Shail Shukla v. Delhi Development Authority

Delhi High Court · 28 Aug 2025 · 2025:DHC:7902
Jasmeet Singh
W.P.(C) 8519/2011
2025:DHC:7902
civil petition_dismissed Significant

AI Summary

The Delhi High Court dismissed the DDA's review petition, holding that ownership of a flat in a multi-storeyed building must be assessed by proportionate land share for eligibility under the Rohini Scheme, and review jurisdiction is limited and not a substitute for appeal.

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REVIEW PET. 217/2024
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 28.08.2025
W.P.(C) 8519/2011 & CM APPL. 31168/2024, CM APPL.
31170/2024, CM APPL. 41899/2024,CM APPL. 34526/2025
SHAIL SHUKLA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr Dilip Singh, Ms Maahi Singh, Mr Arnav Mehta, Mr R Kartik, Advs.
VERSUS
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .....Respondent
Through: Ms. Manika Tripathy, SC
WITH
Mr. Ashutosh Kaushik, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE JASMEET SINGH : JASMEET SINGH.J (ORAL)
JUDGMENT

1. The present review petition has been filed under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) and Section 151 of CPC read with Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India by the respondent i.e., Delhi Development Authority (“respondent- DDA”), seeking review of the judgement dated 16.10.2023 passed in W.P.(C) 8519/2011. In the said judgement, this Court passed the following directions:- “25. The petition is allowed and a writ of mandamus is issued directing the respondent to hand over possession of the plot reserved for the petitioner under the Rohini Scheme, being Plot No.23, Sector-1, Pocket-B, measuring 60 sq. mtrs. and execute the lease deed in her favour.”

2. The respondent-DDA aggrieved by the said judgment dated 16.10.2023 filed LPA bearing No. 292/2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn and the Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court granted liberty to the respondent-DDA to file a review petition against the judgment dated 16.10.2023 vide order dated 10.04.2024. Hence, the present review petition has been filed.

3. The present review petition has been primarily filed on the ground that review petitioner i.e., respondent-DDA has only recently discovered a document showing that the plinth area of the flat which was allotted to the petitioner on 16.07.1985 under the NPRS/HUDCO Scheme, 1979 (“NPRS Scheme”) is of 69.216 sq. mts. along with a courtyard of 6.82 sq. mts. It is submitted that since the petitioner already had an allotted flat under the NPRS Scheme on the date of her registration under the Rohini Residential Scheme, 1981 (“Rohini Scheme”), with a plinth area of 69.216 sq. mts., she was ineligible to get allotment under the Rohini Scheme, as per the eligibility clause being Clause 1(ii) of the terms and conditions of the Rohini Scheme and as per Nazul Land Rules. Hence, it is submitted that the petitioner’s registration under the Rohini Scheme is void ab-initio, reliance is placed on NOIDA v. Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (Dead) Thr. LRs., (2022) 5 SCC 591.

4. On the other hand, the petitioner opposes the review petition and states that the flat allotted to her under NPRS Scheme is on the ground floor of a multi-storeyed building, hence each individual flat owner’s proportionate share on the land is to be calculated and as long as such share is less than 67 sq. mts., she is entitled to allotment of plot under other DDA schemes. Further, it is also stated that the present review petition is not maintainable as it does not satisfy the conditions for review as provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC and that the contentions raised by the respondent-DDA that it recently discovered that the plinth area of the flat allotted to the petitioner under the NPRS Scheme is of 69.216 sq. mts. is false, since this averment was part of respondent-DDA’s pleadings in Writ Petition, counter affidavit, rejoinder, first LPA, first review petition in LPA, additional affidavit after remand and second LPA.

5. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and carefully pursued the documents on record.

6. The only issue that arises for consideration is whether the respondent- DDA has made out a case for reviewing the impugned judgment dated 16.10.2023.

