Girija Devi v. The State of GNCT of Delhi

16. Though there is nothing on record to indicate as to on what account the aforesaid letter was issued by the Principal of the school, yet, the contents thereof, on confronting the learned counsel for the MCD, were not denied. It is relevant to note that as on the date of the death of the appellant’s husband, he was discharging his duties as a Principal of the said school. It is quite logical and aligns with common sense to assume that the late husband of the appellant, who was discharging his duties as Principal of the said school, would be a person responsible to assign duties to the staff under him, including those related to COVID-19 duties. It would be quite illogical to expect that a school where COVID-19 related duties to the extent of administering COVID-19 vaccinations were being discharged by the staff, the Principal would have to assign himself COVID-19 related duties. After all, being the Head of the Institution, it is quite normal to expect such Head of the Institution to be present and supervise, while such duties i.e. COVID-19 duties are being discharged by the staff and the faculty under him. Undoubtedly, the late husband of the appellant would surely be exposed to the imminent danger of being vulnerable to contracting corona virus. The virulent nature of the virus is well known and being an air borne endemic, the late husband of the appellant would be extremely susceptible to exposure. It is well documented, that too, by medical experts all over the world that the corona virus was mutating and ever evolving into myriad versions of itself, posing the greatest challenges to the best and most fertile medical minds. Thus, a restricted and highly constricted view cannot be taken. Though, a submission was addressed on behalf of the learned counsel for MCD that this particular school at Nithari No.2/II, Rohini was not discharging any COVID-19 related duties, however, no document worth its salt was placed before this Court to indicate as to whether this particular school was or was not discharging any COVID-19 related duties at all.

17. The MCD, being the institution maintaining records of all its schools and other bodies, was obligated under law to produce all relevant materials to establish as to whether the school or its staff was or was not discharging COVID-19 related duties. In the absence of such positive documentary material, this Court is unable to appreciate such submissions and the same are found unmerited. For the same reason, we are unable to permit the MCD to resile from the letter dated 24.04.2023 issued by the Principal of the said school.

18. Having regard to the fact that the letter dated 24.04.2023 clearly specified that the late husband of the appellant was deployed on COVID-19 duties, it is clear that his death, on contracting novel corona virus was not only relatable but also attributable to the discharge of such specific duties. We are fortified in our above view by the judgment of this Court in Union of India & Anr. vs. Sangeeta Wahi & Ors.: 2025 SCC OnLine Del 164. Though the judgment of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in Sangeeta Wahi (supra) was rendered in respect of Insurance Scheme floated by Central Government for health workers during COVID-19, the rationale and ratio as to how such benevolent policies ought to be read, interpreted and implemented are squarely applicable to the facts of this case. This Court in the said judgment also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd vs. Nusli Neville Wadia: 2008 (3) SCC 279 wherein the doctrine of “purposive interpretation” was applied to harmoniously construct the real purpose and intent of the Government in rolling out a Welfare Act/Scheme. It would be relevant to extract para nos.11, 12 and 15 of Sangeeta Wahi (supra) hereunder:- “11. Before rendering our opinion, it is felt necessary to extract paras 8 and 9 of the impugned judgment dated 18.10.2023 to examine how pithily learned Single Judge has captured the situation on the ground at the relevant time when COVID-19 was just spreading its tentacles. Para 8 and 9 read thus: “8. Covid-19 Pandemic struck the country in March, 2020. Lakhs of persons lost their lives in the Pandemic. Police officials, healthcare workers, Doctors, Paramedics, etc. were braving the Pandemic and were in the line of duty to provide assistance to persons who fell victims to the life taking virus. Concerns had been raised regarding the country's healthcare system and its capacity to cope with the massive outbreak. Doctors, nurses, paramedical staff, including security staff in various hospitals, were working day and night to streamline the patients to ensure that the patients are screened at the earliest and are quarantined so that the virus does not spread. Persons who were affected by any fever were in a state of panic and not knowing what is to be done, they were rushing to hospitals not knowing where to go and whom to meet. People were crowding OPDs and the causality in the hospital to get themselves screened. At this juncture, it was these security guards, paramedical staff, who not only to ensured the safety of the hospitals but were also acting as guides by directing the patients to approach the correct centre. It, therefore, cannot be said that the security guards who were posted at various places were not in direct contact of Covid-19 patients. It is well known that Covid-19 virus spread through air and any patient who was coming to the hospital could have been infected by the virus, whether he/she was symptomatic or not. The patients got in touch with many service providers, be it security guards, nurses, paramedical staff, who might or might not have been posted in the Covid-19 ward. The Central Government, therefore, cannot take such a narrow approach that only such persons who were posted in the Covid-19 ward or centre only will be covered by the “Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package: Insurance scheme for health workers fighting COVID-19”. The Scheme was actually brought out as a measure to benefit the family members of persons who became martyrs in the line of duty while protecting thousands of persons affected by Covid-19 Pandemic. Taking such a narrow view actually goes against the spirit of the Scheme which was meant to provide immediate relief to persons who were tackling the situation and were protecting the lives of thousands of patients. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that any person having mildest of the symptoms of Covid-19 was getting himself/herself tested. Poor people who could not afford private testing centres were rushing to the Government hospitals. A normal person would never know that there is a special Covid-19 ward and his normal reaction would be to approach either the OPD desk or the casualty of the hospital to meet the Doctor. At that point of time, to streamline the queue, the services of the security guards were availed. The security guards were also directing the people to the Departments where the patients have to approach in order to get themselves treated. It, therefore, cannot be said that the late husband of the Petitioner herein, who died of Covid-19 which he may have contracted in the Hospital, was not in direct contact with the Covid-19 patients.

