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Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal & Ors. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 56 OF 2019
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.8143 of 2018)
Sri Suresh Kumar Goyal and Others …Appellants
JUDGMENT
1. Leave granted. This appeal challenges the order dated 29.05.2018 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dismissing application preferred by the appellants under Section 482 CrPC being Application No.22324 of 2011.
2. Respondent No.2 filed Complaint No.3804 of 2009 in the Court of 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad on 02.12.2009 against Appellant Nos.1, 2 and 3 namely his father, brother and brother-in-law. The main allegations as set out in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 10 of the Complaint were as under:-
3. It was thus alleged that the appellants had betrayed and cheated Respondent No.2 and were guilty of offences punishable under Sections 406, 420, 467, 471, 323, 504, 506, 447 and 448 IPC. However, by his order dated 18.06.2010 the 3rd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad found that no ground to summon the appellants for trial was made out and the complaint being devoid of merits was liable to be dismissed under Section 203 CrPC. The aforesaid order was, however, set aside in Criminal Revision No.179 of 2010 preferred by Respondent No.2 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.2, Ghaziabad, who by his order dated 11.11.2010 remanded the matter with a direction to pass fresh orders after granting an opportunity of hearing to Respondent No.2. The appellants being aggrieved, preferred application under Section 482 CrPC being Application No.9156 of 2011 in the High Court. Said application was disposed of by the High Court on 23.03.2011 observing that if the appellants moved an application under Section 245(2) CrPC the same be heard and disposed of expeditiously.
4. Accordingly, an application under Section 245(2) CrPC was moved by the appellants. Paragraphs 6 to 15 of the application for discharge dealt with acquisition of shares of Reliance Industries Ltd.
5. Similarly, the acquisition of shares of M/s. Amrit Vanaspati Company Ltd. was also dealt with and it was asserted:-
6. The application for discharge was rejected by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Court No.3, Ghaziabad vide his order dated 14.06.2011. While so rejecting, it was observed that sufficient grounds to frame charges under Sections 420, 323 and 504 IPC were made out.
7. The aforesaid order was challenged by the appellants by filing application under Section 482 CrPC namely Application No.22324 of 2011. The High Court noted the contentions on behalf of the appellants as under: “As applicant no. 1 was not happy with the conduct of the opposite party no.2, he disowned him and also filed O.S. No.406 of 2007 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Ghaziabad for a decree of declaration. A criminal complaint was also initiated by applicant no.1 against the opposite party no.2 under Sections 420, 406, 409, 321, 323, 385, 442 IPC. … … … On 2.12.2009, the opposite party no. 2 filed a Complaint Case No.3884 of 2009 against the applicants on the ground that opposite party no. 2 had purchased shares from the Reliance Industries in the name of complainant and applicant no. 2. It is further alleged in the complaint that in the year 1997 and in the year 2006 by making forged signature of the complainant bonus shares were received by the applicants and original shares were also in the possession of the applicants. In spite of demand same has not been handed over to the complainant. It is further alleged in the complaint that applicants with mala fide intention on 9.10.2007 sent a letter to the company which was received to the company on 10.10.2007 and thereafter complainant on 15.8.2009 and 17.8.2009 sent mails to the company in this regard. It is submission of the learned counsel for the applicants that shares were purchased by the applicant no. 1, although they were also in the name of opposite party no.2. At no point of time any forgery has been committed and preparation of any act cannot be termed as forgery.”
8. However, the High Court observed that in a petition under Section 482 CrPC disputed questions of fact could not be gone into and whether the shares were purchased by the appellants or by Respondent No.2 was a matter of evidence and as such no interference was called for. The aforesaid application was thus dismissed by the High Court on 29.05.2018, which decision is presently under challenge.