7. The law with regards to the limited power of the Court in review is no longer res integra and there are catena of judgements by the Hon’ble Supreme Court expressly stating that such power shall be exercised when there is error apparent on the face of the record and is not to be substituted for an appeal[1]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214, has clearly laid down the scope of the Court’s power under review petition:- Shri Ram Sahu (dead) through Legal Representatives and Others v. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others, (2021) 13 SCC 1; S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy and Others, (2022) 17 SCC 255. “18. … Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC lays down the following grounds for review: a. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or could not be produced by them at the time the decree was passed; b. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and c. Any other sufficient reason.

19. This Court has laid down the following principles on the exercise of review jurisdiction[7]: a. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC; b. Error on the face of record must be an error which must strike one on a mere perusal and must not on a long drawn process; c. The power of review must not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits; d. The phrase “any other sufficient reason” means a reason that is analogous to the grounds specified in Order

8. Keeping in view the settled position of law with regard to the limited scope of a review petition, I shall proceed to deal with the contentions raised by the respondent-DDA.

9. Ms. Tripathy, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-DDA has drawn my attention to a document (marked as Annexure A-8 in the review petition) to show that the plinth area of the flat allotted to the petitioner under the NPRS Scheme is of 69.216 sq. mts. along with a courtyard of 6.82 sq. mts. The said document is extracted as under:-

10. While relying on the said document, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent-DDA states that as per Clause 1(ii) of the Rohini Scheme, a person who owns a flat/ plot, allotted by the DDA, on an area more than 65 sq. mts. are ineligible for allotment under Rohini Scheme and therefore, the petitioner who has a flat allotted under NPRS Scheme with plinth area of 69.216 sq. mts. along with a courtyard of 6.82 sq. mts., is not entitled to allotment under the Rohini Scheme. In furtherance of her contention, she has relied upon Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (supra). The said Clause 1 (ii) of the Rohini Scheme is extracted below:-

“1 (ii) The individual or his wife/her husband or any of his/her minor children do not own in full or in part on lease-hold or free-hold basis any residential plot of land or a house or have not been allotted on hire-purchase basis a residential flat in Delhi/New Delhi or Delhi Cantonment. If, however, individual share of the applicant in the jointly owned plot or land under the residential house is less than 65 Sq. mts., an application for allotment of plot can be entertained. Persons who own a house or a plot allotted by the Delhi Development Authority on an area of even less than 65 sq. mts. shall not, however, be eligible for allotment.”

11. The said contention raised by the respondent-DDA regarding the petitioner’s ineligibility to get allotment under Rohini Scheme as per Clause 1(ii) of the Rohini Scheme, because she has already been allotted a plot under NPRS Scheme, while relying on Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (supra), has already been dealt with in detail by this Court in the impugned judgement dated 16.10.2023.

12. Admittedly, the earlier allotment made to the petitioner under NPRS Scheme was of a flat on the ground floor in a multi-storeyed building and the aspect of a person acquiring a flat in a multi-storeyed building has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in DDA v. Jitender Pal Bhardwaj, (2010) 1 SCC 146, more particularly paragraphs No. 7 and 9, which read as under:-

“7. When a person acquires a flat in a multi-storeyed building, what he gets is co-ownership of the land on which the building is constructed and exclusive ownership/long-term lease of the residential flat. As per Clause 1(ii), where the individual share in the land on which the building stands, held by the allottee is less than 65 sq m, he is not barred from securing allotment from DDA. The other interpretation is that if the measurement of the flat is less than 65 sq m and the allottee owns only an undivided share in the land, corresponding to such flat, the benefit of exemption would be available to the applicant. xxxxxxxx 9. Though the intention of Development Authorities in general is to allot plots to the houseless, the policy and scheme has to be given effect with reference to the specific wording of the eligibility provision. If DDA wanted to bar everyone owning a plot/house/flat from securing an allotment, it could have made its intention clear by simply providing that “anyone owning or holding a long-term lease, any plot/house/flat in Delhi/New Delhi/Delhi Cantonment area, will be ineligible for allotment under this Scheme”. But DDA chose to make the eligibility clause subject to an exemption. If it chose to exempt certain categories, such exemption has to be given effect to. When the term of exemption is specific and unambiguous, it is not possible to restrict its applicability or read into it, a meaning other than the plain and normal meaning, on the assumption that the
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general object of the Scheme was different from what is spelt out in the term. Be that as it may.” (Emphasis added)

