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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9597 OF 2018
TRANSMISSION CORPORATION OF
ANDHRA PRADESH LIMITED.....APPELLANT(S)
CABLES LIMITED.....RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
“Having heard learned counsel for the parties and being satisfied of the grounds shown, six days delay in preferring the appeal is condoned. I.A. No. 973 of 2018 stands disposed of.
Prima facie case has been made out by the Appellant in view of the part decree awarded by the competent court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the review application under Section 37
Civil Appeal No. 9597 of 2018
However, taking into consideration the fact that if appeal is allowed and Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is initiated against the Respondent – “Transmission
Corporate of Andhra Pradesh Ltd.’, the government undertaking may face trouble. Therefore, by way of last chance we grant one opportunity to respondents to settle the claim with the appellant, failing which this Appellate
Tribunal may pass appropriate order on merit.
Post the case ‘for admission’ on 4th October, 2018. Appeal may be disposed of at the stage of admission.”
2. Though, in the first brush, it appears that matter is still at the stage of admission and the aforesaid order is an interim order, a careful reading thereof would clearly bring out that the NCLAT perceives that the appellant herein owes money to the respondent and for this reason a chance is given to the appellant to settle the claim of the respondent, otherwise order would be passed initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (for short, ‘CIRP’). According to the appellant, no amount is payable and the order in question is causing serious prejudice to the appellant which is asked to settle the purported claim, failing which, to face insolvency proceedings. It may also be recorded at this stage itself that the appeal pending before NCLAT is filed by the respondent herein which is against the Orders dated April 09, 2018 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal (for short, ‘NCLT’), Hyderabad. By the said order, the NCLT has dismissed the petition filed by the respondent herein under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IBC’). To put it briefly at this stage, the NCLT, after detailed deliberations, has come to the conclusion that the Company Petition filed by the respondent was not maintainable as the claims which were preferred by the respondent against the appellant and on the basis of which respondent asserts that it has to receive monies from the appellant are not tenable and in any case these are not disputed claims. This assertion is based on the fact that these very claims of the respondent were subject matter of arbitration and the award was passed rejecting these claims as time barred. Moreover, the company petition itself suffers various fundamental defects. On that basis, NCLT held that there is a valid dispute, rather no dispute as issue in question was substantially dealt with by various courts as mentioned in the order passed by NCLT.
3. Before going into the details of the said order passed by NCLT it would be appropriate to refer to some important events in chronological order, which have a bearing on the present case.
4. The appellant is a Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh Government and is successor of Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (for short, ‘APSEB’) and is in the activities relating to transmission of electricity. It had awarded certain contracts to the respondent herein for supply of goods and services. Some disputes arose and the respondent initiated arbitration proceedings. As many as 82 claims were filed by the respondent before Haryana Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (hereinafter referred to as ‘Arbitral Council'). These proceedings culminated into Award dated June 21, 2010. The Arbitral Council came to the conclusion that the claims made on the basis of Invoice Nos. 1-57 were barred by law of limitation and, therefore, no amount could be awarded against the said claims. In respect of Invoice Nos. 58-82, the award was passed in favour of the respondent. In these proceedings, we are not concerned with the award in respect of Invoice Nos. 58-82.
5. Against the aforesaid award rejecting claims in respect of Invoice Nos. 1-57 as time barred, the respondent herein filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the Additional District Judge, Chandigarh. The Additional District Judge passed the order dated August 28, 2014 in the said application thereby remanding the case back to the Arbitral Council for fresh decision. Against this order, the appellant filed the appeal before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh. This appeal was allowed by the High Court by its order dated January 29, 2016 thereby setting aside the direction of the Additional District Judge remanding the matter to Arbitral Council for fresh consideration.
6. It may be mentioned at this stage that when the appeal was pending before the High Court, the respondent had moved an application for clarification/review of order dated August 28, 2014. This application was, however, dismissed on August 27, 2015. It may also be mentioned that insofar as order dated January 29, 2016 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court setting aside the order of the Additional District Judge remanding back the matter to the Arbitral Council is concerned, the appellant herein had filed an application for clarification of the said order under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. That application was, however, dismissed by the High Court.
