of convenience,(iii) irreparable injury which could not be compensated in terms of 2JT 1988 (4) SC 232.11money. If a party fails to make out any of the three ingredients he would not be entitled to the injunction and the court will be justified in declining to issue injunction. In the instance case the respondent plaintiff was claiming to enforce the contract of service against the management of the institution. The refusal of injunction could not cause any irreparable injury to him as he could be compensated by way of damages in terms of money in the event of his success in the suit. The respondent was therefore not entitled to any injunction order. The District Judge in our opinion rightly set aside the order of the Trial Court granting injunction in favour of the plaintiff respondent. The High court committed error in interfering with that order.”

21. The aforesaid principle has been relied upon by this Court consistently in Hari Krishan Sharma v. MCD[3], I.K. Mehra v. Wazir Chand Mehra[4], and B.M.L. Garg v. Lloyd Insulations (India) Ltd[5]. In light of this well-settled legal position, it is evident that an applicant seeking an injunction must establish all three essential ingredients, i.e., prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury. These ingredients must be satisfied concurrently, and the inability of the applicant to establish even one would render the applicant ineligible for obtaining the injunctive relief.

22. The cardinal principles for the grant of temporary injunction were further considered in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh wherein the Supreme Court observed as follows:- “5…Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in“irreparable injury” to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that“the balance of convenience” must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties, if the injunction is refused and compare it with that which is likely to be caused to the other side if the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities of likelihood of injury and if the Court considers thatpending the suit, the subject matter should be maintained in status quo,an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.”

23. The Court further held in Dalpat Kumar, that the phrases “prima facie case”, “balance of convenience” and “irreparable loss” are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by ingenuity in the given facts and circumstances of each case. These principles are to be applied with judicial discretion, such that, the relief granted aligns with the ends of justice.”

21. Thus, the cardinal principles of irreparable harm, prima facie case, and balance of convenience have an application in all cases where the Court exercises such power. The interplay of these principles in defamation suits seeking permanent injunction as an interim protection has been succinctly dealt with by this Court in various cases.

22. In Tata Sons Limited v. Greenpeace International,10 this Court, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466 while refusing an injunction, reaffirmed the well-established principle laid down in Bonnard to hold that an interim injunction restraining publication in defamation proceedings shall not be granted unless it is unequivocally demonstrated that the defendant’s defence of justification is bound to fail at trial. In this case, reliance was placed on the authorities of English jurisprudence, including Fraser v. Evans, wherein it was reiterated that the Courts will not interfere with the publication of allegedly defamatory material where the defendant asserts an intention to justify the statement or rely on fair comment on a matter of public interest, as it is not within the judiciary’s purview at the interlocutory stage to usurp the constitutional role of the jury in adjudicating such defences. It was reiterated that the Court will invariably not grant an interim injunction to restrain the publication of defamatory material, as it would be unreasonable to fetter the freedom of speech before the full trial takes place, where each of the parties can argue in detail with the help of additional evidence.

23. In San Nutrition Private Limited vs. Arpit Mangal and Ors. 11,the Court noted the inherent clash between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the protection of reputation under Article 21 of the Constitution. The plaintiff therein sought a permanent injunction against influencers who posted allegedly defamatory, disparaging, and trademarkinfringing content on YouTube and Instagram. The Court emphasized the necessity of striking a balance between the influencers’ right to free expression and the business entities’ right to safeguard their reputation against misinformation, thereby delineating the limits of lawful criticism in 2025 SCC OnLine Del 2701 digital discourse. The relevant extract of the aforesaid decision reads as under:- “3 Interim Injunction in cases of Defamation and Disparagement

53. The courts in India have consistently followed the Bonnard principle as laid down in the judgment of the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) in Bonnard v. Perryman14, wherein it was held that an interim injunction should not be granted unless the defence set up by the defendant was bound to fail in trial. It was held that the courts must exercise exceptional caution while granting injunction before trial in defamation cases as it impinges upon the right to free speech of an individual. In the aforesaid case, the Court agreed that the character of publication was libellous, however, it was observed that the defence of justification raised by the defendant can only be tested in a trial. Hence, the interim injunction was refused. The relevant extracts of the said judgment are set out below: “… But it is obvious that the subject-matter of an action for defamation is so special as to require exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent an anticipated wrong. The right of free speech is one which it is for the public interest that individuals should possess, and, indeed, that they should exercise without impediment, so long as no wrongful act is done; and, unless an alleged libel is untrue, there is no wrong committed; but, on the contrary, often a very wholesome act is performed in the publication and repetition of an alleged libel. Until it is clear that an alleged libel is untrue, it is not clear that any right at all has been infringed; and the importance of leaving free speech unfettered is a strong reason in cases of libel for dealing most cautiously and warily with the granting of interim injunctions.” [emphasis supplied]

