Full Text
HIGH COURT OF DELHI
Date of Decision: 23rd September, 2025
NARENDER RANA & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Amita Sehgal and Ms. Mamta Kajgarhia, Advocates.
Through: Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Standing Counsel
Kiran Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha, Mr. Divakar Kapil, and Mr. Mohd. Sueb Akhtar, Advocates for R-1, R-2 and R-4.
Ms. Manika Tripathy, Standing Counsel for R-3/DDA
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE, J.
1. The original writ petitioners have preferred this review petition under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 seeking review of the judgment/order dated 4th August 2025 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘order under review’ for the sake of brevity).
2. Vide order under review, this Court has recorded that the respondent no.4-Land Acquisition Collector, has made a statement to deposit the amount of compensation to which the petitioners are entitled under the Award within a period of six weeks from the date of the order. This Court further recorded that, in view of the judgments/orders of the Apex Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla [Civil Appeal No.2534 of 2023], possession of the land of the petitioner is deemed to have been taken by the acquiring authority and, as such, the condition as required under Section 24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter shall be referred to as ‘the Act of 2013’) cannot be held to be satisfied so as to declare the lapsing of acquisition.
3. The facts which are necessary for deciding the present review petition are as under: i. The petitioners claim to be the owners of land having Khasra No.48/10, admeasuring 2 Bhigas and 16 Biswas, situated at the village Sahibabad, Daulatapur, New Delhi. The Section 4(1) Notification under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter shall be referred to as ‘the Act of 1894’) came to be issued on 28.04.1995, while the Section 6 Notification under the Act of 1894 was issued on 26.04.1996. ii. The petitioners, somewhere in September 2013, have preferred a writ petition seeking quashing of both these notifications and have prayed for issuance of injunction order prohibiting the respondents from taking possession or any coercive steps in respect to the land referred above. iii. The claim in the petition was based on the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bhagwan Singh & Ors Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors [Civil Appeal No.3015 of 2012, dated 21st March, 2012], wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has quashed the notification issued under Sub-Section (4) of Section 17 of the Act of 1894 and directed the acquisition to be taken recourse from the stage of Section 5A of the said Act. Apart from above, the claim in the petition was also based on the proposed decision of the respondent, which was proposed to delete the land of the petitioners from the acquisition by relying on Annexures P[4] and P[5] which are the Inter-Departmental communications. iv. This Court, after hearing learned counsel for the petitioners and respective counsels for the respondents, passed the order under review by observing that since the land in question was acquired under the Rohini Residential Scheme (land development for residence Scheme), pursuant to the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla [Civil Appeal No.2534 of 2023], the deemed possession of the land of the petitioners was taken and as such, the acquisition of the land in question would not lapse. This Court considered that in view of Hon’ble Apex Court’s order, it is not open for the petitioners to claim the quashing of deemed possession.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the review applicants would strenuously urge that the order under review suffers from error apparent on the face of record, as the petitioners remained in continuous and peaceful physical possession of the land in question and Section 6 Notification came to be issued after a lapse of 17 years and 11 months. The issue of de-notification was not considered by the Court and rather, the Court has ignored the stand of the respondent that the physical possession of the land is neither taken, nor the compensation is paid. According to the counsel for review applicants, even if, the Award was passed on 24th April, 1998 in relation to land of the petitioners, the possession report dated 13th January, 1997 speaks of the possession to the extent of 2 Bhigas to be taken, for which, compensation was paid to the petitioners on 4th June, 1999. It is claimed that though it was recommended that the land of the petitioners be de-notified from the acquisition proceedings, it was expected from the respondent to take up the de-notification proceedings to its logical end. The counsel for review applicants would further claim that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Rahul Gupta Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors [Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.16385-16388 of 2012] & Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla [Civil Appeal No.2534 of 2023] are not applicable, particularly, when the physical possession remains with the applicantspetitioners and admittedly, the compensation was not paid. Both these judgments cannot be read as detrimental to the review applicants to take away the right of land-owners, which are guaranteed under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013.
5. On facts also, it is claimed that both the judgments are not attracted in the case at hand as the said judgments are in relation to land located in different villages, than the one in which the land of the petitioners is situated. As such, it is claimed that the land acquisition in the case in hand is hit by Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 and in view of the authoritative mandate delivered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Indore Development Authority & Ors Vs. Manohar Lal & Ors [2020 8 SCC 129], particularly, paragraph 366.8, the land of the petitioners is required to be declared to be out of bounds of the acquisition.