9. In support of the appeal, it was submitted that the instant complaint was a counter blast after Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 by issuing an advertisement in the newspaper and swearing an affidavit to that effect; and after he had filed a civil suit seeking injunction against Respondent No.2 from coming to the house of the appellants and causing any hindrance; and after a criminal complaint was filed by the Appellant No.1 against Respondent No.2. It was submitted that as disclosed in the application under Section 245(2) CrPC, the entire funding for acquisition of the shares in question had come from Appellant No.1 in the year 1992-1993 when Respondent No.2 was a youngster aged about 24 years. In support of the assertion that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1, the photocopies of the concerned bank accounts were also placed on record. On the other hand, the learned counsel for Respondent No.2 reiterated the submission that the issue of ownership was essentially a question of fact which had to be decided in the pending complaint and that the matter ought not to be entertained in an application for discharge. In support of the submission that Respondent No.2 had acquired those shares from his own funds, reliance was placed upon a typewritten extract showing debit entries of Rs.1250/-, Rs.1250/- and Rs.500/- dated 04.05.1993, 08.06.1994 and 15.10.1994 which extract was however without any details.
10. This Court adjourned the matter to enable the parties to arrive at an amicable settlement whereafter the appellants agreed to withdraw all the cases filed by them against Respondent No.2 on the condition that similar such cases filed by Respondent No.2 against them also be withdrawn, giving quietus to all the proceedings between the parties. Respondent No.2, however, did not agree to the proposal.
11. The thrust of the allegations in the complaint is that the shares in question were acquired from the funds of the complainant, though they have always stood in the names of the complainant and his brother. It is also accepted that the shares have always been in the custody of the father i.e. Appellant No.1. Beyond mere allegation that the funds for acquisition came from his bank account, nothing has even been suggested by the complainant. The entries dated 04.05.1993, 08.06.1994 and 15.10.1994 relied upon by him are much after the issuance of 100 debentures by Reliance Polythene Ltd. on 15.04.1993. As detailed in the application under Section 245(2) CrPC the basic acquisition was these 100 debentures which investment, with the passage of time, got converted and progressed to the present level. The complainant was not even aware of these details. The allegations of beating and intimidation are of the year 1998 and completely devoid of any substance. The question is: are these aspects sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction to discharge the appellants or should the appellants be made to go through the rituals and rigour of trial.
12. While dealing with the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings at the stage of issuance of process, or at the stage of committal, or at the stage of framing of charges, that is to say before the commencement of actual trial, in the light of material placed on record by the accused, this Court in Rajiv Thapar and Others v. Madan Lal Kapoor[1] laid down as under:-
13. In the present case the shares in question, right since the date of acquisition have always been in the custody of Appellant No.1. The material on record is absolutely clear that the acquisition was from the funds of Appellant No.1. The complainant has merely alleged that the funds came from his bank account but beyond such allegations no material has been placed on record at any stage. The stand taken by the appellants in their application under Section 245(2) CrPC is quite clear that the shares can be sold in the market and the proceeds can be divided between Appellant No.2 and Respondent No.2. If Respondent No.2 is insisting on having complete ownership in respect of the concerned shares, the matter must first be established before a competent forum. We have considered the material on record through the steps indicated in Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (supra) and are convinced that the instant case calls for interference under Section 482 CrPC. Further, from the facts that Appellant No.1 had disowned Respondent No.2 and had filed civil proceedings seeking appropriate orders against them, we are also convinced that the present criminal complaint is nothing but an attempt to wreck vengeance against the father, brother and the brother in law of the complainant. The instant criminal complaint is an abuse of the process of Court and is required to be quashed.
14. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the orders passed by the Courts below and allow the application for discharge under Section 245(2) CrPC in complaint No.3804 of 2009 on the file of third Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad.
15. Since we have found that the initiation of complaint was not a bona fide exercise, we direct Respondent No.2 to pay a sum of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) within two months from today to each of the appellants by way of costs for initiating frivolous litigation..………..………..…..……..……J. (Uday Umesh Lalit)..………...………….……………J. (Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud) New Delhi, January 11, 2019.