Full Text
Smt. A .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.P. Kaushal and Mr. Aaryan Sharma, Advocates.
JUDGMENT
1. The State (NCT Govt. of Delhi)
2. Mr. Rajan Khurana S/o Late Sh. Harbans Lal Khurana R/o D-15, Harbhajan Enclave Pusa Campus, New Delhi -110012.....Respondents Through: Mr. Shoaib Haider, APP for the State with Respondent No. 2 in person. CORAM: HON'BLE MS.
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
1. Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.”) has been filed on behalf of the Petitioner, Smt. A, seeks to assail the Order dated 11.05.2018 passed by the Ld. ASJ, New Delhi whereby the Order dated 03.09.2011 of the Ld. MM discharging the Respondent No.2 in FIR No. 99/2008 under Sections 506/509/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as Digitally “IPC”), P.S. Inderpuri, was upheld.
2. Briefly stated, the case of the Petitioner/Complainant is that the accused was terminated from service due to his bad habits. On 22.06.2008, she along with her sister at around 9:00 PM., was walking in the park, when the accused, Rajan Khurana along with his wife Sanjeevan Prakash, came and started abusing and using unparliamentary language, against them. It is alleged that the accused in a loud tone, claimed that he was a “gunda” having links with gunda elements and threatened to kill her and her husband. The Petitioner and her family members have been living under constant threat and fear from the Accused/Respondent No.2.
3. Petitioner lodged a Complaint against Respondent No.2 at P.S. Inderpuri, but no action was taken. She then filed a Complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. along with an application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and the Ld. MM, vide Order dated 06.08.2008, directed the police to register an FIR. Consequently, FIR No. 99/2008 under Sections 506/509/34 IPC was registered against Respondent No.2.
4. Thereafter, Chargesheet was filed. After taking cognizance, summons were issued against Respondent No.2. The Ld. MM, vide Order dated 03.09.2011, discharged Respondent No.2 by observing that the FIR NO. 99/2008 disclosed only the use of abusive or unparliamentary language without specifying the actual words or terminology allegedly used by Respondent No.2. A bare verbal threat, without any immediate effect, was held to be insufficient to attract the ingredients of Section 506 IPC. The Ld. MM also referred to the Complaint dated 02.07.2008 made by Sh. R.S., husband of the Petitioner, to the Director, NBPGR, New Delhi, in which only the general conduct of the accused was mentioned, with no specific Digitally reference to the alleged incident of 22.06.2008. Further, it is observed that the Petitioner has not explained why the present Complaint was lodged on 05.07.2008 in respect of an incident alleged to have occurred on 22.06.2008, which assumes significance as an earlier Complaint had already filed by Respondent No. 2 against the Petitioner’s husband on 28.06.2008. This was not disclosed by the Petitioner in any of her Complaints. The Ld. MM thus, held that there is no material on record to proceed against the Accused who was accordingly, discharged.
5. Aggrieved by the Order dated 03.09.2011 by which Respondent No.2 was discharged, the Petitioner preferred a Criminal Revision before the Ld. ASJ, which got dismissed vide Order dated 28.04.2012.
6. Aggrieved by the Order dated 28.04.2012 of Ld. ASJ, the Petitioner had filed the Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on the ground that in upholding the Order of the Ld. MM, the Ld. ASJ had wrongly relied upon the Status Report which was not part of the Chargesheet. This Court vide Order dated 16.03.2017, without expressing any view on the merits of the case, remanded the matter back to the Ld. ASJ for reconsideration only on this ground.
7. After hearing the matter afresh, Ld. ASJ, vide Order dated 11.05.2018, again upheld the Order dated 03.09.2011 of the Ld. MM, discharging Respondent No.2, by observing that that there was no substantive evidence to establish the charges against Respondent No.2, as alleged by the Petitioner.
8. Aggrieved by the Order dated 11.05.2018, present Petition has been filed on the grounds that the Orders of the Ld. MM and the Ld. ASJ are bad in law being devoid of facts and legal reasoning and have committed grave Digitally error in discharging the Respondent No.2.