7. The respondent herein filed execution petition under Order XXI Rule 21 of the CPC for execution of judgment dated January 29, 2016 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana as well as the award dated June 21, 2010 passed by the Arbitral Council. Insofar as award of Arbitral Council is concerned, as noted above the respondent’s claim pertaining to Invoice Nos. 58-82 was allowed and the execution thereof was sought. The respondent, however, filed another execution petition seeking execution of amount in respect of Invoice Nos. 1-57 also. This application was entertained and both the petitions were directed to be dealt with simultaneously vide orders dated August 17, 2016. That order was challenged by the appellant herein by filing Revision Petition before the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. The High Court vide its order dated November 08, 2016 allowed the said Revision Petition holding that there was no award in respect of claim towards Invoice Nos. 1-57 and, therefore, it was not permissible for the respondent to seek the execution. The relevant portion of the orders passed by the High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad is reproduced hereinbelow:
(ii) Whether the documentary evidence furnished with the application shows that the aforesaid debt is due and payable and has not yet been paid? and
(iii) Whether there is existence of a dispute between the parties or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceeding filed before the receipt of the demand notice of the unpaid operational debt in relation to such dispute? If any one of the aforesaid conditions is lacking, the application would have to be rejected. Apart from the above, the adjudicating authority must follow the mandate of Section 9, as outlined above, and in particular the mandate of Section 9(5) of the Act, and admit or reject the application, as the case may be, depending upon the factors mentioned in Section 9(5) of the Act. xx xx xx
37. It is now important to construe Section 8 of the Code. The operational creditors are those creditors to whom an operational debt is owed, and an operational debt, in turn, means a claim in respect of the provision of goods or services, including employment, or a debt in respect of repayment of dues arising under any law for the time being in force and payable to the Government or to a local authority. This has to be contrasted with financial debts that may be owed to financial creditors, which was the subjectmatter of the judgment delivered by this Court on 31-8- 2017 in Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank (Civil Appeals Nos. 8337-38 of 2017). In this judgment, we had held that the adjudicating authority under Section 7 of the Code has to ascertain the existence of a default from the records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial creditor within 14 days. The corporate debtor is entitled to point out to the adjudicating authority that a default has not occurred; in the sense that a debt, which may also include a disputed claim, is not due i.e. it is not payable in law or in fact. This Court then went on to state: (SCC p. 440, paras 29-30) “29. The scheme of Section 7 stands in contrast with the scheme under Section 8 where an operational creditor is, on the occurrence of a default, to first deliver a demand notice of the unpaid debt to the operational debtor in the manner provided in Section 8(1) of the Code. Under Section 8(2), the corporate debtor can, within a period of 10 days of receipt of the demand notice or copy of the invoice mentioned in sub-section (1), bring to the notice of the operational creditor the existence of a dispute or the record of the pendency of a suit or arbitration proceedings, which is pre-existing — i.e. before such notice or invoice was received by the corporate debtor. The moment there is existence of such a dispute, the operational creditor gets out of the clutches of the Code.
30. On the other hand, as we have seen, in the case of a corporate debtor who commits a default of a financial debt, the adjudicating authority has merely to see the records of the information utility or other evidence produced by the financial creditor to satisfy itself that a default has occurred. It is of no matter that the debt is disputed so long as the debt is “due” i.e. payable unless interdicted by some law or has not yet become due in the sense that it is payable at some future date. It is only when this is proved to the satisfaction of the adjudicating authority that the adjudicating authority may reject an application and not otherwise.” xx xx xx
42. This being the case, is it not open to the adjudicating authority to then go into whether a dispute does or does not exist?
43. It is important to notice that Section 255 read with the Eleventh Schedule of the Code has amended Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 so that a company being unable to pay its debts is no longer a ground for winding up a company. The old law contained inMadhusudan has, therefore, disappeared with the disappearance of this ground in Section 271 of the Companies Act.
44. We have already noticed that in the first Insolvency and Bankruptcy Bill, 2015 that was annexed to the Bankruptcy Law Reforms Committee Report, Section 5(4) defined “dispute” as meaning a “bona fide suit or arbitration proceedings…”. In its present avatar, Section 5(6) excludes the expression “bona fide” which is of significance. Therefore, it is difficult to import the expression “bona fide” into Section 8(2)(a) in order to judge whether a dispute exists or not.
45. The expression “existence” has been understood as follows: “Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the following meaning of the word “existence”: (a) Reality, as opp. to appearance. (b) The fact or state of existing; actual possession of being. Continued being as a living creature, life, esp. under adverse conditions. Something that exists; an entity, a being. All that exists. (P. 894, Oxford English Dictionary)” xx xx xx
51. It is clear, therefore, that once the operational creditor has filed an application, which is otherwise complete, the adjudicating authority must reject the application under Section 9(5)(2)(d) if notice of dispute has been received by the operational creditor or there is a record of dispute in the information utility. It is clear that such notice must bring to the notice of the operational creditor the “existence” of a dispute or the fact that a suit or arbitration proceeding relating to a dispute is pending between the parties. Therefore, all that the adjudicating authority is to see at this stage is whether there is a plausible contention which requires further investigation and that the “dispute” is not a patently feeble legal argument or an assertion of fact unsupported by evidence. It is important to separate the grain from the chaff and to reject a spurious defence which is mere bluster. However, in doing so, the Court does not need to be satisfied that the defence is likely to succeed. The Court does not at this stage examine the merits of the dispute except to the extent indicated above. So long as a dispute truly exists in fact and is not spurious, hypothetical or illusory, the adjudicating authority has to reject the application." The aforesaid principle squarely applied to the present case.
16. As a result, we allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order dated September 04, 2018 passed by the NCLAT. In a normal course, the matter should have been remanded back to the NCLAT for deciding the appeal of the respondent herein filed before the NCLAT, on merits. However, as this Court has gone into merits and found that order of the NCLT is justified, no purpose would be served in remanding the case back to the NCLAT. Consequence would be to dismiss the Company Appeal (80) (Insolvency) No. 366 of 2018 and miscellaneous applications filed by the respondent before the NCLAT. No order as to costs .............................................. J. (A.K. SIKRI) ............................................. J. (ASHOK BHUSHAN) NEW DELHI; OCTOBER 23, 2018