54. In Fraser v. Evans15, the Court of Appeal (England and Wales) followed the Bonnard principle and held as follows: “…in so far as the article will be defamatory of Mr. Fraser, it is clear he cannot get an injunction. The court will not restrain the publication of an article, even though it is defamatory, when the defendant says he intends to justify it or to make fair comment on a matter of public interest. That has been established for many years ever since (Bonnard v. Perryman, [1891] 2 Ch. 269). „The reason sometimes given is that the defences of justification and fair comment are for the jury, which is the constitutional tribunal, and not for a Judge. But a better reason is the importance in the public interest that the truth should out. …” [emphasis supplied]

55. The aforesaid principle laid down in Bonnard (supra) and followed in Fraser (supra) was also adopted by the Supreme Court of India in Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment16. The Supreme Court observed that grant of an interim injunction may have severe ramification on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public's right to know, hence unless the content is „malicious‟ or „palpably false‟, interim injunction should not be granted. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 of the judgment in Bloomberg (supra) are set out below:

24. Furthermore, the Court in Ruchi Kalra v. Slowform Media12 2025:DHC:2024 reiterated that the right to reputation is a valuable constitutional right, yet it is not an unfettered or absolute right. It was observed that such a right must be balanced against the constitutionally protected right of freedom of speech and of the press.

25. Thus, the Court held that the protection of reputation must be exercised subject to the recognised exceptions and defences available, namely truth or justification, fair comment, and privilege, and the remedy of an interlocutory injunction is to be treated as an exceptional, last-resort measure rather than the norm. In framing the legal test for interlocutory relief in defamation suits, the Court reaffirmed the orthodox tripartite test of prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury not reparable in damages, but adapted it to the special nature of defamation. The Court explained that in defamation matters, the Courts must additionally apply the longstanding common-law cautions derived from the Bonnard principle and its progeny.

26. It was further held that an injunction is warranted only in the (i) clearest of cases where the impugned statement is unambiguously and manifestly defamatory on its face (ii) where there are no real or tenable grounds on which the defendant could rely such as truth or qualified privilege, (iii) where damages would plainly be an inadequate remedy because the harm is continuing and cannot realistically be compensated, and where there is evidence of a real intention or risk of repetition or continued publication.

27. The Court distilled rules for the grant of an interim injunction in the digital age. It held that when the defendant pleads truth, the plaintiff must show overwhelmingly that the truth-defence cannot succeed. It further held that the allegedly defamatory character of the material must be apparent without contentious extrinsic evidence. The Court observed that where the publication concerns a matter of public interest or is investigative or reporting material, Courts must be slow to restrain discussion unless malice, gross negligence, or a total absence of veracity is established. The Court emphasised that public figures attract greater civic scrutiny and that journalistic expression, particularly on matters of public interest, enjoys a wide ambit which the courts must not clamp down upon lightly.

28. It is also pertinent to note herein that the Supreme Court in Wikimedia Foundation addressed the countervailing danger of indiscriminate takedown orders against intermediaries and the need to protect freedom of speech. The Supreme Court found the direction by this Court to take down pages and discussions hosted on Wikipedia to be disproportionate: while recognising that courts can, in exceptional circumstances, restrict publication where there is a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the fair trial or administration of justice, such preventive measures must meet the criteria set out in Reliance Petrochemicals Limited Vs. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers13 and Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India14.

29. Upon the aforesaid conspectus of law, the defamatory content and the averments made by the learned counsel are to be examined.