9. It is submitted that both the Ld. ASJ and the Ld. MM. respectively, relied upon the Status Report, which was not the part of the Chargesheet, and could not have been made a basis for discharge.
10. It is further submitted that no Notice was issued to the Petitioner and no opportunity was given to the Complainant/ Petitioner, at the time of hearing arguments on Charge, which is contrary to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
11. It is asserted that the Ld. Courts failed to appreciate that the essential ingredients of Section 509 IPC were disclosed in the Chargesheet as well as in the Complaint, and that there were sufficient grounds and evidence to proceed against the Accused. The Orders passed by the two Courts are based on assumptions and presumptions and material evidence has been ignored. Ld. ASJ erred in observing that the subject matter of the present complaint/FIR was solely to avenge a personal score. Such an observation is stated to be incorrect and unwarranted.
12. Accordingly, it is prayed that the Impugned Order dated 11.05.2018 be set aside.
13. Status Report has been filed on behalf of State/Respondent No.1, wherein the details about registration of FIR and the investigations carried out therein and filing of Chargesheet, are stated.
14. During the course of investigation, the statements of Smt. Seema Devi, Smt. Rama Devi, and Sh. Gautam Kumar were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., all of whom supported the version of the Complainant.
15. A Notice under Section 91 Cr.P.C. was served on the Director, NBPGR, PUSA, New Delhi, seeking details regarding the Complaint made Digitally by Sh. RS, husband of the Petitioner, against Respondent No.2. On 03.07.2009, a Reply was received from the Director, NBPGR, wherein it was stated that Sh. RS, husband of the Petitioner, had submitted a Complaint on 02.07.2008, against Respondent No.2 alleging misbehaviour and abusive language towards children playing in the park and other women of the society. No action could be taken against Respondent No.2 because at the same time, a Complaint filed by the wife of Respondent No.2 against the husband of the Petitioner was also under inquiry. However, action was taken against Sh. RS, husband of the Petitioner under the ICAR/GOI Rules.
16. It is submitted that a Chargesheet was filed against Respondent No.2, but on 03.09.2011, the Ld. MM discharged him on the ground that there was nothing on record to proceed against him. On 11.05.2018, the Ld. ASJ upheld the Order of the Ld. MM.
17. Written submissions have been filed on behalf of Respondent No.2, wherein it is contended that present FIR No. 99/2008 dated 07.08.2008 is nothing but a counterblast to FIR No. 91/2008 dated 25.07.2008, registered under Sections 325/506/509 IPC against RS, husband of the Petitioner, on the Complaint of Respondent No.2. It is submitted that on 18.06.2008, when Respondent No.2 told the Petitioner’s son not to play in the lawn, the Petitioner’s husband assaulted him and his jaw was broken.
18. It is further submitted that only after the wife of Respondent No.2 lodged a Complaint against the Petitioner’s husband with the police and the Department, the Petitioner file present FIR No. 99/2008 dated 07.08.2008, based on a false and fictitious allegation of an incident dated 22.06.2008.
19. Petitioner’s husband challenged FIR No. 91/2008 before this Court in Crl. M.C. No. 3313 of 2008, but it was withdrawn after the SHO, P.S. Digitally Inderpuri, filed the Status Report. This makes it abundantly clear that present FIR No. 99/2008 is a counterblast and that it is Respondent No.2 and his family who are, in fact, victims of the conduct of the Petitioner and her husband.
20. It is submitted that both, the Ld. MM and the Ld. ASJ, have rightly concluded that there was no evidence to proceed against Respondent No.2 and discharged him.
21. Accordingly, it is prayed that the present petition be dismissed. Submissions heard and record perused.
22. A preliminary objection is taken by the Petitioner that the Ld. MM has failed to issue Notice to her at the time of discharging the Respondent No.2, making the Order bad in law.
23. This argument is devoid of any merit. Though the Ld. MM did not give the notice to the Petitioner, at the time of arguments on Charge and discharging the Respondent No.2, but it cannot be overlooked that the Petitioner has approached the Ld. ASJ twice against the Order of Discharge of the Respondent No.2, who heard the Petitioner on the merits of the case on both the occasions. It is only after hearing the Complainant and the perusal of the entire record, the Ld. ASJ decided not to interfere with the Order of Ld. MM. It is evident that appropriate opportunity was given to the Petitioner to raise the grounds in the Revision Petition and was heard before making the impugned Order. This objection is without merit.