6. In addition to above, learned counsel for the review applicants has invited our attention to the affidavit of respondent no.3-acquiring body i.e. Delhi Development Authority, affidavit of respondent no.4-Land Acquisition Collector, so also to the claim that the physical possession of land to the extent of 2 Bhigas 16 Biswas was not taken by the respondents herein.
7. As against above, learned counsel for the respondents have objected to the very maintainability of the petition on the aforesaid grounds, as it is claimed that the grounds which are sought to be raised through this review petition were never canvassed before this Court during the hearing of the writ petition. It is claimed that there is no change in circumstances, which has prompted the petitioners to take out the present review petition and the petition, in such an eventuality, is liable to be dismissed with costs. According to respective learned counsels, the land to the extent of 2 Bhigas 16 Biswas is sought to be released from the acquisition. The total land consisting of 4 Bhigas 16 Biswas was forming part of Khasra no.48/10 and there were three coowners including the petitioners, who have one-third share. It is claimed that the possession of 2 Bhigas out of the said land was taken and the compensation was duly paid to the petitioners on 04.06.1999. It is further stated that out of the remaining unacquired land of the said Khasra number 2 Bhigas and 16 Biswas, one-third share of the petitioners turned out to be 19 Biswas, whereas the petitioners are claiming relief in relation to the entire unacquired land of 2 Bhigas and 16 Biswas. It is specifically claimed that the possession was already handed over to Delhi Development Authority through possession proceedings and there are no intentions of the respondents to release the land from the acquisition proceedings.
8. It is claimed that by virtue of authoritative pronouncement in the matter of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla and Ors (supra) & Rahul Gupta Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors (supra), the deemed possession of the land in question stood vested in the respondent-Authority and that being so, all that the petitioners are entitled to is proportionate compensation. It is claimed that the land in question was acquired for Rohini Residential Scheme viz. planned development for residential housing and as such, both these judgments are squarely applicable to the present case. As such, dismissal of review petition is sought.
9. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsels for the respective parties in the review petition.
10. In the writ petition, particularly, in para 4, it is specifically admitted by the petitioners that land bearing Khasra no.48/10 was included for planned development of Delhi and as such, it is rightly claimed by the respondents that the same is part of Rohini Residential Scheme.
11. The writ petition was primarily preferred on the issue of de-notification and that of quashing of the acquisition based on the judgment in the matter of Bhagwan Singh & Ors Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors [Civil Appeal No.3015 of 2012 dated 21st March, 2012].
12. It appears that when the matter was heard on 4th August, 2025, the counsel for petitioner has not assailed the above issue, but has sought to take shield of lapsing of acquisition based on the non-satisfaction of the twin conditions as reflected in the matter of Indore Development Authority & Ors Vs. Manohar Lal & Ors [2020 8 SCC 129].
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rahul Gupta Vs. Delhi Development Authority & Ors [Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).16385-16388/2012 dated 18.10.2016], made the following observations: - “It is made clear that in case the applicant has re-entered possession or otherwise, he shall vacate the said land and hand over its possession forthwith to the Delhi Development Authority, failing which it shall be assumed to be in possession of the Delhi Development Authority, after the expiry of ten days from the passing of the instant order. …. We grant liberty to the Delhi Development Authority to produce a copy of this order in all matters, pertaining to land acquisition relating to the Rohini Residential Scheme, pending before the High Court, for vacation of similar interim directions. It is made clear that in case the applicants have re-entered possession or otherwise, they shall vacate the said land and hand over its possession forthwith to the Delhi Development Authority, failing which it shall be assumed to be in possession of the Delhi Development Authority, after the expiry of ten days from the passing of the instant order. With the aforesaid directions, these interlocutory applications stand disposed of.” (Emphasis supplied)
14. Apart from above, in the matter of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla & Ors [Civil Appeal No.2534 of 2023], the Hon’ble Apex Court of India while disposing of the Civil Appeal has made following observations: -
15. As such, the Hon’ble Apex Court while exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution has recorded a finding that there is deemed possession of vesting of the land in the acquiring body in relation to Rohini Residential Scheme towards planned development of New Delhi. It is borne out of the record and can also be said to be admitted by the petitioners that the land in question was acquired for the planned development and was part of Rohini Residential Scheme.