30. In the instant case, the relevant defamatory content, which is claimed to be undefendable, has been extracted by the plaintiff by way of the following chart: Batao na jara bacchon ko apna kaala chhitta. Tell the children your wrongdoings. Batao na ki paise lekar ke kaise paper bana rahe the. Tell how you take money and get the papers made. Fraud hai app. Har Jagah dhokha diya. You are a fraud. You keep cheating everywhere. Har Kisi ko dhokha diya aapne. You keep cheating everyone. Khud paise lekar ke solver bane. Bool gaye? You‟ve pocketed money and solved papers for kids. Have you forgotten? Ki jo kal ke paper mein question aana hai, Abhinay Sharma aaj who question pehle se kyon kar raha hai? Kaise aa gye the tumhare paas mein us samay saare questions? The question coming in the paper tomorrow, how come Abhinay Sharma is getting his hands on them today? How have the questions come to you at an opportune time?

30. It is thus seen that, inter alia, three serious allegations appear to have compelled the plaintiff to approach this Court, i.e.,

(i) Plaintiff no.2 has been called a ‘fraud’

(ii) Plaintiffs are stated to be cheating students

(iii) Plaintiff no.2 is stated to pocket money and solve papers for students.

31. The video in question, dated 25.08.2025, extends to a duration of over 55 minutes. The defendants have stated that the said video is uploaded as a purported response to certain allegations earlier made by plaintiff No. 2, against the defendants on 24.08.2025.

32. Although Ms. Trivedi, learned counsel, has sought to draw the attention of this Court to various averments contained in the video dated 24.08.2025, purportedly in justification of the defendants’ conduct, this Court remains cognizant of the fact that in the present suit, the subject matter for adjudication is the alleged defamatory content disseminated by the defendants on 25.08.2025.

33. Thus, the pivotal question before the Court is whether the justification offered by the defendants to such impugned content, at this stage, satisfies the legal test of veracity.

34. At this juncture, it is also imperative to take note of the order dated 04.08.2023, passed by the CBI Court, wherein the chargesheet in the said case has been reproduced. Paragraph No.16.[6] of the order dated 04.08.2023 reads as under: “(16.6) Ms. Sonam wife of Shri Dharmender appeared in CGL Tier-11 from M/s Bells Institute of Management Studies, Shimla on 20.02.2018. In order to ensure her success in the said exam her husband Shri Dharmender entered into a criminal conspiracy with Shri Sandeep Mathur @T. T@Sandy, his college time friend. In furtherance of the criminal conspiracy Shri Dhamender and Sandeep visited Delhi and requested Shri Abhinay Sharma to help Ms. Sonam in solving her Quantitative Ability (QA) exam scheduled for 20.02.2018. Shri Abhinay Sharma in order to confirm the news of leakage of question paper of the SSC CGL Exam, in last few days Exam agreed to help. Again Shri Sandeep Mathur @ T.T. visited Shri Abhinay Sharma and provided questions of the SSC CGL Tier II exam dated 17.02.2018 and 18.02.2018 in a pen drive containing questions of candidate Anoop and Deepak Rana. On 20.02.2018 Shri Sandeep Mathur again visited Shri Abhinay Sharma in Mukherjee Nagar and obtained unauthorized remote access of the question paper of Ms. Sonam with assistance of Shri Dharmender. While remote access of Ms. Sonam's PC was taken she was aware that control of her computer screen has been taken and efforts to help her were underway. However, Shri Abhinay Sharma in order to avoid help passed time and did not solve the questions resultantly Ms. Soonam could not be helped.”

35. It would thus appear from the record of proceedings that one Ms. Sonam, wife of Shri Dharmender, had appeared in the SSC CGL Tier-II examination from M/s Bells Institute of Management Studies, Shimla, on 20.02.2018. It was the specific case of the prosecution in that matter that, in order to secure her success in the said examination, her husband, Shri Dharmender, entered into a criminal conspiracy with his college-time friend, Shri Sandeep Mathur @ T.T. @ Sandy.

36. In furtherance of the said conspiracy, it was alleged that Shri Dharmender and Shri Sandeep Mathur travelled to Delhi and approached Shri Abhinay Sharma, the plaintiff no.2 herein, requesting his assistance in enabling Ms. Sonam to solve her Quantitative Ability paper scheduled for 20.02.2018. It was further alleged that plaintiff no.2, with the objective of ascertaining whether there had indeed been leakage of question papers of the SSC CGL examination in the preceding days, agreed to extend his support.