24. Now coming to the merits of the case, this case arises out of an alleged incident that took place in, a residential Society, where admittedly the Petitioner and her husband as well as Respondent No.2 and his wife, all well-educated persons, are residing as neighbours. The husband of Digitally Complainant is a Class I Government Officer, posted in PUSA Campus.
25. The Petitioner has alleged in her Complaint dated 05.07.2008 that the Petitioner resides with her family in the Society where the Accused persons also resides are habitual drunkards and also consume charas. They create nuisance in the Society and habitually taunt other women. It is further alleged that although both Accused persons were government employees, Respondent No.2 had been terminated from service in the year 2000 on account of being habitually absent, and his wife, Sanjeevan Prakash, though transferred from ICAR to Nagpur, did not join her posting and continued to stay in Delhi.
26. On 22.06.2008, she/Petitioner was walking with her sister in the Society Park, when she was assaulted and intimidated by Respondent No.2 who threatened to kill her and her husband. It is further alleged that Respondent No.2 threatened that he had links with higher “goonda” elements of society. It is further submitted that owing to the illegal activities and the use of abusive and filthy language against the Complainant and her husband, they have been living under constant threat and fear because of the accused persons, with an apprehension that the accused may cause harm to them at any time.
27. The Complaint dated 05.07.2008, was submitted by the Complainant against Respondent No.2 and his wife regarding the alleged incident of 22.06.2008.
28. Since no FIR was registered, the Petitioner preferred an Application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. dated 06.08.2008, on which pursuant to the directions of Ld. MM, FIR No. 99/2008 under Section 506, 509 and 34 of the IPC, was registered and after investigations, ChargeSheet was filed. The Digitally Respondent No.2 was however, discharged by the Ld. MM vide Order dated 03.09.2011 which has been eventually upheld by Ld. ASJ vide Order Dated 11.05.2018.
29. To appreciate whether the Respondent No.2 has been rightly discharged for the offence Criminal intimidation punishable under S.506 IPC, it would be relevant to refer to S. 503 which defines Criminal intimidation as under: “Section 503. Criminal intimidation.— Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.— A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B‟s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.”
30. A bare perusal of Section 503 IPC makes it clear that before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that an accused threatened with an intention to cause alarm to the victim. Mere threats given by the accused with no accompanying requisite mens rea, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.
31. This has been explained in the case of Manik Taneja vs. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, wherein the Apex Court had observed that simply using abusive or threatening language without any intent to cause alarm, does not come within the scope of Section 503 IPC. For a threat to Digitally qualify as criminal intimidation under this Section, it must be made with the intention to cause alarm to the person threatened or to coerce them into doing something they are not legally obligated to do, or to refrain from doing something they are legally permitted to do.
32. The further requirement of S.503 is that the intention of the appellant to cause alarm or compel doing/abstaining from some act and not mere utterances of words, is a prerequisite of successful conviction under Section 506 IPC, as observed by the Apex Court in the case of Parminder Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2020) 8 SCC 811.
33. The Apex Court in the recent judgement of Sharif Ahmed v. State of U.P. (2024) 14 SCC 122 held as under:
34. The Apex Court in Naresh Aneja vs. State of U.P., (2025) 2 SCC 604 has reiterated the observations made in Sharif Ahmed (supra) and held that an offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intends to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not.
35. Thus, to constitute criminal intimidation, it has to be established that Digitally there is an intent to cause alarm and that it must be to alarm or compel doing/abstaining from some act.
36. In the present case, the Petitioner has alleged that Respondent No. 2 threatened to kill her and her family. However, the Petitioner has not furnished any further particulars regarding the circumstances or context in which such threat was allegedly made. It does not clearly establish that the alleged threat was made with the intention to cause alarm. The Petitioner has also failed to explain the circumstances or context in which Respondent No.2 extended the threats to her.