13. A bare perusal of the paragraphs reproduced above, categorically shows that a person having a flat would only be a co-owner in the proportionate area of the land and would only have exclusive ownership of his/her residential flat. In such scenario the area of the land falling under the share of each allottee of a flat in a multi-storeyed building would be reduced proportionately. Further, paragraph No. 9 of the said judgment clarifies that if the DDA wanted to bar everyone from owning a flat after securing an allotment under other DDA schemes, the same would have been explicitly stated. Once the DDA itself has made an exception, there is no requirement to read anything to the contrary.

14. Coming to the present scenario, the document annexed by the respondent-DDA (marked as Annexure A-8) depicts a table which shows the area of each floor of the multi-storeyed building in which the petitioner was allotted a flat under NPRS Scheme. Each flat owner in that building would have a proportionate share in the land underneath, as observed in Jitender Pal Bhardwaj (supra). The petitioner herein was allotted a flat on the ground floor, which as per the document has an area of 69.216 sq. mts. along with a courtyard of 6.82 sq. mts. Even if the area of the plot is taken as 69.216 sq. mts. along with a courtyard of 6.82 sq. mts., the proportionate share of the petitioner in the jointly owned plot of land would be much below 65 sq. mts., thereby, making the petitioner eligible for allotment as per Clause 1(ii) of the Rohini Scheme.

15. Further, the averment made by the respondent-DDA that this Court’s reliance on Jitender Pal Bhardwaj (supra) is wrong as the facts and the area of the flat of the first allotment are not similar, is rejected. The respondent-DDA avers that in case of Jitender Pal Bhardwaj (supra) the measurement of the flat was less than 65 sq. mts. whereas in the instant case, the petitioner owned a flat measuring more than 69.216 sq. mts. The same is not true. As observed above, though the area of the flat allotted to the petitioner under NPRS Scheme maybe more than 65 sq. mts., however, the proportionate share of the petitioner in the plot of land is less than 65 sq. mts., as the flat is in a multi-storeyed building having four flats (one on each floor). Hence, the observation made in paragraphs No. 7 and 9 in Jitender Pal Bhardwaj (supra) are applicable to the facts of the present case.

16. Other contentions raised by the respondent-DDA have been duly dealt with in depth in the judgment under review and are in the nature of challenging the judgement as if in appeal and the same fall outside the ambit and scope of review. It is settled law that a Court in a review petition is not to undertake the role of an appellate Court, or deal with contentions which have already been decided on merits, as observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Telangana and Others v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, (2024) 6 SCC 461, as under:-

“26. Mistake or error apparent on the face of record would debar the court from acting as an appellate court in disguise, by indulging in a rehearing. A decision, however erroneous, can never be a factor for review, but can only be corrected in appeal. Such a mistake or error should be self-evident on the

face of record. The error should be grave enough to be identified on a mere cursory look, and an omission so glaring that it requires interference in the form of a review. Being a creature of the statute, there is absolutely no room for a fresh hearing. The court has got no role to involve itself in the process of adjudication for a second time. Instead, it has to merely examine the existence of an apparent mistake or error. Even when two views are possible, the court shall not indulge itself by going into the merits.

27. The material produced, at this stage, should be of such pristine quality which, if taken into consideration, would have the logical effect of reversing the judgment. Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, 1908 indicates that power of review can be exercised by courts, in three different situations, but these occasions ought to be read in an analogous manner. In other words, they should be read in a manner to mean that a restrictive power has been conferred upon the court. As stated, the words "for any other sufficient reason" ought to be read in conjunction with the earlier two categories reiterating the scope. Being a judicial discretion, it has to be exercised with circumspection and on rare occasions. It is a power to be exercised by way of an exception, subject to the rigours of the provision.” (Emphasis added)

17. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the view that there is no merit in the present review petition. Accordingly, the review petition is dismissed along with pending applications, if any.