16. That being so, the order in the matter of Delhi Development Authority Vs. Monika Shukla (supra) which is being referred to in our order under review, is squarely attracted. Similarly, the view expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Rahul Gupta Vs. Delhi Development Authority (supra) is also applicable to the facts of the case in hand and that being so, this Court was prompt to record a finding that the possession stood vested in the acquiring body and as such, the lapsing claimed under sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, cannot be said to be attracted.
17. Apart from above, we are equally sensitive to the fact that no such ground was raised in the pleadings in the writ petition as regards lapsing of the acquisition.
18. The fact remains that the arguments canvassed at the time of hearing of the petition were solely on the issue of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 seeking lapsing and only upon argument on the said point, this Court was prompted to pass an order on 4th August, 2025. It is after the aforesaid order under review dated 4th August, 2025 passed by this Court, the petitioners have changed the counsel and preferred this review petition, and the review petition is being argued on such issues which were never canvassed by the earlier counsel, who appeared during the course of hearing of the writ petition. Rather, we do recollect that the only point that was canvassed was based on sub-section (2) of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, and not about the quashing of the acquisition based on the alleged Inter-Departmental Communications of the respondent about alleged proposal of de-notifying the land and the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Bhagwan Singh & Ors Vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors, which is placed on record as Annexure P[9] to the petition.
19. This prompts us to look into the legal position as to the circumstances in which the review jurisdiction can be exercised.
20. It is settled position of law that the jurisdiction and scope of review is not that of an appeal and the review petition can only be entertained if an error apparent on the face of record is noticed. The jurisdiction of review can be exercised only in a case wherein the Court is satisfied that the material error, manifest on the face of order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice, is demonstrated. It is not open for the Court in review jurisdiction to reappreciate evidence and reach a different conclusion even if that is possible.
21. The conclusion arrived at upon appreciation of evidence cannot be assailed in a review petition unless it is shown that there is an error apparent on the face of the record or for some reason akin thereto.
22. The Hon’ble Apex Court has summarized the principles in which review can be said to be maintainable and not maintainable. Support can be drawn from the Hon’ble Apex Court’s judgment in the matter of Kamlesh Verma Vs. Mayawati & Ors (2013) 8 Supreme Court Cases
320. Para 20.[1] and 20.[2] of the said judgment reads thus:- “20.[1] When the review will be maintainable:-
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram Vs. Neki, (1921-22) 49 IA 144 and approved by this Court in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos Vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius, AIR 1954 SC 526 to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. 20.[2] When the review will not be maintainable: “(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and corrected but lies only for patent error.
(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate Court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Reviews is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”
23. In the aforesaid legal background, if we appreciate the issues sought to be canvassed by learned counsel for applicants and the objections raised by the respondents, it is worth mentioning that after changing the counsel, who has not obtained ‘No Objection’ from the earlier counsel, the present review petition is placed on record. Perhaps the want of ‘No Objection’ has resulted into the absence of quality interaction between the earlier counsel and the present counsel as regards the points which were canvassed in the earlier round of litigation when the writ petition came to be decided. As such and rightly so, the counsel for the respondents have raised an objection to the very maintainability of the writ petition as the counsel for the review applicants has argued such issues which were never canvassed when the writ petition was argued and decided.
24. In our opinion, merely because there is a change in counsel, by that itself, will not give rise to the remedy of review available to the petitioners to canvass their case fresh thereby arguing fresh grounds and seeking re-appreciation of evidence.
25. In our opinion, the review petition completely lacks merit as the points which are sought to be canvassed are, in our view, the points which were already canvassed at the time of deciding the writ petition, and which were duly looked into and dealt with in the light of the authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
26. For all the aforesaid reasons, the review petition, in our opinion, lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
27. Pending applications, if any, accordingly stand disposed of.
28. A copy of this judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court forthwith.
NITIN WASUDEO SAMBRE (JUDGE)
ANISH DAYAL (JUDGE) SEPTEMBER 23, 2025/ay/ss