37. These general assertion of threat with no specific words of intimidation stated by the Petitioner, are not sufficient to establish the intention of the Respondent No.2 to cause alarm and thus to constitute the offence of criminal intimidation. No such words indicating intimidation emerge from the Complaint made by the Petitioner on the basis of which FIR No. 99/2008 was registered.
38. The Ld. MM has also observed that even the Complaint made by the Petitioner’s husband to the Director, NBPGR, New Delhi, does not contain any specific words or gestures of intimidation.
39. Therefore, the Ld. MM rightly held that a bare verbal threat, without any immediate effect, is insufficient to disclose any intent to cause alarm or compel the Complainant from doing/abstaining from some act, to constitute an offence under Section 506 IPC. Section 509 of the IPC: Insulting the modesty of a woman:
40. The other allegation in the said Complaint is with regards to the offence under Section 509 IPC, which reads as under;
509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of Digitally a woman.—Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, [shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also with fine.]
41. Section 509 IPC provides punishment for insulting the modesty of a woman by acts such as uttering words, making sounds or gestures, exhibiting objects, or intruding upon her privacy with the intention of insulting her modesty.
42. The Apex Court in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 has observed that Section 509 IPC criminalises a “word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman” and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act.
43. It is essential for the Court to carefully assess the evidence presented, in order to determine whether there is sufficient material to establish the intention and knowledge on the part of the appellants, to insult the modesty of the complainant or, to put it pithily, whether any act was intended to shock the sense of decency of the complainant being a woman.
44. The only averments in the Complaint are that the Respondent No.2 has used “abusive and unparliamentary language”. However, there is not even a single mention of any alleged word/abusive language or unparliamentary language that the Respondent No.2 was used against the Petitioner. It is evident that in the Complaint, mere use of the expression “abusive and unparliamentary language” or “filthy language” without Digitally specific words, gestures, or contextual details showing such intent, is insufficient to establish the offence. There is not one word about what act, words or gesture of Respondent No.2 which intruded into the privacy of the Complainant.
45. In the case of Madhushree Datta v. State of Karnataka, (2025) 3 SCC 612 Apex Court observed that the term “filthy language”, when examined in isolation, and without any contextual framework or accompanying words, indicating an intent to insult the complainant's modesty, does not fall within the purview of Section 509IPC. Had there been references to specific words used, contextual details, or any gestures—whether preceding, succeeding, or accompanying these words—that could demonstrate a criminal intent to insult the modesty, and it might have assisted the prosecution in establishing the case against the appellants.
46. In the present case, as detailed above, aside from omnibus allegation of unparliamentary and abusive language, no averment is made from where even prima facie it can be inferred that the offence of S.509 IPC is made out.
47. Therefore, the Ld. ASJ has rightly noted in the Impugned Order dated 11.05.2008, that there is no evidence to bring home the offence under Section 509 IPC against the Respondent No.2. Delay in lodging the Complaint:
48. Another pertinent aspect which needs mention is that as per the Petitioner/Complainant, the alleged incident occurred on 22.06.2008, but the Complaint was first made only on 05.07.2008 i.e. after a delay of 13 days, and that too after a cross-FIR bearing No. 91/2008, had already been lodged against the husband of the Petitioner, on 28.06.2008.
49. Therefore, Ld. MM rightly observed that the Petitioner failed to Digitally explain the delay in lodging the present complaint in respect of the incident of 22.06.2008, which was reported only on 05.07.2008, particularly when an FIR No. 91/2008 was already registered against the Petitioner’s husband.
50. The Petitioner not only failed to provide any justification for this delay, but also deliberately chose not to disclose the details of the other FIR against her husband, in her Complaint. Therefore, it can be rightly concluded that the Complaint against Respondent No.2 is nothing more than a counterblast to the cross-FIR No. 91/2008 already registered against the Husband of the Petitioner. It is clearly reflected that the present FIR has been filed belatedly, only to settle personal scores. Conclusion:
51. It is, therefore, concluded that there is no justifiable ground shown by the Petitioner to interfere with the Orders passed by the Ld. ASJ and Ld. MM.
52. The Petition is hereby, dismissed. The pending Application(s), if any, are accordingly disposed of.
JUDGE SEPTEMBER 23, 2025 Digitally