9. The Scheme has been brought out as a social welfare scheme and application of such schemes are not to be put in Procrustean beds or shrunk to Liliputian dimensions. Welfare Schemes must necessarily receive a broad interpretation. Where Scheme is designated to give relief, the Court should not be inclined to make etymological excursion [refer: Workmen v. American Express International Banking Corpn., (1985) 4 SCC 71].” To add to the above, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that not just this country but the whole world was in panic and admittedly no cure was available. The powerful countries of the world as well as the global medical services were brought to their knees in a couple of months, if not days. No one knew how to take precautionary measures and people were falling like ninepins. Thus, this case has to be examined and appreciated in such a context.

12. That said, judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the Ministry of Home Affairs had, vide the notification dated 24.03.2020, declared the spread of novel Coronavirus as “COVID-19 pandemic” based on a similar declaration by the World Health Organisation (WHO). According to the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 6th Edition, Volume - 2, published in 2007 defines “pandemic” as “spread or prevalent throughout a country, a continent or the world; of or pertaining to such a disease”. Undisputedly, the COVID-19 pandemic had engulfed the whole world in horrendous proportions. xxx xxx xxx

15. At this juncture it may be apposite to refer to the doctrine of “purposive interpretation” to harmoniously construct the real purpose and intent of the government in rolling out the aforesaid Scheme. Locus classicus on this, is the judgment of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Nusli Neville Wadia, (2008) 3 SCC 279. The relevant paragraph is reproduced hereunder: “51. Except in the first category of cases, as has been noticed by us hereinbefore, Sections 4 and 5 of the Act, in our opinion, may have to be construed differently in view of the decisions rendered by this Court. If the landlord being State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India is required to prove fairness and reasonableness on its part in initiating a proceeding, it is for it to show how its prayer meets the constitutional requirements of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For proper interpretation not only the basic principles of natural justice have to be borne in mind, but also principles of constitutionalism involved therein. With a view to read the provisions of the Act in a proper and effective manner, we are of the opinion that literal interpretation, if given, may give rise to an anomaly or absurdity which must be avoided. So as to enable a superior court to interpret a statute in a reasonable manner, the court must place itself in the chair of a reasonable legislator/author. So done, the rules of purposive construction have to be resorted to which would require the construction of the Act in such a manner so as to see that the object of the Act is fulfilled, which in turn would lead the beneficiary under the statutory scheme to fulfil its constitutional obligations as held by the Court inter alia in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. [(1990) 4 SCC 406]