37. It is also alleged that thereafter, Shri Sandeep Mathur @ T.T. @ Sandy once again visited the plaintiff no.2 and handed over a pen drive containing the questions of the SSC CGL Tier-II examination held on 17.02.2018 and 18.02.2018. Said pen drive allegedly contained the question papers pertaining to candidates, namely Anoop and Deepak Rana.

38. A careful perusal of the allegations would further disclose that, on 20.02.2018, Shri Sandeep Mathur once again visited the plaintiff no.2 at Mukherjee Nagar, whereupon unauthorized remote access of Ms. Sonam’s question paper was allegedly procured with the assistance of Shri Dharmender.

39. It also emerges from the record that during the course of such alleged remote access, Ms. Sonam was conscious that control of her computer screen had been taken over, and that attempts were being made to aid her in answering the paper. However, as per the allegations, plaintiff no.2, with a view to abstaining from extending actual help, merely passed the time and refrained from solving the questions, with the consequence that Ms. Sonam ultimately received no assistance.

40. It is further recorded in the concluding portion of the prosecution’s case that the plaintiff no.2 was not eventually arrayed as an accused in the said matter. Nevertheless, the fact remains that his alleged complicity was subjected to investigation by the CBI.

41. It may also be noted that the case in which the role of plaintiff No.2 was investigated continues to remain pending adjudication before the Court of competent jurisdiction, and the proceedings therein are yet to attain finality.

42. Under the aforesaid circumstances, it is evident that the content impugned by the plaintiff, albeit containing imputations of fraud, dishonesty, and involvement in malpractices, cannot at this stage be categorised as manifestly defamatory.

43. The remarks made in the impugned video are intertwined with ongoing criminal proceedings, wherein the plaintiff’s name has surfaced during the investigation, although plaintiff no.2 was never made an accused at any stage. The video has been justified as only apprehending the plaintiff’s role in the investigation.

44. Further, the alleged defamatory statements relate to matters of public importance, particularly the integrity of competitive examinations and allegations of corruption. Therefore, the dispute falls within the scope of ongoing public debate, and at this stage, judicial interference by way of an injunction would be premature and disproportionate.

45. In addition, the plaintiff has failed to establish that damages would be an inadequate remedy. The harm pleaded is reputational in nature and is amenable to compensation, if ultimately found to be unjustified.

46. Consequently, the Court finds that the allegation and counterallegation made by the plaintiff against each other will need to be investigated during the course of trial, once the parties are fully allowed to adduce their respective evidence.

47. At this stage, it is also pertinent to observe that the parties herein are profit-making entities earning substantial revenue through their respective YouTube channels. Any reputational harm alleged by the plaintiffs, even if assumed to have some basis, is compensable in monetary terms by way of damages. Thus, no irretrievable prejudice would ensue to the plaintiffs in the interregnum so as to warrant an injunction.

48. In the facts of the present case, the plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the existence of any strong prima facie case which would justify curtailing the defendants’ freedom of expression at the threshold. Equally, the plea of irreparable injury is devoid of substance. The alleged injury is confined to the realm of reputation and business standing, both of which are capable of being quantified and recompensed in damages, should the plaintiffs ultimately succeed. As reiterated by this Court in Ruchi Kalra, where damages are an adequate remedy, equitable relief in the form of an injunction must be eschewed.

49. As regards the balance of convenience, it tilts decidedly against the plaintiffs. An order of injunction at this juncture would have a chilling effect upon the right of free speech and fair comment on matters of undeniable public importance. On the other hand, permitting the defendants to continue with their publications, subject to the outcome of the trial, causes no such disproportionate prejudice to the plaintiff that cannot be remedied later.

50. It is also a settled proposition that the grant of an injunction upon publication is an exception rather than the rule and must be invoked sparingly, if at all, and only in cases where manifestly false and scurrilous imputations are prima facie established.

51. However, on a prima facie perusal of the material, the Court finds that the action of the defendants cannot be said to be completely unjustified or undefendable.

52. Under these circumstances, the Court rejects the instant application. All rights and contentions are left open.

53. Needless to state, nothing stated hereinabove shall be construed to be a finding on the merits of the case of either of the parties. CS(OS) 578/2025, I.A. 21032/2025 and I.A. 21033/2025 List the matter before the concerned Joint Registrar on 10.11.2025.

JUDGE SEPTEMBER 01, 2025 p/MJ