Full Text
JUDGMENT
2026 INSC 225
┌────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ SLP (C) No. 10967 of 2024 Page 12 of 24 │ │ ‘The police force is a disciplined force. It │ │ shoulders the great responsibility of │ │ maintaining law and order and public order in │ │ the society. People repose great faith and │ │ confidence in it. It must be worthy of that │ │ confidence. A candidate wishing to join the │ │ police force must be a person of utmost │ │ rectitude. He must have impeccable character │ │ and integrity. A person having criminal │ │ antecedents will not fit in this category.’ │ │ (Para 35) │ │ 5.4. The purpose and utility of verification of a │ └────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
6. As is already stated, in the present case, the respondent was charged in respect of the offences under Sections 363, 366, 366/120B, 366A, 376(2)(c) which were the offences in the nature of grave moral turpitude. Every moral turpitude has its own counts and degree to become either abhorrent and unacceptable conduct, and would also amount to commission of offence under the law. In a given case, moral turpitude may not result into a legally proved guilt, and it may go unpunished for variety of reasons. Still however, it remains a conduct against decency, morality and norms practiced in the civil society inviting a serious discount and disability for such person in a given situation and given context.
6.1. In service law jurisprudence, mere involvement of a person in an offence or in a conduct amounting to moral turpitude without anything else may become relevant consideration to judge his fitness to the post and to assess credentials for allowing such a person into the employment.
7. The necessary conclusion from the parameters and principles summarised above, is that whether it is a question of recruiting a person into the service or continuing him in service or extending an employee some service benefit, his criminal antecedents, involvement in criminal activity, the conduct amounting to moral turpitude, registration of a criminal case as well as nature of his acquittal in a criminal case are all germane considerations to be applied. The employer who would be acting through a screening committee to sift such cases, has fairly a large realm of freedom to act, though without becoming arbitrary.
7.1. The area of discretion vested with the screening committee in this regard is wide enough to permit it to exclude a candidate or reject him for the purpose of giving appointment. In a given case where the facts are stark, mere involvement of a person in an alleged offence or in the act of moral turpitude may become sufficient enough to apply it as debilitating factor for such candidate to be offered employment. Antecedents of a candidate play an important role in the decision-making process by the screening committee. This dictum would operate with greater rigour when it comes to the recruitment and appointment to the disciplined force like police.
7.2. The position of law was highlighted again in the following observations by this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Parvez Khan[5], ‘…it is clear that a candidate to be recruited to the police service must be worthy of confidence and must be a person of utmost rectitude and must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged, it cannot be presumed that he was completely exonerated. Persons who are likely to erode the credibility of the police ought not to enter the police force.’ (Para 13) 7.2.1. It was further stated,
‘No doubt the screening committee has not been constituted in the case considered by this Court, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, in the present case, the Superintendent of Police has gone into the matter. The Superintendent of Police is the appointing authority. There is no allegation of mala fides against the person taking the said decision nor the decision is shown to be perverse or irrational.’ (Para 13)
7.3. The domain of considering the fitness and suitability of a candidate for the purpose of taking him in service belongs to the employer. A host of relevant consideration would legitimately find a place in the process of such consideration by the employer to decide whether it is feasible and advisable to offer employment to an aspirant. Where the employer or the screening committee of the employer has acted to discard, exclude or reject the candidature by applying relevant considerations and has not acted arbitrarily or whimsically, the courts have no role to interpose. Of course, a demonstrably mala fide approach by the employer would give room to the courts to exercise the power of judicial review.
8. In Mehar Singh (supra) and in Parvez Khan (supra), this court opined that the decision of the screening committee must be taken as final unless as it is shown to be mala fide. The screening committee also must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must examine the candidate with utmost care for the candidate’s character.
9. But for the above limited considerations namely arbitrariness, unreasonableness, whimsicalness or mala fide approach, the scope of judicial review on this score is extremely limited. The courts are not expected to override the wisdom of the employer in judging the suitability of a candidate and in considering the relevance of the antecedents of the candidate and would not substitute its own view.
9.1. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, the screening committee of the appellant rejected the candidature of the respondent for the post of constable (driver) in police force as per the decision dated 16.06.2017. What weighed with the screening committee was that the respondent was found to be involved in the serious offences such as kidnapping and abducting a minor girl and raping her, which was a conduct undoubtedly amounting to moral turpitude. The respondent, though acquitted in the criminal case, was exonerated only on the ground of benefit of doubt.
9.2. Learned Single Judge was justified in dismissing the petition upholding the decision of the screening committee. The judgment and order of learned Single Judge of the High Court, which was eminently just and legal, came to be reversed by the Division Bench of the High Court for not good reason, directing that the acquittal ought to have been treated as an honourable acquittal and required the appellant-employer to consider the respondent for appointment to the post. The Division Bench of the High Court thereby intruded into the functional realm of the screening committee and trampled upon its discretion which was validly exercised by the Committee to treat the respondent unsuitable to be employed in the police force.
10. For the foregoing discussion and reason, the impugned judgment and order dated 20.07.2023 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court allowing Writ Appeal No. 297 of 2023 cannot be sustained in eye of law. The same is set aside.
11. The appeal stands allowed. All Interlocutory Applications, as may be pending, will not survive in view of the disposal of the main appeal. ……..……………………………….., J. [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH] ……………………………..……….., J. [N.V. ANJARIA] NEW DELHI;