52. Barak in his exhaustive work on “Purposive Construction” explains various meanings attributed to the term “purpose”. It would be in the fitness of discussion to refer to Purposive Construction in Barak's words: “Hart and Sachs also appear to treat ‘purpose’ as a subjective concept. I say ‘appear’ because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter should imagine himself or herself in the legislator's shoes, they introduce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the legislative body sought to fulfil their constitutional duties in good faith. This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had he or she acted reasonably.” (Aharon Barak, Purposive Interpretation in Law, (2007) at p. 87.)

53. In Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Maddula Ratnavalli [(2007) 6 SCC 81] this Court held: (SCC p. 90, para 22)

54. The provisions of the Act and the Rules in this case, are, thus required to be construed in the light of the action of the State as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. With a view to give effect thereto, the doctrine of purposive construction may have to be taken recourse to. (See Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Brij Mohan [(2007) 7 SCC 56: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 304: (2007) 7 Scale 753].)” Superimposing the aforesaid upon the present Scheme, it is manifest that the government had, keeping in view it being a welfare State, sought to extend its “parens patriae” obligation upon a category of citizens who would be most vulnerable to the onslaught of the novel Coronavirus. All individuals who were likely to be affected either directly or impacted indirectly while performing the duties and responsibilities cast upon them in the most vulnerable and highly likely areas where the virus could have spread even without being negligent about one's health, aka hospitals, public places with large gathering of people etc., to name a few, were to be covered by the said Scheme. On a pointed query, the learned counsel for the appellants fairly admitted that appellant no. 2/hospital was a declared “COVID-19 Hospital/Facility” at the relevant point in time. Following the said interpretation, it is obvious that the Scheme sought to cover all workers, call it “frontline health workers” or anything else, subject of course to their deployment in areas specified by the Scheme. To our mind, any interpretation other than the above, would defeat the purpose and object of the Scheme.”

19. Undoubtedly, the policy dated 13.05.2020 of the GNCT of Delhi is a welfare measure, conferring benefits upon a particular class of persons who lost their lives while rendering essential services during the COVID-19 pandemic. While examining applications under such beneficial policies, a narrow and pedantic view ought to be completely avoided. Though it is the bounden duty of the officers scrutinizing such applications to verify the same scrupulously, however, the intent behind such policies must not be lost sight of. We find, in the present case, that the letter dated 24.04.2023, though issued belatedly, has not been denied and points out clearly to the fact that the late husband of the appellant was indeed deployed on COVID- 19 duty apart from discharge of other duties. We have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the unfortunate demise of the late husband of the appellant was caused on account of contracting novel corona virus while discharging COVID-19 duties.

20. Though the respondents did not have the benefit of the letter dated 24.04.2023 while considering the application of the appellant and rejecting the same vide impugned letter dated 27.12.2021, we are of the considered opinion that relegating the appellant back to the situation of filing a fresh application having due regard to the said letter, may not subserve the interests of justice.

21. Accordingly, we direct the respondent no.1/GNCTD to process the application of the appellant having regard to letter of the Principal of the school dated 24.04.2023 and complete the payment as conferred under the Cabinet decision no.2835 dated 13.05.2020, within eight weeks from today. It is made clear that in case the amount as directed above is not released within the time stipulated above, the same shall attract simple interest @ 6% per annum for the period of delay.

22. In view of the above, the impugned judgment dated 28.11.2024 is set aside, and the appeal is allowed as directed above.

23. Pending applications stand disposed of.

24. Original records be returned to learned counsel for respondent no.1. TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J DEVENDER KUMAR UPADHYAY, CJ SEPTEMBER 04, 2025/rl/aj